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Photomediations: An Introduction
Joanna Zylinska
It is perhaps not too much of an overstatement to describe photography 
as a quintessential practice of life. Indeed, over the last few decades 
photography has become so ubiquitous that our very sense of existence 
is shaped by it. In the words of Susan Sontag, ‘To live is to be photo-
graphed, to have a record of one’s life, and therefore to go on with one’s 
life oblivious, or claiming to be oblivious, to the camera’s nonstop atten-
tions’ (Sontag, 2004). We regularly see ourselves and others represented 
by the photographic medium, in both its formal and informal guises – 
from the documentation of our life in its foetal stage via medical imaging, 
through to the regular recording of our growth and maturation in family, 
school and passport photographs; the incessant capture of the fleeting 
moments of our life with phone cameras; and the subsequent construc-
tion of our life’s ‘timeline’ on social media. We also make sense of the 
world around us through seeing it imaged. While photography used to 
be something that others – professionals equipped with large machines 
that allowed them to capture a better image of the world out there, adver-
tisers trying to sell us chunks of that world, photojournalists dispatched 
to the world’s remote corners that few of us could regularly access – did, 
we can safely say that, in the age of the camera phone and wireless com-
munication, we are all photographers now. With ‘the lighting, optics, 
resolution, dynamic range, storage capacity and display of professional 
digital cameras [being] continuously improved’ (All Our Yesterdays, 
2014: 17), the technological developments rapidly cascade down to 
everyday consumers.
Yet we are all not just photographers today: we have also become 
distributors, archivists and curators of the light traces immobilised on 
photo-sensitive surfaces. As Victor Burgin aptly points out, ‘the most 
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revolutionary event in the recent history of photography is not the arrival 
of digital cameras as such, but rather the broadband connection of these 
cameras to the Internet – in effect turning every photograph on the Web 
into a potential frame in a boundless film’ (2011: 144). One could per-
haps go so far as to say that the availability of relatively low-cost storage 
and networked distribution of digital data has changed the very ontol-
ogy of the photographic medium. Photographs function less as individ-
ual objects or as media content to be looked at and more as data flows to 
be dipped or cut into occasionally. The intensity and volume of photo-
graphic activity today, and the very fact that it is difficult to do anything 
– order food, go on holiday, learn about the Moon, have sex – without 
having it visualised in one way or another, before, during or as part of the 
experience, gives credence to Sontag’s formulation that ‘the photographs 
are us’. ‘Andy Warhol’s ideal of filming real events in real time – life isn’t 
edited, why should its record be edited? – has become a norm for count-
less Webcasts, in which people record their day, each in his or her own 
reality show’ (Sontag, 2004).
But, in spite of the embedding of the imaging process in the experi-
ence of life on so many different levels, the traditional scholarly and cura-
torial way of discussing photography still maintains a relatively narrow 
set of positions and discourses on the topic. The plethora of activities in 
which photographs are involved as not just objects but also participants of 
events still tend to be subsumed under one of the two general rubrics: pho-
tography as art or photography as social practice. The first rubric, rooted in 
the methodology of art history, is encapsulated by numerous histories of 
photography – from Beaumont Newhall’s modernist classic The History 
of Photography from 1839 to the Present (1939) through to Michael 
Fried’s 2008 volume, Why Photography Matters As Art As Never Before 
– presented as stories of the evolution of the medium, enacted by those 
separate few deemed ‘artists’. Photography is seen here as an extension, 
or even overcoming, of painting. In this view, photographs are positioned 
as discrete objects that yield themselves to being framed and displayed, 
individually or in series, on flat surfaces in galleries and other cultural 
institutions. Photographs positioned as art objects are then analysed in 
aesthetic and semiotic terms, i.e. in terms of how they affect us and what 
they mean. Photography functions here as ‘the “auristic” artefact…, in 
which concepts such as “pure vision”, “intelligent eye” and “significant 
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form” are privileged’ (Gil Glazer, 2010: 8). The value of photographs as 
singular items is also increasingly tied to the market, with news outlets 
regularly reporting stories about ‘the most expensive photograph ever 
sold’. Photographs as art objects are therefore always potential commodi-
ties, with their singularity and uniqueness validated by the transaction 
between established auction houses, art galleries, collectors, and, last but 
not least, artists themselves. 
The second rubric under which photography tends to be catego-
rised is the one inspired by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s book, 
Photography: A Middle-Brow Art (1990). This more contextual perspec-
tive offered by Bourdieu looks not so much at how people take and make 
photographs, as at what they do with them: how they store images in fam-
ily albums; how they join camera clubs; how ‘professionals’ are different 
from ‘amateurs’; how they all contribute to the emergence of ‘popular 
taste’ around photography. The area of photography as professional prac-
tice – mainly in the documentary and photojournalistic tradition, but also 
in fashion and advertising – falls in-between these two traditional rubrics, 
with the market once again acting as an adjudicator of appropriate cat-
egorisation. And thus the work of Henri Cartier-Bresson or Richard 
Avedon becomes ‘art’, while many street or fashion photographers who 
showcase their work for free on public platforms such as Flickr or 500px 
are seen as hobbyists. Portrait or wedding photography largely remains 
outside the ‘art’ designation, with the latter’s expectations of ‘aura’ and 
‘pure vision’. The outcomes of such professional practice tend to ‘con-
form’, instead, ‘to a photographic program’, to cite Vilém Flusser (2001: 
56). Indeed, their success relies precisely on this conformity. The work of 
wedding or portrait photographers is therefore rarely analysed as ‘work’ 
but more as ‘labour’ (as in the widespread lamentations about the devalu-
ation of the photographic profession, the falling rates for images, etc.). It 
is principally ‘read’ in sociological terms and perceived as a tool for cap-
turing and archiving personal memories, and thus, again, as a conduit for 
social behaviour.
The inadequacy of this rather rigid binary categorisation of photog-
raphy into art and social practice has been put into question by many. 
Attempts to open up the narrowly defined category of ‘photography as 
art’, and to cast light across the spectrum of various photographic prac-
tices, beyond the artist-professional-amateur triangle, have been made 
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from various corners. Geoffrey Batchen, for instance, has called for a new 
history of photography that ‘traces the journey of an image, as well as its 
origin’, ‘acknowledges that photographs have multiple manifestations and 
are objects as well as images’, and ‘sees beyond Europe and the United 
States, and is interested in more than the creative efforts of a few white 
men’ (cited in Glazer, 2010: 3). The idea of the photograph’s journey 
raised by Batchen has been taken up by various artists, curators and schol-
ars in their attempts to position photographs as unstable objects, always 
involved in the process of movement. As curator of the 2011 Paris Photo 
fair Chantal Pontbriand has put it in the exhibition’s catalogue titled 
Mutations, ‘The image becomes flexible, polymorph, more than ever tem-
poral, but also corporeal’ (Pontbriand, 2001: 13). This altered perception 
of photography as an unbounded mobile object has also led to the explo-
ration of photography’s links with cinema, and to the embracing of the 
media ‘contamination’ of the current photographic landscape as an artis-
tic and conceptual opportunity.
One book that deserves a mention is the aptly titled Photography 
Changes Everything published by Aperture in 2012. A unique manifesto 
for the transformative power of photography put together by curator and 
writer Marvin Heiferman, it arose out of the Smithsonian Photography 
Initiative’s project during which theorists, artists, scientists, professional 
photographers and members of the public contributed short postulates 
on the changing photographic condition. Heiferman’s own entry sums up 
this condition most adequately:
By its very nature, photography slows time to a standstill 
in order to corral and flash-freeze information. But just as 
impressively and importantly, photography is active; it keeps 
things moving …
Photographs don’t only show us things, they do things. They 
engage us optically, neurologically, intellectually, emotion-
ally, viscerally, physically. …
[A]s photography changes everything, it changes itself as 
well… (Heiferman, 2012: 16-20).
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This Photomediations: A Reader is part of a larger editorial and curato-
rial project called Photomediations: An Open Book (photomediationso-
penbook.net), whose goal is to redesign a coffee-table book as an online 
experience. The project takes off from these recent development around 
the technology of photography and around different ways of theorising 
photography as a diverse practice that not only changes ‘everything’ but 
that also undergoes constant change. Yet it is perhaps even more ambi-
tious and daring in its approach than the projects mentioned above. 
Responding to the inadequacy of the rigid formulations and categories 
through which photography has been perceived and approached, it pro-
poses instead that it may be time to transform radically, rather than just 
expand, the very notion of photography. The concept of photomediations 
is therefore offered as a richer and more potent conceptual alternative. To 
think in terms of photomediations is not to try and offer just a new history 
of photography, as attempted by Burgin, Batchen and Ya’ara Gil Glazer, 
but also a different narrative about the medium, one that remains more 
attuned to its radically changing ontology. Indeed, the notion of photome-
diations aims to cut across the traditional classification of photography as 
suspended between art and social practice in order to capture the dyna-
mism of the photographic medium today, as well as its kinship with other 
media – and also, with us as media. It therefore offers a radically different 
way of understanding photography. 
The framework of photomediations adopts a process- and time-based 
approach to images by tracing the technological, biological, cultural, 
social and political flows of data that produce photographic objects. 
Etymologically, the notion of photomediations brings together the hybrid 
ontology of ‘photomedia’ and the fluid dynamism of ‘mediation’. Allowing 
us to sidestep the technicist distinction between analogue and digital 
photography, as well as – more radically perhaps – that between still and 
moving image, the concept of photomedia foregrounds instead what is 
common to various kinds of light-based practices under discussion. As Jai 
McKenzie argues, ‘regardless of technological change, light is a constant 
defining characteristic of photomedia intrinsically coupled with space and 
time to form explicit light-based structures and experiences’ (2014: 1). 
For McKenzie, photomedia encapsulate not just photographic cameras 
but also cinema, video, television, mobile phones, computers and photo-
copiers. This definition takes cognisance of the fact that, to cite Jonathan 
12 Joanna Zylinska
Shaw, over the last decade the photographic apparatus has been ‘reunited 
with its long lost child, the moving image, … (arguably) … having given 
birth to it many years ago’ (2014: 4). The concept of mediation, in turn, 
highlights precisely this intertwined spatial and temporal nature of pho-
tography, pointing as it does to a more processual understanding of media 
that has recently been taken up by scholars and artists alike. In Life after 
New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process Sarah Kember and I make a case 
for a significant shift in the way we understand so-called ‘media’. Rather 
than focus on analysing discrete media objects, such as the computer, the 
camera or the iPad, we suggest a richer perspective will open up if we 
understand media predominantly in terms of processes of mediation, and 
see them as always already entangled and networked, across various plat-
forms and scales. For Kember and I,
Mediations does not serve as a translational or transparent 
layer or intermediary between independently existing enti-
ties (say, between the producer and consumer of a film or TV 
program). It is a complex and hybrid process that is simultane-
ously economic, social, cultural, psychological, and technical. 
Mediation, we suggest, is all-encompassing and indivisible. 
This is why ‘we’ have never been separate from mediation. 
Yet our relationality and our entanglement with nonhuman 
entities continues to intensify with the ever more corporeal, 
ever more intimate dispersal of media and technologies into 
our biological and social lives. Broadly put, what we are there-
fore developing in Life after New Media is not just a theory 
of ‘mediation’ but also a ‘theory of life’, whereby media-
tion becomes a key trope for understanding and articulating 
our being in, and becoming with, the technological world, 
our emergence and ways of intra- acting with it, as well as 
the acts and processes of temporarily stabilizing the world 
into media, agents, relations, and networks. (Kember and 
Zylinska, 2012: xv)
Following from the above insight, we could perhaps go so far as to con-
clude that the photograph as such never just exists on its own. Instead, 
what emerges are multiple and ongoing processes of photomediation. 
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Photography can therefore be seen as an active practice of cutting through 
the flow of mediation, where ‘the cut’ operates on a number of levels: per-
ceptive, material, technical, and conceptual. In other words, photography 
can be described as a practice of making cuts in the flow of imagistic data, 
of stabilising data as images and objects. Performed by human and nonhu-
man agents alike, with the latter including the almost incessantly working 
CCTV cameras, Google Street View equipment and satellite telescopes, 
those cuts participate in the wider process of imaging the world. 
In its coupling with movement, the notion of photomediations fore-
grounds another key aspect of photography: its embeddedness in the flow 
of time, duration and hence life itself. Seen in this light, photography as 
part of the process of photomediations presents itself as an inherent part 
of life in a stronger sense than the one discussed at the beginning of this 
Introduction: photography does not merely represent life but also partici-
pates in its active cutting and shaping. To say this is to make an attempt 
to wrest photography away from its long-standing association with mum-
mification and death, and to show its multifarious and all-encompassing 
activity – which does include moments of cutting, freeing, stoppage, 
decay and even demise, but which is not limited by them. Indeed, the 
conceptual framework of photomediations allows us to move beyond see-
ing photography as just a tomb, a fossilised version of the past the way 
modernist theorists of the image such as André Bazin (1960) perceived 
it. It also allows us to challenge the image of photography as first and 
foremost a placeholder for the memory of the deceased, the way Roland 
Barthes defined it in the now classic Camera Lucida – a volume that argu-
ably set the melancholy tone for the academic discourse on photography. 
Yet, in the words of Catalan photographer and writer Joan Fontcuberta, 
photographs can perhaps be seen more productively as ‘exclamations of 
vitality’ (2014: 27).
The recognition of the on-off activity of the photographic process, 
which carves life into fragments while simultaneously reconnecting 
them to the imagistic flow, may allow us to conclude not only that there 
is life in photography, but also that life itself is photographic. As Claire 
Colebrook puts it, ‘All life … can be considered as a form of perception 
or “imaging” where there is not one being that apprehends or represents 
another being, but two vectors of creativity where one potential for dif-
ferentiation encounters another and from that potential forms a relatively 
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stable tendency or manner’ (2010: 31). This idea has its root in the phi-
losopher Henri Bergson’s book, Matter and Memory (1896), where our 
experience of the world, which is always a way of sensing the world, 
comes in the form of images, before it is transformed into concepts. Life 
is thus always photomediated – or even, we could say, life is a sequence of 
photomediations. 
The notion of photomediations has made its way to an online plat-
form called Photomediations Machine (photomediationsmachine.net), 
set up by myself and Ting Ting Cheng in 2013, which has served as a 
first practical testing ground for its conceptual and visual working. Taking 
the inherent openness and entanglement of various media objects on 
board, Photomediations Machine is a curated online space where the 
dynamic relations of mediation as performed in photography and other 
media can be encountered, experienced and engaged. First and foremost, 
Photomediations Machine serves as an online gallery for unique projects, 
both recent and historical, that creatively engage with the technological 
and socio-political dynamism of the photographic medium. The site also 
features short critical essays on recent developments around photomedia 
by international writers and artists. Last but not least, Photomediations 
Machine showcases books and other publications that comment on, or 
even enact, the current multiple mediations of photography and other 
media, such as sound, painting, video, or, indeed, the book itself. The 
site is run on a pro bono basis by a group of academics and artists. The 
project is non-commercial, non-profit and fully open access. Its machinic 
affiliation signals that photographic agencies and actions have not always 
been just human.
Photomediations: An Open Book (of which this Reader is part) is the 
next step on this experimental journey with and across the photographic 
medium. Even though Photomediations Machine and Photomediations: 
An Open Book are open platforms, they certainly do not associate open-
ness with an ‘anything goes’ (or, worse, ‘everything is up for grabs’) 
approach. Part of the academic movement of ‘radical open access’ that 
promotes open access to knowledge and culture (see Hall, 2008; Adema 
and Hall, 2011), the platforms advocate informed and responsible curato-
rial activity. They also recognise the need for singular ethical and political 
decisions to be made, over and over again, with regard to both the medium 
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and its institutions, such as publishers, galleries, online spaces and intel-
lectual property/copyright, in the current media landscape. 
The goal of Photomediations: A Reader that you currently have in 
front of you, in its online version, as an ebook or perhaps as a paper copy, 
is to participate in this process of experimentation, while also trying to 
shift the traditional debate on photography beyond many of its established 
parameters and frameworks. The Reader contains a selection of scholarly 
and curatorial texts on photography and other media that all explore, 
but also simultaneously perform and postulate, the vibrant dynam-
ics of photomediations. It consists of four thematic sections. Section I, 
‘Photography, Optics and Light’ tells a history of photography as a story 
of vision, while the subsequent section, ‘The Image in Motion’, investi-
gates properties of movement as a process that both brings together and 
separates the interrelated histories of photography and cinema. Section 
III, ‘Hybrid Photomediations’, highlights the diversity of media engage-
ments, in early photographic practice as well as in more recent, and more 
knowing, experiments with the image-making apparatus. Last but not 
least, section IV, ‘The Networked Image’, goes beyond looking at a pho-
tograph as a discrete object to consider it as part of the interconnected 
– and constantly changing – media ecology. Photomediations: A Reader 
is published by Open Humanities Press: an international, scholar-led, 
not-for-profit open access publishing collective whose mission is to make 
leading works of contemporary critical thought available worldwide. It is 
being made available on an open access basis, to anyone with access to the 
Internet, with print-on-demand paper copies being sold at cost. As part 
of a broader experiment in open and hybrid publishing – as well as a cel-
ebration of the book as a living object – a version of this Reader also exists 
online in an open ‘living’ format, which means it can be altered, added to, 
mashed up, re-versioned and customised.
‘Permutation, combinatorics, poetry from a machine; cutting up, tak-
ing apart, and putting together again’ were, according to media historian 
Siegfried Zielinski, gestures used by the literary avant-garde in the 1960s 
‘to creatively attack the bourgeois tradition of the post-war manufactur-
ing of culture’ (2013: 58). In the early twenty-first century culture of 
the supposed image and text deluge, predefined camera programmes 
and Instagram, an avant-garde gesture can perhaps lie first and fore-
most in efforts to remap the photographic landscape – and to rewrite its 
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discourses. Rather than pursue the possibility of taking an original photo 
of a wedding or a unique selfie, we would be better off engaging in the cre-
ative activity of photography by trying to arrange different routes through 
the multi-layered landscape of photomediations. The editorial and cura-
torial paths proposed in this project are only one possible way of tracing 
such a new story of photography. They are also an invitation extended to 
our readers to engage fully with the spirit of this book and to mark their 
own photomediations routes, well beyond its covers.
Original source and licence
This is a reworked version of the Introduction from the online project, 
Photomediations: An Open Book, http://photomediationsopenbook.net. 
Licence: CC-BY 4.0.
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I Photography, Optics and Light

CHAPTER 1
A New Kind of History? The Challenges of 
Contemporary Histories of Photography 
Ya’ara Gil Glazer 
‘I want a new kind of history’
Since the late 1970s, when the history of photography became an aca-
demic subject, and with increasing interest in photography in the art 
market, there have been frequent calls by various scholars for a ‘new 
kind of history’ of photography. These calls were part of what Rosalind 
Krauss and Annette Michelson described in a special photography issue 
of October (1978) as a renewed scholarly ‘discovery’ of the medium, 
characterized by the ‘sense of an epiphany, delayed and redoubled in its 
power’ (Krauss and Michelson, 1978: 3). This rediscovery carried the 
message that photography and its practices have to be redeemed ‘from 
the cultural limbo to which for a century and a half it had been con-
signed’ (1978: 3).
The calls for a new history of photography suggested that the time 
has come to substitute Beaumont Newhall’s hegemonic modernist clas-
sic The History of Photography from 1839 to the Present with a new text 
(1939).1 Newhall was a librarian and later the first director of photog-
raphy of the Museum of Modern Art in New York. His work is con-
sidered as ‘the English-language text that has shaped thinking on the 
subject more permanently than any other’ (Nickel, 2001: 550). Based 
on the catalogue of his MoMA exhibition Photography 1839-1937, 
‘usually cited as a crucial step in the acceptance of photography as full-
fledged museum art’ (Phillips, 1992: 17), this book was the predominant 
photo-history for more than 50 years. It shifted the historiographic focus 
from the chemical-physical aspect of the medium to its visual aspect. 
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Similarly, the geographic center of the historiography of photography 
shifted from Europe to the United States.2
Newhall’s history has been vigorously criticized in recent decades. 
It is denounced as based on a formalist methodology that ‘forced him to 
mostly comment on style rather than content’, and as focusing ‘on genre 
and the tracing of influences’ (Rodriguez, 1982: 485). The critics also 
argue that his canonization of the masters of photography, detached pho-
tographic practice from social, political and cultural historical contexts 
(Nickel, 2001: 553). In the later editions (1949, 1964, 1982), Newhall 
made significant changes and revisions to his text, though his formalist atti-
tude and selective and authoritarian approach concerning ‘masterpieces’, 
‘photographic artists’ and photographic genres remained. Nonetheless, as 
noted by Marie Warner Marien, ‘Newhall’s aversion to losing the unique-
ness of photography in the world of art is a constant underlying value in 
the text’ (Marien, 1986: 5). His emphasis on photographic means, proce-
dures and techniques is characteristic of that concern. 
A relatively early event that marked this need for a new history of 
photography was the series of lectures ‘Toward the New History of 
Photography’ organized by the Art Institute of Chicago in 1979. In his 
lecture for the series, Carl Chiarenza opened with the assumption that 
‘there will be new histories of photography…’ that ‘will be critical of past 
histories…’ (Chiarenza, 1979: 35, 41). Contrary to Newhall’s approach, 
Chiarenza’s critical vision regarding the future history of photography 
was that it ‘must be part of the history of all picturemaking’, i.e. part of a 
general visual culture.3
Another early landmark in the formulation of the need for a new his-
tory of photography appears in Andy Grundberg’s ‘Two Camps Battle 
over the Nature of the Medium’ (1983). In this article for the New York 
Times he defined two distinct ‘camps’, i.e. two contemporary photo-
graphic concepts: 
The lines are drawn between those who think of photogra-
phy as a relatively new and largely virgin branch of art his-
tory, and those who rebel at the very notion of photography 
being ‘estheticized’. The former welcome the medium’s eleva-
tion to the realm of the museum, the marketplace and tradi-
tional art-historical scholarship, while the latter argue that 
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photography’s ‘museumization’ … robs it of its real importance 
– that is, its social meanings. (Grundberg, 1983) 
Towards the end of the twentieth-century, the calls for a new history of 
photography and the debate regarding its character intensified. The 1997 
summer issue of History of Photography, for instance, was titled ‘Why 
Historiography?’ and included articles by young and promising scholars 
such as Mary Warner Marien, Christine Mehring, and Malcolm Daniel. 
Its guest editor, Anne McCauley, described the purpose of the issue as a 
review and reconsideration of the history of photography at the end of the 
twentieth-century. She suggested the need to move from descriptive writ-
ing and ‘largely unexplored assumptions’ to an integrated history, focused 
on ‘photography’s shifting social roles’ (McCauley, 1997: 86).
Another project reexamining the theory and historiography of pho-
tography is Photography: Crisis of History, an anthology of short essays 
published in 2003, written by an international group of photo-historians, 
curators, critics and photographers. These authors were asked by scholar 
and photographer Joan Fontcuberta to ‘offer their reflections on the state 
of the historiographic question in photography’ (Fontcuberta, 2003: 14, 
17). Their texts, according to Fontcuberta, ‘represent different ways of 
revisiting history, and put forward ideas that will undoubtedly prove 
very useful in bringing new light to historical studies with a bearing on 
photography… help[ing] to place us in a position from which to over-
come with greater surety that crisis of history in which we find ourselves’ 
(Fontcuberta, 2003: 14). The authors in the anthology, among them Ian 
Jeffrey, Carmelo Vega, Boris Kossoy and Marie Loup Sougez, referred in 
various ways to questions such as: ‘What are the problems that emerge 
from his [Newhall’s] approach?’ (i.e. canonizing certain photographers 
and photographs and emphasizing ‘the history of technique’); ‘What are 
the principal filters – cultural, ideological and political – that have deter-
mined the dominant historiographic model?’; Can photography still be 
studied as an autonomous discipline…?’; ‘Is a social history of photogra-
phy compatible with an aesthetic history, a history of uses with a history 
of forms?’ and ‘How are we to produce a “politically correct” history of 
photography?’ 
What seems to be an effective summing-up of the need for a new 
history of photography appeared in Geoffrey Batchen’s proem in the 
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May/June 2002 issue of Afterimage, comprised of wishes expressed in 
the recurrent assertion ‘I want a new history [of photography]’. Batchen 
demands, for instance, a history that ‘looks at photography, not just at 
art photographs’, ‘breaks free from an evolutionary narrative’, ‘traces the 
journey of an image, as well as its origin’, ‘acknowledges that photographs 
have multiple manifestations and are objects as well as images’, and ‘sees 
beyond Europe and the United States, and is interested in more than the 
creative efforts of a few white men’ (Batchen, 2002: 3). 
Shortly before the publication of Batchen’s proem, Douglas Nickel 
made an assessment of photo-history’s ‘state of research’ in the pages of 
the Art Bulletin. Like Grundberg in the early 1980s but with a wider 
perspective, he concluded that the field is caught between two oppos-
ing forces: one that construed photography as high art, with the accom-
panying aura of prestige, originality and uniqueness; the other arguing 
for ‘photography’s social determination’ and interdisciplinary character. 
While the first force is essentially related to the rising power of photogra-
phy collecting market in the 1970s and intensified during the 1980s and 
1990s, and the incorporation of photographs in museum collections at 
around the same period, the second is the incorporation of photography 
as an academic field in Art History departments and later in departments 
such as social and cultural history, anthropology, literature and philoso-
phy. This process was described by Nickel as ‘fraught with contradic-
tions’ due to the ‘dual challenges’ of critical theory and the crisis in the 
field of Art History itself (Nickel, 2001: 554-555).
In this context, Nickel describes how a prominent group of commen-
tators of the 1980s-1990s, who made the history of photography the focus 
of their research, had revived the ideas of critics such as Walter Benjamin, 
Roland Barthes and Susan Sontag, from different theoretical perspec-
tives, among them Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis. Some of them, 
he argues, had taken a radical political approach to the history of photog-
raphy, promoting it ‘to assume a central position in the larger project of 
postmodern criticism’ (554).4 He concludes his article commenting that 
The intellectual self-consciousness with which photography’s 
social agency can now be contemplated is the beneficial and 
necessary end product of two decades of soul-searching on its 
behalf, but how (or whether) the remains of this process get 
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reassembled into something vital will be determined largely 
by the institutional forces that presently control photographic 
history’s fate. (Nickel, 2001: 556)  
New histories, new challenges 
In response to these calls for a new history of photography, at least six 
comprehensive academic photo-histories have been published in the 
United States and Europe between 1984 and 2002. Such volumes serve 
as essential textbooks for art-history students, and as a general introduc-
tion for the interested public. They therefore play a central role in the 
construction of historical-photographic knowledge. Three of most popu-
lar of these histories, according to sales estimates and new editions, are: A 
World History of Photography by Naomi Rosenblum (1984; 4th edition, 
2008), Seizing the Light by Robert Hirsch (1999; 2nd edition, 2008), and 
Photography: A Cultural History, by Mary Warner Marien (2002; 3rd 
edition, 2010).5
Are these texts really a new kind of history? Almost ten years after 
Nickel’s article, and almost nine years after the publication of the 
most recent and innovative of these books – Marie Warner Marien’s 
Photography: A Cultural History – seems to be an appropriate time to 
investigate how they comply with the demand for a new history of pho-
tography, how they compare with Newhall’s history, and how and to 
what extent they fill the lacunae left by his prototype.6 
The present article focuses on two sections of these books: the first 
engages with the Photo-Secession art-photography movement. The sec-
ond focuses on the Farm Security Administration’s documentary pho-
tographic project. The Photo-Secession was an American movement of 
photographers interested in promoting the status of photography as fine 
art. It was established in New York and was active between 1880 and 
1920. The photographic project of the Farm Security Administration 
(the FSA), was part of the New Deal program for reviving American 
agriculture throughout the country during the Great Depression of the 
1930s. Each of these subjects, according to Newhall, signifies a high point 
in photographic history. 
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These sections were selected for two reasons: first because the subjects 
are familiar to anyone with general knowledge of the history of photogra-
phy, which makes their analysis both accessible and comprehensible; and 
second as they represent the problems of photography’s manifold charac-
ter, raising the old but still relevant questions regarding the differences 
and similarities between documentary practices and art. The discussion 
of the texts and images representing these two ‘poles’ in histories of pho-
tography testifies to some of the challenges and complexities involved 
with revising or creating an alternative to Newhall’s history. 
The sections in the three books will be discussed in relation to 
Newhall’s work, according to the following criteria: the extent and com-
plexity of their historical and photo-historical contexts; the narrative 
sequence and the approach to canonical photographers; the approach to 
canonical photographic images; the expansion of the canon and political 
corrections.7 
Historical and photo-historical contexts 
Rosenblum, Hirsch and Marien’s new histories reveal their authors’ 
approach to the importance of historical and photo-historical contexts. 
While all the new authors discuss photographic issues in a broader his-
torical context, in Rosenblum’s and Hirsch’s books this context is demar-
cated by their chapters, which are usually defined stylistically. One of 
the problems resulting from such categorization is the inconsistencies in 
the ways by which photographic issues and approaches are discussed. 
Documentary photographs, for instance, are presented in their books in 
a much wider historical context than artistic photographs taken at around 
the same period. The latter seem to have a discrete history of art photog-
raphy that does not integrate cultural, social, or political historical events, 
but rather focuses on internal stylistic influences. 
Like Newhall’s, Naomi Rosenblum’s and Robert Hirsch’s sections 
on the Photo-Secession are therefore set in the context of efforts in the 
USA and in Europe to establish photography as fine art under the head-
ing ‘Pictorialism’. The sequence of events – the rejection of mid ninetieth-
century artificial painting-like photographs, the efforts to distinguish art 
photography from amateur photography, the advent of naturalist pho-
tography, of camera clubs and of photography salons, and the rise of the 
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Photo-Secession as a coherent group of pictorial photographers – clearly 
adheres to Newhall’s evolutionary narrative pattern. 
Marien, on the other hand, totally deconstructs Newhall’s model by 
eschewing the stylistic categories and examining varying photographic 
approaches and practices, which operate in parallel within a specific cul-
tural historical framework. In this way, she challenges the traditional con-
texts in which pictorialist photography and the Photo-Secession are dis-
cussed. Though she too refers to the aforementioned sequence of issues 
and events, she does not emphasize this trend in photography simply as 
a counter-reaction to painterly photographs or the proliferating amateur 
photography of the period within the seemingly hermetic world of art 
photography. Instead, she describes the rise of the pictorialist movement 
and the increasing significance of photography in everyday modern life 
in a chapter on ‘Photography in the Modern Age’. This chapter includes, 
for example, sections on social reform photography, science and photogra-
phy, and war and photography. 
While the Photo-Secession is portrayed by Hirsch and by Rosenblum 
in a way similar to Newhall’s – a unique school of art photography within 
the broader pictorialist movement, headed by Alfred Stieglitz – Marien 
again rows against the current and insists that Stieglitz’s role ‘was not 
unprecedented’ (Marien, 2002: 183). While all authors create the impres-
sion that the Photo-Secession’s journal Camera Work, and its exhibition 
space – gallery ‘291’ (located at 291 Fifth Avenue, New York) were exclu-
sively American phenomena, she describes the Photo-Secession in the 
context of influential European exhibitions (among them those organized 
by Stieglitz’s mentor H. W. Vogel) and photographic magazines. Just as 
the Photo-Secession is discussed at length in chapters on art and pictorial 
photography, references to the FSA photographic project are prominent 
in reviews of documentary photography in the first half of the twentieth-
century in Newhall’s text and in the new histories. Newhall opens with a 
definition of the term ‘documentary’ and continues with examples of doc-
umentary photographers and photographs, beginning in the early years 
of the twentieth-century, to create an allegedly evolutionary sequence of 
documentary photography as a genre, almost isolated from a historical 
context. This is how he describes the FSA photographic project in this 
sequence, after Lewis Hine, and before Margaret Bourke-White: ‘At the 
same time that filmmakers began to talk about “documentary”, here and 
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there photographers were using their cameras in a similar way. In 1935 
the United States government turned to these photographers for help in 
fighting the Depression…’ (Newhall, 1982: 238). 
There is a marked difference in the new authors’ approaches in com-
parison to Newhall’s. Rosenblum, Hirsch and Warner set the FSA pho-
tographic project in the context of a more diverse social documentary 
initiatives and individual photographers. They focus on social documen-
tary and discuss it in relation to various issues such as social change, the 
social sciences, and ethnographic photography.8 Unlike Newhall, they 
also supply a wider social and cultural context to the establishment of the 
FSA photographic agency and its operation, against the backdrop of the 
Depression and the New Deal, including the wide distribution and cir-
culation of its images – mainly promoted by the head of the project, Roy 
Emerson Stryker – as well as viewers’ responses to the images. All three 
authors, for instance, conduct an important discussion regarding the pub-
lic’s ambivalent acceptance of FSA photographs: was this ‘real’ evidence 
or ‘red propaganda’? 
Although providing a broader background to the FSA photographic 
project, Rosenblum and Hirsch follow Newhall’s example, locating it in 
a chapter on documentary photography (albeit within a section on social 
documentary). Warner, on the other hand, includes the FSA project in a 
chapter titled ‘New Vision’. Rosenblum employed this term – borrowed 
from Bertolt Brecht who referred to the period as ‘a great lesson for a 
new vision of the world’ – to describe the interaction between modern-
ism and photography in the years between the two World Wars (Brecht, 
in Frizot, 1998: 457). By setting documentary photography in the con-
text of photographic avant-garde of the 1920s and 1930s, Marien in fact 
demarcates this branch of photography as no less modernist than the 
experimental and/or straight photography of the period. This approach, 
perhaps inspired by the historian Michael Denning in his Cultural Front, 
challenges the traditional split between modernist ‘art photography’ and 
documentary photography in the period under discussion.9
Nevertheless, while Marien discusses some important formalist 
aspects of RA/FSA photographs, it is not at the expense of the project’s 
significant social and cultural role, which she emphasizes more than any 
of the other authors. She is the only one, for example, who suggests that 
the RA (Resettlement Administration – which later merged with the 
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FSA), ‘was regularly questioned by conservatives who felt that direct, 
planned government intervention into the economy and the daily lives 
of citizens was un-American or, worse, crypto-socialist’ (Marien, 2002: 
281). This is very significant, in light of the perception by late twentieth-
century photo-historians of the FSA photographs as mere propaganda 
for the US government.10 Warner is also the only author who provides 
examples of the uses of RA/FSA photographs in popular newspapers 
and in documentary photo-books. By expanding the visual knowledge of 
those famous images, she encourages their examination within the con-
texts in which they were originally produced and circulated during the 
1930s and early 1940s. The other authors, like Newhall, present the 
images as individual examples that do not suggest their numerous cul-
tural manifestations. 
Narrative sequence and the canonization of photographers 
Newhall’s history was attacked as ‘developing from one Master to 
another’, as ‘the key site of analysis becomes the qualities of the individ-
ual photograph’, rather than the social and cultural contexts in which it 
was produced and reproduced (Bezencenet, 1982: 485). This approach 
resembles that of the second best-known museological history of pho-
tography after Newhall’s, i.e. John Szarkowsky’s Photography until Now 
(1989). Like Newhall’s, this book is based on an exhibition at MoMA 
and represents the ‘camp’ which sees (and constructs) photography as the 
‘auristic’ artefact described by Grundberg and Nickel, in which concepts 
such as ‘pure vision’, ‘intelligent eye’ and ‘significant form’ are privileged 
(Hugunin, 1991). 
An examination of narrative sequences in the new histories discussed 
here evokes Newhall’s prototype in various ways. The story of the Photo-
Secession in Hirsch’s book is virtually Alfred Stieglitz’s story, opening 
with the group’s establishment by the latter and followed by a citation of 
his statement concerning its goals, and listing the names of other founders 
and members. In further sections – ‘Decadent Movement and Tonalism’, 
‘Woman Pictorialists’, and ‘The Pictorial Epoch / The Stieglitz Group’, 
Hirsch describes prominent photographers in the Photo-Secession one by 
one, with strong emphasis on their affiliation to Stieglitz. 
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It seems that Hirsch was also influenced by Rosenblum in his sections 
on pictorialism and the secession group, in particular in his emphasis on 
women pictorialists, whom Newhall virtually ignores. Nevertheless, her 
text is much more balanced in regard to background information and 
detail, and she also corrects Newhall’s injustices, including his blurring of 
Edward Steichen’s role in the Photo-Secession: 
The formidable role played by Stieglitz ... has received ample 
attention, but the active participation of Steichen, who found 
and installed the exhibition space, designed the cover and 
publicity for Camera Work, and initiated contacts with the 
French graphic artists whose works eventually formed an 
important part of Secession exhibits and publications, is less 
known. (Rosenblum, 1984: 325) 
Warner opens her section on the Photo-Secession in a sophisticated way 
that suggests the complexity and contradictions inherent to the term 
‘pictorialism’. She cites the prominent photography critic Sadakichi 
Hartmann’s comments on a pictorialist exhibition at the Carnegie Institute 
in Pittsburgh in 1904, published in American Amateur. Hartmann had 
unfavorably reviewed some of the works in this exhibition, organized, 
among others, by Stieglitz, as ‘overstep[ping] all legitimate boundaries 
and deliberately mix[ing] up photography with the technical devices of 
painting and the graphic arts’, and calling on the movement’s photogra-
phers to present reality in a straightforward manner (Marien, 2002: 181).
The term ‘straight photography’ was later adopted by Newhall 
to define his favorite ‘photographic genre’ - primarily represented by 
Stieglitz’s mature works. His chapter on ‘Straight Photography’ follows 
the one on ‘Pictorial Photography’. However, the distinction between 
the pictorial and the straight branches of the Photo-Secession made by 
Hartmann seven years later in Camera Work is not mentioned by Marien, 
a fact that weakens her critique of the movement.11
Unlike her narrative of Stieglitz and the Photo-Secession, part of 
Marien’s section on the FSA photographic project, surprisingly retains 
the pattern of Newhall’s narrative sequence, and her account of the FSA 
photographers is very similar to his. Her writing on Walker Evans, for 
instance, seems to be a dissonant synthesis of the contextual approach 
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and Newhall’s canonical mold. Newhall wrote, for example: ‘Walker 
Evans was one of the first photographers to be hired’ and Warner almost 
literally rewrote his words: ‘Among Stryker’s first hired was Walker 
Evans’ (Newhall, 1939 238; Marien, 2002: 282). Subsequently, again 
like Newhall, Warner discusses Dorothea Lange, relatively at length.12
The canonization of these two photographers, especially of Evans, is 
criticized by contemporary photo-historians of the FSA, who argue that 
such an approach detaches their works from the specific political context 
in which they were created and presents them as the works of outstanding 
individual artists. ‘We run the risk of developing a “star system” approach 
to these images’, comments Jack F. Hurley: ‘We stand back, view the 
beautiful print on the gallery wall and say, “isn’t it wonderful?” It’s an 
Evans’ (or Lange, or Lee, or whatever)’ (Hurley, 1972: 244).13 The can-
onization of some FSA photographers also obscures the contributions of 
others, among them Marion Post-Wolcott, Jack Delano and Carl Mydans, 
to name a few. 
Rosenblum’s profile on FSA photographers appearing at the end of 
the chapter on documentary photography, separately from the section 
on the FSA photographic project, is the only one truthful to history in 
this regard: it begins with a description of the work of Arthur Rothstein, 
the first photographer hired by Stryker. Stryker met Rothstein when they 
were students at Columbia University in the early 1930s and called him 
to join the new and still amorphous project (Hurley, 1972: 244).  
Concluding the section on the FSA photographic project, Warner, 
again like Newhall, mentions other photographers hired by the FSA 
during the later years of the administration and after its merger with the 
Office of War Information (OWI.) However, in an obvious effort to pro-
vide a politically-correct alternative to his pattern, she focuses on two fig-
ures: Gordon Parks, the only black photographer in the FSA/OWI, and 
Esther Bubley, one of the few women photographers in the FSA/OWI. 
She also provides details about the later careers of prominent FSA pho-
tographers, which again seems to correct Newhall, who was criticized 
for designing his history according to categories in which such an option 
would be untenable. 
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Canonical images
Figure 1.1. Alfred Stieglitz, The Steerage, 1907, Photogravure, 15.9x21.6 cm,  
Museum of Modern Art, New York. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, 
The Alfred Stieglitz Collection, Gift of Georgia O’Keeffe [LC-USZCN4-243]. 
Just as he canonized certain photographers as masters, Newhall also con-
sidered their works masterpieces. Both Rosenblum and Hirsch, but the 
latter in particular, revert to Newhall’s model in this regard. Their refer-
ences to Stieglitz’s The Steerage (1907) and Dorothea Lange’s Migrant 
Mother (1936) are examples of this. Newhall mentions The Steerage, a 
photograph of travelers and re-emigrants from the US to Europe on the 
first and lower-class decks of the ship Kaiser Wilhelm II, as what Stieglitz 
considered to be his finest work. In his history it is the focal representa-
tive of straight photography (appearing on the first double page spread of 
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the chapter ‘Straight Photography’), reflecting Stieglitz’s preference for 
‘stick[ing] closely to the basic properties of camera, lens and emulsion’ 
at a time when he ‘began to champion the most progressive painting and 
sculpture, as well as photography’ (Newhall, 1939: 167-168). Newhall 
emphasizes the formal aspect of the image, citing Stieglitz’s description of 
what motivated him to take it: 
A round straw hat, the funnel leaning left, the stairway lean-
ing right, the white drawbridge with its railings made of cir-
cular chains; white suspenders crossing the back of a man in 
the steerage below, round shapes of iron machinery, a mast 
cutting into the sky, making a triangular shape…. I saw a pic-
ture of shapes and underlying that the feeling I had about life. 
(Stieglitz, in Newhall, 1939: 168).
Rosenblum and Hirsch offer no alternatives to Newhall’s formalist read-
ing of The Steerage; rather, they reinforce it by emphasizing its affinity 
with art movements of the period, especially with Cubism. Hirsch actu-
ally goes even further than Newhall. While Newhall comments that 
Stieglitz was flattered by Pablo Picasso’s excitement about the picture, 
and Rosenblum quotes Picasso’s statement that he and Stieglitz worked 
‘in the same avant-garde spirit’, he discusses the image, under the heading 
‘Cubism’, as representative of a ‘transformation’ in Stieglitz’s ‘aesthetic 
thinking’ under the influence of analytic cubism. Apart from the fact 
that cubism is a term that fundamentally belongs to the realm of paint-
ing (Stieglitz himself, according to Marien, ‘praised Picasso’s “antiphoto-
graphic” work, meaning that it had renounced the simple vanishing-point 
perspective imposed by the camera’), Hirsch decontextualizes Newhall 
and Stieglitz’s resistance to the assimilation of photography into the realm 
of painting and its vocabulary, and their efforts for the recognition of pho-
tography as a discrete medium. His ignorance of the social content in 
Stieglitz’s photograph is also surprising (Rosenblum, 1984: 405; Hirsch, 
1999: 215; Marien, 2002: 189).14
Thus Rosenblum and Hirsch maintain the canonical status of the 
image but fail to discuss contemporary critical references to it. Warner 
also describes Stieglitz’s scene of The Steerage but, unlike them, she sub-
sequently echoes Allan Sekula’s Marxist-oriented critique in his ‘On 
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the Invention of Photographic Meaning’ (1975): ‘He was looking over 
the first-class deck to the steerage below, recognizing there not the dis-
heartened immigrants returning to Europe, but a combination of abstract 
forms….’ (Marien, 2002: 185). Nevertheless, Warner’s up-to-date and 
significant reference to Sekula’s seminal article is problematic. She mixes 
history and critique in a way that will most likely confuse the novice 
reader who is seeking an introduction to the history of photography. By 
supporting Sekula and presenting opinion as fact, she virtually constructs 
the readers’ perception of the photograph without letting them make their 
own conclusions, and without even mentioning Sekula’s name.15 
Migrant Mother is the best-known photograph of the FSA project and 
perhaps of American documentary photography as a whole, an endur-
ing symbol of the Depression.16 Newhall’s description of this image of a 
mother and children of a poor, migrant agricultural workers’ family, taken 
by Dorothea Lange in Nipomo, California, appears on the first page of his 
chapter on documentary photography: 
Lange could make a deserted farmhouse, abandoned in 
acres of machine-plowed land, an eloquent definition of the 
phrase ‘tractored-out’, which was on the lips of hundreds of 
dispossessed farmers. Her photograph of a migrant mother 
surrounded by her children, huddled in a tent, became 
the most widely reproduced of all the FSA pictures…. 
(Newhall, 1939: 244).
Similarly, Hirsch writes that Lange’s FSA photographs ‘epitomized the 
human cost of the Depression’ and that Migrant Mother was considered 
by many as the ‘quintessential FSA image’ (Newhall, 1939: 244; Hirsch, 
199: 286).17 Rosenblum also notes the reputation of the photograph; as 
in Newhall’s history, it is given a full page in her book as a signifier of 
the FSA photographic project. Warner, on the other hand, comments 
that: ‘Though powerful, Migrant Mother is not typical of Lange’s work’ 
(Marien, 2002: 285). She is also the only author who presents the image as 
it frequently appeared in the popular press, thereby shedding light on the 
circulation of FSA images, and on how urban Americans were exposed to 
them in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The choice of this version of the 
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image also suggests different possible interpretations of FSA photographs 
in different texts and contexts.18
 
Figure 1.2. Dorothea Lange, Migrant Mother (Destitute pea pickers in California. 
Mother of seven children. Age thirty-two. Nipomo, California). 1936, 1 negative: 
nitrate; 4 x 5 in., Library of Congress [LC-USF34-009058-C]. 
However, Marien’s short summary next to the image, again combining 
cultural history and critical theory, is confusing. The first part, in which 
the image is described as recalling ‘religious images of the Madonna and 
Child’, seems to echo art and photography historian John Pultz’s feminist 
reading of the image as drawing on ‘Renaissance depictions of the Virgin 
and Child and the secularized versions of these that began to appear in 
the mid nineteenth century…’ This is part of Pultz’s analysis of the image 
as centering ‘on the female body … that is socially constructed through 
the gaze, and has the quality “to be looked at”’ (Pultz, in Wells, 2000: 44). 
Such a presentation of the photograph, characteristic of feminist dis-
course of photography, is again confusing for the reader who expects an 
introductory textbook that provides a cultural historical framework of 
photographs. Not only does it shift the focus from the social and cultural 
historical context in which it was taken, it actually contradicts the media-
constructed version of the image chosen by Marien herself, which called 
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on the middle-class public to ‘look in her eyes’, not as a representation of 
objectified female body, but as a representative of the most deprived class 
in American society.19  A discussion of contemporary readings of the pho-
tograph is certainly worthy, but they should be explained as late interpre-
tations, and in a way that acknowledges the image’s numerous and var-
ied readings. 
Marien’s subsequent statement that the image ‘also expresses 
Depression era values’ is vague. If these values are implied by the contin-
uation of her above cited sentence: ‘the children on either side turn away, 
symbolically ashamed of their wretchedness’ (which also resonate Pultz’s 
writing: ‘the two older children turn their heads away from the photogra-
pher (out of shame or shyness?)’ (Pultz, in Wells, 2000: 44), t1hen such 
reading also seems decontextualized. The idea of the poor as ashamed or 
responsible of their situation was characteristic of the late ninetieth-cen-
tury Social Darwinism but was actually weakened during the Depression. 
Besides the diluted faith in capitalism due to the economic crisis during 
that period, the images of the Depression poor played a significant cul-
tural role, constructed by the mass media as the ‘deserving poor’, repre-
senting a tentative national situation that will apparently be overcome 
soon. Hence, the symbolic figures of the rural poor were connected with 
the agrarian myth and the ethos of the white pioneers who built America 
and survived hardship to eventually become successful and prosperous.20
The second part of Warner’s discussion of the image deter-
mines that the mother’s careworn face, her tattered clothes, 
and the dirty baby near her breast indicate extreme distress, 
deserving of compassion. Yet her expression hints at a determi-
nation to persevere through hard times. (Marien, 2002: 284).
The combination of these oppositions – distress and persevere, or ‘tragedy 
and resistance’, according to photography critic John Roberts ‘in essence 
was what the magazine editors were waiting for’ (Roberts, in Wells, 
2000: 43), namely, a message that aimed to pacify American middle 
class audience. This combination was also pronounced by Stryker retro-
spectively, as he described it in 1973 as ‘the picture of the Farm Security 
Administration … She has all the suffering of mankind in her but all the 
perseverance too. A restraint and a strange courage’ (Stryker and Wood, 
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1973: 73). However, Stryker’s aim was of course different from that of 
the popular magazine’s editors: he was trying to promote public support 
for the RA/FSA rehabilitation programmes through images that would 
arouse both respect and empathy. 
For a third time then, and again with no reference to her resources, 
Warner confuses the reader with an apparent factual characteristics of 
the image (‘the mother’s … face … indicate[s] extreme distress … Yet her 
expression hints at a determination to persevere’) instead of discussing its 
construction (by the mass media versus the FSA, for instance) as such.
Extending the canon and political corrections 
As shown earlier, Rosenblum’s and Hirsch’s approaches to canonical pho-
tographs certainly seem like variations on Newhall’s book, even though 
they, and Marien, significantly extended his range. Their extensions also 
include images of and by representatives of social groups that were under-
represented or disregarded by Newhall, among them women, African 
Americans and Native Americans. 
Newhall’s list of photographers in his chapters ‘Pictorial Photography’ 
and ‘Documentary Photography’ is almost completely present in the new 
books, though the authors have expanded this list considerably, both in 
number and variety. Rosenblum’s most notable contribution, for instance, 
has been to extend the photographic canon beyond the United States and 
Central and Western Europe. In the chapters under discussion, she adds 
examples of pictorial and documentary photographers in countries such 
as Spain, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, Russia and Japan. 
Rosenblum also discusses the important role played by women in the 
pictorialist movement. This amendment was followed by both Hirsch 
and Warner. Apart from Gertrude Kasebier – the only pictorialist woman 
photographer discussed by Newhall – Rosenblum, Hirsch and Warner 
also present works by Alice Boughton, Anne W. Brigman, Eva Watson-
Schutze, Sara C. Sears, Jane Reece and others. They also refer to more 
women documentarists than Newhall did, including those who worked 
for New-Deal agencies operating parallel to the FSA, such as Marjory 
Collins and Martha McMillan.21
Commenting that ‘women, who were more active in all aspects of pho-
tography in the United States, were especially prominent in pictorialism’ 
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(Rosenblum, 1984: 320),  Rosenblum’s discussion of women pictorialists 
is a part of the section ‘Pictorialism in the United States’. This corrects the 
imbalance of women photographers in Newhall’s history, while Hirsch’s 
and Warner’s presentation of the women photographers in a discrete sec-
tion actually removes it from its historical and local contexts, referring to 
their work as if it were a ‘school’ existing separately from pictorialism. 
Similarly, political correctness is also apparent concerning the work 
of black photographers. Warner, as aforementioned, discusses the black 
FSA photographer Gordon Parks and all three writers discuss works 
by James van der Zee, who was also neglected in Newhall’s book. The 
new histories also correct a radical lacuna in images of American blacks 
in Newhall’s book (the only African-American image in the last edition 
of Newhall is that of Paul Robeson by Edward Steichen, taken in 1933). 
Rosenblum includes images of blacks by Ben Shahn (for the FSA) and by 
her husband, the Photo League photographer Walter Rosenblum. Warner 
presents the most detailed story of Photo League’s documentation of poor 
blacks’ life in Harlem (and of harassment by the FBI as suspected of sub-
versive communist activity). She also dedicates a number of paragraphs 
to discussion of black representations in photography in the 1930s, with 
images by Margaret Bourke-White, Eudora Welty, Carl Mydans, Aaron 
Siskind and Van der Zee. 
Hirsch’s most original political addenda are four examples of Native 
American images in his chapter on documentary photography: ‘The 
Snake Priest, Hopi’ by Adam Vroman (1901), ‘Bear Bull-Blackfoot’ by 
Edward Curtis (1926) (both these photographers are also discussed by 
Newhall) ‘Class in American History’ by Frances Benjamin Johnston 
(1899), and ‘Horace Poolaw, Aerial Photographer, and Gus Palmer, 
Gunner, MacDill Air Base’ by the Native American photographer 
Horace Poolaw (1944). 
It should be noted that despite the significance of the political correc-
tions in the new histories, they rarely involve critical discussions. Warner, 
for example, refers to historian Deborah Willis’ observation that Van der 
Zee’s photographs of middle class blacks ‘often suggest that the postwar 
mass movement of blacks from the south to take factory jobs in the north-
ern cities was a success’ – but she does not make it clear that this sugges-
tion was highly deceptive (Marien, 2002: 297). Neither does her descrip-
tion of Gordon Parks’ work for the FSA include the racist reception he 
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received from members of the administration’s photographic laboratory. 
He arrived there under a Julius Rosenwald fellowship, without which he 
would probably never have been accepted to work for the FSA.22
One of the few critical discussions of ‘correcting images’ is done by 
Hirsch. While Newhall comments, for instance, that ‘to Curtis the 
Indian, as a nation, was the “vanishing race”, whose ancient manners, 
customs, and traditions should be recorded before they disappeared, and 
this often led him to pose his subjects....’, Hirsch suggests that his work 
was retrospectively ‘criticized for its racist attitudes’. He also refers to the 
unconsciously patronizing stance in Benjamin-Johnston’s photograph of 
‘Class in American History’, in which ‘viewers observe the stereotypical 
Native American warrior as a specimen of the old (bad) picturesque wild 
west’ (Newhall, 1939: 136; Hirsch, 1999: 274-275).  
A significant though in some cases problematic outcome of the exten-
sions of Newhall’s canon is the discussion of the works of certain pho-
tographers under different categories, some of which virtually undermine 
his dictated boundaries between ‘pictorialism’, ‘straight photography’ 
and ‘documentation’. Frances Benjamin Johnston, for instance, who was 
ignored by Newhall, was a prominent ninetieth-century photographer 
who turned from pictorialism to photojournalism. Her works appear in 
chapters on documentary photography in both Rosenblum’s and Hirsch’s 
book, while in Warner’s they appear in ‘Photography in the Modern Era’ 
just before those of pictorialist photographers. The text concerning her 
career concludes the section on women pictorialists. 
Other examples are evident in the classifications of works by two sig-
nificant figures in Newhall’s canon: French photographer Eugene Atget, 
who created an extensive photographic document of Paris; and Curtis, 
who was previously mentioned, is famous in his romanticized exoticist 
gaze on Native Americans. Both were active at the turn of the twentieth-
century and during its first decades. Atget’s works appear in Newhall as 
representative of straight photography. In Rosenblum they appear in the 
‘New Technology’ chapter, in a section on ‘Instantaneous Photographs of 
Everyday Life’; in Hirsch’s chapter ‘The New Culture of Light’; and in 
Warner among documentary works in the ‘New Vision’ chapter referred 
to previously. 
Curtis’s works are discussed in Newhall’s ‘The Conquest of Action’, 
which more or less parallels Rosenblum’s ‘New Technology’ chapter (in 
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which Atget’s works are discussed). In the latter, Curtis’s works are dis-
cussed in the chapter on early documentation – ‘Documentation: Objects 
and Events, 1839-1890’. In Hirsch’s book, Curtis is also referred to as a 
documentarian, in a section titled ‘Ethnological Approaches’ of the chap-
ter ‘Social Documents’, while in Warner’s they appear in the chapter 
on ‘Photography in the Modern Age’ in the section on ‘Anthropological 
Pictorialism’.
Conclusion and a remark concerning Newhall 
The challenges concerning contemporary histories of photography are 
answered to varying degrees and in different ways by the new histories 
written by Rosenblum, Hirsch and Marien. Compared with Newhall’s 
History of Photography from 1839 to the Present, the authors of the new 
books provide broader cultural and social historical contexts and dis-
cuss broader aspects of the medium. They are less canonical, less West-
oriented, and include images of and by minorities and discriminated-
against social groups. 
However, none of these authors have re-shuffled the cards. 
Substantially, their work derives from Newhall’s model, and Hirsch’s 
seems to be the most obvious example of this. His history, like Rosenblum’s 
and Marien’s, expands Newhall’s model and canon, provides a wider his-
torical background and incorporates some original ideas and innovations. 
For the most part, however, it seems like an updated Newhall. 
Rosenblum’s and Marien’s histories are much more contextual. They 
both emphasize the background and content of photographs rather than 
the careers of the photographers, and they both extend the scope of pho-
tographic history to non-Western areas. Warner’s approach is much more 
radical. She makes the most extensive revisions to Newhall’s narrative, 
including sophisticated (even if sometimes problematic) references to 
issues of contemporary critical theories of photography. 
A fundamental difficulty encountered by all authors of the new his-
tories is that of formulating a cohesive methodology to account for dif-
ferent approaches and different aspects of photography. The example 
of ‘art’ versus ‘documentary’ (i.e. documentary not initially intended 
as art) discussed in this article is evidence of this. In Rosenblum’s and 
in Hirsch’s books, the social and cultural context in which the FSA 
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photographic project is discussed is disproportionate to that of the Photo-
Secession. Furthermore, while Warner sets both topics within a wide 
cultural-historical framework, her history still bears Newhall’s imprint, 
particularly regarding the inconsistent canonization of some photogra-
phers. Discussions of the works of ‘documentary’ photographers in sec-
tions on art photography, and on ‘artistic’ photography in chapters on 
documentary photography, are symptoms of this difficulty. However, it is 
not only the limitations of Newhall’s model that have given rise to these 
structural and methodological problems. They are also largely inherent 
to any historiography or theory of photography, as Barthes suggested in 
Camera Lucida: 
From the first step, that of classification (we must surely clas-
sify, verify by samples, if we want to constitute a corpus), 
photography evades us. The various distributions we impose 
upon it are in fact either empirical (Professionals / Amateurs), 
or rhetorical (Landscapes / Objects / Portraits / Nudes), or 
else aesthetic (realism / pictorialism), in any case external to 
the object, without relation to its essence ... We might say that 
photography is unclassifiable. (Barthes, 1981: 5).  
It is worth noting, however, that while all the new authors indirectly react 
to Newhall’s classic, their explicit references to it and to him are surpris-
ingly minimal. Rosenblum and Hirsch at least refer to his book as ‘the 
best-known general history that has appeared in the twentieth-century’ 
and as the text that ‘defined the modernist approach’ to photography. 
Conversely, Warner uses Newhall’s name in two marginal contexts only 
(Rosenblum, 1984: 9; Hirsch, 1999: 344; Marien, 2002: 298-9; 391).23 
This is disturbing because all three histories – though innovative in many 
ways and responsive to most of the criteria summed up by Batchen – are 
largely founded on Newhall’s seminal work. 
Post-conclusion: photography as art in the new histories 
Batchen ends his proem with the question ‘What kind of history do you 
want?’. The fact that classifying photographic approaches, practices and 
practitioners, products and expressions is such a complex undertaking, 
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enables recognizing the agenda behind the new histories’ attempts to 
answer Batchen’s question. A common denominator among the three 
texts is evident: all the authors’ discussions of photography in the nineti-
eth-century and the first half of the twentieth-century present a relatively 
balanced picture of different trends in photography, but the chapters con-
cerning the 1950s and 1960s, and, more radically, the 1970s to the pres-
ent, are essentially focused on art photography (i.e. photographs for the 
museum or gallery wall – to use Michael Fried’s definition) by photogra-
phers whose intention is primarily artistic. In Rosenblum’s book almost 
85% and in Hirsch’s almost 100% of the post-1970 images can be clas-
sified as art. Warner’s final chapter ‘Convergences: 1975-Present’ com-
prises more than 90% art.24
Has photographic expression since the 1970s been essentially artis-
tic? The answer is a categorical ‘No’. There are many photographic 
expressions in contemporary culture that are not art. Photojournalism, 
advertisement and fashion photography, digital news photographs 
(sometimes by executors or victims of an event) and the proliferation of 
amateur photography on the web are some examples.25 Newhall’s his-
tory was attacked as an ‘art history of photography’ (Gasser, 1992: 57). 
Examination of Rosenblum’s and Hirsch’s books indicates that even 
though they offer a wider historical context than Newhall, they had a sin-
gular problem in removing their classifications from his traditional catego-
rization. Moreover, although Warner’s approach appears to be the most 
self-aware and compound alternative to this approach, when it comes to 
contemporary photography she also seems to be rather ambivalent regard-
ing the ‘divorce’ from Newhall’s prototype and from ‘categories previ-
ously constituted by art and its history’, to cite Rosalind Krauss (Krauss, 
1986: 150). This is not an illegitimate tendency, but it is an undeclared 
one, that makes these books’ structures and methodologies incoherent and 
misleading. 
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Notes
1  The book was first titled Photography: A Short Critical History. 
2  For a detailed survey of the history of photography before Newhall see 
McCauley, 1997 and Gasser, 1992.
3  Chiarenza’s article was published in the summer issue of Afterimage, 1979.  
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4  Among these writers he mentions Rosalind Krauss, Allan Sekula, Sally 
Stein, Victor Burgin, Christopher Phillips and John Tagg. While their work 
was largely in reaction to the medium’s ‘apotheosis as a museum object’, 
Nickel defines it as a ‘negative, iconoclastic critique’ by authors who ‘neglected 
to counter its negative critique adequately with any positive program of study 
or foundational theory of their own, or even attempt to define for the field 
coherent limits and scope’ (Nickel, 2001: 555).
5  Rosenblum, 1984; Hirsch, 1999; Marien, 2002. All three books appear in 
Amazon and Barnes and Nobles websites as the bestselling comprehensive 
academic history of photography books (keywords: ‘history of photography’; 
sort by: best selling.) In Amazon they appear after Newhall’s fifth edition 
(1982; latest print: 2010), while in Barnes and Noble Newhall’s book is 
the least popular among the four. The order of popularity is, in Amazon: 
Hirsch’s, Rosenblum’s, Marien’s; in Barnes and Noble: Rosenblum’s, Hirsch’s, 
Marien’s. Non-English-language history of photography books such as A 
History of Photography (Jean Claude Lemagny and Andre Rouille, New 
York: Cambridge University Press) and A New History of Photography 
(Michele Frizot, Koln: Konemann) have been published in only one edition in 
English, in 1987 and 1998 respectively.
6  Marien herself was one of those who pointed to a need for a new history of 
photography, in two articles from 1986 and 1995.
7  Newhall’s 1982 edition (latest reprint: 2010) is the latest and most up-to-date. 
Its publication date is the closest to the new histories’ publication dates, and 
therefore it was chosen to be compared with them.
8  Rosenblum, Hirsch and Marien mention photographers and groups of 
photographers in the US, in Northern and Eastern Europe, among them 
Jacob Riis, Lewis Hine, Berenice Abbott, the ‘New York photo league’, Bill 
Brandt, Humphrey Spender, Helmar Lerski, August Sander, and Roman 
Vishniac. Rosenblum also gives some instances of Japanese documentary 
photographers such as Kuwabara Kineo and Horino Masao. Hirsch gives 
some instances of biased photographic documentations of Native Americans. 
Marien also presents photojournalism from 1939-1945 war in this chapter, 
while the other authors present such images in a chapter on photojournalism.
9  Denning defines ‘documentary aesthetic’ as a ‘central modernist innovation’ 
(Denning, 1996: 118).
10  For an extended critical discussion of this issue, see Hurley, 1993.
11  This distinction in which Hartmann described the painterly branch of the 
movement as demises, served Newhall’s interest. It is actually cited by the 
latter, who also saw the first branch as opposed to the nature of photography. 
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However, as noted by Alison Bertrand, some photographs noted by Newhall 
as ‘straight’ were actually ‘pictorially’ manipulated. See Bertrand, 1997: 341.
12  After Lange, Newhall discusses Ben Shahn, while Marien discusses 
Arthur Rothstein.
13  Beverly W. Brannan and Carl Fleischhauer also comment that since FSA 
photographs were ‘rediscovered’ in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘the books in which 
[they] appeared usually identified them only by the name of the artist and a 
brief title… one image to a page, each one framed in white …’ They conclude 
that ‘both the passage of time and this style of publication have isolated the 
photographs, obscuring the circumstances of their creation’. See Fleischhauer 
and Brannan, 1988: 7. 14  In fact, the only photographic experiments 
that can be entitled ‘cubist’ are Alvin Langdon Coburn’s experimental 
‘Vortographs’, which are fundamentally different from Stieglitz’s work. 
15  Sekula is mentioned by Marien in another context, in a section on 
contemporary theory of photography titled ‘Thinking photography’ in the 
final chapter of the book (423).
16  This prevailing title of the photograph was actually coined by Newhall in 
his history. The original title given to it by Lange was Destitute pea pickers in 
California. Mother of seven children. Age thirty-two. Nipomo, California. 1936 
(Library of Congress, LC-USF34-009058-C).
17  However, the latter, who also comments that this image overshadowed 
Lange’s other important works, offers no single visual or verbal example of 
these important works, unlike the other new authors.
18  The instance given by Warner is a clipping from Midweek pictorial 17 Oct 
1936: 23. Library of Congress LC-USZ62-117092. http://www.loc.gov/
pictures/item/96518456/.
19  In fact, the FSA image that is perhaps the second most renowned parent-and-
children image is Rothstein’s photograph of a father and his children fleeing 
a dust storm. Farmer and sons walking in the face of a dust storm. Cimarron 
County, Oklahoma, 1936 (LC-USF34- 004052): http://www.loc.gov/pictures/
collection/fsa/item/fsa1998018983/PP/.
20  For further reading on poor agricultural workers as representing ‘citizens of 
the kind who built America’ see Cooney, 1995: 187.
21  Of the three authors, Rosenblum presents the most examples of women 
photographers. In 1994 she published A History of Women Photographers 
(Abbeville Press).
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22  Nicolas Natanson cites photographer Esther Bubley’s description of the 
hostility Parks had suffered from members of the technical team of the FSA 
photography laboratory. See Natanson, 1992: 62.
23  Warner’s case is maybe the most surprising since already in 1986 she 
published a comprehensive article on Newhall’s history (‘What Shall We Tell 
the Children?’).
24  These images appear in Rosenblum’s chapters 11 and 12: ‘Photography 
since 1950: The straight image’ and ‘Photography since 1950: Manipulations 
and color’, in Hirsch’s chapters 16, 17 and 18: ‘New frontiers: Expanding 
boundaries’, ‘Changing realities’ and ‘Thinking about photography’, and in 
Warner’s chapters 6 and 7: ‘Through the lens of culture (1945-1975)’ and 
‘Convergences (1975-present)’. In Newhall’s 1982 edition there are four 
images dated 1970 and later. They are all art. The other images in the final 
chapter, titled ‘New Directions’, are also art photographs.
25  It is worth mentioning in this regard Carl Chiarenza’s words from 1979 on 
Aaron Scharf’s book Art and Photography (1968): ‘as Scharf approached 
the last chapter of his book photography seemed to emerge slowly as art 
rather than as the something other that it was at the beginning of the book’ 
(Chiarenza, 1979: 37).
CHAPTER 2 
Painting with Light:  
Beyond the Limits of the Photograph
Melissa Miles
For the Polish-born artist, Josef Stanislaus Ostoja-Kotkowski, the colour 
and dynamism of light was a long-term fascination. After migrating to 
Australia in 1949, Ostoja-Kotkowski was captivated by the many possi-
bilities of light and sought to represent them in various aspects of his prac-
tice. Ostoja-Kotkowski is perhaps best known for his electronic art, but he 
also worked in theatre design, filmmaking, painting, photography, kinetic 
sculpture and laser art. In pursuit of the fugitive qualities of light, Ostoja-
Kotkowski crossed the boundaries of diverse mediums.
The vibrant, dazzling light that Ostoja-Kotkowski experienced while 
working at the Leigh Creek Coalfields and as a house painter in Central 
Australia during the mid-1950s captured his imagination, and he often 
spoke of his frustration that traditional artistic media could not fully con-
vey the sensation that he recalled: 
The terrific iridescence you can get behind the eyes in 
Central Australia forces you to think of the source of light – 
whether it’s beam, lantern or sun – and to think of it as the 
most impressive, most flexible and richest tool imaginable for 
an artist, the life-giving source. You come across phenomena 
which seem to wipe everything else off – something like the 
auroroa… Why couldn’t a painting change its shape, form and 
color?... It seemed to me that you could achieve this by using 
light as a tool and that the closest thing to the source of light 
we know and can handle confidently is electronics. (Thomas, 
1976: 183-4)
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Among Ostoja-Kotkowski’s various efforts to use electronics to represent 
the fluidity of light was a fascinating technique that he developed in the 
late 1950s. Using an old television set with a picture that was specially 
modified, Ostoja-Kotkowski made a series of luminous abstract photo-
graphs. Described by Ostoja-Kotkowski as ‘electronic paintings’, these 
works have remained largely neglected in histories of Australian art and 
photography and were panned by contemporary art critics. However, as 
they raise a series of compelling issues about the limits of artistic agency 
and medium specificity that anticipated many of the concerns of the cur-
rent ‘post-medium’ age, it is timely that Ostoja-Kotkowski’s ‘Electronic 
Paintings’ be reconsidered.
Figure 2.1. J. S. Ostoja-Kotkowski at Hendon, South Australia. SLSA: PRG919/4/130.
The process of making Ostoja-Kotkowski’s electronic paintings was 
complex. He began experimenting with an old television set during the 
late 1950s, and soon found that he could produce abstract forms and 
patterns by introducing extra contrast and throwing the picture out 
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of alignment and synchronisation (figure 2.1). With the assistance of 
Dr Angus Nicholson, the electronics engineer Malcolm Kay and the 
Philips Electronic Workshops at the Australian Research Laboratories at 
Hendon, South Australia, Ostoja-Kotkowski refined this process. The nor-
mal synchronising circuit of the cathode ray gun was disconnected from 
the television and a specially developed control panel helped to guide 
the random patterns that appeared on the screen (Ostoja-Kotkowski, 
1968: 5). These patterns, which could be derived from either broadcast 
television programs or from square wave and sine wave generators, were 
manipulated by magnetic fields. Ostoja-Kotkowski explains this technical 
process as follows:
A permanent magnet, or more conveniently a DC electro-
magnet can be used to bend parts of the picture while an AC 
electromagnet supplied with a current at picture repetition 
frequency (frame frequency) can be used to form swirls and 
folds, the nature of the shape depending on the phase angle 
between the magnetic field and the picture repetition fre-
quency. (1964)
Rather than being a screen for viewing images, the television was accord-
ingly transformed into a source of light for creating abstract patterns, 
which were captured with the use of a camera. The resultant ‘Electronic 
Paintings’ were the product of both chance and the artist’s skill in 
manipulating the random components that form the patterns. Ostoja-
Kotkowski’s ultimate goal was to develop a computer for electronic 
painting in which this manual operation would become redundant and 
the artist’s mental image would be transformed into an electronic paint-
ing ‘through the direct linking of thought-waves with the technical unit’ 
(Ostoja-Kotkowski, PRG919/4/1) (figure 2.2).
Although that second stage of the project was not realised, Ostoja-
Kotkowski’s experiments at Hendon enabled him to use the television as 
a controlled light source with which to create a range of expressionistic, 
abstract photographs. The glowing, swirling forms suggest rays of light 
radiating from a hidden source and fracturing through prisms. A total of 
120 of these photographs were made at this time, and 44 were selected 
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for Ostoja-Kotkowski’s solo exhibition at the Argus Gallery in Melbourne 
in June 1964.
Ostoja-Kotkowski’s photographs were enlarged up to 30 x 30 inches 
for this exhibition, and printed in black-and-white (figures 2.3 and 2.4). 
The choice of black-and-white printing, the exhibition catalogue reveals, 
was based on financial considerations rather than aesthetic ones (Ostoja-
Kotkowski, 1964). Ostoja-Kotkowski (1975) later experimented with 
colour television images projected on a large screen while working at the 
Marconi Experimental Laboratories in Chelmsford, England, but his 
‘Electronic Paintings’ shown at the Argus Gallery were to remain limited 
to the tonal possibilities of black-and-white photography due to the cost of 
colour printing at that time.
Ostoja-Kotkowski (1968: 5) was nonetheless careful not to refer to 
these works as photographs, and instead described them as ‘electronic 
paintings’ made with a brush of light and a television screen as a canvas. 
Comparable conceptions of photography as painting or drawing with 
light are as old as the medium itself, and famously found form in Julia 
Margaret Cameron’s photograph, Cupid’s Pencil of Light (1870), and 
Oskar Rejlander’s Infant Photography (1856), which both feature an 
infant, photography, drawing or painting with light. Diverging somewhat 
from these earlier notions of photography as painting with light, Ostoja-
Kotkowski maintained that his own electronic painting occurred not with 
the camera but with the electronic means of the television set – the cam-
era was merely a transparent recording device with which to fix the mov-
ing electronic image. 
Despite Ostoja-Kotkowski’s insistence upon referring to these 
black-and-white photographs as electronic paintings rather than photo-
graphs, their material connection to photography was difficult to deny. 
The celebrated modernist photographer Wolfgang Sievers did much of 
Ostoja-Kotkowski’s printing in his Collins Street photography studio in 
Melbourne. A letter from Sievers to Ostoja-Kotkowski, dated 23 May 
1964, or four weeks prior to Ostoja-Kotkowski’s Argus exhibition, sug-
gests that it is likely that Sievers printed Ostoja-Kotkowski’s ‘Electronic 
Paintings’. The modes of printing discussed in the letter and the subse-
quent installation of the ‘Electronic Paintings’ at the Argus Gallery indi-
cate that Ostoja-Kotkowski was struggling to overcome the material limits 
of photography. Sievers’s letter refers to mounting prints on pine board 
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and the use of a variety of printing papers, including Argenta Photolinen, 
which had the effect of mimicking the appearance of paintings. The 
framing and installation of the photographs also deviated from contem-
porary conventions in photography framing. Some of these photographs 
were installed in the gallery at a diagonal, some were mounted on board 
without a frame, and others were framed to resemble paintings with a sur-
rounding mount, timber frame and no glass. With titles such as Trance, 
Nymphex, Mantissa and Mask, Ostoja-Kotkowski’s ‘Electronic Paintings’ 
were further wrested from the referential domain of photography and 
placed in a more evocative, other-worldly context of illusion and abstrac-
tion. However, despite all of his efforts, Ostoja-Kotkowski later reflected 
with frustration that ‘no matter how I exhibited these results, they were 
going to be called photography and I wanted to know how to make a 
painting’ (Thomas, 1976: 184).
Ostoja-Kotkowski was trained as a painter and commented after 
embracing electronic media that he had not changed his ideas about paint-
ing, just updated his tools: ‘The idea of electronic images is a step towards 
developing a means of electronic painting which sooner or later will come 
to be practised as much as the orthodox portrayal of an idea on canvas 
or board by means of pigments, wax, oil, p.v.a., etc.’ (1964). Arguing that 
painters are behind the times in ‘fiddling with paint and brushes’, he 
insisted that art should reflect the technological developments of the day.
Figure 2.2. J. S. Ostoja-Kotkowski. Sketches for EP Development, c. 1963. SLSA: PRG919/47/205. 
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Ostoja-Kotkowski’s preference for the term ‘electronic painting’ over 
photograph must not be seen as a desire to distance himself from pho-
tography in general. Ostoja-Kotkowski was a very active and highly 
respected member of Australian and international photography com-
munities. As well as receiving awards from the Australian Photographic 
Society, publishing regularly in photography journals and presenting 
Figure 2.3. J. S. Ostoja-Kotkowski, Electronic Painting, 1965. SLSA: PRG919/4/350.
Figure 2.4. J. S. Ostoja-Kotkowski. Electronic Painting, 1965. SLSA: PRG919/4/341.
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lectures at national photography conventions, Ostoja-Kotkowski was 
given the honour of being named ‘Excellence FIAP (EFIAP)’ of the 
Fédération Internationale De L’Art Photographique in Berne, Switzerland 
in 1967 for his contributions to photography. Ostoja-Kotkowski may have 
embraced photography in other aspects of his practice, but he continually 
stressed that his electronic paintings were paintings and not photographs.
Yet critics of the Argus Gallery exhibition were unwilling to follow 
Ostoja-Kotkowski’s lead and embrace these works as a new form of paint-
ing with light and electronics. The artist often bitterly described how 
Melbourne critics considered the show worthless and a waste of time and 
money. He regularly argued that these critics were behind the times and 
lacked vision: ‘Everything with them has to be traditional. Unless you sit 
down with an easel, a paint brush and oils, to them it is not art. They can-
not understand that in this age we have to branch out into new methods. 
To paint this world of space, surely we have to use electronics’ (Batman, 
1965: 23). In an interview with Robert Scarfe in 1971, Ostoja-Kotkowski 
reflects on this dismissive reception as a major setback in his career:
That was my first exhibition and I didn’t sell a single exhibit, 
and it was a tremendous financial blow to me, and it took a 
good two to three years to recover from it. That was just 
thanks to someone who doesn’t know enough about it. There 
was only one critic who helped me in Melbourne – the rest 
were just against it, and this is very bad. (Scarfe, 1971: 9)
An analysis of the reviews of Ostoja-Kotkowski’s 1964 Argus Gallery 
exhibition suggests that critics had trouble approaching the work because 
it challenged prevailing assumptions about the limits of the medium. 
The renowned Melbourne art critic, Bernard Smith (1964: 5), asserted 
that Ostoja-Kotkowski’s ‘Electronic Paintings’ were ‘not painting’ and 
described them ambivalently as ‘moving patterns of light of an impersonal 
clinical beauty’. Alan McCulloch (1964) of the Herald similarly wrote 
that it is a ‘ghastly prospect’ that electronic images could be considered a 
substitute for painting, but conceded that the experiments were techno-
logically worthwhile. While McCulloch asserted that Ostoja-Kotkowski’s 
‘Electronic Paintings’ were not paintings, he also argued that they were 
not photographs: ‘The images look like black and white photographs of 
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the abstract constructions of the Russians, Gabo and Pevsner. They are 
not however. Photography plays a part, but the images are made electroni-
cally’ (1964: 23). Australian photography historians, who have consis-
tently excluded Ostoja-Kotkowski’s work from narratives of Australian 
photography, also seem to have accepted this argument that Ostoja-
Kotkowski’s works are not photographs. Neither paintings nor conven-
tional photographs, these works have slipped between the gaps of both 
media and history. 
Adrian Rawlins (1965: 42) provides a clue to the absence of Ostoja-
Kotkowski’s work from the history of Australian photography when he 
argues that although his electronic paintings look like photographs and 
are produced through photographic processes, they are ultimately not 
photographs because they reveal no tangible connection to ‘things’. ‘It 
isn’t a photograph’, writes Rawlins, ‘because it is not of anything’. Rawlins 
(1965: 43) likens Ostoja-Kotkowski’s works to Man Ray’s rayographs, but 
ultimately differentiates them because of ‘the organic nature of Ostoja-
Kotkowski’s motifs’. Whereas the referent is clearly visible in many of 
Man Ray’s rayographs, Ostoja-Kotkowski’s electronic paintings ‘give no 
hint of their means of production’.
 This connection between photography, its means of production 
and its object was integral to notions of medium specificity during the 
mid-twentieth century, which delimited the critical reception of Ostoja-
Kotkowski’s work. Despite the ‘essentialist connotations’ (Doane, 2007: 
129) of the term, medium specificity must be understood as a histori-
cally explicit idea that changes over time. During the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, medium specificity was closely bound to the formalist modernism 
espoused by critics such as Clement Greenberg and Beaumont Newhall, 
and placed emphasis on the material or technical means of creative 
expression. To Greenberg (1966), abstract expressionist painting repre-
sented the ultimate exemplar of modernist painting because, rather than 
claiming to offer a three-dimensional view of the world, it limited paint-
ing to the core qualities of paint applied to a two-dimensional plane.
Newhall’s concerns for photography’s unique characteristics were 
linked to the promotion of straight, un-manipulated photography. In the 
1949 edition of his book, The History of Photography, Newhall is critical of 
photographic abstraction and questions whether the more abstract works 
of László Moholy-Nagy and Man Ray can be seen as photographs at all:
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The vision which led to these applications of the photo-
graphic technique is quite separate from the vision of those 
who seek to interpret with the camera the world of nature 
and man. Viewing these photograms and solarized prints and 
distorted negatives, we are constantly reminded not of photo-
graphs, but of paintings. (1949: 211)
Although Newhall gave a more thorough account of Moholy-Nagy and 
Man Ray’s photographic abstractions in the revised and enlarged 1964 
edition of this book, his initial concerns point to the way in which abstract 
photographs unsettle assumptions about the very definitions of photog-
raphy. Implicit in Newhall’s identification of abstract photographs with 
painting is a desire to bolster the status of photographs as unmediated 
images of the ‘real’ world. 
Although Newhall later modified his approach to abstract photogra-
phy, comparable notions of medium specificity persisted in the writings 
of John Szarkowski, the influential photography curator at the Museum 
of Modern Art in New York. Published in 1966, two years after Ostoja-
Kotkowski’s first exhibition of ‘Electronic Paintings’, Szarkowski’s book 
The Photographer’s Eye reiterated some of Newhall’s thinking and sought 
to define photography’s specificity with reference to ideas of composition, 
authorship, influence and originality. According to Szarkowski (Petruck, 
1979: 206), the diverse photographs collected in his book share the com-
mon vocabulary of this independent medium: ‘these pictures are unmis-
takably photographs. The vision they share belongs to no school or aes-
thetic theory, but to photography itself [emphasis added]’. Such notions 
of medium specificity problematically leave no room for works such 
as Ostoja-Kotkowski’s ‘Electronic Paintings’, which were accordingly 
received in negative terms as ‘not photographs’ or ‘not painting’.
The assumption that photographs must be ‘of’ something is under-
pinned by the belief that light’s primary function in photography is to 
reveal and fix presence. Light is shed on an object from a place beyond 
its material and discursive limits, and then acts as a bridge connecting the 
object and the photosensitive emulsion. As a kind of fugitive printmaker, 
light inscribes the image into the photosensitive surface while ultimately 
having no visible presence in itself. It is pertinent that Ostoja-Kotkowski 
employs these same, fugitive qualities of light to exceed the limits of the 
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medium. If medium specificity speaks consciously to the constraints and 
possibilities of a given medium, as Mary Ann Doane (2007: 131) argues, 
then Ostoja-Kotkowski’s desire to embrace the immateriality of light 
through electronics marks an attempt to transcend these constraints. 
Ostoja-Kotkowski uses light to exceed the boundaries of his practice’s 
material support, whether it be painting’s brushes and paints, or photog-
raphy’s indexical connection to its object. However, light’s ultimate trans-
parency and its dependence on other objects and materials to be made 
visible ensured that Ostoja-Kotkowski’s success in this endeavour was to 
remain provisional.
Ostoja-Kotkowski was not alone in his interest in light’s transgressive 
possibilities for art. His exhibition of ‘Electronic Paintings’ coincided with 
the production and exhibition of other light-, colour- and technology-
focused practices that similarly challenged notions of medium specific-
ity. Frank Hinder’s Luminal Kinetics were made in 1967–8, and Ludwig 
Hirshfeld-Mack’s Colour-Light Plays, originally produced at the Bauhaus 
during the 1920s, were reconstructed for presentation in Australia in 
1964. Although these works suggest that there was a wider interest in 
extending the possibilities of the medium through an engagement with 
colour and light, like Ostoja-Kotkowski, Hinder complained about the 
reception of his work. State galleries may have collected his luminal kinet-
ics, but Hinder regrets that the work was not displayed because it was 
considered ‘too much trouble’ (McNamara, 2008: 13).
To many of his critics, Ostoja-Kotkowski’s use of light and electron-
ics to cross the boundaries between media resulted in a loss of the artist’s 
presence, his emotion or ‘the soul’ in his art. Neil Jillett takes a humor-
ous approach to this issue when he comments in The Age that ‘The 
works to be exhibited by Mr. Ostoja-Kotkowski at the Argus Gallery are 
so electronically avant garde that we can expect some of Melbourne’s 
best-known computers at the opening sherry party on Monday night’ 
(1964). The implication that Ostoja-Kotkowski’s electronic work speaks 
to machines more effectively than to humans recalls some of the anxiet-
ies surrounding photography when it first emerged in the nineteenth 
century. Marcus Aurelius Root’s denigration of amateur photography as 
‘mere mechanism’ during the mid-nineteenth century can be understood 
as a reaction against the conception of photography as ‘light-writing’ and 
‘sun-painting’. These photographic metaphors effectively subordinate the 
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role of the photographer as a creative agent to the productive and genera-
tive qualities of light, and position the photographer as a mere operator of 
a mechanical device – the camera (Green-Lewsis, 1996: 37–64; Edwards, 
2002: 113–8). Similarly, to many of Ostoja-Kotkowski’s critics the use of 
machines and the apparent absence of signs of the artist’s touch in the fin-
ished work, meant that artwork produced with electronics emphasised the 
mechanical over distinctly human characteristics like a soul and emotion.
Writing in Meanjin in 1966, Earle Hackett (1966: 494–5) comments 
on the lack of emotion in Ostoja-Kotkowski’s ‘Electronic Paintings’, not-
ing that there was no place ‘for sudden irrational gestures with their over-
tones of emotion.’ Elwyn Lynn (1966: 16) likewise complained that ‘one 
feels (if feeling comes into it) only retinally, not emotionally involved’. 
The painter, James Gleason (1966: 78), is scathing in his review of one 
of Ostoja-Kotkowski’s op-art exhibitions presented two years after the 
Argus exhibition: ‘These works are as perfectly finished and as immac-
ulate as things tooled by machinery instead of being shaped by fallible 
human muscle and tendon. Instead of emotion, there is clinical exacti-
tude’. Speaking more generally about Ostoja-Kotkowski’s work as op art, 
Gleason writes:
It is entirely sexless and as morally aseptic as a theorem… I 
have no doubt that some of the discoveries of Op-art could be 
used as a subtle form of torture. In the hands of an inventive 
artist-inquisitor it could become a cruel weapon. A word like 
beauty has no meaning in this context. Here we have art being 
used like a drug to produce certain physical effects. (1966: 78)
Ostoja-Kotkowski was very conscious of these concerns about emotion 
in electronics. In personal notes for a lecture, dated September 1963, he 
describes his initial worries about electronic painting: ‘The similarity [to 
painting] is obviously there, but I felt that the mechanical implications 
were too strong to allow to express the human feelings necessary to make 
a photograph a work of art’ (PRG919/1/35). In an article written several 
years later, titled ‘Prometheus unbound’, Ostoja-Kotkowski reveals how 
he came to grips with this apparent absence of human feeling in elec-
tronic art. After referring to one of his critics, Ostoja-Kotkowski (1978: 
6) writes: ‘Giving light a form is basically no different from giving paint 
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a form, or piano a sound form – it depends entirely on the artist, his abil-
ity, his quality to handle the brush, the keyboard, or whatever medium 
he has to express his SOUL’. Ultimately, to Ostoja-Kotkowski, the adop-
tion of electronic painting did not amount to the mechanisation of cre-
ative, artistic processes. Electronic painting relied upon training similar to 
that required for traditional painting, and he commented that only artists 
were capable of painting electronically. In ‘The medium is not the mes-
sage’ Ostoja-Kotkowski (1971: 24) remarked upon the need to shift focus 
away from the medium and towards the work’s meaning: ‘It is always 
the final statement of an artist that is important – not the tools he used to 
realise his idea’.
Although Ostoja-Kotkowski seeks to challenge the limits of medium 
specificity, in a formalist sense, his work may be better understood in light 
of Raymond Williams’s more inclusive interpretation of medium speci-
ficity. Published in Williams’s 1977 book Marxism and Literature, this 
approach to the medium places more emphasis upon the social and cul-
tural context in which media are practised than on their distinct mate-
rials and technologies. Understanding Ostoja-Kotkowski’s work as con-
textually embedded shifts the focus of his electronic paintings towards 
the ways in which his technologies speak to the social and cultural lan-
guage of their day. Adrian Rawlins alludes to the importance of taking a 
broader contextual approach in his own account of ‘Electronic Paintings’, 
written in 1965:
Ostoja-Kotkowski does not seek to smear art with science… 
but to free the imagination from the impediment of means. 
[His electronic drawings] give no hint of their means of pro-
duction. But their very form, because of its means of produc-
tion, is perfectly attuned to the space age… By moving into a 
polychromatic world parallel to the polychromatic world of 
movies and industrial design, Stanislaus Ostoja-Kotkowski 
begins to explore a new synthesis of art and technology which 
is perfectly in tune with today – and tomorrow. (Quoted in 
Jones, 2008: 207)
It is not simply the material conditions of a work or its technical means 
of production that constitute the media of photography, painting and 
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electronic art. Following Williams, these media can be considered the 
product of a convergence of materials, conventions and ideas that are 
brought together for different purposes. Using light, the most elusive of 
substances, as his medium and his subject, Ostoja-Kotkowski draws on 
the technologies available to him to underscore what photography might 
have in common with painting, or even sound and set design, and to show 
how those commonalities might lead to new ways of overcoming the limi-
tations of mediums.
The notion that we live today in a ‘post-medium’ era, popularised by 
Rosalind Krauss (2000: 56), among others, belies the ways in which an 
earlier generation of artists sought to create what Krauss refers to as a ‘dif-
ferent specificity’ for art. In Ostoja-Kotkowski’s practice, this specificity 
was not bound by materials or processes, but was evident in his approach 
to art itself as an expression of individual experience and subjectivity. 
Ostoja-Kotkowski has much in common with Krauss’s more recent pro-
motion of a different specificity, which purports that the most success-
ful post-medium art reflects its own practice in relation to the past, and 
acknowledges the medium specific practices that are being replaced, 
modified or combined in a self-conscious exploration of the very idea of 
art. Ostoja-Kotkowski’s practice similarly remained self-aware, as his vari-
ous lectures and publications attest, while being grounded consistently in 
a larger desire to expand the possibilities of art production and reception.
Ostoja-Kotkowski was never afraid to write an angry letter in response 
to a bad review and was fond of reminding people that he had the last 
laugh. Despite the disastrous critical reception of his ‘Electronic Paintings’ 
at the 1964 Argus exhibition, a month after the exhibition closed he was 
commissioned to make a film based on the principles of electronic paint-
ing. The film later won an Australian Film Institute silver award at the 
Melbourne Film Festival. ‘The fact that many people failed to recognise 
my work set me back financially, and the panning I received from the crit-
ics was frustrating’, he said in 1968. ‘But I know sooner or later this form 
of art will become commonplace, and the critics will have to accept it’ 
(Day, 1966). Traversing the ground between photography, painting and 
electronic image-making, Ostoja-Kotkowski’s cross-disciplinary works of 
light are imbued with a tension that can tell us much about the ways in 
which expectations of the medium historically promoted certain possibili-
ties for meaning while delimiting others. However, most importantly, an 
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analysis of these works and their modes of reception reveals how such lim-
its can be overcome to generate much dynamic and inclusive approaches 
to the role of the medium in art and art history. 
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CHAPTER 3
Why Burn a Photograph?  
A Film by Hollis Frampton
Alexander García Düttmann
Why burn a photograph? Why put it on a hotplate and let the paper 
slowly be consumed by heat? Why allow the image to go up in smoke so 
that perhaps another image must be printed before I can look at it again? 
Why engulf a photograph in flames and make it smolder until there is 
nothing left but a sort of crater in the middle, a temporary parenthesis, a 
respite, or a pit, for nostalgia? Why start with an image, a one-dimensional 
surface, and end up with cinders, a protruding grey landscape, a dark 
sculptural object, or a dirty bulky lump, that crack when touched and 
dissolve into thin air? Why move from ‘contemplative distance’ (Moore, 
2006: 60) to ‘tactile immediacy’?
Burning a photograph is different from tearing it apart. If I tear it 
apart, no matter how small the bits and pieces that will be left in the end, 
my disposition is such that to some extent I act blindly. I am so actively 
involved in what I do that I can hardly witness the photograph disappear. 
I make it disappear and I see it disappear but I do not witness its disap-
pearing. I am part of the critical mass needed for the act to come about 
and be performed. The difference between burning and tearing up a pho-
tograph is the difference between making something disappear and let-
ting it disappear, between use and mention, between a strange craft and 
art, between staying at home and having bitter thoughts about a girl who 
laughed at me outrageously and going to the cinema, or to an art gallery. 
Of course the letting will always involve some making, if only because the 
pressurized liquid gas in a lighter needs to be ignited or because the pho-
tograph needs to be placed on the hotplate. Conversely, the making will 
always involve some letting, if only because I can pause as I tear up the 
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photograph and decide whether the bits and pieces are small enough by 
now or require further downsizing. In the so-called digital age, the closest 
one tends to come to the physical experience of tearing up a photograph 
is the dissection of a credit card after its validity has expired, or after it has 
been used fraudulently by a third, unknown party. One just hopes that 
the plastic fragments will be as tiny as they need be to disallow an evil 
person from deciphering the encrypted information and emptying one’s 
bank account swiftly. 
There is something matter-of-fact about burning a photograph by plac-
ing it on a hotplate, something distanced and distancing, something that 
lacks the direct implication of the one who puts his hands to the plow, as 
it were, and tears up the photographic paper on which an image has been 
printed. A photograph burning is a spectacle for a witness who remains 
outside, on the margins, or in the wings. How often have we seen a film 
with a scene where someone strikes a match, holds a letter, an incriminat-
ing document, or a photograph, close to the flame, and then throws the 
burning paper into a fireproof receptacle while he watches it disintegrate! 
How often have we seen celluloid burned by a projector, accidentally or 
as a filmic device! And yet to place a photograph on a hotplate and see it 
disappear could be regarded as a melodramatic gesture as much as tearing 
it apart. The staging magnifies the fire, transforms it into a conflagration, 
into a public representation with flames like succulents; the act of tearing 
a photograph apart, on the other hand, has a minimizing, personalizing, or 
privatizing effect, no matter how many people actually look at the staged 
fire or participate in the manual shredding.
Torn photographs, it should be remembered, feature in Hollis 
Frampton’s Poetic Justice, the second installment of his Hapax-Legomena 
films. In Frampton’s (nostalgia), made in 1971 as the first installment in 
the series, thirteen photographs are placed on a hotplate and filmed from 
above. Steadily, the paper turns into carbon. The images become more 
and more unrecognizable as the S of the searing electric coils begins to 
leave its imprints on the paper. (nostalgia) has been called a ‘structural 
film’. Regardless of how helpful or even pertinent the term may be, the 
talk of ‘structural film’ points to the rigor of the fixed camera and the pre-
cision of the staging, to the predetermination achieved by the formal set-
up, as if Frampton had tried to keep the melodramatic impact at bay by 
making what happens in the image and on the screen as objective and 
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as anonymous as possible. What happens is out of reach. The spectator 
never catches sight of the instant when the photograph is placed on the 
hotplate, and each sequence appears to be of equal, or similar, length, with 
each repetition of a sequence anticipating the next repetition. The uncon-
trolled subjective gesture or act, the excess that cannot be accounted for, 
have been excluded, it would seem, in favor of the cold black-and-white 
ideality of the natural process of combustion.  
A voice tells the spectator details about the different photographs. 
Yet it does so in advance, ahead of the information provided to the eyes. 
The voice keeps referring to the photograph that the spectator will see 
only once the photograph he sees at the moment of listening will have 
been reduced to ashes, will have performed the burning’s little song and 
dance and will have entered the film, will have been metamorphosed 
into cinematography without leaving anything behind but dissolving 
flakes. ‘Temporality is everything’, as Rachel Moore puts it (2006: 58), a 
source of fatigue and a source of excitement. It hollows itself out. Only 
one photograph, the photograph of an artist’s lab, or a darkroom, is not 
described, or commented upon, and remains outside the series, a ‘hapax 
legomenon’ in the visual and aural realm, just as only one comment, the 
one that comes last, remains outside the series as well, for the photograph 
which it describes is never seen and perhaps cannot be seen. Is symmetry 
restored to frame the asymmetry of sound and image? If so, this symmetry 
is an open symmetry. The spectator feels that the series could have begun 
before the film starts and end after the film stops. In the film, photographs 
are alluded to that are not exhibited on the hotplate. A black screen sepa-
rates each take, the regularity of its insertion triggering a sort of mute met-
ronomic beat. The film features an aerial prologue, a sound rehearsal that 
can be heard but not seen. It includes a sentence that is never repeated, 
though it would seem to belong to the actual text: ‘These are recollections 
of a dozen still photographs I made several years ago’. If the spectator is 
not too fatigued and confused by the procedure that keeps disrupting the 
correspondence between the senses, or between the senses and sense, and 
if the spectator is still able to listen to the voice and remember what it has 
said when the next photograph is fed to the cold sun of the hotplate, to the 
light from which it originated, if, as unlikely as it may appear, the specta-
tor masters Frampton’s future perfect and engages in a mental activity, in 
a conceptual exercise of reflective coordination that protects his ears and 
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his eyes against the aesthetics, or the beauty, of a pure image and a pure 
sound, he may come up with a list of reasons why a photograph might be 
burnt. Does the burning of a photograph, the play of visibility and invis-
ibility, of chronological repetition, that is doubled by the play of sight and 
sound, of repeated non-coincidence, alert the spectator to the ‘doubling 
presence of death’ (Foucault, 1963: 77) without which one could not see 
anything, as Foucault maintains in his early study of Raymond Roussel? 
In a space and time without death, everything would be absolutely visible 
and invisible at the same time.
In the case of the photograph of Carl Andre, the artist confesses to 
seeing less and less of him in recent times, less than he would like to see 
him anyway, while there are other people, he says, of whom he sees more 
than he cares to see, more than his eyes can take, as it were. Hence burn-
ing a photograph can be a reminder that we don’t see what we ought to 
be seeing, the friends we ought to be frequenting, or that we have become 
trapped in a condition of distraction. The spectator who has watched the 
film before, or who ponders it after a first viewing, knows that Pascal is 
named towards the end of the film, though it is hard to make sense of this 
reference in the context in which it appears. As the spectator sees a pho-
tograph that Frampton made for Vogue magazine, the voice tells of a pho-
tograph that shows a man in an orchard. It is a photograph Frampton has 
found, not one he produced himself. The voice says: ‘On the other hand, 
were photography of greater antiquity, then this image might date from 
the time of, let us say, Pascal; and I suppose he would have understood it 
quite differently’. Obviously, this is also a joke, a joke about how to look at 
a photograph and what to see in a photograph, a joke about what we see 
and what we do not see when we look at a photograph. ‘Divertissement’, 
or entertainment, the attitude towards others and the world that Pascal 
batters in his Pensées, derives etymologically from the Latin verb 
‘divertere’, which means to separate, to turn away, to divert. One is enter-
tained when one’s attention is taken away from something and directed at 
something else. ‘Distraction’ comes from Latin ‘distrahere,’ to draw asun-
der or apart. Each time one wishes to be entertained, one seeks distrac-
tion. For Pascal, the distraction of ‘divertissement’ always lies in a move-
ment that tends towards the outside and, in a sense, towards itself since it 
tends not towards a goal to be attained but towards the turmoil and uproar 
that reign outside, out there. Man, trying to escape a confrontation with 
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his own condition, his own misery, looks for turmoil and uproar, for con-
stant movement, exposing himself to the trouble caused by ‘a thousand 
accidents, which make afflictions unavoidable’ (Pascal, 1977: 17). Even 
friendship, Pascal stresses, can be part of the distraction caused by ‘diver-
tissement’. He believes that few friendships would survive if one of the 
two friends knew what the other one says about him in his absence, speak-
ing ‘sincerely and without passion’ (502). One wants friends to be flat-
tered by them, not to discover the ‘depth of one’s heart’ and to see oneself 
‘as one is’. One wants friends to be able to rely on one’s ears: ‘If one con-
sults the ear only, it is because one lacks heart’ (356).  However, on one 
occasion Pascal also notes: ‘These people lack heart. One would not want 
them to be one’s friends’ (383).  Does the blocked continuity, the struc-
tural discontinuity that causes sound and image to divert and diverge, or 
that tears apart spoken comment and seen photograph, draw attention to 
the ambivalent role both the ear and the eye can play? For if, as Pascal 
stresses, finite human beings prove unable to see the infinite nothingness 
from which they stem and the infinite into which they are thrown, the 
infinitude of creation that swallows them, some such beings are still able 
to contemplate others with the ‘eyes of faith’ (210). 
Yet Frampton’s anamnestic comments on the somewhat surreal pho-
tograph of Andre’s handsome boyish face, which appears in a small pic-
ture frame next to a metronome whose large needle the sculptor’s hand 
either puts in motion or prevents from moving, also end with the ambigu-
ous words: ‘I despised this photograph for several years. But I could never 
bring myself to destroy a negative so incriminating’. The photograph is 
destroyed in lieu of the negative, as if the negative were indestructible 
and could only be destroyed symbolically, by way of destroying a printed 
image; or as if the photograph always maintained itself in reserve and 
thereby proved its indestructibility, not on account of its quality, of the 
artist’s achievement, but on account of its negativity, its incriminating 
character. Does it incriminate the artist because it reminds him of his dis-
traction or because it reminds him of his failure as a photographer? To 
know as an artist that one has produced such an image, such a negative 
is so unbearable that one cannot even go near it, let alone look at it. All 
one can do is use it, print yet another photograph and burn it yet again. 
Once the artist has ceased to distract himself, once he has discarded all 
the habitual excuses, such as his youth, his inexperience, his other, more 
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convincing work, his need to pay for the child’s schooling, his reliance 
on the art world to subsist, he realizes that what he makes turns out to 
be beyond his reach, whether in the case of a truly successful work of 
art, a work of art that truly works, as a whole or in some of its parts, or 
in the case of a truly incriminating artwork. A truly incriminating work 
is a work of art that keeps accusing the artist, judging and blaming him 
for having burdened the world with his so-called art, with something that 
will never allow itself to be incinerated, that will escape the iconoclast’s 
grasp, because it has already branded or burnt an indelible mark in the 
artist’s memory, causing him sleepless nights of never-ending insomnia. 
Frampton must have asked himself whether the artist Hollis Frampton, 
the artist Hapax Legomena, who replaced Frampton when the artist had 
grown out of one of his former selves, the artist Carl Andre and virtu-
ally all the other artists of all times, would ever forget the bullshit he had 
devised, whether any holocaust would ever be so purifying as to undo the 
negative once and for all, or whether any future metamorphosis, any res-
urrection in the future, would allow him to cease being a criminal. One 
of the first things that the voice tells us, the substitute voice, the voice of 
Michael Snow reading flatly, clumsily, casually, and perhaps in a manly 
tone a text of personal ‘recollections’, of souvenirs or postcards from the 
past written by a subject formerly known as Hollis Frampton, is that the 
portrait of Carl Andre the spectator has not seen yet is the first still photo-
graph Frampton ever made ‘with the direct intention of making art’.
Hence photographs can be burnt as a painful reminder of a distrac-
tion that threatens to render a life meaningless and as an equally pain-
ful reminder of the difficulty of destruction in art. Is it indeed possible 
to delete the traces and vestiges of art meant as art, of pretentious arti-
ness, of the frame that is not structural but ornamental? The double pain, 
real or ironic, bestows the meaning of a ritual upon the formal set-up of 
(nostalgia). Burning, when painful, means sacrificing, offering the friend’s 
image to atone for one’s betrayal of friendship, and to acknowledge the 
intractable negativity of bad art that one is incapable of abolishing. But 
since the two reasons mentioned are also incompatible with each other, 
at least to the extent that the artist must hold his friend dear to burn his 
image and remind himself of his distraction, and that at the same time the 
image he is burning is the one he must look at again and again in anger 
because he so much wants to, and cannot, destroy the negative, a certain 
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irony permeates this cinematographic ritual. As a consequence, what we 
see is what we see and yet also proves to hover undecidably between dif-
ferent meanings. What if irony were Hollis Frampton’s melodrama?
If one continues scrutinizing (nostalgia) for other reasons that might 
justify the burning of a photograph, bearing in mind that a photograph 
might be placed on a hotplate and burnt for no other reason than as an 
appealing visual device, a device fit for a film that reflects on itself as an 
experimental medium, one will find that Frampton keeps resorting to a 
moral register of friendship and an artistic register of debunking, and that 
he often does so in a humorous manner that makes light of the seriousness 
suggested by morality and art. Some of the more whimsical comments 
come across as if made up for the occasion, though, given how idiosyn-
cratic friends and artists can be, they may contain perfectly true anec-
dotes. About an unnamed married friend who has not been his friend 
‘for nearly ten years’, Frampton tells the spectator: ‘We became estranged 
on account of an obscure embarrassment that involved a third party, and 
three dozen eggs’. About his friend James Rosenquist, with whom he 
seldom meets because he and James both live far apart from each other, 
he states: ‘I cannot recall one moment spent in his company that I didn’t 
completely enjoy’. About Michael Snow’s reaction to a photograph he 
took of him and a poster he conceived for one of his shows, he observes: 
‘I recall that we worked half a day for two or three exposures. I believe 
that Snow was pleased with the photograph itself, as I was. But he dis-
liked the poster intensely. He said I had chosen a typeface that looked 
like an invitation to a church social. I regret to say that he was right. But 
it was too late. There was nothing to do about it. The whole business 
still troubles me. I wish I could apologize to him’. About a self-portrait, 
he remarks: ‘There are eleven more photographs on the roll of film, all of 
comparable grandeur. Some of them exhibit my features in more sensitive 
or imposing moods’. And Frampton adds: ‘I take some comfort in realizing 
that my entire physical body has been replaced more than once since it 
made this portrait of its face’. About an initial series of photographs that 
captured the window of a cabinetmaker’s shop on West Broadway, he 
notes: ‘I rejected it for reasons to do with its tastefulness and illusion of 
deep space’. About photographs of ‘junk and rubble’ taken in the spring 
of 1961 ‘in imitation of action painting’ and then shown to a neighbor 
who was a painter interested in ‘Old Masters,’ he says: ‘My neighbor saw 
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my new work, and he was not especially pleased’. About a likeness of 
Frank Stella that shows him blowing smoke rings, he asserts: ‘Looking at 
the photograph recently, it reminded me, unaccountably, of a photograph 
of another artist squirting water out of his mouth, which is undoubtedly 
art. Blowing smoke rings seems more of a craft. Ordinarily, only opera 
singers make art with their mouths’. When examining the photograph 
of the interior of a bank on Wall Street, made with the intention of imi-
tating Lartigue’s sense of mystery ‘without, however, attempting to com-
prehend his wit’, he bluntly declares: ‘My eye for mystery is defective’. 
When considering a photograph of Larry Poons on a mattress, made in 
a state of ecstatic happiness unrelated to the image itself and the result 
of a single exposure, he tells the spectator: ‘Months later, the photograph 
was published. I was working in a color-film laboratory at the time. My 
boss saw the photograph, and I nearly lost my job. I decided to stop doing 
this sort of thing’. Sometimes the object chosen for a photograph appears 
to be rather odd, as if the artiness had merged into the choice of object: 
‘I set up my camera above an empty darkroom tray, opened a number 
2 can of Franco-American Spaghetti, and poured it out’. But hey, such 
spaghetti did in fact exist until recently – ‘Franco-American’ is not a pun 
on America doing art but merely a brand name of the Campbell Soup 
Company. At other times, Frampton proposes an interpretation of one of 
his images that ridicules the expectations that informed beholders might 
have of photography as an art. Is he also ridiculing the image itself? He 
claims, for example, that his photograph of two adjacent toilet cubicles 
amounts to an ‘imitation of a painted renaissance crucifixion’. After 
identifying a ‘bowl with its lid raised’ as an iconic portrait of St. Mary 
Magdalene, he concludes his interpretation with the following sentence: 
‘I’m not completely certain of the iconographic significance of the light 
bulbs, but the haloes that surround them are more than suggestive’. 
So what is it, then, that Frampton holds in reserve for his last com-
ment, the one that refers to an image we never see, an impossible image? 
Sadly, it is a disappointment. The image is said to depict the open door 
of a truck that has turned into an alley, into a ‘dark tunnel with the 
cross-street beyond brightly lit’. As Frampton develops the negative, he 
becomes aware of a detail, something reflected in the rear-view mirror 
attached to the truck’s door. It is a reflection of a reflection of the almost 
invisible cross street caused by the window of a factory. Time and again, 
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the photographer enlarges the image so as to recognize what it is that 
this small section of his image reveals. He keeps failing. ‘Nevertheless, 
what I believe I see recorded in that speck of film, fills me with such fear, 
such utter dread and loathing, that I think I shall never dare to make 
another photograph again. Here it is! Look at it! Do you see what I see?’ 
Commentators have written about the allusion to Antonioni’s Blow-Up, 
although, when asked about such an allusion, Frampton did not confirm 
it. They have also speculated on whether or not, if one lets oneself be 
guided by the logic of (nostalgia) rather than the topological lay-out of 
Manhattan’s streets, the photographed reflection of a reflection could be 
a double reflection of the photographed darkroom that the spectator sees 
in the beginning (Moore, 2006: 28) and that, in the film, is not preceded 
by a comment. The darkroom would come to symbolize, or encapsulate, 
a photographer’s career, but also the incrimination of the artist whose 
relationship to his own photographs is at best ambiguous. Be it as it may, 
the final envoy, the last address or consignment that sends the spectator 
off into darkness, is too reminiscent of the photograph of Carl Andre, of 
the collapse of its manifest intention of artistry into a debacle of artiness. 
Frampton’s comment presents itself so much as the last possible comment 
on photography and art that it proves as incriminatory as the photographs 
he dismisses for confounding art with the will to art. The artist makes too 
much of an effort and, unable to end the fucking film, falls short of his 
achievement. Or perhaps he looks back when he reaches the end, loathes 
the whole endeavor, everything he has accomplished so far, and decides 
to sink the project, ruin (nostalgia) for the spectator who has patiently 
watched the film up to the point where the last comment leaves him 
alone with his own blindness, free and constrained to imagine whatever 
he wishes to imagine, maybe an ‘infinite film’ (Frampton, 2008: 36) that 
is always the same and always different, like the takes and the ashes in 
(nostalgia), for no photograph burns in the same manner as another pho-
tograph. Photographs must not even be burnt as the very fact of burning 
them may already betray an excess of seriousness, some melodrama.
The question ‘why burn a photograph?’ reveals itself to be a question 
about seriousness in life and art. It reveals itself to be a question about 
that which an artist can bring about, something that will then, strangely, 
remain out of his reach, incriminating him, returning to him without 
allowing itself to be touched, something beyond participation and for 
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this reason forever given, something forever given without ever becoming 
available. Frampton’s answer to the question ‘why burn a photograph?’ 
encourages the spectator of (nostalgia) not to let go of seriousness, to 
envisage its relevance from the limit of what may easily be dismissed as an 
exaggeration, namely the fatality of a self-incrimination rooted in life and 
art and hence indistinguishable from an incrimination that stems from 
the other, that renews itself incessantly and constantly reopens a burn-
ing wound in the mind, all the more ungraspable the more it originates 
in a comportment or in the creation of an artwork that could have been 
different. Yet in life and in art, such seriousness also requires some of the 
flippancy, the irreverence, with which Frampton treats his photographs 
and his film, but also the subjects of his photographs and their art. Retain 
the flippancy only and you get an adolescent’s enjoyment and entertain-
ment. Retain the seriousness only and you get pious artiness and self-righ-
teousness. Why burn a photograph? For no good reason. Or to testify, in 
life and in art, to the tension that traverses and exposes seriousness and 
that allows it to be seriousness in the first place. It is a tension generated 
when the out-of-reach is reached. To reach the out-of-reach is a paradox 
and thus it imposes two irreconcilable and yet equally necessary forms 
of behavior, necessary for each form of behavior to be what it aspires to 
be, seriousness and flippancy. Is Frampton, the moment he stops burning 
photographs and, regrettably, botches the end of his film, too serious or 
too flippant?
Original source and licence
‘Left’ issue (issue 8) of the online journal World Picture, summer 2013; 
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CHAPTER 4
Processing Color in Astronomical Imagery 
Kimberly K. Arcand, Megan Watzke, Travis Rector, 
Zoltan G. Levay, Joseph DePasquale,  Olivia Smarr
1. Image as translation 
Astronomy is largely funded by taxpayer dollars, and because the nature 
of the scientific process includes the dissemination of results – in the 
form of proof or a ‘public report’ (Miller, 2004: 279) – many in the pro-
fessional community believe in the responsibility of releasing meaning-
ful results to the public (Frankel, 2004: 418). Quite often, the images 
produced from astronomical data are a great asset in doing this; they 
provide a principal source of information that forms public concep-
tions about space (Snider, 2011). One can draw a parallel from Felice 
Frankel’s work in creating visually appealing images of materials science 
and the importance of producing ‘wonderful and accessible images’ to 
effectively communicate science (Frankel, 2004: 418). 
With advancements in detector technology, many astronomical 
images created today sample data from wavelengths outside those of 
human vision. These data must be translated, through the use of pro-
cessing, adding color and artifact removal, smoothing and/or cropping 
into human-viewable images. The choices involved in deciding how best 
to represent or translate such data underscore the idea that ‘what we 
encounter in the media is mediated’ (Mellor, 2009: 205). 
There is, however, a lack of robust studies to understand how people 
– particularly non-experts – perceive these images and the information 
they attempt to convey. The extent to which the choices – including 
those surrounding color – made during image creation affect viewer per-
ception, comprehension, and trust is only beginning to be more closely 
examined. For example, the influence of images in news reports has not 
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been extensively studied (Jarman et al., 2011: 4). Are there rules when 
it comes to presenting something visually that cannot be seen with the 
human eye? Is there an inherent amount of manipulation through the 
choice of color in this process of creating astronomical images? Or is it 
simply providing a proxy so that we can experience something (that is, 
views of the universe) that otherwise may not be available to us? 
The intent behind the manipulation of astronomical data for the 
creation of public images is important. The choices made by the scien-
tist must not, of course, change the overall interpretation (Rossner and 
Yamada, 2004: 11). The assumption made here is that the intent is to 
add value and information, make the presentation of the data aestheti-
cally pleasing, make the information accessible, and/or make the material 
understandable. Images can, after all, be both informational and beautiful 
(Frankel, 2004: 418). Color plays a vital role in these goals. 
But to manipulate an image responsibly, the scientist or science image 
processor must also understand the perspectives of non-experts and be 
willing to embrace openness and transparency in their work to foster 
trust with the public (Irwin, 2009: 7). We argue that non-experts may not 
necessarily perceive colors in the same way that the scientific community 
does. In fact, until recently, there has been little scholarly research into 
the differences in perception of color between lay audiences compared 
with professional scientists, in particular, astronomers and astrophysi-
cists. In this paper, we describe the current state of affairs in the creation 
of astronomical images using color, raise some of the issues in doing so, 
and outline some of our efforts to address these questions using research-
based methodologies. 
1.1 Historical notes, and image as truth 
Photographs, though made by human hands using machinery humans 
have invented, have been perceived as being free of human bias (Schwartz, 
2003: 28). Photographs have also been considered as ‘records of the real’ 
(Rothstein, 2010). Photography’s veracity, though once seen as an inher-
ently true vehicle of a snapshot in time, has seemingly decreased since 
the purported ‘reintroduction of the human hand’ (Schwartz, 2003: 30) 
through the ability to manipulate images quickly and efficiently with digi-
tal imaging software such as Adobe Photoshop. There is, understandably, 
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a negative connotation to manipulating photos, so much so that ‘to photo-
shop’ has become a pejorative verb. 
Since image manipulation is more convenient and accessible today, it 
is perhaps more in the public consciousness than it was with analog (film) 
processing. However, such control over an image’s appearance has been 
around since the beginnings of photography. Aside from deceptive or 
entertaining uses of altering photographs, a skilled darkroom technician 
can evoke detail and tonality from the negative that is not apparent in a 
‘straight’ print, using techniques including altering exposure and devel-
opment (contrast), dodging, burning, intensification, toning, etc. Ansel 
Adams, for example, was well known for his ability to adjust his pro-
cessing from exposure through printing, even though many non-experts 
would likely consider his photos to be faithful representations of well-
known landscapes (Adams and Baker, 1995). 
The correspondence between photographs of scenes and how the 
eye sees those same scenes still affirms the general truth of photographic 
images today. The question of ‘is this what it really looks like’ is commonly 
heard from the non-experts who look at astronomical images.11 How does 
the color mapping being used to create those astronomical images play 
into this assumed truth? To explore this further, one needs to understand 
the origins of the astronomical image from the first telescopes. 
2. Creation of the astronomical image 
The history of astronomical imaging arguably began in 1609 when 
Italian astronomer Galileo Galilei, with his new astronomical telescope,2 
observed craters on the surface of Earth’s Moon (figure 4.1a) and discov-
ered four lunar bodies orbiting Jupiter. He then transcribed them into 
drawn format and published his findings in 1610.3 
Astronomical imaging has been evolving ever since with the develop-
ment of increasingly sophisticated technology. For example, during the 
20th century, astronomers began making three-color composite images 
using filters on film. (Filters in this case refer to ways to limit the amount 
of light in each image. For example, some filters enable the astronomers to 
look at the light emitted by only hydrogen atoms, or in other instances, in 
the higher energies detected by the telescopes.) Making three-color astro-
nomical images involves stacking three different images of the same field 
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of view of different slices of light, typically assigning red, green, and blue 
as the colors for each layer. 
Figure 4.1a (left). Galileo’s transcription of our Moon‘s surface from Sidereus Nuncius 
in the 17th century. (Credit: Wikimedia Commons.) Figure 4.1b (middle). One of the 
oldest surviving daguerreotype images of the Moon, from 1852, taken by John Adams 
Whipple (Credit: Harvard/Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:1852_Moon_byJAWhipple_Harvard.png). Figure 4.1c (right). The Moon in X-ray 
light, taken in 2001 by the Chandra X-ray Observatory. (Credit: NASA/CXC/SAO)
During the second half of the 20th century, there were major advances 
for astronomical telescopes on the ground with larger and more sophisti-
cated mirrors being constructed (DeVorkin, 1993). This period also saw 
the dawn of the Space Age (Portree, 1998), of which astronomers were 
eager to take advantage (for example, Tucker and Tucker, 2001: 28). By 
being able to launch telescopes into space, astronomers could build detec-
tors and other instruments that were sensitive to ultraviolet, X-ray, and 
other types of light that are absorbed by the Earth’s atmosphere. Given 
these new technologies, and specifically since the launch of NASA’s 
Hubble Space Telescope, the period since the 1990s is considered a ‘new 
era’ for astronomy (Benson, 2009: 322). There are now many space-based 
telescopes and observatories on the ground available to look at a wide 
range of different types of light from the cosmos. Astronomical data from 
such modern telescopes are no longer captured on film. They are instead 
natively digital and arrive from the telescope in a form that generally 
requires processing in order to create an image. 
This boon in astronomical data also means that today we find popular 
media flush with astronomical images. But the transition in science image 
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communication from hand-drawn observation to emerging photomechan-
ical techniques in astrophotography and the most advanced space-based 
optics today reflects a shift in the purported subjectivity of the scientist 
when producing these images as vehicles of visualizing his or her data. 
Mechanically produced images were assumed to eliminate the ‘meddling’ 
mediation of the human hand – an instrument having no will, desires, or 
morals of its own (Daston and Galison, 1992: 83). But as the next sec-
tion notes, complete objectivity and neutrality in the interpretation of 
scientific data into the pictorial form is not feasible, nor is it desired. The 
science embedded in the image often informs the human choices for the 
color composite. 
2.1 The processing pipeline 
2.1.1 Translation from 1’s and 0’s into pixels 
As mentioned previously, modern astronomical images – whether from 
an optical telescope like the Hubble Space Telescope or one that looks at 
X-rays like the Chandra X-ray Observatory – are inherently digital. When 
a satellite, for example, observes an object in space, its camera records the 
exposure of light-sensitive electronics to photons. These exposure record-
ings then come down to Earth from the spacecraft via a network in the 
form of 1’s and 0’s. Scientific software then translates that data into an 
event table that contains the position and, in some cases, certain informa-
tion for the time and energy, of each photon that struck the detector dur-
ing the observation. The data is further processed with software to form 
the visual representation of the object as pixels (Rector, 2007: 599). 
2.1.2 Mapping color 
Color plays an important role in human perception and culture, and also 
has some meaning in the realm of science. The spectrum of light that can 
be detected with the human eye can be broken into various colors from 
red to green to violet. In astronomy, these colors are applied to wave-
lengths of light far beyond the range humans can see. Using telescopes 
in space and those on the ground, astronomers can now ‘see’ from radio 
waves to gamma rays, across the full range of the electromagnetic spec-
trum (see figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2. Electromagnetic radiation comes in a range of energies, known as the 
electromagnetic spectrum. The spectrum consists of radiation such as gamma rays, 
X-rays, ultraviolet, visible, infrared, and radio. (Illustration: NASA/CXC/SAO)
The data that are received by telescopes originates as variations of bright-
ness with no inherent color. Color must then be added to the image. To 
do this, scientists or science image processors put together a color map 
that ‘translates’ portions of the data to various colors that can be seen with 
the human eye. 
Here we take this opportunity to raise the issue of false color. The 
term false color is often used to describe astronomy images whose colors 
represent measured intensities outside the visible portion of the electro-
magnetic spectrum.4 But a false color image is not wrong or phony as the 
term might imply (Hurt, 2010). It is a selection of colors chosen to repre-
sent a characteristic of the image (intensity, energy, or chemical composi-
tion, for example). False color images are not actually ‘false in any sense 
of the word, but only a matter of different visual codes’ (Snider, 2011: 9). 
The colors used are representative of the physical processes underlying 
the objects in the image.5 Alternatively, a scientist or image processor may 
want to be able to differentiate between low, medium, and high energy, 
assigning red, green, and blue (RGB) in a ‘chromatic order’ (Wyatt, 2010: 
35) from low to high energy as it does in a rainbow. 
This use of RGB for low, medium, and high energies can be applied to 
wavelengths that fall outside human vision. For this first example, we look 
at the black hole at the center of the Milky Way, known as Sagittarius 
A* (figure 4.3a) as observed by the Chandra X-ray Observatory. In this 
image, the X-rays near the black hole (seen as the bright white structure 
in the center) and greater surrounding area are shown in three colors: red 
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(2-3.3 keV), green (3.3-4.7 keV), and blue (4.7-8 keV).6 All of these X-ray 
wavelengths are invisible to the human eye but can be seen in relation to 
one another through an application of color. 
As we mentioned earlier, some astronomical images are colored to 
highlight certain scientific features in the data. For example, an image of 
supernova remnant G292 (figure 4.3b) shows colors that were selected to 
highlight the emission from particular elements such as oxygen (yellow 
and orange), neon (red), magnesium (green), and silicon and sulfur (blue).7 
Again, this is an image made from X-ray light. Each color represents the 
specific wavelengths of light that each element gives off or is absorbed in 
this environment. Compare figures 4.3b and 4.3c; the colors added in 
4.3b provide additional insight into physical characteristics of the X-ray 
gas in this supernova remnant that could not be gleaned from the black 
and white image. 
In both cases, the choice of color is contributing to the informational 
quotient of the image because the colors reflect the processes inherent in 
these objects. When color maps are combined, they yield ‘new insights 
into the nature of the objects’ (Villard, 2010). However, since the selection 
of wavelengths and decisions on color are not standardized, it may be con-
fusing to non-experts and lead to perceptions of phoniness in the images.
Figure 4.3a (left) Sagittarius A* in X-ray light. Figure 4.3b (middle) Supernova 
remnant G292 in X-ray light. Figure 4.3c (right) Raw, unprocessed broadband 
X-ray image of supernova remnant G292. (Credit: NASA/CXC/SAO)
How does all of this relate to the ethical issues of color representation? For 
one, it exemplifies the idea that scientists and their collaborators make use 
of interpretation, selection, judgment, and artistry (Daston and Galison, 
1992: 98) when deciding how to represent specific scientific data. To put 
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it another way, both scientific and aesthetic choices are being made when 
an image is created. Modern astronomical images function as ‘an illustra-
tion of the physical properties of interest rather than as a direct portrayal 
of reality as defined by human vision’ (Rector, 2005: 197; see also Rector, 
2007). The next section of this paper examines the various degrees of 
manipulation possible in the color mapping of astronomical images and 
whether those decisions might be perceived as ethical by non-experts. 
3. Other colorful examples
3.1 A recognizable object seen differently 
While perhaps not considered by the greater public to be an astronomi-
cal object, the Sun, of course, is our closest star. The most common view 
of our Sun is that as seen from the ground: an unchanging yellow disk. 
Images from NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) reveal the Sun 
(figure 4.4a) in a much different way. Using detectors that observe in 13 
distinct wavelengths from X-ray to ultraviolet, the space-based SDO cap-
tures curving and erupting prominences, and the features in the images 
trace magnetic field structure. The hottest areas appear almost white 
while the darker areas indicate cooler temperatures on our local star. The 
colors assigned as presented in this tableau of solar images8 are somewhat 
arbitrary in hue and saturation. However, when colors are combined to 
create a multiwavelength view of the Sun, colors are chosen in an RGB 
ordering according to temperature. In the single wavelength views, these 
images seem to ‘flaunt’ their color (Wyatt, 2010: 35), almost purposefully 
making the familiar unfamiliar. Is this more acceptable because the Sun 
is an easily recognized object by most citizens of our planet? It could be 
that because the color is so unexpected, it immediately functions as a 
visual cue that the color is not being presented as reality but rather as a 
layer of information for the viewer. Similarly, this might be part of the 
reason why brightly false-colored radar maps on the nightly news are 
acceptable (figure 4.4b). Foreign colors on recognized objects have less of 
a claim to veracity. Their point is, perhaps, clearer to the viewer. If one 
observes, however, that images ‘are not self-explanatory’ but rather that 
they ‘need to be interpreted, and the human task of interpretation is often 
a [big] obstacle’ (Gladwell, 2004: 2), then there is still a risk of non-experts 
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misunderstanding the purpose of color, even on a recognizable object 
that is not being understood as ‘true’. This is particularly the case when 
no explanation of the color table is offered with the images. The satellite 
imagery for weather forecasts still utilizes color for a specific purpose – 
indicating variations in temperature or precipitation, for example – and 
either it is accompanied with a color legend or with verbal or textual nar-
ration. Any solar images would also benefit from clear, descriptive infor-
mation to explicitly relate the purpose of the color. 
Figure 4.4a (left) Multi-bandpass images of the Sun. (Courtesy of NASA/SDO and the AIA, EVE, 
and HMI science teams.). Figure 4.4b (right) Satellite imagery of Asia. (Credit: The Weather Channel) 
In another sense, the recognizable object can be something that grounds 
an unfamiliar and exotic process to a shared experience or common con-
ception through the use of the visual metaphor (Frankel, 2002: 254). 
For example, figures 4.5a and 4.5b present a 2010 Chandra X-ray 
Observatory press release that shows a multiwavelength view of the 
massive galaxy M87. The galaxy harbors a super massive black hole at 
its center, producing massive jets of energetic particles, creating shock-
waves that ripple throughout the galaxy. This process was compared with 
images and video of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajokull, which erupted 
in 2010 and showed analogous shockwaves to those seen in M87. The 
color choice for the galaxy image added to the analogy with warm and 
cool hues providing contrast to the shockwaves in a similar way as was 
seen in the volcano imagery. 
84 Arcand, Watzke, Rector, Levay, DePasquale, Smarr
3.2 Cultural norms and misconceptions 
NGC 4696 is a large elliptical galaxy in the Centaurus Galaxy Cluster, 
about 150 million light years from Earth. This composite image that was 
released to the public (figure 4.6a) shows a vast cloud of hot gas (X-ray = 
red) surrounding high-energy bubbles (radio = blue) on either side of the 
bright white area around the supermassive black hole.9 
Astronomers and other experts in this area understand that the color 
blue physically represents higher temperatures than red does. (Blue 
stars, for example, can burn at temperatures that are tens of thousands of 
degrees higher than red stars.) 
However, most non-experts consider red to be hotter than blue. In 
a study done on this particular image of NGC 4696, 71.4% of the non-
scientist study participants thought red was hotter than blue (Smith et al., 
2010). To get across the point that this image is an immensely hot cloud of 
gas, the image processors inverted the more traditional, physically aligned 
color scheme and colored the highest-energy/hotter-temperature features 
red (figure 4.6a). Figure 4.6b shows the color mapping that is more typi-
cal of astronomical images, where the band passes are in chromatic order 
(red, green, and blue are mapped from low to medium to high energies, 
respectively). The use of color here might be viewed as perpetuating a 
misconception. One could question if it is the responsibility of the scien-
tist to correct or disabuse common notions, such as that red is hotter than 
blue. The primarily red image seems to convey – in a cultural language 
– the extreme heat of this object better, even though its color mapping 
Figure 4.5a (left) M87 in X-ray (blue) and radio (red) light. Figure 4.5b (right) Icelandic 
volcano Eyjafjallajokull. (Credit: NASA/CXC/SAO; Volcano image: Omar Ragnarsson) 
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might be considered by the scientific community to be non-standard. The 
responsibility may in fact fall to both scientists and the public to develop 
a mutually consistent visual literacy, a framework from which to view and 
understand these images (Trumbo, 1999). 
Is it the case that one must ‘be true to the real nature of science, not 
to an idealized preconception’ of that science (Ruse, 1996: 304)? Or can 
one also ‘acknowledge the realities of human nature’ and make choices 
for the greater good – that is, choices that reflect the greater number of 
people who would then understand that image in a more meaningful way 
(Ruse, 1996: 304)? Aligning these images to cultural norms (regarding 
the perception of color, at least) might make the image and the science 
more trustworthy and relatable for the non-expert. Though it may seem 
counterintuitive not to explicitly follow the highest degree of ‘truth’ rep-
resented in the data of a scientific image, the benefits of following cultural 
norms could outweigh the risks – particularly when the reasoning behind 
the choice is properly explained. 
4. Discussion: color and construction 
The examples above are just a small sample of the different ways astro-
nomical data can be presented. The images are constructed from actual 
data. They look different due to the subjective choices of the scientist 
and science image processors – including choices of color. As Trumbo 
notes, ‘these seemingly simple considerations determine what the viewer 
encounters and ultimately contribute to what the viewer understands’ 
Figure 4.6a. Alternating colors: red (Figure 4.6a, left) and blue (Figure 4.6b, right) color-coded 
versions of galaxy NGC 4696 in X-ray, infrared, and radio light. (Credit: NASA/CXC/SAO) 
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(Trumbo, 2000: 387). How is it possible to maintain (or obtain) public 
trust in colored science images such as these? 
Perhaps the way to do this is two-fold: through transparency and a 
more active provision of information. If non-experts can develop a visual 
literacy through access to the choices made – and to the information on 
why these choices need to be made in the first place – then it may be 
possible to decrease any feelings of the public being misled (at best) or 
deceived (at worst). Opportunities to provide viewers with a more com-
plete narrative of the choices being made might include systematically 
posting raw (unmanipulated), black and white versions of the data that 
the scientist first analyzes. It could also be helpful to provide more oppor-
tunities for non-experts to see behind any ‘Wizard of Oz’ curtain directly 
and be able to manipulate astronomy images themselves using free and 
open-source software, such as some observatories are starting to do.10 
Some steps are being taken to address these questions through ana-
lytical research. In 2008, the Aesthetics and Astronomy11 (A&A) project 
at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory was formed to help better 
understand and clarify how non-experts perceive astronomical images. 
The goal of this project is to help provide scientists and science communi-
cators with a more informed consensus on the perspectives of non-experts 
and help make these questions become less of an ethical issue. The A&A 
program consists of experts from a variety of fields including astrophysi-
cists, education and public outreach professionals, and aesthetics experts 
from the field of psychology. By conducting both online and focus group-
based studies, the A&A has begun to tackle the issues of color in astro-
nomical images. 
A project such as A&A represents an important step in better under-
standing how people of various backgrounds consume and relate to scien-
tific images. The visual products of science are embedded with a sense of 
authority of the science itself. The color images are created to represent 
and visualize the science, but they are seldom actually used to do the sci-
ence. There are rigorous techniques used by researchers to analyze their 
data. In other words, the scientific results are not subjective in the way 
the color images are. This authority is ‘enhanced by the traditional uni-
directional model of science communication to the public’ (Greenberg, 
2004: 83). This is likely even more of the case when the process by which 
the image was produced is very complex – and with many choices having 
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been made by the scientist – so much so that non-experts become less 
likely ‘to engage critically with it’ (Greenberg, 2004: 83). That authority 
then, when unquestioned, can become more powerful. By not spelling 
out the various enhancements for the greater good, astronomy profession-
als risk embodying that lack of questioning as to how an image was made 
and how those decisions affected the final product. One of the goals of the 
scientist or science communicator is to help facilitate engagement with 
the audience in a ‘dialogic, “two-way” or “bottom-up” approach – sci-
ences on one side, in a more symmetrical relationship with publics on the 
other – where openness and transparency are valued’ (Holliman, Jensen, 
2009: 37). One objective in creating images should be making the images 
and the science they embody accessible to the non-experts to which they 
are being presented. 
5. Summary and conclusion 
Modern telescopes and the availability (online and otherwise) of the 
many resulting images have helped make astronomical imagery visible. 
People can experience a deep personal reaction to astronomical images 
(Arcand & Watzke, 2011), and some of that emotion may be influenced 
by the choice of color. Enhancing astronomical images with color adds to 
the information quotient of the image and enhances the aesthetic appeal. 
This aestheticism appeals to a pre-existing ‘sensibility’ within the viewer 
and can elicit an emotional response that ‘entrances’ or otherwise seduces 
the viewer (Hall, 1996: 28). These images are also of highly ‘exotic and 
inaccessible’ (Hall, 1996: 20) processes and phenomena that make the 
pictorial representation of the data as well as visual metaphors impor-
tant and useful. Taken in context with the text of a science article, these 
images ‘are not simply adjuncts to the written word; they are integral to 
the process of meaning making’ (Jarman et al., 2011: 4). 
In order to help establish or maintain public trust in the representa-
tion of such scientific data, it is imperative that additional transparency 
is provided by the image creator to reveal details on how the images were 
made, including the choices of colors for each image and why those colors 
were chosen. If the greater public perceives an image to have been ‘faked’ 
or otherwise believes the use of false color has no purpose but to mislead, 
then this undermines the credibility of the science that is being conveyed. 
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Likewise, it is incumbent upon the public to develop and embrace a 
visual literacy to enable a critical reading of these images (Trumbo, 2000; 
Jarman et al., 2011). This issue of accountability and full disclosure is 
important to reconcile the perceived ‘truth’ in an image derived from 
manipulated data. 
Though color to the scientist might not be the most important fac-
tor of the research result, color to the non-expert is perceived as having 
importance. It is the way our minds function every day in a cultural con-
text, from the red traffic light telling a driver to stop to the yellow tinge of 
a baby’s skin being a clue to jaundice or a green hue in the sky warning 
of bad weather. These colored pixels have power, and they convey mean-
ing. These visual representations of data tell a story and say that the ‘role 
of the image in the communication of science is an increasingly complex 
one’ (Trumbo, 2000:380). 
In summation, for astronomy it is not feasible to have a rigidly stan-
dardized treatment of color due to the inherent complexity of the data 
and the many types of data being used. However, it should be possible to 
convey the imagery with such transparency that the aesthetic appeal is 
maximized while assuring the greater public that scientific integrity has 
been maintained, and subjectivity made plain, to aid in their interpreta-
tion and critical reading of the visual representation. Effectively commu-
nicating the science of the universe continues to be challenging, yet offers 
significant rewards for expert and non-expert alike. 
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Notes
1  For example, as noted during a focus group at the Smithsonian 
Astrophysical Observatory for the Aesthetics & Astronomy research project, 
December 2010.
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2  Note that Thomas Harriot’s telescope preceded Galileo’s as the first 
astronomical telescope, though Galileo’s findings are considered to be more 
significant. See Edgerton Jr, S. Y. (1984) ‘Galileo, Florentine “Disegno,” and 
the “Strange Spottednesse” of the Moon‘, Art Journal, Vol. 44 (3): 225-232.
3  Galileo‘s drawings of the moon allowed him to argue that the lunar surface 
was filled with mountains and valleys. This was in direct contradiction 
with Aristotelian doctrine stating that all celestial bodies were perfectly 
smooth. See Whitaker, E. A. (1978) ‘Galileo’s Lunar Observations and the 
Dating of the Composition of “Sidereus Nuncius”’, Journal for the History of 
Astronomy, 9: 155-169.
4  See also http://chandra.si.edu/photo/openFITS/overview.html by Chandra 
EPO Group at SAO (DePasquale, Arcand, Watzke et al., 2009).
5  It might be desirable to replace the term false color with representative color 
to help remove some of the negativity that the inclusion of false helps summon 
(Christensen et al., 2008: 20).
6  Where keV equals kilo-electron volts, a unit of energy being observed.
7  See ‘Chandra Images and False Color’, ed. Chandra EPO Group at SAO 
(Arcand, Watzke et al., 2005), http://chandra.si.edu/photo/false_color.html.
8  Images from http://sdo.gsfc.nasa.gov/data/ (November, 2011).
9  For more on this object see http://chandra.si.edu/photo/2006/bhcen/. 
Chandra EPO Group at SAO (Edmonds, Watzke, Arcand et al., 2006).
10 Examples of publicly-oriented open-FITS programs are at http://chandra.
si.edu/photo/openFITS/, http://www.spacetelescope.org/projects/
fits_liberator/datasets_archives/.
11 http://astroart.cfa.harvard.edu/
II The Image in Motion

CHAPTER 5
It Has Not Been – It Is.  
The Signaletic Transformation 
of Photography
Mette Sandbye
In 2011, the use and distribution of private photographs on websites 
such as Facebook, Picasa, and Flickr was as extensive as never before. 
Millions of photographs of private and apparently insignificant everyday 
moments and situations were being uploaded daily.1 Also, in that year, 
Swiss-American UK-based artist and composer Christian Marclay (born 
1955) won the exclusive Venice Biennial Golden Lion Grand Prize for 
his film The Clock from 2010. It is a 24-hour-long film that painstakingly 
assembles sampled sequences from a massive number of movies to take 
the viewer through a full day. At the same time, the film is synchronized 
to real time: that is, to the time in which it actually plays. In this arti-
cle, I intend to show a connection between several seemingly disparate 
elements: Marclay’s film and a film by another artist, David Claerbout 
(born in 1969); the general development of digital amateur photography; 
and ‘the paradigm of the signal’, as Bodil Marie Thomsen calls one of the 
major recent developments within electronic and digital media. I intend 
to show how we can grasp and use this concept of ‘the signaletic’ with 
regard to the medium of photography in order to describe and to theo-
rize the new use of digital photography. Departing from The Clock, but 
analyzing another art work more in depth, namely Belgian artist David 
Claerbout’s video Sections of a Happy Moment (2007), I will show how 
contemporary artworks can give insight into what happens with pho-
tography in the light of its recent and very radical digital changes. I will 
argue that concepts such as presence, performance, and even aesthetic 
involvement are much more relevant than realism, nostalgia, and the 
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freezing of time to describe what goes on in the new digital photography. 
Inspired by the concept of ‘the signaletic’, I will propose a new under-
standing of photography as a social device related to everyday life, to com-
munication, to presence, and to the blurring of boundaries between fic-
tion and reality, the body, and the outside world.
Photography and Web 2.0
Maybe what’s happening now to photography was always 
its destiny and fate. But it’s not the end of photography. It’s 
rather the end of photography as we know it. To understand 
this change, we need a new media ecology.2 
When digital photography became widespread in the mid-1990s, people 
started to predict the ‘death of photography’, referring especially to its 
realism and non-manipulated objectivity, but analog photography has 
always been manipulated to a certain degree. Instead, I will propose that 
the real change when it comes to the conception and use of photography 
came much later, namely with the Internet, the advent of Web 2.0 and 
its focus on user-generated content. Especially, vernacular photography 
has changed dramatically in less than a decade, to such an extent that we 
can now talk about analog ‘old photography’ and digital ‘new photogra-
phy’. When we use these terms it is important to underline that the con-
cept of the ‘new’ is very much related to the use of photography, which 
has changed dramatically with the advent of the Internet. Photography 
is not any more what it was when both the general public and the fol-
lowing development of a theory of photography during the twentieth cen-
tury connected the medium with realism, objectivity, indexicality, and a 
melancholic freezing of the past, preserving it for eternity. Although the 
‘old’ photography – as articulated by the early phenomenological photog-
raphy theories of André Bazin and Roland Barthes – confirmed ‘what-has 
been’ (Barthes, 1981) and fulfilled a ‘mummification desire’ to embalm 
time (Bazin, 1980), the new digital practices on the Internet show ‘what-
is-going on’, i.e. presence.
When I look at almost any of the millions of publicly accessible pri-
vate photography albums available, for instance, on Picasa or Facebook, 
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I am struck by at least two major differences from traditional analog 
photography albums: first, a specific situation is often depicted in many 
almost identical images, with sometimes up to several hundred of them 
being stored in albums as an archival database. This presentation is, of 
course, due to the fact that taking as many photographs as you want of a 
given situation is free, whereas before you had to pay for the development 
of each analog photograph and thus became more cautious about how 
many you actually took. But the technological development has opened 
up the possibility of using the still camera in a more ‘filmic’ way, using 
exposure times of several seconds. In that way, you can take photographs 
that unfold in time without them becoming a film – and many people do 
indeed use that possibility. These stored photographs thereby enhance 
the feeling of experiencing a moment rather than embalming it. Second, 
and this, of course, relates to the same technological development, the 
subject of the image is often much more apparently insignificant than 
with ‘old photography’: a flower, a cat, a half-eaten meal, 50 images of two 
kids playing in a swimming pool, and 30 images of a cloud crossing the 
sky. I would propose that these images are presented in public on a global 
scale in order to communicate the feeling of being present with an audi-
ence, known or unknown.
Today photography is predominantly a social, everyday activity rather 
than a memory-embalming one, creating presence, relational situations, 
and communication as well as new affective involvements between bod-
ies and the new photographic, media-convergent technologies, such as the 
mobile phone. Look at people taking photos in the streets during spectac-
ular events as well as in their daily lives: the camera(-phone) is often held 
at a distance, with the outstretched arm functioning as a bodily exten-
sion, whereby we ‘touch’ the world, and the assessment of the photograph 
immediately following the shooting situation is part of a social act. In light 
of this epistemological change, the medium of photography demands a 
reformulation, one that photographic historians and theoreticians have 
had problems articulating. Increasingly, everyday amateur photography 
will be regarded as a performative practice connected to ‘presence’, as 
opposed to the storing of ‘precious’ memories for eternity, which is how it 
has hitherto been conceptualized.
In 2001, the first mobile phone camera was put on the market, but 
it only took off in 2004, the same year that the web platform Flickr was 
98 Mette Sandbye
launched. Photography is a central part of these new digital communities 
in Web 2.0. Photography is converging not only with the Internet but also 
with mobile phones. In 2004, 246 million camera phones (mobile phones 
with digital cameras) were sold worldwide – nearly four times the amount 
of the sales of digital cameras. And mobile phone commercials increas-
ingly highlight the camera. While ‘analog photography’ was directed at a 
future audience (because it took time to have the film roll developed and 
the images printed), pictures taken by camera phones can be seen imme-
diately by people at-a-distance who are in possession of mobiles equipped 
with an MMS or email service. In the United Kingdom, where around one 
in two mobiles were camera phones in 2007, ‘448,962,359 MMS picture 
messages were sent in 2007, the equivalent of 19 million traditional (24 
exposure) rolls of camera film’.3 The affordances of digital photography 
potentially make photographic images both instantaneous and mobile.
‘New’ photography
Within the past 5-7 years, the material base of photography has been rev-
olutionized to such an extent that we can talk about ‘new photography’, 
the digital. The future of the medium seems inextricably linked to mobile 
phones and to the Internet and, to a much lesser degree, to paper images, 
albums, and traditional cameras. All this indicates that digital photog-
raphy is a complex technological network in the making rather than a 
single fixed technology. We therefore also need to rethink the theory of 
photography. Although photography scholars used to theorize photogra-
phy as a distinct technology with a ‘life of its own’, photography has now 
converged with the omnipresent technologies of the Internet and mobile 
phones. We cannot theorize or research amateur photography in particu-
lar without including such media. At the same time, this convergence of 
new media and the proliferation of amateur photography does not mean 
the end of photography, as many proclaimed with the advent of digital 
photography around 1990, but the end – or at least the radical change 
– of photography ‘as we know it’, as Martin Lister states in the quote 
above. These developments represent a radical moment, a paradigm shift, 
in the understanding and conception of photography. Instead of terms 
such as index, referent, nostalgia, melancholic freezing, and mummifi-
cation desire, we need a new conceptual framework to fully grasp and 
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acknowledge the change of the medium of photography with digital cam-
eras, Web 2.0, and mobile phones: a new media ecology, as Lister calls it. 
Here, the concept of ‘the signaletic’ as developed in Bodil Marie Stavning 
Thomsen’s article, ‘Signaletic, Haptic and Real-time Material’ (2012), 
seems highly applicable to the medium of photography. 
While much (earlier) writing on digital photography either focussed 
on the dualism truth/analog vs. construction/digital or resembled techno-
logical determinism by only considering technical affordances, today we 
must realize that technologies cannot be separated from embodied prac-
tices, from doings. The specific affordances of technologies shape, but do 
not determine, whether and how they can be used and made sense of in 
practice. This also means that digital photographs can be many different 
‘things’, according to how they are made meaningful and performed in 
specific contexts. Photography must be understood as, at the same time, a 
social practice, a networked technology, a material object, and an image. 
Both the phenomenological version of photography as a memento mori 
and the sociological (Bourdieu) and constructivist approach (represented 
especially by the Anglo-American school of Discourse Criticism, with 
scholars such as John Tagg, Allan Sekula, and Martha Rosler) must be 
supplemented by an analytical approach that includes the practices, the 
affect, as well as the performative self-construction, and the creation of 
‘presence’, sociability, and community that is embodied in everyday digi-
tal photography.
It is most remarkable that one of the most widely read anthologies on 
photography, The Photography Reader, opens with the question ‘What is 
a photograph?’ (Wells, 2003: 1) and that methodology books and read-
ers on visual culture almost exclusively discuss the methods to analyze 
photographs that already exist as signs to be deciphered – as if they were 
texts. One of the more recent general overviews of the state of the the-
ory of photography is James Elkins’s Photography Theory (2007). In this 
book, the main theoretical foci are (still) the questions of indexicality, 
truth, and referentiality, that is, the question of what photography is. It is 
highly problematic that photography as a practice has been so relatively 
little discussed in academic photography literature. Technology cannot 
be separated from the question of performative practice. The performa-
tive aspects of photography are obvious not only when people take pho-
tographs, staging and posing, but also when editing their photographs, 
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putting them in frames and albums, on blogs, and on websites. An impor-
tant aspect of photography as performance is to articulate and transmit a 
feeling of presence. 
Clocks and moments
I will now return to the question of how a work of art can assume the func-
tion of articulating sensations and new emotional, as well as conceptual, 
paradigms and epistemologies in other ways than descriptive and/or ana-
lytical terms, i.e. how a work of art can provide us with the insights that 
academic literature on photography is lacking. There are many explana-
tions behind the allure of Christian Marclay’s 2011 Golden Lion-winning 
film The Clock. First of all, the cinematic experience of floating in a com-
fortable sofa in a dark cinema room in the middle of the hot, buzzy, and 
very fatiguing adventure that is the Venice Biennial, experiencing a seem-
ingly unending row of clips with famous actors from famous Hollywood 
films, was fantastic. In that sense, the film can be seen as a tribute to the 
classic Hollywood film and the film experience per se. The Clock, which 
lasts 24 hours, is constructed out of moments in cinema when time is 
expressed or when a character interacts with a clock, or just a particular 
time of day, where a clock appears in a specific film. It is about how time 
gets lived in movies and portrayed back to us. You could even argue that 
we learn to live out time partly by having seen how it plays out in film. 
Among the thousands of clips collected and sampled by the artist dur-
ing several years, the film includes clips from such diverse films as High 
Noon, starring Gary Cooper; Titanic, with Leonardo DiCaprio; Easy 
Rider, with Peter Fonda; and the Arnold Schwarzenegger action movie 
Eraser. It is, of course, not a real-time movie but rather a simulation of the 
experience of time passing. At the same time, as the film thematizes time 
and our constant dependence on and interaction with clocks, it transfers a 
bodily experience of the passing of time in itself directly to the audience, 
since the film is synchronized to the real time of the actual screening of it. 
The film itself thus functions as a clock. So when it was 1.15 PM in the 
film, it was 1.15 PM in Venice. The film manages to depict the passing of 
time at the same time as the bodily feeling of being in time, in a very origi-
nal way. In 1907, the French philosopher Henri Bergson wrote Creative 
Evolution, in which he articulated a phenomenological experience of 
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time being divided between the rational, cosmological, measurable time 
and the sensed, psychologically and personally experienced time, la 
durée: an opposition that has been a focal point for phenomenology dur-
ing the twentieth century. I would suggest that Marclay’s film simulta-
neously includes both aspects of time, and in that sense, it points toward 
an alternative way of understanding the relationship between time and 
visual media.
But, let me turn to another film that condenses this experience to 
the medium of photography and thereby brings us even further in the 
search for an understanding of the new media ecology of photography: 
Sections of a Happy Moment (2007) by Belgian artist David Claerbout.4 
It is a 25-minute-long video consisting of b/w still images of the same con-
structed family photograph ‘decisive moment’. In the silent and therefore 
non-dialogue film we meet an Asian-looking family consisting of what 
appears to be six family members in the courtyard of a nondescript high 
rise estate. A little boy has just thrown a ball in the air to a girl that seems 
to be his sister, who raises her arms to catch the ball. We watch the two 
children and the other four family members, two men and two women, 
probably parents and grandparents, all smiling and looking up in the air 
at the ball. There seem to be three generations gathered in this ‘happy 
moment’. The situation could be seen in any ‘classical’ family photograph, 
but here it is depicted in hundreds of photographs. The video is a visually 
complex depiction of that very moment depicted simultaneously, with 
at least 15 cameras from many different angles and mounted into one 
sequence lasting 25 minutes in perception time but less than a second in 
depicted time.
Apart from the six figures placed in the middle of the courtyard, five 
other people can be seen: an old man carrying a plastic bag has stopped to 
watch the scenery. He is situated a few meters away from the group, con-
templating them with an empathetic smile. Two teenage girls are crossing 
the square, turning their backs on the group, thereby not seeing the ball in 
the air or the other persons. They seem to be lost in their own conversa-
tion, and they are moving out of the ‘situation frame’. Lastly, an elderly 
couple is caught in the act of sitting down on plastic chairs outside one 
of the entrances to the high rise building. The fact that they are in the 
midst of sitting down enhances the photographic momentariness of the 
situation. Judging from the clothes of the figures it seems to be summer, 
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and since they are all casting long shadows, it is probably late afternoon. 
The film is in black and white. First of all, this choice removes the atten-
tion from the narrative and raises the effect of a moment being sculpted in 
time, one could say. Second, it raises the contrast between the smiling peo-
ple and the modernist concrete and almost inhuman architecture that sur-
rounds them. Incidentally, the film seems to articulate a critical attitude 
toward the ideas behind classical modernist, mass produced architecture.5 
This is also underlined in a sculpture of naked human figures, made in a 
modernist, vitalistic, almost abstract style that was seen in the middle of 
the twentieth century, which appears in this high rise building ‘plaza’ as a 
piece of dead material, contrasting with the lively family group.
The film consists of hundreds of different still images of the same 
moment, each shown between 5 and 13 seconds, and accompanied by a 
simple, contemplative composition for one piano. The artist had placed 
at least 15 cameras in and all around the scenario, which is depicted from 
many different angles and focus points: as extreme close-ups focusing on 
the facial expression or bodily gesture, as full-frames depicting all 11 fig-
ures in one shot, via a frog’s or bird’s eye perspective, etc. Some of the 
shots are taken from a high perspective inside the buildings. Invoking the 
gaze of a sniper looking out, but half covered behind a curtain or a glass 
wall, some of these images add a slightly uncanny feeling to the film: the 
family is being watched. 
Database time images
As viewers we experience an ongoing moment without beginning and 
end; one could call it a radical performance of the momentality, intensity, 
and presence of time itself. It certainly is a family photograph that we see, 
but we do not relate it to an indexical, nostalgic freezing of the past and a 
specific memorable moment but much more to a performance of a photo-
graphic presence that we experience with our own body over 25 minutes. 
The ‘digitality’ of the images makes some of them look slightly ‘paint-
brushed’ or softened, especially the ones where a cropped or zoomed 
detail fills most of the screen and where we thus focus on, for instance, 
the girl’s ponytail or the little boy’s necklace. The black-and-white film 
appears as a haptic surface where you can sense the materiality of time in 
itself, as a sculpture of time sculpted out of the very moment via the many 
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cameras used by Claerbout and his crew. The images in the film are not 
related to narration, but are rather used as signifiers of pure time in order 
to make the audience ‘sense’ time. 
In interviews, the artist has mentioned that he has been inspired 
by the ‘time philosophy’ of Henri Bergson, especially as it is echoed in 
Deleuze’s film books and his notion of the ‘time-image’ (Deleuze, 1986, 
1989). And you can remark that the film is an artistic articulation of the 
Bergsonian la durée, the psychologically imagined as well as bodily felt 
duration of time as opposed to the experience of time cut up in rationally 
divided frames of minutes and seconds. Actually, the rational time, the 
clock time, is exactly the subject of Marclay’s film, but synchronizing 
the filmic time with the perception time, he manages to show how the 
clock time is bodily experienced as a psychological ‘durée’ just as much 
as Clearbout’s extended moment. So, at first glance, Marclay’s film seems 
to represent rational time, whereas Claerbout’s demonstrates psychologi-
cal time. But my point is that each of them does both, thereby inviting us 
to re-articulate the relationship between time and photography in favor 
of a more presence-oriented conception of time in relation to photogra-
phy. In different ways, and through film as well as still photography, both 
films are magical contemplations of time itself and of the possibility of 
photograph-based media to articulate time. Thomsen quotes Maurizio 
Lazzarato’s ‘video philosophy’ in order to use his description of the ‘hap-
tic’ video image to describe ‘the signaletic image’ as ‘A place, a movement 
space for time as such. It is no longer quite simply about an image that is 
going to be seen but about an image in which you interfere, with which 
you work (a time of events)’ (2012: non-pag.). Likewise, these two art-
works become not only representations of people and situations but also 
places for contemplation of time as presence.
Both The Clock and Sections of a Happy Moment could in principle 
have been made with traditional analog technology, but it is the ‘signa-
letic’ qualities of digital media that provide them with both the practical 
tools and the very idea behind the works. One could argue that a ‘digital 
epistemology’ was needed in order to ‘think’ these works. They explore 
‘the database logic of new media’, to use a phrase from Lev Manovich 
(2001); that is, they collect an immense amount of filmic/photographic 
database material, which is digitally stored and composed with an 
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archival, repetitive, circular, or ‘flat’ logic, rather than structured by a tra-
ditional, progressive narrative. Manovich writes:
After the novel, and subsequently cinema privileged narra-
tive as the key form of cultural expression of the modern age, 
the computer age introduces its correlate – database. Many 
new media objects do not tell stories; they don’t have begin-
ning or end; in fact, they don’t have any development, the-
matically, formally or otherwise which would organize their 
elements into a sequence. Instead, they are collections of indi-
vidual items, where every item has the same significance as 
any other. (2001: 194)
In Web 2.0, we can encounter 200 almost identical images of two boys 
playing in a swimming pool on their mother’s private Picasa website,6 
and many private photography websites are structured as such database 
collections without a beginning or an end. Manovich calls the database 
the new symbolic form of the computer age: ‘A new way to structure 
our experience of ourselves and the world’ (2001: 194), and he analyzes 
various artworks articulating the ‘poetics of the database’. The Clock and 
Sections of a Happy Moment are not constructed around a traditional nar-
rative, but as collections of almost similar or only slightly differing data 
‘objects’. It is the transmission of the signal of timeliness in itself that is 
the message in Marclay’s and Claerbout’s works. As Saint Augustine 
famously stated in his Confessions (year 398): ‘What is time? If one asks 
me, I know. If I wish to explain to someone who asks, I no longer know’. 
Both artworks give form to duration, a form that needs to be experienced 
over time. ‘Time’ is not being depicted as ‘sign’, it is happening here and 
now – as ‘signal’. ‘Time’ is not the subject matter as much as it is a con-
stitutive matter to be bodily experienced. They manage to make ‘time’ 
felt, via the photographic freezing and at the same time the prolonging 
of time in Clearbout’s work and the physical effect of the passing of time 
in Marclay’s filmic work. As Claerbout has put it: ‘In my work I think of 
the digital as a platform in which past, present, and future are not distin-
guishable from one another and instead coexist happily’.7 The notion of 
‘the signaletic’ is related to the transmission of real-time signals in digi-
tal, global media such as surveillance cameras, for instance. In that sense, 
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the two artworks described are not ‘signaletic’, nor is the above mentioned 
database of private family photographs. But, it is my argument that they 
nevertheless philosophically and aesthetically articulate aspects of ‘the 
signaletic’ that we can use to enhance our understanding of contempo-
rary digital photography, as it is used, for instance, in private Web 2.0 
photograph albums.
Photography as signaletic presence
Digital collections of photographs, for instance, on Flickr and Picasa, can 
be seen as such archival databases filled with often very similar images. 
Showing us the signaletic database logic of photography especially, 
Claerbout proposes a new understanding of photography that throws 
light on these Web 2.0 practices. Sections of a Happy Moment thus helps 
us formulate an epistemologically new conception of photography as 
process, presence, and bodily ‘affect’. Having formulated this new theory 
of photography, we will also be able to look back into the history of the 
medium and highlight the everyday, social, performative, as well as mate-
rial aspects of photography, which have hitherto been neglected.
I realize that we are just starting to see how the digital production, 
perception, and use of photography will develop in new and truly ubiqui-
tous ways that we cannot dream of even today and that this development 
in the near future will have important implications for our very under-
standing of the thing or phenomenon we call ‘photography’. Works like 
The Clock and Sections of a Happy Memory are still extremely difficult 
and time-consuming to produce, but soon technological improvements 
will allow anyone with a computer to compile thousands of clips, as done 
by Marclay, or photograph the same moment from a hundred different 
angles the way Claerbout did. Therefore, we will see artists pushing tech-
nology even further in the years to come, articulating in this way new 
philosophical aspects of technology. However, as classifications such as 
Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s ‘remediation’ (1999) have dem-
onstrated, the conceptualization of a new medium is often based on what 
precedes it. Thus, the digital photograph albums that we meet in Web 2.0 
are to a large extent still constructed and perceived as the traditional ana-
log precursor. Simultaneously, as they remediate older forms, new media 
inventions or practices can also shed light on some older practices. So the 
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new use of photography we experience with Web 2.0, which, I argue, is 
conceptualized in Sections of a Happy Moment, can actually highlight the 
aspects of the medium that were always already there: the conception of 
photography as a primarily social, participatory, and performative phe-
nomenon. More philosophically put, it might change our conception of 
what authenticity and identity mean in relation to photography.8  
To return to my introduction, the way photography is used and pre-
sented in social networks like Picasa, Facebook, and Flickr differs from 
the function of photography as espoused by Barthes and Bazin. Susan 
Murray has described sites such as Flickr as follows:
On these sites, photography has become less about the spe-
cial or rarefied moments of domestic/family living (for such 
things as holidays, gatherings, baby photos) and more about 
an immediate, rather fleeting display of one’s discovery of the 
small and mundane (such as bottles, cupcakes, trees, debris, 
and architectural elements). In this way, photography is 
no longer just the embalmer of time that André Bazin once 
spoke of, but rather a more alive, immediate, and often transi-
tory, practice/form. (2008: 151) 
According to Søren Mørk Petersen, Flickr is really about articulating an 
aesthetics of the everyday and the ephemeral. Like Murray, he stresses 
the presence character of images and photo sharing on Flickr. His field-
work demonstrates how people take photographs with their cell phones 
and upload them directly in order to get a quick and ‘fresh’ comment by 
other ‘Flickrs’ and that this element –  closely related to pervasive com-
puting within everyday life – is the primary function of Flickr. It thereby 
contradicts Barthes’ and Bazin’s phenomenological connection of pho-
tography to death: ‘when it registers the banal and mundane aspects of 
everyday life and not least when it is shared, it becomes a practice closer 
to life than death’ (Peterson, 2008: 146). ‘The practice of mob logging, 
everyday photography, and photo sharing express a desire to retain the 
experience and sensation of presence and the affective character of every-
dayness. Uploading becomes a practice that can negotiate the different 
sensations of presence and the present’ (Petersen, 2008: 154).
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In summary, I have described two new ‘signaletic’ databased photo-
graph practices. One, the ubiquitous presence of everyday Web 2.0 pho-
tography from mobile phones to social network sites, is extremely wide-
spread but not yet comprehensively theorized. The other practice, as seen 
in the two video works, is a self- and media-reflexive ‘niche product’ of 
the same technological as well as epistemological development, of the 
database logic as symbolic form. Artists such as Marclay and Claerbout 
can be said to react to the new media developments; and by exploiting 
them they are enhancing our understanding of the nature of the media. 
By bringing attention to their presentation of the photographic construc-
tion of presence, I hope to have inspired readers to theorize ‘photography’ 
differently and to develop a new media ecology, which is now still in an 
embryonic state.
Original source and licence
Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, Vol. 4, 2012 http://www.aestheticsand-
culture.net/index.php/jac/article/view/18159. Licence: CC-BY NC 3.0 
This is a slightly edited version of the original.
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5  A more in-depth analysis of this critical stance would be most interesting in a 
thematic reading of the film, but lies outside the scope of this article.
6  http://picasaweb.google.com/hstebby47 (accessed November 20, 2011).
7  Artinfo, http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/31145/ori-gersht-puts-five-
questions-to-david-claerbout/ (accessed May 1, 2009).
8  For instance, as in Christopher Pinney’s (1997) studies of Indian studio 
photography, where a heavy amount of staging and image manipulation such 
as handcoloring is perceived as an authentification tool. His fieldwork in 
these Indian villages has implications for our traditional Western conceptual 
connection between concepts such as authenticity, truth, indexicality, and 
non-manipulation. 
CHAPTER 6
The ‘Potential Mobilities’ of Photography
Debbie Lisle
In the summer of 1944, American Sergeant Paul Dorsey was hired by 
the Naval Aviation Photography Unit (NAPU) to capture ‘the Marines’ 
bitter struggle against their determined foe’ in the Pacific islands (Philips, 
1981: 43). Dorsey had been a photographer and photojournalist before 
enlisting in the Marines, and was thus well placed to fulfil the NAPU’s 
remit of creating positive images of American forces in the Pacific. 
Under the editorial and professional guidance of Edward Steichen, 
NAPU photographers like Dorsey provided epic images of battle (espe-
cially from the air and sea), and also showed American forces at ease – 
sunbathing, swimming, drinking and relaxing together (Bachner, 2007). 
Steichen – by now a lieutenant commander – oversaw the entire NAPU 
project by developing, choosing and editing the images, and also provid-
ing captions for their reproduction in popular newspapers and maga-
zines such as LIFE. Under his guidance, selected NAPU images were 
displayed at the famous Power in the Pacific exhibition at the Museum 
of Modern Art in New York at the end of the war, and distributed in the 
popular U.S. Navy War Photographs memorial book, which sold over 6 
million copies in 1945.
While the original NAPU photographers (Steichen himself, Charles 
Kerlee, Horace Bristol, Wayne Miller, Charles Fenno Jacobs, Victor 
Jorgensen and Dwight Long) had been at work in the Pacific since the 
summer of 1942, Dorsey was hired specifically to document the advance 
of American Marines through the Marianas and Volcano Islands. In line 
with the NAPU’s remit, Dorsey provided a number of famous rear view 
shots of combat action on Guam, Saipan and Iwo Jima. However, there 
are a number of his photographs that do not fit easily within that vision of 
war – images of wounded Marines and dead Japanese soldiers, as well as 
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shots of abject Japanese POWs with their heads bowed and faces averted. 
It is this last group of enemy images that proves the most interesting, for 
not only do they trouble NAPU’s explicit propaganda framework, they 
also challenge our traditional assumption that photography is an inert 
form of representation.
It is not hard to imagine that photographs of abject Japanese POWs 
reinforced feelings of triumph, conquest and justice that circulated in 
America’s post-war victory culture. Indeed, images of emaciated and 
incarcerated Japanese soldiers provided the perfect contrast to the hyper-
masculine, hard-bodied, beefcake figures that populated the NAPU pho-
tographs and symbolized American power in the Pacific. However, once 
Japan was rehabilitated into a powerful American ally, and the decision 
to drop the atomic bomb was questioned once again in America’s Culture 
Wars of the 1980s and 90s, it was no longer acceptable to feel triumphant 
in the face of Japanese abjection and suffering. Instead, these images 
helped foster a new kind of belated patriotism – and a new global disposi-
tion – in which Americans generated their own magnanimity by express-
ing pity, compassion and sympathy for victims of their previous foreign 
policy decisions (Lisle, 2007: 234).
While that patriotic interpretive framework tells us much about how 
dominant formations of American identity are secured by the production 
– especially the visual production – of enemy others, it cannot account 
for images or viewer interpretations that exceed, unwork, or disrupt war’s 
foundational logics of friend/enemy and perpetrator/victim. I focus on 
Dorsey because he offers one such ‘deviant’ image (figure 6.1).
This photograph was taken by Dorsey on Guam in July 1944, and its 
caption tells us that the Japanese prisoner ‘waits to be questioned by intel-
ligence officers’ (Philips, 1981: 189). As the POW looks into Dorsey’s 
camera lens (and therefore at us, the viewers), he is subject to the collec-
tive gaze of the American marines situated behind him, and presumably 
others that lay out of the frame, behind Dorsey. What is fascinating about 
this particular image is the prisoner’s refusal to obey the trope of abjec-
tion so readily assumed by other Japanese POWs documented in the 
NAPU archive and in other popular war-time imagery. Indeed, when I 
first encountered this image I immediately framed the POW’s return gaze 
as defiant – a challenging, bold, and forceful reply to American aggres-
sion in the Pacific. The problem, of course, was that this resistant gaze 
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soon became reductive; that is, by replicating war’s foundational logics of 
difference it effaced a number of other dispositions at work in the photo-
graph. What I find compelling about the POW’s return gaze is its refusal 
to be contained within the available subject positions of either ‘abject 
POW’ or ‘defiant resistor’. Indeed, this unruliness is what keeps me com-
ing back to Dorsey’s image, for it teaches us that photography itself always 
exceeds the conventional assumption that it is a static form of visual 
representation.
Figure 6.1. Paul Dorsey’s photograph of the Japanese POW is # 80-G-475166 in the NAPU 
archive and is reproduced here courtesy of the United States National Archives.
Photography, animation, movement
The connections between movement, stillness and photography have 
two important starting points. The first, and more general, is Walter 
Benjamin’s concept of the dialectic image in which the past and the 
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present come together ‘in a flash’ and constitute what he calls ‘dialectics 
at a standstill’ (Benjamin, 1999: 463). Unlike Theodor Adorno, who 
lamented Benjamin’s Medusa-like tendency to turn the world to stone, 
I read Benjamin’s concept of standstill – of stillness in general – as some-
thing fizzing and pulsating with ‘political electricity’  (Adorno, 1997: 227-
42; Buck-Morss, 1997: 219). This is to deny our most basic assumption 
about photography: that it is an inert visual form that freezes and captures 
discrete moments in time and space. My central argument is that photog-
raphy’s assumed stillness is always constituted by a number of potential 
and actual mobilities that continually suture and re-suture viewing sub-
jects and images into one another.
Developing Benjamin’s idea of the past and present coming together 
‘in a flash’, Roland Barthes provides the second starting point with his 
notion of the punctum of photography: ‘this element which rises from the 
scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me’ (Barthes, 2000: 25). 
Conventional understandings of the punctum frame it as a static moment 
– so powerful that it freezes the viewer, stops them in their tracks, and 
captures their attention. My point is that the affective punch of the photo-
graph is not a frozen moment at all; rather, the punctum – like the dialec-
tic image – is fizzing with political electricity. Therefore, to suggest that 
a viewing subject is arrested in the moment of perception – that they are 
somehow captured by a photograph’s meaning – is to mistakenly under-
stand the act of looking as a static behaviour.
I want to use Dorsey’s image of the POW to push these theoretical 
starting points and explore the mobile dispositions that are generated 
when a viewing subject encounters a photograph. What most interests 
me about Dorsey’s photograph is the level of animation it produces. The 
POW’s return gaze is actually rather blank: it is unclear whether he is 
angry, weary, bored, insane or none of the above. But it is the viewing 
subject’s anxiety at such ambivalence – such unknowability – that pro-
vokes a powerful desire to name it. The visceral sensations and emotional 
responses provoked in viewers (Are we taken aback? Do we sympathize 
with the POW? Are we equally blank?) very quickly become settled 
interpretations, for example, ‘his defiant gaze resists American power’. 
What I want to do is explore the pre-interpretive moment when images 
like Dorsey’s reach out and grab us – for it is in that moment that photog-
raphy’s ‘political electricity’ reveals itself most clearly.
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Production, signification, interpretation
The mobility inherent in the photograph has an important antecedent 
at the level of production. Since the Brownie camera was introduced in 
WWI, photographers have carried their mode of representation with 
them – in Dorsey’s case, his portable camera was carried with him as he 
travelled with the Marines through the Pacific (Philips, 1981: 29). It is 
the photographer’s itinerary – his or her movement prior to clicking the 
camera’s shutter – that shapes and determines a photograph’s content. 
More to the point, the action of clicking the camera’s shutter is never 
an isolated moment; rather, it is punctured by all of the previous clicks 
and moments leading up to it – especially on a long photographic assign-
ment like Dorsey’s – and contains within it all of the subsequent clicks 
and moments that potentially come after it. In this sense, the photogra-
pher’s click recalls Benjamin: it is a ‘charged force field of past and pres-
ent’ (Buck-Morss, 1997: 219). That complicated temporality is also mani-
fested in the photographer’s contact sheet (or, more recently, computer 
file), which operates as a visual travelogue of discrete moments that bleed 
into one another.
The mobility inherent in photography extends itself into the level 
of signification; that is, the arrangements of signs depicted within the 
frame of each discrete image. Critic Gilberto Perez gives us a clue to this 
mobility in his comments about Eugène Atget’s famous ‘painterly’ photo-
graphs of Paris:
A photograph begins with the mobility, or at least potential 
mobility, of the world’s materials, of the things reproduced 
from reality, and turns that into a still image. More readily 
than in a painting, we see things in a photograph, even statues, 
as being on the point of movement, for these things belong to 
the world of flux from which the image has been extracted. 
(Perez, 1983: 328). 
I agree that the origin point of a photograph is potential mobility, but 
that mobility is never completely vanquished when it is turned into a still 
image. For me, photographs – no matter what they depict – are always 
saturated with the ‘potential mobility of the world’s materials’, and in this 
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sense they are never still. Indeed, the world of flux out of which the image 
is extracted includes the image itself, and in that sense, an image can never 
be isolated from the world it is derived from. If we follow Perez and char-
acterize the world as one of flux, but then insist that the photograph can 
never be extracted from that world, it follows that the photograph, too, 
is characterized by fluctuation and change – in short, by mobility. The 
point, here, is to read a photograph counter-intuitively – not as an arrest of 
movement or a freezing of time, but as a collection of signs that is always 
potentially mobile. This is what Roland Barthes was hinting at when he 
suggested that a photograph is ‘a mad image, chafed by reality’: any pho-
tograph is haunted by absence because the depicted object is no longer 
present, but it is also full of certainty that the depicted object did exist 
at a previous time and place (Barthes, 2000: 113-15). This is precisely 
Benjamin’s point as well, that ‘what has been comes together with the 
now’ (Benjamin, 1999: 463). Following on from Barthes and Benjamin, I 
want to argue that photographs don’t freeze a moment in time, but instead 
set in motion a continual journey between feelings of absence in the pres-
ent (i.e. ‘it is not there’) and present imaginings of the past (i.e. ‘but it has 
indeed been’).
As Barthes’ notion of the punctum reveals, the most powerful regis-
ter at which photography’s inherent mobility operates is in the sensations, 
responses and feelings provoked in viewers. This is why we say that a 
photograph has the capacity to move us: the best images take us from one 
emotional state (e.g. passive, curious, bored) and carry us into another (e.g. 
shocked, sad, amused). It is this emotional terrain of our responses to pho-
tography that both Roland Barthes and Susan Sontag have explored in 
depth. Why are we moved by some images and not others? Are documen-
tary or artistic photographs more likely to reach out and prick us? What is 
the most appropriate or ethical response to pictures of another’s suffering?
Sontag suggests a different connection between photography and 
mobility in that it enables a particular touristification of the world; that 
is, cameras help ‘convert the world into a department store or museum-
without-walls in which every subject is depreciated into an article of 
consumption, promoted to an item for aesthetic appreciation’ (Sontag, 
1971: 110). While Sontag’s political economy of photography (with its 
Frankfurt School echo) continues to be explored by anthropologists and 
scholars in Tourism Studies, I want to argue that it offers a particularly 
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reductive account of photography’s potential mobilities. While Sontag 
does address photography’s constitutive and rather complex relationship 
with reality, she still conceives of photographs themselves as static and 
inert representations. Indeed, what she wrestled with in On Photography 
was the ‘insolent, poignant stasis of each photograph’, and the photo-
graph’s capacity to make reality ‘stand still’ (Sontag, 1971: 111-12; 163). 
The problem with such a view is that it limits our account of interpreta-
tion; in short, it suggests that viewers either accept a photograph’s static 
message (and are thus moved), or reject it (and remain unmoved). But 
the moving, here, is the sole prerogative of the viewer: there is no sense 
in which the photograph and its contents are themselves mobile. I want 
to argue that the relationships established in the act of looking between 
viewing subjects and the objects contained within an image are much 
more complex and varied than Sontag’s framework suggests. 
Photography’s affective mobility
To reveal the mobilities underscoring photography’s affective punch, 
we must redistribute its more familiar power relations through W. J. T. 
Mitchell’s important question: what do pictures want? Such a question 
subverts our usual approach to photographs (i.e. what do we want from 
photographs?) by redeploying the privileged agency of the viewer into the 
image itself. In other words, it is the image that demands something of the 
viewer rather than the other way around. What it demands, of course, is a 
response. Certainly this is an emotional response, for even being bored by 
a photograph is a response of sorts. But an emotional response is also an 
affective response, which means that the punch carried by a photograph 
is as physical as it is metaphorical or visual. Indeed, it is precisely in the 
act of perception, where the emotional and the affective fuse, that photog-
raphy’s assumed stillness is powerfully subverted.
If Mitchell animates the picture by affording it some of the viewer’s 
agency, then Gilles Deleuze goes one step further by exploring what 
happens to agency in the act of perception. For Deleuze, a work of art 
– for our purposes, a photograph – is not an inert or still document, but 
rather a ‘block of sensations’ (Deleuze, 2003; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994 
and Bogue, 2003). It is not a finished object produced by an autonomous 
artist or beheld in its entirety by an autonomous viewer; rather, it is a 
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combination of percepts (initial perceptions) and affects (physical inten-
sities) that passes through all subjects at the point of visual perception. 
This kind of relational encounter with an image not only deconstructs 
Modernity’s foundational distinction between the subject and the object, 
it also opens up an affective connection between all subjects engaged in 
the act of looking; in this case, the photographer, the subjects and objects 
within the photograph and the viewer.
From Deleuze, we know that perception is characterized by common 
physical responses in all subjects: the movement of the optic nerve, the 
dilation of the pupil, the squint of the eyelid, the craning of the neck to 
see up close. However small, however imperceptible, these physical sen-
sations are all still movements; indeed, they are movements repeated by 
all seeing subjects. My point is that these imperceptible modes of atten-
tion are consistently engaged in the act of viewing photographs. What 
this suggests is that taking account of the affective level of perception 
changes our traditional understandings of interpretation; indeed, even if a 
photograph fails to move us emotionally, it certainly moves us physically, 
though we may not be conscious of it.
Drawing from Mitchell and Deleuze, then, we can say that a pho-
tograph’s ‘insolent, poignant stasis’ makes no sense. A photograph is 
constantly animated not just by the potentials inherent in its enframed 
subjects and objects, but more importantly, in the acts of perception 
undertaken by viewers. Certainly some photographs move us emotionally 
– to tears, to laughter, to rage – and indeed, this emotional terrain is where 
Barthes and Sontag offer important insights. My point is that all photo-
graphs, no matter what they depict, move us physically through the act 
of perception. If we take Mitchell’s question seriously and extend agency 
to the photograph, then it is in the affective register that we can discern a 
more relational encounter between subjects and objects because both are 
in a constant state of mobility.
Ambivalence and paralysis
How might Mitchell’s question apply to Dorsey’s photograph? What does 
this image want from us? What does it demand from our acts of looking? 
The dispersed account of agency put forward by Mitchell suggests that 
the act of looking can never be contained within the subject; indeed, what 
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is produced in each act of looking is some kind of subject-object-world 
assemblage in which each component is characterised by its potential and 
actual mobilities. With respect to Dorsey’s image, then, the multiple lines 
of sight at work in the photograph indicate multiple – and mobile – rela-
tionalities. Primarily, there is the relationship between the viewer – any 
potential viewer – and the photograph. If we follow Mitchell’s line of 
questioning, however, we need to ask how the photograph itself shapes 
the emotive and affective experience of visual interpretation – how the 
photograph’s demand is transmitted to the viewer.
Firstly, this demand is channelled through Dorsey’s line of sight that 
extends through his camera’s viewfinder and into the formal elements 
of the photograph: the focused POW in the foreground, the blurred fig-
ures in the background, the light and shade on the subjects’ clothing and 
skin, the battle scarred terrain, and the position of these elements within 
the viewfinder’s frame. As viewers we cannot see Dorsey, but his pres-
ence fills – and indeed constitutes – the photograph. Secondly, the pho-
tograph’s demand is channelled through the POW’s line of sight that 
extends to Dorsey (who is both photographer and marine Sergeant), and 
potentially through his camera to imagined viewers. It is precisely the 
return gaze of the POW that packs such an affective punch – not because 
of what it means, but rather because of how it makes us feel emotionally 
and physically. While a conventional account would understand this 
affective punch as shocking, stopping or capturing the viewer, I want to 
argue it does the opposite – it suddenly reveals the fizzing, vibrant mobili-
ties that transmit the picture to us, and us to the picture.
There are, I think, important lessons for us in Dorsey’s photograph. 
It is a powerful antecedent to Judith Butler’s exploration of the Abu 
Ghraib images, and her repetition of Sontag’s question of ‘whether the 
tortured can and do look back, and what do they see when they look at 
us’ (Butler, 2007: 966). The POW’s gaze provides an answer to the first 
part of this question – they certainly do look back. But as to what they 
see when they look back at us, that question can only be answered if we 
redistribute both agency and mobility into the photograph to empower 
and mobilize the tortured, the abject, and the objectified. That leaves us 
with Sontag’s much more vexing question of what we do after we look at 
photographs. As Butler explains, Sontag has denounced the photograph 
‘precisely because it enrages without directing the rage, and so excites our 
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moral sentiments at the same time that it confirms our political paraly-
sis’ (Butler, 2007: 966). This sets up an important challenge for us: in 
refusing conventional understandings of photography as a still visual art, 
how can we use more dispersed accounts of agency and mobility to work 
through the political paralysis that Sontag identifies? 
Original source and licence
M/C Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2009) - ‘still’, http://journal.media-culture.
org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/viewArticle/125.  
Licence: CC-BY NC ND.
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CHAPTER 7
The Cinematograph As an Agent of History 
Kamila Kuc
The photographic apparatus as a nonliving agent
For many classic film theorists such as André Bazin, the invention of pho-
tography in the 19th century was a response to the human’s supposed 
psychological need for illusion created by ‘a mechanical reproduction’. 
According to Bazin, the arrival of photography was precipitated by a 
crisis of realism in painting, a crisis that emerged from a certain tension 
between the ‘aesthetic and the psychological’ (Bazin, 2005a: 12-13). 
Bazin believed that photography had ‘freed the plastic arts from their 
obsession with likeness’ and, in doing so, addressed a ‘psychological’ prob-
lem: the human need to preserve images for posterity, thus winning the 
battle against time and ‘spiritual death’ (Bazin, 2005a: 9). For Bazin pho-
tography was characterized by a greater objectivity than painting, as he 
considered the photographic apparatus a ‘nonliving agent’: ‘for the first 
time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the creative 
intervention of a man’, he pronounced (Bazin, 2005a: 13). Because of 
its ability to reproduce movement, cinema took this aspiration to real-
ism a step further as it was capable of capturing, or simply functioning 
as, ‘objectivity in time’ (Bazin, 2005a: 14). It was in film that, for the first 
time in the history of vision, ‘the image of things [was] likewise the image 
of their duration’ (Bazin, 2005a: 15). 
One could argue that, ever since its emergence, this task of faithfully 
representing reality has been imposed on cinema because of its ability to 
capture motion. And it is precisely the notion of movement that brings 
together – and separates – the complex and interrelated histories of pho-
tography and film. Both media have been burdened with claims about 
their supposed objectivity as something that shapes and defines their 
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ontology. It is also because of its extensive use in science, for example in 
providing records of surgical operations, that it was traditionally believed, 
especially in the early days of the medium, that cinema’s main destiny 
was to document reality. Among those who held this view was an inter-
nationally renowned Pole, Boleslaw Matuszewski (1856-1944), who was 
convinced that film’s most important role was to capture the world faith-
fully as it was. Matuszewski was a keen theorist, photographer (he owned 
two photographic studios: one in Paris, one in Warsaw) and filmmaker. 
This essay revisits Matuszewski’s understanding of the cinematic appara-
tus as a witness of history in relation to Karen Barad’s notion of agential 
realism. A clear tension between the objective and subjective approach to 
filmmaking is revealed once we allow the claim that the cinematic appara-
tus is not just a witness to history but also its active agent. In what follows 
I will show that, on the one hand, early documentary practices were seen 
as a rather conventional, straightforward record of reality, as embodied 
in Matuszewski’s actualities (aka proto-documentaries) and the principle 
of ‘capturing life unawares’. On the other hand, the 1920s and 1930s 
avant-garde experiments with documentary allow us to situate this type 
of filmmaking within the realm of more subjective and, to use Barad’s 
term, more agential storytelling, as seen, for example, in Dziga Vertov’s or 
Walter Ruttmann’s city symphonies. 
The cinematograph as a creator of history 
Matuszewski’s seminal article ‘The New Source of History: The 
Creation of a Depository for Historical Cinematography’ (1898) is one 
of the first texts concerning the ontology of the cinematic image.1 An 
admirer of both still photography and the cinematograph, Matuszewski 
believed that the latter was less open to manipulation than photography. 
For him photographs could be retouched, ‘even to the point of transfor-
mation. But just try to make identical changes on… microscopic images!’ 
(Matuszewski, 1898a).2 For Matuszewski the superiority of the cinemato-
graph rested in the fact that, unlike any other medium, it could reliably 
reproduce movement, and hence life. For him, ‘authenticity, exactitude 
and precision’ were intrinsic to ‘animated photography’ (Matuszewski, 
1898b). Matuszewski’s belief in the impartiality of the cinematic lens 
led him to a conviction that film was actually capable of correcting the 
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errors of history. A Polish weekly paper commented on the publication of 
Matuszewski’s ‘A New Source of History’ as follows:
As a work of the human mind, every literary or printed source 
must, from the very nature of things, be more or less reticent. 
Because of this, historical truth is relative. However, the cin-
ematograph – unmistakably a source of, as they say, mechani-
cal history – is an absolutely truthful document: the cinemato-
graph never lies. (Anonymous, 1898).3
Matuszewski considered his actuality, The Visit of President Faure in 
St Petersburg (1898), an expression of this view. The film documented 
the visit of President Faure to St Petersburg. During this visit, Otto von 
Bismarck accused the French President Félix Faure of breaching a cer-
tain diplomatic etiquette by not taking his hat off while reviewing a guard 
of honour. Matuszewski’s footage challenged this claim by showing that 
Faure did indeed do so, thus preventing a historical error and a possible 
diplomatic conflict.4 For Matuszewski this film proved itself a reliable eye-
witness, as the cinematograph verified ‘verbal testimony’ (Matuszewski, 
1898a). He believed that ‘if human witnesses contradict each other about 
an event’, the cinematograph could ‘resolve the disagreement by silencing 
the one that it belies’ (Matuszewski, 1898a).
For this reason, the filmmaker considered a celluloid strip not simply a 
historical document, but a part of history in its own right. The process of 
recording reality was thus the very act of creating history for him, which 
he believed was the filmmaker’s greatest responsibility (Matuszewski, 
1898a). Such a view conflates different senses of ‘history’: as a record and 
document, as well as analysis and discourse. Matuszewski’s idea that a 
celluloid strip constituted a part of history not only granted the cinemat-
ograph more seriousness, but it also made a stronger claim for the reli-
ability of the recorded image. This echoes the German historian Leopold 
von Ranke’s concept of writing history. Because of his critical use of docu-
ments as the model for historical research and writing in the 19th century, 
Ranke is often referred to as the ‘father of historical science’. Influenced 
by German Idealist thought and figures such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
and Friedrich Schelling, Ranke’s method can be summarised in the idea 
of holding on ‘strictly to the facts of history’.
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For Ranke a proper understanding of history required a reconstruc-
tion of the past, which stressed the importance of the relevant facts and 
the use of a strict critical method. This included ‘a documentary, pene-
trating, profound study’ as a necessary approach. Ranke considered his-
tory an art but, unlike other arts, history required the ability to recreate 
(Iggers, 2010: xi). The ideal historian, for Ranke, should therefore pos-
sess certain qualities, the most important one being his ‘pure love of truth’ 
(Ranke, 1830: 12). He believed that ‘by recognizing something sublime 
in the event, the condition, or the person we want to know something 
about, we acquire a certain esteem for that which has transpired, passed, 
or appeared’ (Ranke, 1830: 12).
However, for Ranke, the factual establishment of events did not 
yet constitute history and the historian was not a passive observer who 
merely recorded events: instead, the historian actively recreated a histori-
cal subject matter by relying on empirical observation and was ‘bound by 
the reality of his subject matter’ (Iggers, 2010: xxvii). The ability to ‘por-
tray the forces of history without interjecting one’s own set of values is 
the core of objectivity’, thus impartiality was of key importance (Iggers, 
2010: 2). For Ranke universal history could never be a mere compilation 
of national histories, but the history of the nations had to be related to a 
‘broader course of world history’ (Iggers, 2010: 84).  He valued an ‘honest’ 
historian who could confront the documents and thus attain an objective 
view of the great facts, ‘free from the mutual accusations of the contem-
poraries and the often restricted view of their posterity’ (Iggers, 2010: 84). 
According to Ranke, history was given a task of ‘judging the past’ and 
‘of instructing the present for the benefit of future ages’ (Ranke, 1824: 
57). For him a reliable historian should be able to show ‘what actually 
happened’ (‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’) (Ranke, 1824: 57). Similarly, 
Matuszewski was convinced that the human word failed as the only evi-
dence in the recollection of historical events and that the cinematograph 
could correct this failure because it offered a reliable and objective view. 
Like Ranke, Matuszewski thought that history could teach future genera-
tions how to avoid political errors: ‘Do you believe that some knowledge 
of past events contains nothing useful which is applicable to the present 
or future?’, asked Ranke (Ranke, 1836: 77). The aim of history was not so 
much to ‘gather facts and to arrange them as to understand them’ (Ranke, 
1836: 77). Although it is not clear whether Matuszewski had ever read 
124 Kamila Kuc
Ranke, many of Ranke’s beliefs, prominent at the time, were reflected in 
the way Matuszewski perceived the role of film in society. 
Matuszewski’s appreciation of the cinema’s documentary values 
was echoed in subsequent debates about the processes of recording his-
tory. For example, in 1931 the President of the American Historical 
Association, Carl L. Becker commented on the fact that many historical 
events are only known ‘imperfectly’ because we can ‘never revive them, 
never observe or test them directly’ (Becker, 1931: 221). Becker contin-
ued that once the event had occurred, it had disappeared, ‘so that in deal-
ing with it the only objective reality we can observe or test is some mate-
rial trace which the event had left – usually a written document’ (Becker, 
1931: 221). As an effect, Becker distinguished two histories: ‘the actual 
series of events that once occurred; and the ideal series that we affirm and 
hold in memory. The first is absolute and unchanged – it was what it was 
whatever we do or say about it; the second is relative, always changing in 
response to the increase or refinement of knowledge’ (Becker, 1931: 221).
This complex relationship between the actual and the related events 
is at the heart of Matuszewski’s film, which illustrates the limitation in 
the process of writing history with words. The numerous imperfections in 
relating historical events could be successfully avoided in film, as seen in 
The Visit of President Felix Faure. Although Matuszewski claims that the 
process of recording reality counts as the very act of creating history, often 
in his discourse the apparatus of cinema, i.e. the actual cinematographic 
machine, seems to function as an objective and passive agent. Similarly, 
in his claim about a greater authenticity of photography over painting, 
Bazin supports himself with an observation that ‘the lens’ in French is 
‘the objectif’, a nuance that seems lost in English (Bazin, 2005a: 13). In 
the process of revisiting such claims Karen Barad’s notion of agential real-
ism, which I will discuss at the end of this essay, will prove instructive.
Actualities and the avant-garde documentary tradition: 
between objectivity and subjectivity 
Matuszewski’s own films were of documentary (Coronation of Tsar 
Nicolas II, 1896; The Jubilee of the Queen of England, Victoria, 1897 and 
The Visit of President Faure in St Petersburg, 1898), ethnographic (Travels 
in Spała and Białowieża, 1895) and educational character (Surgical 
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Operations in Warsaw, 1895). His practical and theoretical works tes-
tify to a certain tension that existed in cinema from its beginning: the one 
between what filmmakers and critics alike perceived as objective and sub-
jective forms of filmmaking. The key films of the 1920s and 1930s avant-
garde were typically seen to be of a documentary nature: for example, 
Dziga Vertov’s Man with the Movie Camera (1929, Soviet Union) and 
Walter Ruttmann’s Berlin: Symphony of a Great City (1927). These films 
to a great degree reflected the growing politicization of the avant-gardes, 
as captured in Hans Richter’s 1934 book, The Struggle for the Film, in 
which the filmmaker traced a departure of numerous avant-garde film-
makers from a purist, formalist filmmaking to a politically and socially 
concerned filmmaking of the late 1920s and 1930s.  
By the 1920s the documentary was also one of the most popular film 
genres in Poland. Productions such as Praca Polski na morzu (Polish 
Work at the Sea, produced by Sea and River League, 1928) and Łódź – 
miasto pracy (Stefan Grodzieński, 1927) (Banaszkiewicz and Witczak, 
1989: 245-246) all derived from the early actualities by filmmakers like 
Matuszewski. Let us first consider the differences between actualities and 
documentaries, because it is in this distinction that the more creative role 
of the supposedly realist and representational filmmaking comes to the 
fore. Tom Gunning understood ‘actuality’ as ‘the practice before World 
War One’, whereas such practices after the Great War are referred to as 
‘documentary’ – the term which has been in use since John Grierson’s 
1926 review of Robert J. Flaherty’s Moana (1926) (Gunning, 1997: 23). 
In Grierson’s view Flaherty ‘had created a film of documentary value’, 
which nevertheless involved a ‘creative treatment of actuality’ (Grierson, 
in Loiperdinger, 1997: 25).  The founder of the British Documentary 
Movement therefore clearly believed that the filming of ‘actuality’ in itself 
did not constitute what might be seen as the ‘truth’. Actuality footage had 
to be subjected to a creative process ‘to reveal its truth’. He distinguished 
documentaries from other films made from ‘natural material’, such as 
newsreels, scientific and educational films. Film could not just describe 
and photograph – it needed to analyse and synthesise. Only through this 
process, Grierson claimed, could creativity emerge, and he believed that 
his film The Drifters (1929) was an expression of such an approach. 
This creative approach to the recording of reality discussed by 
Grierson as a mark of difference between actuality and documentary 
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relies on a particular intervention and embraces the notion of the cut (i.e. 
edit) in the process of shaping the film’s form and content. It is because, 
as we know well by now, the practice of editing is by no means neutral. 
Prompted by this realisation, in Life After New Media: Mediation As a 
Vital Process (2012) Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska ask: if we must 
always cut – as writers, photographers and filmmakers, then ‘what does it 
mean to cut well?’ (Kember and Zylinska, 2012: 71). One possible answer 
to this question can be found in Bazin’s writings. For the Cahiers du 
Cinéma theorist the decisive cut is not just an aesthetic but also an ethical 
notion, which is a point that Kember and Zylinska also make. Not one in 
favour of the fast cutting and montage techniques of Sergei Eisenstein, 
Bazin preferred the deep focus of Orson Welles and the long takes of the 
Italian Neorealist directors. He believed that these latter techniques cre-
ated a greater illusion of reality and thus brought cinema closer to life 
(Bazin, 2005b). Yet ‘reality’ remains a highly contested and subjective 
term, given its reliance on editorial decisions, choices and cuts. 
As for the links between documentary and the avant-grade, Bill 
Nichols argues that what fulfilled Grierson’s desire for ‘the creative 
treatment of actuality’ most relentlessly was the modernist avant-garde 
(Nichols, 2001: 592). It can thus be said that the evolution of documen-
tary went hand in had with the development of avant-garde tendencies in 
film. They both utilised each other’s techniques: ‘Modernist techniques 
of fragmentation and juxtaposition lent an artistic aura to documentary 
that helped to distinguish it from the cruder form of early actualities or 
newsreels’ (Nichols, 2001: 583).
It was the experimental use of film that, according to Nichols, turned 
an actuality into a documentary. In consequence, ‘documentary, like 
avant-garde film, cast the familiar in a new light…’ (Nichols, 2001: 580). 
Nichols thus considers documentary as a mature version of actuality and 
an important genre of avant-garde film. For Matuszewski the raw footage 
of actuality was enough to consider it a faithful representation of reality 
as the cinema’s artistic status rested in its unique qualities as an objec-
tive source of historical events. The mission to represent reality faithfully 
was, he believed, the cinematograph’s raison d’être. In a similar vein, in 
his 1935 book Documentary Film, Paul Rotha recognised the early actu-
alities’ capability of recording ‘spontaneity of natural behaviour’ as ‘a cin-
ematic quality’ (Rotha: 1935, 79). Matuszewski’s preoccupation with film 
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in the service of the nation and his recognition of film’s nation-building 
qualities resembles not only Polish Romantic beliefs but also an approach 
employed by such key figures of the international avant-garde film scene 
as Sergei Eisenstein, Vsevolod Pudovkin and Dziga Vertov. 
In his argument for making a connection between documentary and 
avant-garde films, Nichols points out four elements that contributed to 
the formation of a documentary film wave. Only one of these elements, 
Nichols argues, ‘had been in place since 1895’ (Nichols, 2001: 586). 
Incidentally, this element is most crucial to my argument as it refers to 
‘the capacity of cinema to record visible phenomena with great fidelity’ 
(Nichols, 2001: 586).  Here Matuszewski’s attitude towards shaping his-
torical consciousness through the use of film puts him at the forefront 
of the debates about the propagandist values of film. His recognition 
of the propagandist values of cinema corresponds to some degree with 
that of Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin (1925) and October: Ten 
Days That Shook the World (1928). Although highly stylized and heav-
ily cut, Eisenstein’s films, like Matuszewski’s actualities, reflect Nichols’s 
belief in the documentary’s power to ‘alter our perception of the world’ 
(Nichols, 2001: 596). 
Both Matuszewski and Eisenstein shared a certain level of uto-
pian visionary romanticism as far as the role of cinema was concerned. 
According to Sheila Skaff, Matuszewski’s writing was ‘informed by the 
nineteenth century Polish Romantic nationalist literary tradition and its 
sense for longing identity, which has fallen into a slumber and must be 
reawakened’ (Skaff, 2008: 33). Matuszewski’s proposal concerning the 
importance of preserving aspects of army life is relevant here. He thought 
that footage of army battles could be shown to the future generations of 
soldiers and civilians (Matuszewski, 1898a).  In this vein, in 1900 Robert 
W. Paul filmed The Army Life or How Soldiers Are Made: Mounted 
Infantry, a silent propaganda actuality, which featured the King’s Own 
Royal Lancaster Regiment riding over a plain. Both Matuszewski and 
Paul recognized the nation-building values of the cinematograph and 
its potential for strengthening patriotic feelings and preserving tradi-
tion – a function that, particularly in the occupied Polish territories, was 
previously performed by literature and painting. In filming soldiers fight-
ing for the freedom of their country, Matuszewski saw the resurrection 
of national values and the promotion of patriotism, as seen in the art of 
128 Kamila Kuc
painting (Mazaraki, 2006: 40). His need to present ‘the true’ version of 
history may have been driven by his coming from a country which for 
many years had been affected by the reversals of history (Mazaraki, 2006: 
40). He saw the cinematograph as playing an important part in the pro-
cess of creating a new national consciousness and cultural identity of the 
Poles. To this end, Matuszewski considered the role of a filmmaker as 
that of an orator who offers moral and political guidance to the masses by 
means of film. 
Taking into account Poland’s political situation and its geographical 
positioning in the 19th century, it is no surprise that Matuszewski empha-
sised the need for objectivity in the process of recording history in an 
accurate manner. There had been no Polish state since the partition of 
1795 (Wandycz, 1996). Divided between the three occupiers: Austria, 
Prussia and Russia, Poland existed only as an idea. His conviction about 
the role of the cinematograph as a reliable witness to history is also a 
reflection of the spirit of nationalism in Europe in the 19th century.
In his ongoing commitment to representing reality faithfully, 
Matuszewski believed in cinematic truth as the ultimate truth. It was 
mainly because of the cinematograph’s ability to record reality in an accu-
rate manner that he proposed to establish a legitimate film archive, an act 
which the British film historian Penelope Houston has described as ‘one 
of the most unexpected and remarkable in film history’ (Houston, 1994: 
10). For Matuszewski, cinematographic documents deserved the same 
level of authority as any other objects kept in a museum. Matuszewski 
also wanted to publish a periodical of animated photography with an 
international editorial board – Chronotografia i jej zastosowanie – which 
was to be used as a platform to discuss film preservation and other issues 
concerning cinema. 
Matuszewski’s proposal recalls Robert Paul’s 1897 letter to the British 
Museum, ‘Animated Photos of London Life’, in which he expressed the 
need to create an archive devoted to the moving image, for pieces of his-
tory to be safely stored (Matuszewski, 1898b). Matuszewski’s recognition 
of the need for a moving image archive brings him close to the preoccu-
pations of the later film avant-gardes, since the question of film archives 
formed an ongoing debate among numerous avant-garde filmmakers 
in the late 1920s, particularly since, as Malte Hagener points out, the 
avant-garde was largely responsible for the naturalization of documentary 
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(Hagener, 2007: 36). In 1928 Walter Ruttmann highlighted the need for 
a film archive of sorts. Such an archive, Ruttmann believed, would pre-
serve and make available all those important films ‘which failed to be suc-
cessful’ (Ruttmann, in Hagener, 2007: 113). Matuszewski was thus at the 
forefront of the ideas of archiving and preserving moving image works.
The very process of recording history also makes us reflect on the role 
of documentary cinema in the avant-garde tradition. As shown here, for 
theorists such as Nichols the evolution of documentary took place along-
side the various developments in avant-garde film, as both genres utilised 
each other’s techniques. This, I suggest, permits us to view Matuszewski’s 
supposedly ‘objective’ work in the context of more experimental, subjec-
tive filmmaking. 
In her book Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (2007) Karen Barad proposes to 
view apparatuses as active agencies and ‘boundary-making practices’. For 
her apparatuses are ‘specific material reconfigurings of the world that do 
not merely emerge in time but interatively reconfigure spacetimematter 
as part of the ongoing dynamism of becoming’ (Barad, 2007: 142). To this 
end she considers apparatuses as material-discursive practices. They are 
‘not passively observing instruments’ but are capable of producing dif-
ferences that matter; hence they are boundary-making practices that are 
‘formative of matter and meaning’ (Barad, 2007: 142, 146). The appara-
tuses can reconfigure the world and here Matuszewski’s film proves that 
the apparatus’s record shaped the course of history and helped to avoid 
a diplomatic disaster. This conclusion corresponds with Barad’s agential 
realism, which proposes that ‘phenomena do not merely mark the epis-
temological inseparability of observer and observed … rather phenomena 
are ontological inseparability/entanglement of intra-acting “agencies”’ 
(Barad, 2007: 139). Apparatuses, according to Barad, are themselves 
phenomena and have no intrinsic boundaries, thus they constitute open-
ended practices (Barad, 2027: 142). 
Barad’s notion of ‘intra-actions’ suggests that individuals ‘do not pre-
exist as such but rather materialize in intra-action’, which means that they 
‘only exist within phenomena’ (materialized/materializing relations) ‘in 
their ongoing iteratively intra-active reconfiguring’ (Barad, in Kleinman, 
2012: 77). Most importantly, for Barad, the intra-actions enact ‘agential 
separability’ – ‘the condition of exteriority-within-phenomena’ (Barad in 
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Kleinman, 2012: 77). Barad’s notion of agential realism does not begin 
with any predetermined set of fixed differences. Instead, it aims at mak-
ing inquiries into how differences are made, ‘stabilised and destablised’ 
(Barad in Kleinman, 2012: 77).  Barad’s argument goes beyond the objec-
tive/subjective divide: she claims that apparatuses actually shape the his-
tory on the material level, beyond the thoughts and passions of their indi-
vidual human users. Seen in this light, Matuszewski’s cinematograph – or, 
indeed, any other camera – is not a passive witness to history but an active 
creator and agent of it. The more recent uses of highly portable, digital 
devices that upload content to various Internet platforms with immedi-
ate effect – as seen, for example, in Jehane Noujaim’s Oscar-nominated 
documentary about the Egyptian revolution, The Square (2013), in which 
such small devices played a crucial role – testify to the medium’s active 
(even if not determining) role in all kinds of history-making. 
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Notes
1  Matuszewski’s seminal article was written and originally published 
in French as ‘Une nouvelle source de l’histoire (création d’un dépôt de 
cinématographie historique)’. Here I am using Julia Bloch Frey’s translation, 
with an introduction by William D.Routt at La Trobe University website: no 
longer available.
2  Matuszewski, ‘La photographie animée, ce qu’elle est et ce qu’elle doit être’ 
(‘Animated photography. As it is and as it should be’) at La Trobe University. 
Translated by William D. Routt and Danielle Pottier-Lacroix. Accessed on 
16 July 2007 [1898].
3  My italics.
4  Le Figaro from 12 January 1898 confirmed that Matuszewski’s film 
challenged von Bismarck’s claim: ‘Or, voici qu’avant-hier le cinématographe 
reproduisit précisément la scène de l’arrivée de M.Félix Faure a Saint-
Pétersbourg. Et chacun put voir le Président s’avancer à pas lents, devant le 
front, et baisser tout à coup son chapeau, d’un geste large et correct, - ce geste 
que tous les Parisiens connaissent bien’. Le Petit Journal from 15 July 1898 
stated that, thanks to documents such as Matuszewski’s footage, Bismarck’s 
assertion could have been refuted: ‘C’est même grâce à ces documents qu’on 
a pu réfuter l’assertion de Bismarck, qui prétendait que M. Félix Faure avait 
omis de se découvrir devant le drapeau russe à son débarquement’.
CHAPTER 8
What is the Value of a Technological 
History of Cinema?
Lee Grieveson
  I was asked some time ago to contribute to a discussion on the func-
tion and value of a technological history of cinema.1 Remarks I made 
are reproduced here, and I have resisted the temptation to substantially 
rework them. What is lost from a fully worked out and carefully con-
structed article is, perhaps, gained in the looser and slightly more polemi-
cal framing of this. I am particularly interested here in thinking about 
how cinema emerged in the context of the broader transformations of the 
second stage of the Industrial Revolution, itself powered by a particular 
formation of capitalism, and how in turn this form of media and spec-
tacle helped enable the expansion of that conjuncture across a world sys-
tem (Grieveson, 2012).
It is a commonplace of industrial history that the last third or so of 
the nineteenth century saw a second-stage Industrial Revolution driven 
principally by new discoveries in electricity and chemistry. Around the 
turn of the century these developments led to the rapid and extensive 
mechanisation of industrial production that underpinned the diffusion 
of mass production methods as well as the emergence of new organ-
isational procedures and the formation of new corporate forms (and 
intra-corporate or monopoly organisation, frequently predicated on the 
corporate monopolisation of technological intelligence which became 
essential to profit maximisation: in this way, technological knowledge 
was increasingly privatised). Industrial capital produced a surplus 
reinvested as finance capital, motivating globalising practices (either 
colonialist or, as with the U.S., an economic imperialism increasingly 
divorced from geographic possession and later supported by ostensibly 
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neutral international institutions like the World Bank). Like it was in the 
Industrial Revolution, when the steam engine enabled the greater circu-
lation of raw materials and manufactured goods, so it was that the new 
industrial and economic practices of the echo-boom of the revolution 
were twinned with developments in transportation and communication 
technologies – now automobiles, airplanes, telegraphs, telephones – and 
the construction of large modern technological systems that subtended 
new economic forms of ever more rapid circulation. All of this was accord-
ingly supported by liberal capitalist states through policies that increased 
research potential (and here investments in schools and universities were 
critical); the potential circulation of materials on rails, roads, international 
canals, airways; and macroeconomic policies that developed safeguards 
for intellectual property rights, facilitated monopolisation, and weakened 
worker and subaltern resistance. ‘Technology’ accordingly became a key-
word from the 1930s onwards, recent scholarship suggests, supplanting 
earlier terms like ‘useful arts’ that made less and less sense in the face of 
large-scale technological systems (Schatzberg, 2006). And this shift was 
facilitated by the close links between universities and business. All to say: 
it is, then, a truism of modern history that the concurrent emergence or 
coupling of technology and corporate and increasingly global capitalism, 
facilitated by liberal states, is one of the most significant developments of 
the modern world. We live in many ways in the shadow of this. 
Likely it is already apparent that the tenor of my answer to the ques-
tion posed by this discussion – what is the value of a technological history 
of cinema?  – is to push thinking in the direction of addressing cinema’s 
role in a broader technological, and so therefore necessarily economic and 
political, history. Technology may not be determining, as the Humanities 
mantra must repeat, but it is increasingly hard to look outside the walls of 
the cinema and not notice that global economies are quite determining. I 
personally have next to no interest in a history of cinema technology for 
its own sake, as a discrete history of a privileged object. Rather, the invita-
tion of this discussion is to pose different questions. What roles, I want to 
ask, did cinema play in the formation of a corporate liberal political econ-
omy? What were the ways that media as a system was integrated with 
new capitalist practices? What were the logics of capital that made these 
machines (cameras, kinetoscopes, projectors) or storage substances (cellu-
loid, as a visual and later auditory material and chemical substrate), and 
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what did these machines help make? It is not easy to answer these ques-
tions, of course, but let me offer some observations along those lines, some 
examples drawn from recent scholarship, and some reflections on what 
this material might do for our understanding of how cinema technology 
was enmeshed with particular economic and governmental projects.
The connections are, of course, myriad. We might start, for example, 
with the discovery of photosensitive halogen silver salts, crucial to the 
establishment of photographic film as an improvement on the technology 
of glass plates. Eastman Company developed this most thoroughly from 
the 1870s (from which point, of course, it carved out a system of patents 
to maximise profits). Eastman’s marshalling of chemical knowledge to 
develop flexible photosensitive film was a critical, formative, technologi-
cal development for what came to be called cinema. In a 1927 investment 
report on the moving picture business, the Chicago investment firm of 
Halsey, Stuart & Co. observed in passing that motion pictures use more 
silver than the United States mint. What an interesting image. Where did 
this silver come from? I don’t know precisely, but here is what I assume: 
from silver mines, likely enough those in colonised states, and certainly 
predicated on exploitative and dangerous labour practices. The film 
in film technology was always already ensnared in complex histories of 
extraction and exploitation… Quite some time ago now, at a conference 
in India, I was told by colleagues there that very few Indian films of the 
1940s survive because they were destroyed to release the silver content 
in them.2 I suppose this was a wider practice, and that archivists would 
know a great deal about this, and likely I should have known it myself. In 
any case, the connections between film, extractive economy, and the con-
juncture of ‘precious’ metals associated with currency, ornamentation, 
and the chemical basis of photosensitivity is worth remarking upon.
I do know better, because of other people’s research, that experiments 
in serialised photography emerged from, and supported, new conceptions 
of temporality and the subdivision of time into discrete units – visible in 
the proliferation of watches from the 1870s – that were fundamentally 
connected to industrial labour practices. E. P. Thompson’s 1966 account 
of the emergence of time-oriented, as opposed to task-oriented, labour is 
the classic account of this.3 It is no coincidence, surely, that Eadweard 
Muybridge’s experiments in serialised photography were sponsored by 
a railroad magnate and made directly possible by technology borrowed 
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from a telegraph company: driven, we might say, by the twin motors of 
transportation and communication, and the imperatives of the speeded 
up circulation of goods and information so central to advanced capitalism. 
Later experiments by physiologists and industrialists utilised this technol-
ogy to examine closely the movement of the labouring body, so enabling 
the extraction of extra surplus value (Braun, 1992; Rabinach, 1992). The 
fragmentation of flow into discrete and manageable moments was integral 
to a new rationalised industrial capitalism. Moving pictures facilitated 
this. Frank Bunker Gilbreth filmed workers completing various tasks – 
packing and labelling cartons, for example, analysed carefully the film to 
devise quicker ways of working, and re-filmed the now redesigned task to 
show clearly the success of his methods.4 
In my own research on the Ford Motor Company’s extensive use of 
film I discovered some evidence that the Company used film technology 
as part of its elaboration of the mass assembly line (Grieveson, 2012: 26-7). 
Time-motion studies at Ford contributed directly to the division of labour 
into separate and increasingly routinised and mechanised tasks. When 
combined with the production of machine tools enabling standardisation, 
this rationalisation process culminated in the momentous establishment 
in 1913 of the moving assembly line (Hounshell, 1984). It was this inno-
vation that enabled the direct and mechanised control of the movement 
and pace of workers, dramatically increasing productivity and the extrac-
tion of surplus value from labouring bodies (Braverman, 1998: 127-62). 
Mass assembly and production was fundamental to the establishment of 
corporate capitalism. And, through the reduction of costs, it underpinned 
a mass culture of abundance and consumerism that emerged most clearly 
in the 1920s (Zunz, 1998: 73-92). At Ford, this coercive architecture of 
production enabled automobiles to be produced, as two contemporary 
observes noted, ‘like the successive negatives on a motion picture film’ 
(Arnold and Faurote, 1915: 360). Another interesting image. We might 
invert it to say: for a time, the successive frames of motion pictures par-
ticipated in the process by which the outputs of the labouring body could 
be maximised to produce quickly the identical Model T’s that rolled off 
the assembly line as perhaps the most emblematic image of the age of 
mechanical production.
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I could likely go on, and remind us all (if it were needed) perhaps that 
the first significant theorist of the cinema, Hugo Münsterberg, was, in his 
day job, a scholar of ‘attention’ and the problem of directing and harness-
ing workers attention – but let me shift tack, towards a few brief remarks 
on the state use of cinema technology.5 It is increasingly clear that many 
of the technical innovations in the fields of photography and cinema were 
financed and first tested for warfare and military objectives and thus 
there was, in the words of Friedrich Kittler, a ‘historically perfect col-
lusion of world wars, reconnaissance squadrons, and cinematography’ 
(Münsterberg, 1916: 124). Here we might think specifically about the 
synergy between the design of automatic weapons and the camera appa-
ratus (Marey’s chronophotography derived in part from machine-gun 
technology); the development of 16mm; portable projection technologies 
in mobile cinema vans to bring cinema as recreation and propaganda to 
soldiers and diverse populations; and the broader enmeshing of surveil-
lance and state agendas through visual and sound technologies (General 
Electric, for example, developed aspects of sound technology under the 
direction of the U.S. Navy: these connections continue in later media 
practices, though I would need to be a much, much better historian of 
the Internet to make the precise connections between military objectives, 
new media, and surveillance). Virilio reminds us that the nitrocellulose 
in film stock was used also for explosives; and that searchlight technology 
filtered back into studio lighting practices (Virilio, 1989: 288).
Liberal and other states used film technology in the state of exception 
of wartime, certainly, but this practice became regularised, just as – as 
Giorgio Agamben teaches us – exceptional state practices tend to. In the 
U.S. the Departments of Agriculture, Interior and Commerce pioneered 
the production of film beginning in the 1910s and running through the 
New Deal. Vans carrying films to ever more remote peripheral regions 
were developed, capable of using electricity generated from their engines 
to overcome problems of local differences in electricity current to proj-
ect these films of government practice to isolated rural populations. In the 
U.K. the Conservative party pioneered this use of mobile cinema vans 
in the 1920s, carrying the films it financed to working-class populations 
who had become electorally significant after the Representation of the 
People’s Act in 1918.
138 Lee Grieveson
Figure 8.1: Conservative Party’s Mobile Cinema Van. Courtesy of the 
Modern Records Centre at the University of Warwick.
It is relatively well known, I think, the subsequent history of these devel-
opments in the formation of the Empire Marketing Board Film Unit 
in 1927 that pioneered various uses of technology to supplement its 
attempts to establish a colonial economic bloc: not only mobile cinema 
vans, but also automatic film projectors placed in train stations in London 
to advertise imperial produce. This is the direct progenitor of all those 
screens selling us things that populate public space these days. Media 
technology operated as part of a wider networked infrastructure working 
to facilitate and mediate the materials, goods and capital that travelled 
along the same pathways. 
Later, the use of mobile cinemas was imported to the empire, with 
the intention frequently of using film to ‘educate’ colonial populations, 
to create modern colonial subjects, and to bind populations into an 
imperial collectivity.6 Exhibition functioned as a performance of mod-
ern colonial power, a kind of ritual of state power that started with film 
itself as the embodiment of the technological modernity that colonial 
power claimed for itself. Here film technology supplied the ‘shock and 
awe’ that facilitated colonial practices. Indeed, EMB and other British 
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colonial films insistently feature technology: a common trope shows 
raw materials being gathered in the empire, and transported back to the 
metropole – on the British ships so central to its position of geopolitical 
and economic primacy in the nineteenth century – where they are fed 
into great big machines, and turned into the manufactured goods that 
maintained British economy and the necessary underdevelopment of 
colonial economies. The fascinated gaze of the camera machine at the 
various industrial machines that litter the film offers exemplary instances 
of what Brian Larkin has called ‘the colonial sublime’, the ‘effort to use 
technology as part of political rule’ (Larkin, 2008: 39). The films make a 
distinction, though, between the way workers interact with machines, for 
in the sequences in, say, colonial Africa the machines dwarf workers, who 
are always supervised in their relatively menial work of fetching and car-
rying by British officials, whereas in the short sequences in British facto-
ries the workers are unsupervised and demonstrate a mastery of complex 
technology. 
Figure 8.2: West Africa Calling (1927). Courtesy of the British Film Institute National Archive.
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The gulf of technological superiority legitimises colonial rule. If this rep-
resentation belies the history of how new technologies of mass production 
and Fordist work practices deskilled working-class populations, it does so 
in the goal of a political logic that seeks to cathect the working class to 
technological modernity and perhaps even more substantively to associ-
ate the power of machinery with that of capital and state. The machinery 
of state powers industrial machinery, witnessed here (and so facilitated) 
by the actual and figurative machinery of film.
I will end here. I have made no reference to the expansion of com-
modity capitalism into the sphere of leisure, or to the screen as a tech-
nology of display. All the examples I have given have, instead, been from 
what we might call nontheatrical cinema, or, following Charles Acland 
and Haidee Wasson, ‘useful film’: the attempts by various organisations, 
from states to corporations to educators and reformers, to use film and its 
related technologies to supplement what I would describe as a corporate 
liberal political economy. It is in these connections, in the ways cinema 
gets cathected to – and helps orchestrate – economic and political proj-
ects that I see the most value for thinking carefully, again, about cinema 
and technology.
Original source and licence
Alphaville: Journal of Film and Screen Media (6), Winter 2013. Licence: 
CC BY NC ND.
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Notes
1  The ‘Impact of Technological Innovations on the Historiography and Theory 
of Cinema’ conference was organised by André Gaudreault and Martin 
Lefebvre as part of the Permanent Seminar on the History of Film Theories 
in Montreal in late 2011. My thanks to Martin Lefebvre in particular for 
the invitation.
2  The conference was held at the English and Foreign Languages University 
in Hyderabad. My thanks in particular to Madhav Prasad for the invitation.
3  Thompson argued that industrialisation fundamentally changed the 
understanding of time and of labour practices, shifting production away 
from workers managing their own schedules in a focus on particular tasks 
often correlated to seasons or cycles – for example, harvests – to one that 
subdivided tasks and regularised timings.
4  A compilation of some of these films is available online from Prelinger 
Archive at http://www.archive.org/details/OriginalFilm.
5  Münsterberg played a significant role in the development of industrial 
psychology in America and his book Psychology and Industry Efficiency 
(1913) is seen by some as the founding work in the discipline (see Hale, 1980).
6  The history of this process is told on the Colonial Film Website at http://
www.colonialfilm.org.uk.
CHAPTER 9
A New/Old Ontology of Film
Rafe McGregor
The purpose of this article is to examine the ontological effects of digital 
technology, and determine whether digital films, traditional films, and 
pre-traditional motion pictures belong to the same category. I begin by 
defining the parameters of my inquiry, and then consider the two most 
significant consequences of the new technology. §2 proposes a decisive 
refutation of the causal relationship between reality and photography. 
§3 identifies an end to the dominance of photorealistic film over anima-
tion, and argues for an inversion of that relationship, whereby animation 
is paramount. Finally, I consider the implications of these consequences 
for film ontology, compare theories, and conclude in favour of Berys 
Gaut, for whom digital film is the latest incarnation of a history of mov-
ing pictures that stretches back for centuries.
Defining the question: terminology and technology
The fundamental problem with the question ‘what is film?’ is that it 
presupposes a certain kind of answer. In fact, the words ‘film’, ‘motion 
picture’, and ‘movie’ all make the question redundant. The term ‘film’ 
is derived from film stock, the photosensitive chemical material used to 
record rebounding light. The conversion of light into film produces a 
negative, which is then photographed itself to produce an original print. 
The photochemical process has been labelled ‘traditional’, and produces 
both still photographs and the sequences of still images called ‘films’. So 
it seems that asking what film is limits the answer to the projection of 
photographic images onto screens, exhibited through the medium of cin-
ema from 1895. Although photographic film is still used, the success of 
George Lucas’s Star Wars: Episode II – Attack of the Clones in 2002 
144 Rafe McGregor
heralded the entry of digital cinema to the mainstream market. James 
Cameron’s Avatar (2009), a three-dimensional (3D) digital production, is 
the most commercially successful film to date at the time of writing, and a 
return to photographic film in the future appears highly unlikely. 
The use of ‘motion picture’ and ‘movie’ is no less prescriptive. The 
etymology of ‘movie’ is uncertain, but is probably an abbreviation for 
‘moving image’ or ‘moving pictures’. I shall regard ‘moving image’, ‘mov-
ing pictures’, and ‘motion picture’ as synonymous for my purposes. If the 
inquiry concerns moving pictures rather than film, then it extends back 
well beyond 1895. Berys Gaut identifies three different categories of 
motion picture: object-generated, handmade, and mechanically-gener-
ated (2010: 6-10). Object-generated motion pictures have existed since 
at least the tenth century CE, in the form of Indonesian and Chinese 
shadow puppet plays. Handmade motion pictures include simple flip-
books, magic lanterns, the thaumatrope, the phenatakistocope (1832), the 
zoetrope (1833), the choreutoscope (1866), and the praxinoscope (1877). 
Mechanically generated motion pictures began with Edison’s kinetoscope 
and the Lumière cinématographe – both of which used film stock – and 
the category includes subsequent electronic and digital developments. 
While Gaut maintains that all three types of moving image share a 
common ontology, Noël Carroll restricts motion pictures to the mechan-
ically-generated (Gaut, 1996: 127-130). I wish to avoid asking a redun-
dant question and limiting the scope of film or motion pictures without 
justification. I shall therefore use ‘film’ and ‘motion picture’ interchange-
ably, with both referring to the exhibition of moving images in the broad-
est possible sense, i.e. not restricted to either photochemical stock or 
photorealistic pictures. I include animated features in the category of 
traditional film due to the fact that until Toy Story (John Lasseter, 1995) 
animated films consisted of photographs of either illustrations or objects 
(for stop motion animation, e.g. Wallace and Gromit [Nick Park and Nick 
Rushton, 1989-2010]). 
Carroll distinguishes film from similar art forms like theatre and 
puppet shows by stipulating the moving image as two-dimensional (2D) 
(Carroll, 1996: 130). With the post-Avatar revival of 3D film, this distinc-
tion might seem outdated, but 3D cinema has existed since the screening 
of The Power of Love in 1922, so the issue is neither new nor linked to dig-
ital cinema (Zone, 2007: 1-2). I endorse Carroll’s distinction, specifying 
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that motion pictures are 2D even though they may appear 3D. The images 
are generated on a two-dimensional surface; they may be drawn on this 
surface directly, in the case of a flip-book or a zoetrope, or projected onto 
a flat screen, in the case of a shadow play or traditional film. I can now 
identify the question, which is ‘what is film?’ where ‘film’ is the art form 
involving the exhibition of 2D moving pictures, and ‘a film’ or ‘motion pic-
ture’ is a specific instance of this category. I have noted the possible begin-
nings of the art as shadow plays, mentioned the more recent precursors to 
traditional film, and given a very brief description of the photochemical 
process. A summary of the digital revolution in film follows. 
In contrast with the photographic process, where light is converted to 
film, digital image recording converts light into streams of binary numbers. 
Digital recording employs a charge-coupled device (CCD) to first con-
vert light levels to voltages and then convert them to the number streams, 
which are stored in bitmaps, i.e. grids of pixels.1 The bitmap is a math-
ematical representation and thus has no physical relation to the image, 
which is manufactured by the interpretation of numbers. The images can 
be recorded either on digital tape or as digital files. Aside from the use of 
a CCD, there are two other methods of producing digital images: by hand 
with a software tool, and computer synthesis. The former creates images 
by digital painting; the latter involves the construction of a vector graphic 
or 3D model to generate bitmaps. All three methods of manufacture can 
be combined seamlessly. The digital image does not suffer degradation 
when it is replicated, and duplication produces a clone rather than a copy 
(Gaut, 2010: 12-16).
‘Computer-generated imagery’ (CGI) describes the application of 
pre- and post-production digital painting and computer synthesis to film, 
and is fundamentally ‘a form of computer animation’ (Cook, 2004: 882). 
Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park (1993) was the first extensive use of CGI 
in a photorealistic film, and met with unprecedented commercial success 
(Cook, 2004: 890-891). Two years later Toy Story became the first digi-
tal feature film, i.e. the first film created entirely with CGI. Star Wars: 
Episode I – The Phantom Menace (George Lucas, 1999) made even more 
use of CGI than Jurassic Park, and was exhibited in digital screenings in 
addition to its traditional cinema release (Gaut, 2010: 10-11). The suc-
cess of the sequel in 2002 ushered in a new era of motion pictures. The 
philosophical implications of digital cinema are both far-reaching and 
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complex, but I believe it has finally quashed the various positions that 
reject photography as a representational art.
Another long goodbye: photography as presentation
Gregory Currie bade a conclusive farewell to the persistent – but insub-
stantial – hypothesis that the ontology of film was that it constituted a 
particular kind of language. The argument he calls the ‘presentation 
thesis’ has been just as persistent, with as little substance (Currie, 1995: 
48). Currie describes the presentation thesis as the claim that photogra-
phy presents rather than represents the world, and focuses on Kendall 
Walton’s transparency argument. Gaut maintains that there are two dis-
tinct objections to photography as art within transparency – causal and 
reproductive – and although I disagree, I shall mention all four of the 
arguments opposing representation in photography (Gaut, 2010: 21-22). 
André Bazin held that photography was essentially objective, by 
which he meant that the photographic image was (the same as) the thing 
itself: ‘Photography enjoys a certain advantage in view of this transference 
of reality from the thing to its reproduction’ (Bazin, 1960: 8). For Bazin, to 
look at an old family photograph was to see the deceased relatives them-
selves, rather than to see a representation thereof. Rudolf Arnheim inter-
preted Charles Baudelaire’s comments on photography imitating real-
ity as the idea that photography ‘was nothing but a mechanical copy of 
nature’ (1974: 155). If this is indeed the case, then photography has no 
capacity to express artistic intention. Roger Scruton contrasted photogra-
phy with painting: where the latter stood in an intentional relation to its 
subject (due to the representational act), the former stood in a causal rela-
tion, and could not be considered a representational art (Scruton, 1981: 
578-598). Looking at an object through a camera lens (or at the resultant 
photograph) was thus the same as looking at a mirror or looking through a 
telescope; it merely presented the reality. Finally, Kendall Walton argued 
that to see a photograph of X was to see X, while to see a painting of X was 
not: ‘Photographs are transparent. We see through them’ (Walton, 1984: 
251). This transparency causes photographs to put one in perceptual con-
tact with the object photographed.
I believe these four theses – objectivity, reproduction, causal relativ-
ity, and transparency – all present a single challenge to photography as 
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representational art, and I use ‘presentation thesis’ to describe this chal-
lenge. I shall first show why the presentation thesis does not hold – even 
for traditional photography – and then show the effect of digital pho-
tography on the debate before considering the implications for film. It is 
worth noting an observation by Currie at the outset: most advocates of the 
presentation thesis have limited their claims to photographic images that 
have not been significantly altered subsequent to exposure (Currie, 1995: 
48). So the presentation thesis is subject to a qualification, and even its 
proponents do not accept that seeing (a photograph) is always believing 
(the reality). Scruton is even more restrictive, limiting his observations to a 
‘logical ideal’ (Scruton, 1981: 578). One could argue that if photographs 
are not always objective, reproductions, causally related, or transparent, 
then there is a capacity (of some sort) for representation inherent in the 
medium, but the move is not necessary.
Gaut provides a conclusive and entertaining refutation of the pre-
sentation thesis, using the example of Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres’s 
painting, Madame Moitessier (1856) (Gaut, 2010: 30-31). He identi-
fies a number of ideas expressed by Ingres in the work, and then imag-
ines that the woman depicted had been painted by Oscar Kokoshka and 
Lucian Freud. Gaut notes the differences in intention and appearance 
likely to have resulted, e.g., from skin as pure as marble (Ingres) to skin 
that looks like raw meat (Freud). He then extends the thought experi-
ment to photography, suggesting that parallel differences in appearance 
would result if the subject was photographed by Sir Cecil Beaton, Julia 
Margaret Cameron, and Diane Arbus. The photograph perceived by the 
viewer would differ significantly in all three cases – just as the painting by 
each artist would differ. These differences are caused by the intentions 
of the photographers and the capacity of photography to express these 
intentions indicates that it is a representational medium. I believe Gaut’s 
thought experiment is sufficient to turn the tables on the presentation 
thesis. There is no justification for regarding all unaltered photographs as 
presentations of reality; many photographs are representations, so the pre-
sentation thesis should be confined to those depictions where the inten-
tion of the photographer is to present (rather than represent) an object. 
One might acknowledge that, e.g., photojournalists and crime scene pho-
tographers typically present reality, but even this claim is debatable. 
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The appearance of Kevin Carter’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Starving 
Child in the Sudan in the New York Times in March 1993 resulted in 
public concern for the infant portrayed (Keller, 1994). When readers saw 
the photograph they believed that there was a real starving girl, and that 
the event captured in the image – a vulture awaiting her demise – really 
happened at a certain time and place. The assumption was correct, and 
would not have been made if the picture printed in the newspaper had 
been an illustration, no matter how life-like. When one sees a photograph 
in a context like a newspaper one tends to think of it as presenting reality. 
There seem to be degrees of realism: from actual perception, to looking 
at a photograph, to looking at a painting. Thus looking at Carter’s photo-
graph is not as horrific as actually being in the Sudan with the child and 
the vulture, but is more horrific than seeing a sketch of her. Walton makes 
this point by contrasting the immediacy of Francisco Goya’s ‘Even Worse’ 
(1810), part of The Disasters of War, with Timothy H. O’Sullivan’s pho-
tograph, Death on a Misty Morning (1883) (Walton, 1984: 247-248). 
Walton has selected a particularly visceral portrayal of the aftermath 
of a battle, but his choice is unfortunate for his argument: O’Sullivan 
was believed to have moved the bodies of the corpses he photographed 
in order to create a more dramatic effect, i.e. to express his intentions in 
his representations of dead soldiers.2 While (most) photographs undoubt-
edly appear more real than (most) other pictures, even photojournalistic 
images do not necessarily present reality. Two of the most famous photo-
graphic images ever taken serve as examples. There is an ongoing debate 
about Robert Capa’s Falling Soldier (1936). The question is not only 
whether the image was posed, as I have suggested in Walton’s example, 
but where it was actually taken: on the battlefield as claimed, or at a safer 
position behind the front lines (Mitchell, 1992: 40-43). When Dorothea 
Lange took the photograph Migrant Mother (1936) she failed to notice 
that her subject had grasped a tent pole in order to steady her sleeping 
child. The thumb and finger that appeared in the foreground of the image 
were subsequently edited out (Curtis, 1986: 17-20). 
My point is that in two paradigmatic cases of photojournalism there 
is room for doubt as to the reality, and room for expression on the part 
of the photographer. William J. Mitchell mentions the response to an 
international incident between the United States and Libya in January 
1989 as an exemplary instance of photographic evidence being contested 
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– contested on the very basis that it does not present reality (Mitchell, 
1992: 22-24). Hoaxes like the Cottingley Fairies (1917) and the surgeon’s 
photograph of the Loch Ness Monster (1934) reveal that the capacity 
for deception afforded by photographic evidence is not a recent develop-
ment. I offer these examples as a supplement to Gaut’s argument, to show 
that there is always – and has always been – a possibility for representa-
tion in photography, even when it appears at its most transparent.3 If this 
is true of traditional photographs, then the opportunity for representation 
in digital photographs is even greater, due to the increased possibilities 
in editing. 
Gaut maintains that the digital image is correctly identified as: ‘a 
mélange (or blended) image – that is, it can be produced by any of three 
distinct techniques and each technique may vary in the proportion it has 
in the making of a particular image’ (Gaut, 2010: 45). He claims that even 
if one restricts one’s inquiry to the digital photograph, the software pack-
ages accompanying digital cameras allow photographers of all proficien-
cies a wide range of editing options. Mitchell believes that digital images 
should never be called photographs, even if created with a digital camera, 
as they differ as much from a traditional photograph as a photograph from 
a painting (Mitchell, 1992: 3). Gaut rejects this radical distinction on the 
basis of the similar generative methods employed in traditional and digital 
photography (Gaut, 2010: 49). I agree with his assessment, though I shall 
show that he underestimates the impact of his own falsification of the pre-
sentation thesis.
I have considered the presentation thesis in some detail due its impli-
cations for the ontology of film. If photography could only present rather 
than represent reality, then photorealistic film would be similarly lim-
ited as an art form. Scruton is convinced that a film presents a drama, 
and that while drama is a representative art, the filming or photograph-
ing thereof is not (Scruton, 1981: 598-603). He holds that photography 
hinders rather than assists dramatic representation, because of the limits 
it places on interpretation and its link to fantasy rather than the imagina-
tion. For Scruton, therefore, the ontology of film is that it is no more than 
photographed drama. Arnheim contemplated the consequences of the 
thesis for contrasting reasons, and was concerned about the inevitable and 
undesirable conclusion that there could be no artistic expression in film 
(Arnheim, 1974: 155). With the presentation thesis refuted, however, 
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film can take its rightful place as an art form.4 The digital revolution has 
not only strengthened the argument for film as art, but also – I shall argue 
– indicated the category of art to which digital and traditional film belong.
The digital film: photorealistic animation
Gaut defines digital cinema as ‘the medium of moving images generated 
by bitmaps’ (Gaut, 2010: 14), and Lev Manovich identifies it as ‘a par-
ticular case of animation which uses live action footage as one of its many 
elements’ (Manovich, 1995). They both note a number of essential differ-
ences between digital and traditional film (Manovich, 1995; Gaut, 2010: 
17-18). All three types of digital image are subject to direct manipulation, 
with the result that the visual realism of photography has a plasticity that 
was formerly confined to animated film. In digital cinema, the traditional 
distinction between the ease of editing (a sequence) and the difficulty of 
image manipulation (special effects) has been eroded, and the spatial and 
temporal qualities of images can now be rearranged with equal ease. As 
there are no longer any aesthetic features linking film to film stock, digital 
cinema also has a purity from its physical origin. Once live action mate-
rial is digitised, the existing relation to reality is lost as the digital images 
become raw material (grids of pixels) for manipulation. Digital technol-
ogy has eroded the distinctions between creation and modification, pro-
duction and postproduction, as every image – whatever its source – is 
processed through various computer programs before the final cut. Lastly, 
the speed of computer processing has opened up new possibilities for 
interactivity in digital cinema. 
Even the most cursory examination of the philosophy, theory, and 
criticism of film reveals an overwhelming bias in favour of photorealistic 
– as opposed to animated – films. Gaut states that the ‘philosophy of film 
has concentrated almost exclusively on traditional photographic images’ 
(Gaut, 2010: 19). Manovich takes an even stronger line, describing the 
marginalisation as resulting in animation being ‘cinema’s bastard rela-
tive, its supplement, its shadow’ (Manovich, 1995). Works of reference 
on film frequently pay scant attention to animated features, and many 
philosophers exclude them from their definitions and ontologies of film. 
When the American Film Institute published a list of the hundred best 
American motion pictures made from 1898 to 1998, it included only two 
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animated films: Snow White and the Seven Dwarves (David Hand et al., 
1937), forty-ninth, and Fantasia (James Algar et al., 1940), fifty-eighth. 
When the list was revised in 2007, it included Toy Story at a rather dis-
appointing – given its significance in the history of film – ninety-ninth 
place, and at the expense of Fantasia (which was dropped) (American 
Film Institute). Animated films have nonetheless played a significant role 
in the film industry, from the commercial success of Snow White and the 
Seven Dwarves to the artistry of Beauty and the Beast (Gary Trousdale 
and Kirk Wise, 1991), and the groundbreaking technological advances of 
Toy Story and The Polar Express (Robert Zemeckis, 2004). 
Gaut believes that digital technology has undermined the dominance 
of the photograph in film (Gaut, 2010: 17). The (literal) photographic 
essence of traditional film, the link between film and film stock, has been 
severed. Live action photography is now merely one of several meth-
ods – methods which are themselves frequently combined – of produc-
ing the moving pictures that comprise a particular film. Manovich notes 
that digital technology has introduced the possibility of a feature film of 
one hundred and twenty-nine thousand, six hundred frames that is both 
indistinguishable from a photorealistic film, and created entirely by digi-
tal painting (Manovich, 1995). He maintains that the combination of live 
action material, painting, image processing, compositing, 2D and 3D ani-
mation that constitutes digital film has returned the moving image to its 
roots, which lie in the animation used in devices such as magic lanterns, 
zoetropes, and praxinoscopes. For Manovich, therefore, digital film has 
reversed the traditional relationship between photography and anima-
tion, with the latter now dominating. 
Perhaps digital film is best described by Gaut, as a mélange. Certainly 
my first thoughts on seeing a trailer for Avatar were, ‘what is it, a film or 
a cartoon?’5 There seem to be two equally valid answers: ‘both’, in that 
it was created with live actors (using motion capture) and digital paint-
ing; and ‘neither’, because it doesn’t fit into either traditional category. 
David A. Cook presents an interesting study by comparing the represen-
tation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in From Here to Eternity 
(Fred Zinnemann, 1953) and Pearl Harbor (Michael Bay, 2001) (Cook, 
2004: 921-926). The former relied heavily on the use of actual documen-
tary footage from 1941, but appeared much less realistic than the latter, 
which involved extensive use of CGI. Simulated reality, created by the 
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combination of digital photography, digital painting, and computer syn-
thesis, is thus more ‘real’ than the photo-chemically-recorded reality. 
Cook believes that the two films cannot be compared by the same stan-
dards, and agrees with Manovich that the digital revolution has created 
a new aesthetic where film has become a type of animation, and where 
production is the first stage of postproduction (Cook, 2004: 925-926). 
Cook uses ‘photorealistic animation’ to refer to animation that resem-
bles photography in its attention to detail, but I believe the term appropri-
ates the sense in which animation can replicate reality more successfully 
than photography (Cook, 2004: 883). Film can no longer be differenti-
ated from animation because the development of digital cinema has com-
pletely blurred the distinction. Peter Jackson deliberately used CGI tech-
niques with a strong photographic basis for The Lord of the Rings trilogy 
(2001-2003). He successfully created an appearance of reality, yet one of 
the main characters – Gollum – is entirely computer-generated. Robert 
Zemeckis’s The Polar Express is an apparently clear case of an animated 
film, yet his paradigmatic use of motion capture brings an almost disturb-
ing element of realism to the characters. Films like Avatar and Alice in 
Wonderland (Tim Burton, 2010) – their 3D aside – fall somewhere in 
between, and these examples of the cross-pollination of photography and 
painting show that the line between photorealism and animation is not 
only unclear, but irrelevant. The distinction may continue to be made for 
marketing purposes, but the two types of film have converged in a single 
category, digital film. Photorealism and animation have been replaced by 
photorealistic animation. 
Whether one regards the digital film as animated (Manovich) or 
mélange (Gaut), the photograph is obviously no longer as significant to 
the phenomenon as it once was. I believe that film has been freed from 
the restrictions imposed by photography, with the result that the scope for 
representation has increased exponentially. Drawing on Walton’s work 
(1970: 143-145), Gaut (2010: 37-38) elucidates the link between artistic 
expression and the perception of film and reality. Perceiving a film and 
perceiving reality diverge in a number of ways. Where the divergence is 
fixed, e.g. the lighting in the theatre and the 2D structure of the screen, 
one cannot regard it as communicating any artistic intention. Where 
divergence is variable, e.g. the shape of the image on the screen and the 
movement of the camera, one can attribute intention and expression. The 
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point can be generalised to all art: when there is choice, there is a poten-
tial for the expression of meaning; and the greater the capacity for choice, 
the greater the capacity for expression. 
I have mentioned the increase in choice in the change from traditional 
to digital photography, and the case is even more extreme for the mov-
ing image. The bewildering number of options available to contemporary 
film directors means that they have increased opportunities for expressing 
their intentions, and it is this intentional relation to the subject that makes 
film a representational art. Gaut holds that the digital revolution has 
resulted in a more compelling argument for film as art; indeed, Scruton’s 
claim that film is merely a recording of representative drama is simply 
implausible for the digital variety (Gaut, 2010: 49). Gaut also notes the 
intentionality of digital film in that it ‘possesses the possibility, in its non-
photographic modes, of creating expressive content that does not require 
the recording of any reality at all’ (Gaut, 2010: 50). I believe, however, 
that he understates the importance of digital developments. 
Although photographs continue to be used in film, they have become 
one of several kinds of mathematical representations that constitute the 
raw material from which the finished product is created. The photo-
graphic element of film is no longer any more significant than, e.g., com-
puter synthesis, and Manovich has noted that even photorealism need 
not involve any photography. The fact that digital film does not require 
the recording of reality not only means that the art form has the poten-
tial to stand in a purely intentional relation to its subject, but that it actu-
ally does so. The reason can be found in Walton’s standard and variable 
properties, alluded to by Gaut. In photorealistic traditional film the use 
of photography was a standard (fixed) property, like the 2D screen, i.e. 
there was no other option available. In photorealistic digital film, the use 
of photographs has become a variable property. Live footage has become 
one of several options for the director, and the decision to use it has thus 
become an expression of intention. Digital film, like painting, is always 
intentional. A contemporary director who used only photographs (of 
either type) in a feature film would be exercising a meaningful choice, and 
that choice would convey his intention. The consequence of this inten-
tionality is that digital film is indisputably a representational art.
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What is film in the 21st century?
I began by defining the scope of my inquiry as the art form of moving 
pictures, where the movement may be actual or apparent, and where the 
picture – despite appearances – is understood in the ordinary sense of 
being presented on a flat surface.6 I have established that all four catego-
ries of traditional and digital photography and film offer possibilities for 
representation, and noted that the digital film is a development of tradi-
tional film characterised by what I have called ‘photorealistic animation’. 
I shall now answer the question ‘what is film?’, taking into account both 
traditional and digital varieties, and consider the restrictions an ontology 
of film should impose in order to make an enlightening classification of 
the art form. 
Currie produced the first comprehensive philosophy of film in the 
analytic tradition with Image and Mind in 1995. Although the ontology 
of film he proposed has much to recommend it, Currie’s position on non-
photographic film is opaque. He cites animation as an example that ‘more 
distant causes’ of the cinematic experience need not be photographic, but 
subsequently excludes all reference to animated film (Currie, 1995: 4). 
It seems that he is either concerned purely with photorealistic film or – 
at most – film produced with film stock. By linking film to photography, 
Currie is committed to the view that Toy Story – produced with CGI – is 
not a film, and that Toy Story and Snow White are therefore different phe-
nomena. The position is clearly erroneous. 
Digital technology – in the form of CGI – has been applied to photo-
chemical film over a period of at least forty years, with notable early exam-
ples like 2001: A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick, 1968) and Westworld 
(Michael Crichton, 1973). CGI has been used incrementally, as technol-
ogy developed, and even Toy Story was recorded onto celluloid for screen-
ing, and thus used photochemical material. There is some dispute over 
the first film produced and released without employing any photochemi-
cal process, but the success of Star Wars: Episode II – Attack of the Clones 
in 2002 popularised the fully-digital film (Gaut, 2010: 11-12). It would 
be unfair to attribute the view that digital films are not films to Currie, 
and I think it much more likely that he simply failed to foresee the conse-
quences of the digital revolution.7 
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Carroll was quicker to realise the implications of the new technology: 
in 1996, he noted the advances made in electronic cinema and predicted 
the possibility of films being produced on CD-ROMs (Carroll, 1996: 
115), and the future film as ‘digitally synthesized images’ (Carroll, 1996: 
122). He believes that the domain of film is moving images, which seems 
a promising start in the light of subsequent developments. He stipu-
lates ‘moving images’ as opposed to ‘moving pictures’ in order to include 
abstract, nonrepresentational, and non-objective film (Carroll, 1996: 
126). Carroll’s ontology of moving images identifies five necessary (but 
not jointly sufficient) conditions: they must have the potential to appear 
to move, be a detached display, be 2D, and be generated by a template 
that is a token such that performance tokens are not works of art (Carroll, 
1996: 130). That an image must have the potential to appear to move 
seems obvious. By ‘detached display’ Carroll means that the images must 
not contain egocentric information, i.e. tell the viewer where he is in rela-
tion to the space depicted.8 Thus watching Jurassic Park does not tell me 
how to find the park in question, nor identify my position in relation to 
the dinosaurs roaming on screen. I have already accepted the 2D require-
ment, which is implied in ‘picture’ (although not in ‘image’). So far, there-
fore, Carroll’s ontology is applicable to digital and traditional film, and 
the range of motion pictures that preceded traditional film. 
Carroll uses the type-token distinction to contrast film with theatre 
(Carroll, 1996: 127-129). The play Richard III is a type, and its perfor-
mance is generated by an interpretation. I may, e.g., have the option of 
seeing two Richard IIIs, one at the university and one at a theatre in town. 
The interpretation of Shakespeare’s text will differ according to the tastes 
and skills of the different directors and actors involved. These interpre-
tations are themselves types, and they generate the token performances, 
e.g. a week of six shows from Monday to Saturday at the university. 
These tokens will ideally be identical, but the two interpretations may 
differ substantially. In a play the text, the interpretation, and the perfor-
mance are all subject to artistic evaluation. Richard Loncraine’s 1995 film 
Richard III differs entirely, however. I could have seen exactly the same 
performance no matter what film theatre I went to because the token – 
the particular screening I did in fact see – was generated by a template, 
which would have been a film print in 1995, and could be a film print or 
a digital file fifteen years later. The template is itself a token of the type, 
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with the result that the performance I see is a token generated by another 
token. Neither the template nor the performance are subject to artistic 
evaluation, only the type, Loncraine’s Richard III. The interpretation, 
acting, cinematography, and other aesthetic elements of the film are all 
contained in the type. The template and the screening may be faulty, but 
such problems are technical rather than artistic. 
It should be evident that Carroll’s use of type and token differentiates 
plays and, e.g., puppet shows, from traditional and digital film, and is thus 
satisfactory in dealing with bitmap-generated motion pictures. Strangely, 
Carroll describes his ontology as ‘overly inclusive’ for ‘what we typically 
call motion pictures’ (Carroll, 1996: 131). He specifically excludes mass 
produced flip books and the zoetrope from the art form he is attempting 
to identify because they ‘do not seem to be the kind of phenomena that 
one has in mind when speaking of moving pictures in ordinary language’ 
(Carroll, 1996: 131). I believe Carroll is in error here, for if he is attempt-
ing to establish an ontology of photographic film, then there should have 
been some reference to photography or film stock in his criteria. If he is 
seeking a broader ontology of moving images, however, then the ordinary 
usage of ‘motion picture’ for ‘traditional film’ is of little relevance. There 
is an inconsistency in investigating the moving image and restricting the 
results to its current popular incarnation. 
Inconsistency notwithstanding, there is a further problem with 
Carroll’s ontology in that it excludes both hand-crafted flip books (as he 
admits) and any moving picture presentation where the performance is 
an art. With regard to the latter, I have mentioned that the requirement 
that the moving image be generated by a template is an implicit link to 
Gaut’s mechanically-generated category. While the template might 
apply to mass-produced thaumatropes and zoetropes – and perhaps even 
certain magic lantern shows – it would definitely exclude the shadow 
puppet plays, where the performance is not produced by a template and 
is itself a source of artistry. Perhaps this is not a fault in Carroll. If one 
considers watching Avatar in 3D and watching a shadow play, one might 
well conclude that they are not the same kind of thing. Yet Carroll’s ontol-
ogy includes the flip book and the zoetrope, which seem much closer to 
the shadow play than the digital film in category. Why can a zoetrope be 
a moving image, but not a shadow play; and why can a mass-produced 
flip book be a moving image, but not a handmade one? Though Carroll’s 
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ontology is remarkable in anticipating and including digital cinema, I 
believe it ultimately fails by excluding object-generated and handmade 
moving pictures without sufficient justification.
Manovich’s characterisation of film as a particular type of animation 
may serve better, for animation seems to be – literally – the art of mov-
ing pictures. Manovich’s ontology of film is in fact more radical than this. 
He maintains that the return to handmade motion pictures epitomized in 
digital manipulation is not merely a return to animated moving pictures, 
but ‘a particular branch of painting – painting in time’ (1995). His answer 
to the ontological question is thus that a film is a series of paintings. The 
proposal is intriguing, but while there are aspects of digital cinema that 
are indeed a return to handmade motion pictures, the particular synthesis 
between human artistry and mechanical computer production in digital 
images appears to be a new development rather than a return to painting. 
One might, e.g., possibly conceive of Avatar as a series of paintings, but 
I’m not convinced that describing Rob Marshall’s Nine (2009) as series 
of paintings would be in any way enlightening. Although Guy Ritchie 
achieved the photorealism in Sherlock Holmes (2009) by animation, 
Manovich’s answer to the question ‘what is it?’ still seems confusing. Even 
if one agrees with Manovich entirely, however, his ontology excludes tra-
ditional film, and the many similarities between digital and traditional 
film indicate that the former is a development of the latter rather than a 
new art form (in the same way that digital photography is a development 
of traditional photography). 
I believe that digital film is the same kind of ‘thing’ as traditional film 
and its predecessors, and that choreutoscopes and phenatakistocopes are 
similarly related to their own predecessors, magic lanterns and shadow 
puppet plays. They are all displays of motion pictures – or moving images 
– and while any two examples of the category may appear quite different, 
there is evidence of a linear development through history, particularly 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century. I agree with Manovich that 
the latest technology has asserted the dominance of animation over film, 
and reversed the relationship that persisted through the twentieth cen-
tury. For all my criticism of Carroll, he had a seer’s vision in stating, ‘[t]he 
epoch of photographic film… may represent nothing but a brief interlude 
in the artform’ (Carroll, 1996: 122). Ultimately, however, Gaut’s descrip-
tion of the many kinds of cinema is the most convincing. Cinema, and 
158 Rafe McGregor
moving pictures, have existed for centuries, and the current sovereignty 
of animation in digital imaging serves as a reminder that the moving 
picture pre-dated photography. What is a film? A series of pictures in 
motion. What is a digital film? The latest incarnation of the motion pic-
ture. Motion pictures can, as Gaut claims, be produced by objects, hand, 
or machine, but nonetheless belong to the same ontological category. 
The concept of film is currently in crisis, as it was eighty-odd years ago 
when the ‘talkie’ replaced the silent film. The talkie was seen by many 
as a threat, or a different kind of art form, but increased the opportuni-
ties for expression in the established art of film. The digital revolution 
has enriched the art form no less – perhaps even more so – returning the 
motion picture to its roots in animation, and creating new horizons for 
expression. Digital technology has created new possibilities for interactiv-
ity and mass-produced virtual reality. The consequences of virtual reality 
‘total cinema’ and the threat of interactivity to the traditional unity of the 
art work are beyond the scope of my inquiry, and may produce questions 
to which a contemporary answer would be premature. At this point in the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, however, digital film remains – 
like traditional film and its predecessors – the art of moving pictures.9
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Notes
1  Electronic recording also uses a CCD, converting light to an electric pulse, 
and has been primarily employed in television and video (Gaut, 2010: 9-10). 
I do not discuss electronic cinema as its innovations have been overshadowed 
by digital technology.
2  I am not aware of conclusive evidence that O’Sullivan engaged in the 
practice, but several American Civil War photographers did, including his 
colleague Alexander Gardner. See Buser (2006: 214); Mitchell (1992: 43-45); 
Seels (1997: 48-51).
3  Photographs created with instant cameras, the production of which 
was dominated by the Polaroid Corporation from 1948-2008, are a 
possible exception.
4  Interestingly, Polavision – the Polaroid Corporation’s instant movie 
camera – was a commercial failure, being discontinued two years after its 
launch in 1977.
5  The word ‘cartoon’, with its juvenile, trivial connotations, is a product of the 
peripheral status of animation in the twentieth century.
6  The question of whether the images projected by a film actually move or only 
appear to move is much debated. See Currie (1995: 28-47) and Kania (2002) 
for contrasting views.
7  Significantly, Currie subsequently changed his conception of ‘film’ to 
anything that displayed moving images (1997: 47).
8  This has also been disputed, however. See Currie (1995: 22-27).
9  I am indebted to Maarten Steenhagen and David Tallerman for their 
assistance with this paper.
II Hybrid Photomediations

CHAPTER 10
Notes on a Painting of a Painted Photograph
Ajay Sinha
Figure 10.1: Unknown artist, Portrait of a Young Prince, 19th century, 
watercolor on paper, National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi, India, Acc. 
No. 14759, Courtesy National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi. 
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This is not a painted photograph. It is an opaque watercolor painting on 
paper that resembles a painted photograph. Conventions of a painted 
photograph are closely followed. A heavy green curtain on the left intro-
duces us to the seated figure next to a table, as in a studio photograph. 
The painter also embellishes this basic setup. On the table, the blue chi-
noiserie vase painted like wallpaper, the sacred book with metal clasps, 
and the clock are picked out and made legible against the bright pink 
Victorian table cover. The chair, sculpted in sharp chiaroscuro, flares out 
unusually to accommodate the sitter’s outstretched left elbow. The spot-
ted scarf on the sitter’s lap looks creaturely. On the floor, the carpet pops 
out at us in bold relief, flattening the pictorial space, while more than nec-
essary potted plants, graded from bright to dull green, dramatize perspec-
tive and depth. 
Unusual among these standard features of a painted photograph, how-
ever, is the background. It is neither a backdrop of fantastic locales ren-
dered in atmospheric perspective nor a glowing, opaque ground against 
which figures magically levitate (Pinney, 2003: 202). A closed wooden 
door set on a marble threshold returns us instead to the banal setting of 
the original black-and-white photograph, which may have been taken not 
in a studio but rather in a room belonging, presumably, to the royal sit-
ter’s mansion. Oddest is the sitter’s defiant look away from the camera, 
this in spite of the chance artists usually take for adjusting it toward a 
frontal gaze, as is conventional in painted photographs.1 The look is an 
anomaly. It recalls not the painted photograph of which this is a copy, but 
instead the very first, unpainted photograph from which this painting is 
twice removed. 
In the history of world photography, the interaction of photography 
and opaque paint is unique to India and quite unlike tinting the surface 
of the photographic emulsion found generally in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies (Gutman, 1982: 103-32).2 For scholars of Indian photography, 
opaque paint covering the grey photographic emulsion using techniques 
of Indian miniature painting marks the local ways of socializing the mod-
ern technology. In such a hybrid image, clashing interests in flat, bright col-
ors as well as exaggerated depth and perspective also indicate a painterly 
resistance to the scopic regimes of British colonial photography in India. 
In this image, however, paint is used not only to reproduce bright colors 
but also to paint in the surface greyness and indexical details that might 
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have been left untouched in the original painted photograph, thus revers-
ing the inquiry. Instead of asking about painterly inventiveness operating 
on photography, the question to be posed, somewhat counterintuitively, 
is: What motivates a painter to use his miniature painting style to under-
score, not obscure, the shady presence of the photographic emulsion? 
This essay offers five loosely connected thoughts regarding possible 
motivations for this choice as a way of suggesting the web of visual and 
cultural relations in which this image was involved.
1. It is possible that the image is simply a copy of a pre-existing photo-
graph of a deceased ancestor. The painting is in the Jaya Appasamy collec-
tion at the National Gallery of Modern Art, New Delhi, where the sitter 
is identified as an unknown, late-19th-century tribal prince from central 
India. The figure and his Victorian setting certainly capture the 19th-cen-
tury conventions of painted photography, but the copy could also belong 
to the early 20th century, when an old, fading image required renewal.3 
The NGMA has no documentation of the provenance of the image, and 
the artist is unknown. Unmistakable, nevertheless, is the impulse to imi-
tate, not embellish, the original photograph. The painter maintains its 
appearance exactly, without alteration. A conspicuous indicator of this 
choice is the sitter’s skin, in which shades of grey are visible through the 
brownish tint, pointing to the natural chemical layer of a photographic 
image. Whereas artists usually try to tint and inflect the deathly grey of 
the photographic image or cover it with opaque paint, here the painter 
mixes chalk white and soot black to match the combination of grey and 
brown of the sitter’s skin in the photograph. The observation leads me 
to suggest that the intention here is simply to preserve in an exact pic-
torial form a photographic image that is possibly beyond repair. At the 
same time, it leads me also to ask why the artist, or the patron, subjected 
the revered ancestor to such a museological impulse and not a painterly 
one that could have transformed the fraying photograph into a living pres-
ence, as is common in pictorial practices.
2. It is possible that the patron prefers a painting even while desir-
ing photographic effects in the image. Exploring mechanically repro-
ducing images of Indian gods and other social individuals, Christopher 
Pinney makes an argument for a preference for chromolithography over 
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photography on the grounds that Indian consumers of images usually 
looked beyond mere appearance for signs of ‘extra-mundane’ qualities of 
the subject, for which ‘photography was deemed a phenomenological fail-
ure’ (Pinney, 2009: 79).4 I suggest that the NGMA image is reaching for 
the ‘extra-mundane’ qualities of the sitter by converting the photograph 
into a painted copy. Miniature paintings have performed the function of 
bestowing power and status to royal patrons within India’s courtly culture 
since the 16th century.5 Painters invented elaborate iconographic frames 
for their sitters, giving them sacred attributes and exquisite halos, and 
located them in settings designed to convey their importance in a hier-
archy of power relations (Aitken, 2010: 111-53). It is this traditional role 
and value of painting that extends to the NGMA image. 
One could even propose that the NGMA image returns the painted 
photograph to the cultural valence of painting. When court painters 
picked up photography, in the mid-19th century, photography certainly 
took over some of the concerns of traditional painting.6 The genre of 
painted photograph is one result, but painted photographs were also used 
for making other kinds of images instead of being an end in themselves, as 
is usually assumed.7 Tryna Lyons documents a large mural portrait of the 
Maharaja Rana Zalim Singh II of Jhalawar, dated to about 1918–1920, 
in Garh-Mahal in Jhalawar, Rajasthan, and calls it the ‘photo studio’ 
type because it resembles a painted photograph except for its large scale 
(Lyons, 2004: 170). The young Maharaja sits on a chair in three-quarter 
view, resting his right elbow against the marble-top table, while details of 
the carpet and the fine muslin tunic, as well as the blurred, romanticized 
backdrop with a classical column, are painted to closely imitate a painted 
photograph. The difference between the mural and the NGMA paint-
ing is the latter’s small size – made to be framed, displayed, and handled 
exactly like a photograph, not stretched on a wall from floor to ceiling. 
3. The NGMA image differs from the Jhalawar mural discussed above 
in one more significant way. The mural filters out the chemical greyness 
of the painted photograph and retains, in fresco secco, only the warm 
orange and brown tints of the sitter’s skin. By contrast, the NGMA image 
reproduces both the grey photographic emulsion and the brown tint the 
original painter might have introduced in the painted photograph. Thus, 
the use of a photograph as a model, to be reworked into an adequate image 
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of the sanguine sitter, is understandable in the mural but not in the minia-
ture painting. Surely the painter of miniatures demonstrates his ability to 
observe and emulate, but he applies that ability to reproduce the original 
model exactly, not to transform it according to the sitter’s sense of him-
self. In other words, this is a case not of realism but of photorealism, the 
almost mechanical reproduction of a photographic image. The painting 
accurately documents what is being encountered in the original painted 
photograph, including a somewhat irregular mixture of both depth and 
flatness and photogenic facts such as residual indexical details and chemi-
cal greyness. To put it another way, the copy merely declares the painted 
photograph as a material object in itself. 
4. Like gold, or lapis lazuli in an earlier era of miniature painting, the 
grey chemical underlayer of the photographic emulsion in this copy now 
gains a material presence. It is neither to be removed, as in the mural, 
nor inflected or covered up, as in a painted photograph, nor overlooked 
in order to get to the ‘real’ photographic referent, as in black-and-white 
photography. Instead, grey becomes one among several layers of paint to 
be burnished, reworked, and brought to a shiny finish as in the tradition of 
miniature painting. Furthermore, the greyness of the image is highlighted 
when seen against the pink table, the colorful vase, and the gold embroi-
dery on the sitter’s black jacket. One could argue from this treatment that 
brightly painted details were considered standard, conventional features 
of a painted photograph by the early 20th century, but what is added 
in this image is a sensuous response to the photographic emulsion. Our 
awareness of greyness is heightened when we realize that we are looking 
at a painting, not a photograph, in which greyness is unavoidable and nor-
malized. The material presence of greyness is especially worked out in 
the back wall, which was probably left unpainted in the original image. 
In the copy, crosshatching and lightly variegated white spots give the 
wall a ‘physical substantiality’ employing techniques previously used to 
depict fleshy, erotic figures by early-19th-century Rajasthani artists such 
as Chokha (Beach et al., 2005: 81).
5. How should we approach and evaluate the ‘substantiality’ of pho-
togenic greyness in the NGMA image? One could suggest at least two 
possibilities: First, in bringing attention to the greyness of the image, the 
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painter could be looking at photography with the same fascination late-
18th- and early-19th-century Rajasthani artists, Chokha among them, 
showed toward other modern visual effects, such as linear perspective, 
light and shade, and panoramic view, disregarding scholarly arguments 
on the subject of Indian painting’s, and by extension Indian photogra-
phy’s, preoccupation with a flat pictorial surface.8 In other words, the 
photogenic greyness of the NGMA image relates better to the broader 
historical context of visual exchanges in early-modern India. In addition, 
although the Indian viewers may have preferred brightly colored chromo-
lithographs against the ‘phenomenological failure’ of three-dimensional 
space and chemical greyness of colonial photography, as Pinney suggests, 
the NGMA image may be elevating the grey surface of the photographic 
emulsion itself to an ‘extra-mundane’ level. 
Second, the photogenic qualities of the image could have seemed to 
the painter to be an integral part of the sitter’s appearance, even perhaps 
his ‘extra-mundane’ personality. This strange fact can be explained by 
what could be called the linguistic or iconographic approach in Indian 
miniature painting. Artists of the traditions of courtly miniature paint-
ing rendered painted portraits from models preserved in sketchbooks, 
not directly from real life. Thus, painting became a matter of giving a 
visual syntax to dispersed visual elements and attributes taken from 
those sketchbooks.9 The practice also means that the likeness of a sitter 
was a renewal, or reornamentation, of an earlier model. That a portrait 
was a collection of well-practiced iconographic motifs is especially true 
for venerable figures, whose ‘extra-mundane’ qualities the finished design 
was meant to incorporate.10 Within this traditional framework, to which 
the NGMA image belongs, the original painted photograph could have 
appeared as a visual model for describing the venerable attributes of 
the sitter. In this view, the photogenic greyness of the image could have 
appeared as one more attribute, the newest one, to be included in the fin-
ished portrait along with the sitter’s pose in the chair, the curtain, and the 
table containing a vase, a clock, a writing quill, and a sacred book. 
What kind of ‘attribute’ is this photogenic greyness? I suggest it marks 
the individual in the image with an immanent sense of ‘nowness’, a conno-
tation relating to the modern technology of photography itself. This grey-
ness is a product of alchemy – a combination of sunlight, the not readily 
available silver nitrate, camera lens, and darkroom – as well as investment 
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of clients in the power of this alchemy to absorb the world. The alchemy 
is what attracts clients to the camera and to photo studios, and holds their 
enchanted presence in an image, throughout the global history of photog-
raphy. Greyness, with a hint of silver underlying the shiny surface of the 
chemical image, is also what relates photography to the moving image in 
the early 20th century. If photography lends an aura to an individual sit-
ter’s social presence, the moving image, tinted or not, makes palpable to 
viewers myths, dreams, and spectacles of faraway worlds. It is this grey-
ness of the technological image that is incorporated in this painting. 
Coda
The photogenic greyness of the NGMA image goes unnoticed in the 
current discussion of Indian painted photographs, in which it is con-
nected only with the colonial technology to be resisted through opaque 
paint. Grey, however, spreads across image practices in early-20th-
century India, and is seen in secular as well as religious images. Tryna 
Lyons reproduces a remarkable image of the Hindu god Krishna, datable 
to 1900-1910, painted by Ghasiram, a well-known artist and photogra-
pher practicing in the religious town of Nathadwara, in Rajasthan. In 
that image, Krishna’s body is painted blue, as is usual, except for his face. 
Krishna’s face is treated with the grey tonal shades of a black-and-white 
photograph, made vivid also by surrounding details, such as his yellow 
turban, gold ornaments, a peacock feather, and the pink lotus blossoms 
he holds.11 The Nathadwara image documents the disappearance of pho-
tography into the sacred shimmer of a god, and it is this shimmer that is 
rekindled within the secular portraiture in the NGMA image. 
Original source and licence
Local Culture/Global Photography special issue. Trans-Asia Photography 
Review, Volume 3, Issue 2, Spring 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/
spo.7977573.0003.205. © Ajay Sinha. Permission to republish granted.
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Notes
1  Even in memorial portraits made from a photograph taken of a person after 
death, the artist paints in bright, open eyes looking straight at the viewer. 
(Pinney, 1997: 139-140 and fig. 122)
2  See also Alkazi, Allana, and Kumar (2008) and Dewan (2012).
3  Assigning a date to the moment of painting as opposed to the moment when 
the photograph was taken can be tricky. See Allana (2008) for the artist 
Pannalal Gaur (c. 1880–1950), whose earliest-known work is on a photograph 
of the Maharana Swarup Singh of Udaipur by an unknown photographer, 
datable to c. 1861, when the Maharaja presumably died (fig. 7). Based on the 
artist’s own dates, Allana concludes that the painting could have been done 
years only after the photograph was taken. From Gaur’s very long career, 
the last work reproduced in the catalogue, a portrait of the Maharaja Kumar 
Bhagwat Singh of Udaipur, dates from c. 1940.
4  The phrase suggests a certain quality that exceeds, but is also indicated in, 
the visual image and the network of exchanges in which it participates.  
5  For the ‘conflation of Krishna with Rajasthan’s rulers’ as a ‘common trope’ in 
Rajasthani paintings, see Aitken (2010: 49).
6  For photographer-painters in the Mewar court of Rajasthan, in western 
India, see Lyons (2004: 170).
7  For a detailed discussion and typology of various painting techniques by 
which photographs were finished, see Dewan (2012). 
8  For flatness in photography, see Gutman (1982: 81); Goswamy and 
Dallapiccola (1983); Lyons (2004); Aitken (2010).
9  See Davis (2008); Lyons (2004) and Aitken (2010) for detailed 
documentation of sketchbooks and their usage in Rajasthani painting.
10  On the iconography of one such feature, the profile, in imperial Mughal 
portraiture, see Koch (1997: 130-43). On ‘eye as an iconographic form’ in 
Rajasthani portraits, see Aitken (2010: 260-65).
11  See Lyons (2004: 151). In this image, Ghasiram might be exploring 
possibilities for visualizing Krishna’s body as shyama (darkness), which is 
neither blue nor black.
CHAPTER 11
Boredom and Baroque Space
David Bate
André Bazin argues in ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’ that ‘In 
achieving the aims of baroque art, photography has freed the plastic arts 
from their obsession with likeness’ (Bazin, 1980: 240). Photography and 
the cinema, he says, have satisfied our ‘appetite for illusion’. The inven-
tion of myriad computer imagery shows this to be otherwise. The appe-
tite for illusion shows no bounds, just as the psychoanalytic proposition of 
Jacques Lacan regarding the ‘metonymy of desire’ reminds us that desire 
itself is an endless process. In this context, new computer-based practices 
of representation are, without knowing it, precipitating a mutation in rep-
resentational space. There is an uncanny ‘return of the repressed’ which 
moves us out of twentieth-century photographic realism. It is a Baroque 
trend of spatial illusions, theatrical imagination and intense feelings, 
where an image is a representation of the thing it represents through a 
relation of meaning, a kind of ‘psychological realism’, rather than through 
a mere mimetic likeness or literal resemblance.
The attitude of Baroque art, according to Erwin Panofsky, can be 
defined as ‘based on an objective conflict between antagonistic forces, 
which, however, merge into a subjective feeling of freedom and even 
pleasure...’ (Panofsky, 1997: 38). The paradigmatic example of this for 
Panofsky is a sculpture, the Ecstasy of St. Theresa (1644–47) by Bernini. 
This famous altar piece in Rome dedicated to Saint Theresa depicts the 
moment in her story when an angel of the Lord has pierced her heart 
with a golden flaming arrow.  She is shown swooning, filled with pain and 
erotic ecstasy. Her facial expression is intended to express this emotional 
intensity, while streams of light in the form of golden rays suggest the 
movement of her rising to heaven.  The drapes around her body also sug-
gest movement with their crisp dishevelled and whirling forms.  Intended 
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to be seen from a single point of view, as in the modern photographic 
image, the three-dimensional statue combines picture, relief and plastic 
grouping.  Thus, for Panofsky, ‘Baroque art came to abolish the borderline 
between the “three arts”, and even art and nature, and also brought forth 
the modern landscape in the full sense of the word, meaning a visualiza-
tion of unlimited space captured in, and represented by, a section of it, so 
that human figures became debased to a mere “staffage” and finally could 
be dispensed with altogether’ (Panofsky, 1997: 45, 51).
For Michel Foucault ‘the Baroque’ period is ‘the privileged age of 
trompe-l’oeil painting, of the cosmic illusion, of the play that dupli-
cates itself by representing another play, of the quid pro quo, of dreams 
and visions; it is the age of the deceiving senses’ (Foucault, 1985: 51). 
Celestial frescos, anamorphic distortions, the illusion of doors, windows 
and other images where they do not exist, all move the spatial representa-
tion of the world away from one of resemblance. For Foucault, this is the 
‘essential rupture of knowledge in the Western world, what has become 
important is no longer resemblances but identities and differences’. If 
somewhere like Versailles is ‘baroque’, it is its grand plan, its ‘grotesque’, 
‘excessive ornamentation’, the ‘decorative’ components that spiral off into 
an infinity of minute differences. The vases in the garden:  each one the 
same identity (as vase) yet different in decoration. Decoration is not extra 
or unnecessary in the baroque, but constitutive of differing identities, of 
an infinite difference. Where representation had been based in resem-
blance and similitude in the sixteenth century, the seventeenth century 
world was represented in signs without guaranteed meaning. While com-
parison and similitude had revealed the ordering of the world, baroque 
rhetoric made representation (of the world) a question of analysis.  The 
logic of likeness, resemblance, the ‘chimera of similitude’, was represented 
as such.  It is no coincidence that the Baroque was also the age of alle-
gory where a sign is always already a collection of other signs.  Laid bare, 
the illusion of space where there is none (i.e. the trompe-l’oeil), may be 
read allegorically as a critique of the structure of social space and social 
relations within them. Whether viewed as ugly or beautiful, the common 
sense of baroque as ‘excessive decoration’, of an exaggerated, unnecessary 
artfulness, only shows our distance from an understanding of the Baroque 
rhetoric of visual splendour.  Pleasure is the measure of intelligence and 
boredom is the signified of a lack of eloquence.  A common-sense view 
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of baroque is associated with decadence and a grotesque, as things that 
grew out of an ‘ennui’, the result of a boredom with the existing spatial 
and representational conventions.  In courtly life of the period where 
speech was the equivalent of thinking, a bored response signified a refusal 
or rejection of the speaker’s thought.  A boring speech was one composed 
of boring thoughts, or rather, for the listener, no libidinal investment or 
stimulus in the speaker’s words. Therefore, ‘Plato is boring because he is 
not eloquent’ (Lichtenstein, 1993: 29).
The term Baroque initially begins as an insult, a term of abuse and 
derision to describe – or criticise – the bold, ‘over-ornate’ style.  The use 
of the word boredom similarly describes a negative state of being bored 
by something.  But boredom is a question of what one does with space. 
‘Nothing to do’ or ‘nothing to see’ does not mean that there is literally 
not anything to see, but rather that the subject cannot see it.  Vision is 
colonized, inhibited, by boredom. The bored person is the one for whom 
seeing is blasé, the sense of sight, supposedly, as it is commonly said, is 
‘dulled through over-stimulation’ (Fenichel, 1954: 302). As Otto Fenichel 
argues, what such situations really describe is the damming up of a libido. 
Repressed, the libidinal energy turns around on the subject and disperses 
through it as a kind of paralysis of any aim (or rather, boredom is now 
the manifestation of that aim). This boredom is like anxiety, it similarly 
petrifies the subject into non-action. Boredom and anxiety are defences 
against libidinal excitement. This can be seen as the ‘passive’ type of bore-
dom. The ‘active’ type of boredom, in turn, is exemplified in the idea of 
the ‘Sunday neurotic’:  the person who cannot abide the idea of vacation, 
they are bored by it. When there is no duty to fulfil, the libidinal energy 
comes rushing out, only to be inhibited and dammed up as ‘I’m bored’. 
At work such a person strives to disperse their desire for intense excite-
ment in the demands of work duties. Once these duties are removed, the 
anxiety of how to disperse the libidinal energy emerges again in boredom. 
The activity of work thus offers an escape from the pain of boredom.  
The sort of ‘clutter’ associated with Baroque architecture, sculpture, 
painting and rhetoric is not merely ornamental, but a constitutive com-
ponent of the style. If this style is ‘irritating’ to someone, it is because it 
invokes anxiety and boredom. There is too much ‘emotion’ in it, too many 
signifying components, it is ‘over-stated’. Baroque work itself seems to 
characterize the active aim of boredom. The ‘eclectic’ sticking together 
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of ‘disconnected styles’, the ceilings filled with an imaginary space, the 
portraits that are crowded allegorical personifications, everything is 
doubly filled with meanings and details.  It is as though the whole age 
of Baroque recognised the illusion of the Renaissance representational 
space. Perspective, where a horizon is the vanishing-point of the lines 
that meet in the infinite distance, hides the anxiety that there is nothing 
beyond the perspectival horizon. The anxiety of cosmic space is ‘filled in’ 
in Renaissance representation by the horizons of Quattrocento perspec-
tive. Revealed in the Baroque as a chimera, this perspectival logic is obses-
sively covered over and simultaneously revealed. The anxiety of there 
being nothing beyond is actually represented and embodied in the signi-
fying forms of the Baroque. This is the symptom of the Baroque age.
The painting by Velasquez of the maids of honour called Las Meninas 
(1656) holds for Michel Foucault the representation ‘of Classical rep-
resentation, and the definition of the space it opens up to us’ (Foucault, 
1985: 16). Much earlier Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533) had 
combined two points of view, literally ‘perspectives’ (one anamorphic), 
into the same picture plane, simultaneously revealing the supplement 
of mercantile capitalism and the accumulation of worldly goods: death. 
The spatial ‘distortion’ of the anamorphic skull or flying pancake (I am 
reminded, distractedly, of Lacan’s ‘hommlette’ joke) as it appears from the 
‘normal’ point of view interferes with, and cuts across, the normal per-
spectival logic of the picture.  It is such ‘distortions’ that the computer 
enables to be produced fairly simply, such that these images become 
absorbed into the dominant signifying practices of our visual culture as 
‘normal’. We are again in a period of chimerical representation, of eclec-
tic styles, an obsessive covering over of the holes in existence, which both 
reveals them and denies them.  As Baroque art ‘upped the stakes’ in the 
demand for the ever new with a spiral of invention – new combinations of 
contradictions – so its use of the devices and ornaments inevitably multi-
plied.  On the one hand, Baroque invention appears as a kind of ‘Sunday 
neurosis’, the crowding of signifiers, a constant work of signification, to 
avoid the anxiety and boredom of ‘nothing to see’.  On the other hand, 
these eclectic signifiers fill a space, which offers no comfort for the sub-
ject of a passive boredom.  A bored subject is one who craves stimulation. 
But boredom is not a property of the object, it is a problem of the subject. 
Thus, whatever the signifier, the signified is always ‘boring’. Stimulation 
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is repressed, such that it manifests as a bored response, a constant deferral 
of dealing with the passing of time. With the speed of new technologies, 
the distance between things is collapsed, simultaneously different spaces 
are collapsed into the same time.
Today’s culture of the ‘visual’, based in a logic of the photographic 
image, is potentially thrown into a baroque ‘deception’ when the indexi-
cal-iconic field of resemblance is constantly disturbed by the new capaci-
ties for illusion.  If the computer is giving a twist to the uncertainty of 
the historical kaleidoscope of representation, we may find ourselves in the 
space of a baroque dream. 
Licence
© David Bate. 
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CHAPTER 12
Differential Interventions: 
Images as Operative Tools
Aud Sissel Hoel and Frank Lindseth 
Advanced imaging technologies are currently transforming operating 
theaters into sophisticated augmented reality studios. State-of-the-art 
operating rooms are run like modern media laboratories exploring recent 
developments in communication technology, including computer visu-
alizations, positioning and navigation applications, and the expansion 
of network systems. Surgeons interact with various displays permitting 
indirect observation of the surgical field through high definition video-
scopes (microscopes, endoscopes), supplemented with scans obtained 
before the operation in combination with image and tracking data 
acquired during the procedure. Surgical imaging and navigation chal-
lenge established frameworks for understanding images, just as much as 
they belie the idea, widespread in early-stage theories of digital images, 
of digitization corrupting the detecting capacity of images. While being 
highly interventional and artificial, and sometimes entirely computer-
generated and synthetic, medical images and visualizations undoubtedly 
reveal pertinent aspects of reality. How are we to make sense of them?
Images used for guidance during surgical procedures exemplify a cat-
egory of images that in recent literature has been characterized as ‘opera-
tive’ (Farocki, 2004; Kogge, 2004; Krämer, 2009). Operative images are 
images that, in the words of Harun Farocki, ‘do not represent an object, 
but rather are part of an operation’ (Farocki, 2004: 17). The images in 
question typically serve practical purposes tied to specialized tasks, such 
as, in the case of navigated brain tumor surgery, to localize a tumor and 
control the removal of pathological tissue. The active and performa-
tive work of digital images is also emphasized by new media scholars 
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investigating digital image applications such as Photosynth, Augmented 
Reality, and Google Street View (Uricchio, 2011; Verhoeff, 2012; Hoelzl 
and Marie, forthcoming). As pointed out by William Uricchio, algorith-
mic intermediation reconfigures the relation between the viewing subject 
and the object viewed in a way that ‘ultimately determines what we see, 
and even how we see it’ (Uricchio, 2011: 33). Algorithmically enabled 
image applications do not simply reproduce pre-given realities but exer-
cise transformative powers on both ends of the subject-object relationship 
(Carusi, 2012). This is why established representational approaches fall 
short of accounting for the active roles of digital image applications, and 
this is why new theorizations of images are needed.
Operational approaches provide promising possibilities for rethinking 
images for at least three reasons: first, they offer dynamic approaches that 
analyze phenomena into doings and happenings rather than into things 
and static entities; second, they offer relational approaches that conceive 
identity in terms of open-ended processes of becoming; and third, by so 
doing, they allow us to ascribe agency to images, and crucially, to conceive 
agency as distributed across interconnected assemblages of people, prac-
tices, and mediating artifacts. In the following, we contribute to the ongo-
ing efforts to rethink images in dynamic terms by probing more closely 
into neurosurgical imaging and navigation practices where images are 
literally used as operative tools. By zooming in on critical moments of the 
image-guided neurosurgical process, we draw out key features of an oper-
ational understanding of images, with the aim of developing it further as a 
‘differential’ theory of images (Hoel, 2011a and 2011b).
Contemporary neurosurgery relies heavily on computer-assisted navi-
gation technologies. Neuronavigation, which is a further development of 
stereotactic surgery (Enchev, 2009), is a set of methods that makes use of 
three-dimensional coordinate systems for frameless guidance, orientation, 
and localization of structures during brain surgery. Neuronavigation sys-
tems transfer multimodal image data into the surgical field, track surgical 
tools, and overlay the position of important instruments on medical image 
maps of the patient. A major challenge for neuronavigation is the shift 
in position of the brain anatomy as the operation progresses, commonly 
referred to as ‘brain shift’. To compensate for this shift, updated maps 
are acquired during the operation on the surgeon’s request (Lindseth et 
al., 2013). 
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Figure 12.1. The surgeon’s view in the operating room.
In a tumor removal procedure that we observed, the navigation system 
included preoperative magnetic resonance images, live video images 
from a surgical microscope, intraoperative ultrasound images, and opti-
cal tracking of surgical instruments. The image and tracking information 
was shown on a multimodal display unit facing the surgeon (figure 12.1), 
either as corresponding views in separate display windows, or as inte-
grated navigation scenes mixing features from different imaging modali-
ties (figure 12.2). In addition to this, the surgeon could change the magni-
fication levels of the images and flip between different modes within each 
imaging modality.1 Apart from that, the operating room was populated 
with additional screens displaying the microscope images as well as the 
patient’s vital signs during anesthesia. At critical points in the operation 
(before, during, and after the removal of tumor tissue), ultrasound volumes 
were obtained to show the extent of brain  shift. Far from being passive 
reflections of pre-given realities, medical images rely on active interven-
tions. Magnetic resonance imaging produces images using the magnetic 
properties of hydrogen atoms, which abound in the human body, espe-
cially in tissues such as fat and water. When the patient is placed in an 
MRI scanner, the system generates images by producing a strong uniform 
magnetic field that aligns the axes of the protons parallel or antiparallel 
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to the field, emitting a radiofrequency pulse at the right frequency and 
duration, and altering the magnetic field on a local level using gradient 
magnets to determine the location of the image ‘slices’. 
When the radio-wave transmitter is turned off, the protons start to 
‘relax’, producing radio wave signals as they release their energy and 
return to their equilibrium state. The signals are picked up by the sys-
tem’s receiver coils and transformed into gray level intensities for each 
pixel in a cross-sectional image. Since protons in different tissues have dif-
ferent relaxation times, various scanning sequences can be used to distin-
guish between different types of tissue, say, fat and water, or pathological 
tissue and normal tissue. Conventional 2D ultrasound also builds cross-
sectional grayscale images of the anatomy at hand, this time by a trans-
ducer probe emitting a high frequency sound pulse into the patient. As 
the sound waves travel into the body, they hit boundaries and interfaces 
between various tissue types and some of the sound waves are reflected 
back to the probe. In ultrasonic imaging, each sound pulse is followed by 
‘listening’ for these sound echoes. By measuring the time taken for echoes 
to return, the system calculates the distance to anatomical structures and 
displays the strength of the echoes as a grayscale image.
Figure 12.2. Navigation display. Corresponding MR (left) and ultrasound (middle) slices, as well as an 
overview showing the position of the ultrasound probe relative to the head.
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We have zeroed in on technical details of medical image generation 
in order to show that MR and ultrasound imaging are based on con-
trasts. The patterns shown are not simply found; they stand out only to 
the extent that the areas of interest are subjected to targeted excitations, 
tissues and organs being provoked to answer back along the lines speci-
fied by the parametric setup. Each imaging method has a highly selective 
range, disregarding anatomical or functional features that fall outside its 
scope. The point we want to make, however, goes beyond the familiar one 
concerning the selective nature of imaging methods. Rather, the point is 
that these methods stand in a generative relation to the imaged features: 
each imaging method differentially intervenes into the phenomena under 
examination, delineating and sustaining a characteristic pattern or struc-
ture not detectable in the same way by other methods.
In order for images to support navigation, the image data have to be 
registered to the patient coordinate system. The registration process 
makes the coordinates of anatomical features in physical space and the 
various image spaces coincide. During surgery, 3D ultrasound can also 
be used to update the preoperative image maps, shifting the positions of 
imaged features by means of advanced algorithms (Lindseth et al., 2013). 
In the observed operation, fiducial markers were placed on the patient’s 
skull before entering the MRI scanner. When the patient was immobi-
lized on the operating table, the markers, visible in the MR images, were 
used by the surgeon to identify the corresponding points on the patient’s 
head by means of a tracked pointer. As the procedure progressed, ultra-
sound was used for direct guidance (figure 12.3).
Figure 12.3. Ultrasound-guided surgery. Preoperative planning using a tracked pointer (left), 
acquisition of a new ultrasound volume using a tracked ultrasound probe (middle), and removal 
of tumor tissue using a tracked resection instrument guided by updated ultrasound images.
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Images used for neuronavigation are clearly ‘part of an operation’; 
they are active, transformative, and most definitely reconfigure the sub-
ject-object relationship. For all that, even if they are considered here as 
‘agents’, they are not understood to operate on their own. Further, even 
if they are made to be processed by computers, the images are ultimately 
aimed at human eyes. First, when it comes to objects, it is important to 
note that the imaged features are relational and dynamic entities. The 
objects revealed by one method are not strictly speaking the same as the 
objects revealed by another method. Each method establishes, so to speak, 
a ‘working object’ (Daston and Galison, 2007), natural objects being too 
plentiful and unrefined to usefully cooperate in systematic comparisons. 
Second, when it comes to subjects, imaging methods enact a productive 
displacement of the human sensorium, bringing information that is nat-
urally beyond us into the purview of the human senses. By enhancing 
human sensitivity, they expand the human action range. In neuronaviga-
tion, agency is distributed as humans, apparatuses, and tissues form an 
integrated system.
Thus, if we replace the framework of representation with a dynamic 
and relational framework, the ‘operational’ understanding of images 
can be further specified as ‘differential’: images serve to discern differ-
ences; differential intervention is their mode of operation. However, if 
we truly endorse a dynamic and relational framework, we soon come to 
realize that in fact all images, even the pre-digital ones, are operative and 
differential tools.
Original source and licence
The New Everyday: A MediaCommons Project, ‘The Operative Image’ 
cluster curated by Ingrid Hoelzl, http://mediacommons.futureofthe-
book.org/tne/cluster/operative-image January 24, 2014. Licence: 
CC-BY ND SA.
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CHAPTER 13
Glitch Studies Manifesto
Rosa Menkman
1. The dominant, continuing search for a noiseless channel has been – and 
will always be – no more than a regrettable, ill-fated dogma.
Acknowledge that although the constant search for complete transpar-
ency brings newer, ‘better’ media, every one of these improved techniques 
will always possess their own inherent fingerprints of imperfection.
2. Dispute the operating templates of creative practice. Fight genres, inter-
faces and expectations!
Refuse to stay locked into one medium or between contradictions like 
real vs. virtual, obsolete vs. up-to-date, open vs. proprietary or digital vs. 
analog. Surf the vortex of technology, the in-between, the art of artifacts!
3. Get away from the established action scripts and join the avant-garde of 
the unknown. Become a nomad of noise artifacts!
The static, linear notion of information-transmission can be inter-
rupted on three occasions: during encoding-decoding (compression), feed-
back or when a glitch (an unexpected break within the flow of technol-
ogy) occurs. Noise artists must exploit these noise artifacts and explore 
the new opportunities they provide.
4. Employ bends and breaks as metaphors for différance. Use the glitch as 
an exoskeleton for progress.
Find catharsis in disintegration, ruptures and cracks; manipulate, 
bend and break any medium towards the point where it becomes some-
thing new; create glitch art.
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5. Realize that the gospel of glitch art also tells about new standards imple-
mented by corruption.
Not all glitch art is progressive or something new. The popularization 
and cultivation of the avant-garde of mishaps has become predestined 
and unavoidable. Be aware of easily reproducible glitch effects automated 
by software and plug-ins. What is now a glitch will become a fashion.
6. Force the audience to voyage through the acousmatic videoscape.
Create conceptually synaesthetic artworks that exploit both visual 
and aural glitch (or other noise) artifacts at the same time. Employ these 
noise artifacts as a nebula to shroud the technology and its inner workings 
and to compel an audience to listen and watch more exhaustively.
7. Rejoice in the critical trans-media aesthetics of glitch artifacts.
Utilize glitches to bring any medium into a critical state of hypertro-
phy, to (subsequently) criticize its inherent politics.
8. Employ Glitchspeak (as opposed to Newspeak) and study what is out-
side of knowledge. Glitch theory is what you can just get away with!
Flow cannot be understood without interruption, nor function with-
out glitching. This is why glitch studies is necessary.
Original source and licence
Rosa Menkman (2011) The Glitch Moment(um). Network Notebooks 
04. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures. http://networkcultures.
org/blog/publication/no-04-the-glitch-momentum-rosa-menkman/. 
Licence: CC-BY NC ND 3.0.
CHAPTER 14
NewFotoScapes:  
An Interview with Charlotte Cotton
Jonathan Shaw
A creative life
NewFotoScapes (Jonathan Shaw as NFS): We are here in the offices 
of Michael Mack in the heart of London talking to Charlotte Cotton. 
Welcome and many thanks for agreeing to take part in the conversation 
for NewFotoScapes.  I think it would be fair to say that you describe your-
self as a writer, curator and sometimes educator of photography?
Charlotte Cotton (CC): Yes
NFS: I was fascinated to hear earlier this year, at the Association of 
Photography in Higher Education conference in Wales, how photogra-
phy became your destiny and I wondered if you could share this with our 
community here? 
CC: I was talking about the fact that at the moment I’m thinking a lot 
about an earlier point in my own life when I was seventeen or eighteen 
years of age, and what I remember needing to reinforce my aspirations to 
have a creative adult life. It didn’t really take much contact with cultural 
spaces for me to feel as if it would be possible to have a creative adult 
life.  I was 17 and studying for my A-levels when I came up to London 
and went to the V&A and the Boilerhouse, which was hosting a pro-
gramme of exhibitions, including photographers such as Irving Penn, 
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that felt sophisticated and relevant and exactly what I would want to look 
at. I think I then ended up at The Photographers’ Gallery off Leicester 
Square. I really wanted to see what I should wear, how I should interact 
and exchange and converse if I was going to have an adult creative life.   
And I am not even really that sure how I knew those two places existed, 
pre-internet age.  But I did, and I think that antenna that you have when 
you are young is one of the most remarkable things! I really am concerned 
about what it would mean, what tangible evidence and support I would 
find if I was trying to navigate an entry into creative life if I was going 
through it in this era.
Conservatism and creativity
NFS: Why is that?
CC: For a number of reasons. One of them is, we are in a situation that 
is equally economically challenging for young creative people as the late 
1980s. One thing that has happened within the creative industries in the 
twenty-first century has been an ageing of creative industries and their 
workforces. For example, if you think about fashion photography, through 
the post-war period it was an area where somebody who was young, 
whether it was a photographer, a fashion editor, a designer, a model, 
could innovate, could inject real life and the currency of ‘the new’ into 
image-making culture. 
That dynamic took place in Britain through the post-war period, includ-
ing when I was young in the late 1980s early 1990s, with what got 
labelled ‘grunge’ photography and photographers such as Corrine Day, 
Juergen Teller, Nigel Shafrab and David Sims, and stylists including 
Melanie Ward, Venetia Scott, Edward Enninful, and i-D magazine and 
The Face.   It is within our active memory that there has been a period 
when it was possible for a group of very young creative people to liter-
ally visualise what was going on within culture. Fashion photography 
post-9/11 became deeply conservative.  We saw this impact across the 
commercial world: it was the time to get rid of the creatively opinionated, 
to say all bets are off, things are going to work in a different way, where 
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creative vision was far from sacred and the risks in bringing in new and 
audacious talent would be made only sparingly. 
NFS: And you saw the photographers’ day rates tumble…
CC: Right, you saw the mere handful of fashion photographers who rep-
resent the pinnacle that many aspire to taking cuts in their day rate, tak-
ing jobs they would have discounted five years before.  And what got bro-
ken was that quid pro quo of commercial image-making, namely that as a 
young person wanting to begin a career in fashion photography, you work 
like hell, you subsidise the costs of your first editorial shoots, you practi-
cally subsidise the editorial pages of youth magazines.
NFS: Yes, because it was about the portfolio of photographs.
CC: You build a portfolio and you reach a point where somebody picks 
you out of obscurity, and you are in line for a lucrative advertising cam-
paign, which brings in enough money for you to go off and do your own 
photography and also make a name for yourself as a new talent. That sys-
tem was severely damaged in the commercial fragility of the US (the com-
mercial home of fashion image-making) in the aftermath of 9/11. And 
even today, over a decade later, you pretty much see the same list of top 
fashion photographers as in 2000.
Revolutions and radical change
NFS: So broadening that out and thinking of the breadth of routes that 
the new landscape of photography offers, do you feel that it is still gov-
erned by the economics associated with photography then, in terms of the 
type of image-making that is produced or the type of work that is getting 
seen? Is it now more about free labour as opposed to really trying to push 
and enhance ideas?
CC: Well, those two things are not mutually exclusive, but I think when 
there is a client involved in the production of photography, you are visu-
ally problem solving for someone else. If you are ambitious and audacious 
and are given the space, you might also produce something which is the 
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visualisation of a moment in time, and all of this is magical and worth chas-
ing after. I think this dynamic does move to other areas of photographic 
practice. You could say that there is a parallel or even a precedent with 
editorial photography and the economy of documentary photography. 
The idea of defining your practice as an editorial documentary photog-
rapher or photojournalist has been under debate for a number of decades 
now.  What we saw in the 1990s and early 2000s was the movement of 
some documentary photography into the new axis points for the cultural 
appraisal of photography in the book form and into exhibitions for non-
profit spaces, museums and art galleries. However, it is a misunderstand-
ing to suggest that that has been a secure and vital place for documentary 
photography, or that there is full career as a documentarian who produces 
books and exhibitions. 
NFS: That sense of change and of considering the photographic object 
reminds me a little of your conversation with Aaron Schumann for 
FOAM’s project, ‘What’s next?’.   A particular quote that stood out for 
me was where you said you ‘do fetishize revolutions and moments of 
radical change, that you really enjoy them and that you are enjoying 
this moment’.
 
CC: Yes.
NFS: That seems to suggest something very upbeat, because there could 
be a debate in terms of how we have approached our conversation up to 
now, the finances go down, and the demand is going down, a deep conser-
vatism.  But that quote very much suggest something different, a different 
way of looking at this kind of change?
CC: They are actually connected and I think the first stage of emanci-
pation is to abandon hope that the situation is any less challenging or in 
need of radical change than it really is.  Across the world, creative people 
in the fields of photography, curation, activism, writing, filmmaking, know 
that the money is spent. That is the first step, to know that there isn’t a 
reassuring paternalistic structure that you can literally buy your way into. 
It doesn’t exist, and if anyone promises you that they are lying to you. 
They might be lying to themselves as well. They might have too much of 
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a vested interest in keeping that idea of pedagogy and creative industry 
alive to admit the possibility of any other reality.
But it is over, and owning that is the first step, and I don’t see that as 
a negative. I actually think that’s a really positive thing in life to know 
where you are because this is the key to all things – to your mental health, 
to the sustainability of your creativity: you can only start from where you 
are, not from where you hope or wish to. You can only start where you 
are.  I think that’s what the quote from the conversation with Aaron was 
really about.
NFS:  What’s really interesting there is that often, and especially around 
academia, we talk about authority and institutions, and the canons of pho-
tography being the authorities, and I think there’s something quite pow-
erful about freeing ourselves from that paternalistic notion, the idea of 
trying to please somebody. Maybe we should think about that time when 
we are young and creativity is the tool that we have to express ourselves 
– that actually maybe this is the space photography and broader creative 
fields can explore now and open up some really interesting possibilities?
Questioning authority and expertise
CC: Yeah, absolutely.  I think the other thing to be said here is that author-
ity and expertise are notions that are definitely under question with the 
dismantling of cultural structures that privilege such terms. Obviously, I 
am not thrilled at the idea that expertise is something that has become 
optional to the development of culture, but the reality is that no one is an 
expert on the future, especially in a time of change.
NFS: That’s true… But is there something in particular that you feel or 
believe has been a defining factor and that has seen such a shift in the 
landscape of the lens, a particular moment or any other elements that 
have shifted things? We’ve talked about finance, for example?
CC: I think the shape of commercial image making post-9/11, and also 
the decline of printed news media, are two of the biggest militating forces 
for the shape of what it means to be a photographer in the professional 
sense right now. But we should look at the other two important areas in 
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relation to photography: what happened to independent artistic photog-
raphy and also the idea of the amateur or citizen photographer. Both of 
these facets have seeded profound shifts in the character of photography, 
even if they are not entirely evident to us yet in the behaviour of institu-
tions. Shall I talk about those two things?
NFS: Yes, what would be interesting to hear is how that really is informing 
and changing your interpretation of your response to this field of practice.
CC: Contemporary art photography has become much more special-
ised and rarefied. In the early 2000s, we had a strong market for photo-
graphs that were printed large and laminated behind Plexiglas; it felt like 
a bubble market for photography.   We’re at a period now where I think 
we are in a really good place, much leaner and more precise.   Making 
photographic prints or using photographic language within artistic prac-
tice is something few people decide to do.  At its best, it’s not a lifestyle 
choice and it’s not a career. It’s actually a very old school idea of the arti-
san, somebody who crafts and renders something. Personally, I work more 
with artists who don’t necessarily come from a photographic training now, 
because the point we have reached within contemporary art is one where 
photography is a set of materials rather than a separate discipline.  As you 
know from my writing I think one of the big things that we are grappling 
with is whether the structures to legitimise photography as an indepen-
dent art form that began in the 1970s are going to work so well for what 
happens next in the story of photography.  Those historic structures often 
relied on monographic narratives and separatist ideas of photography and 
its history, as devices to align photography with more established inde-
pendent artistic disciplines. And all of those things actually are not very 
useful for interpreting contemporary photographic culture. 
To think about photography at large at this terrifically exciting 
moment is where the innovative potential for cultural institutions lies. If 
you spend a lot of time with contemporary art, as I do, visiting exhibitions 
and making studio visits, I’d guess that as much as half of what is under 
artistic discussion uses the materials of photography and video. And very, 
very little of this critical mass would fit within the tail end of a separat-
ist history of photography as proclaimed by most photography institu-
tions and museum departments. I really want cultural institutions to 
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offer points of view on the real practices of photography and to support 
emergent talents to know that photography is one tool amongst many that 
you can use to express yourself. The artists who I think will define this 
moment, who do define this moment for other artists, are actually invis-
ible to most cultural institutions.
NFS: This quest for more from our cultural institutions seems to push 
the ideas you were writing about in The Photograph as Contemporary Art 
back in 2004. Interestingly, in preparation for our meeting today, I came 
across an article where you were saying that, even at the time of writing 
the book, you were bored of that debate and really you felt it was kind of 
over before you put it out there.
CC: The title wasn’t my choice, I thought it could just be ‘Contemporary 
Art Photography’ because I really felt that was a statement of fact by 
2004. But I am actually really glad that the commissioning editor, Andrew 
Brown, persisted with the title, because it suggests an active election of 
photography as art, as opposed to all of the other facets of the medium’s 
character. And of course what happened afterwards was the central idea 
of photography moving to the vital arena of amateur and citizen practices, 
and Andrew was right to give the book an equivocal title.
NFS:  What becomes a testament to that is the fact that the projects you 
have been part of, and the ideas you are exploring, have consistently put 
you at the forefront of thinking around what photography is or where 
photography is going.  As that example illustrates, that was the point 
where your book became a key title on a university reading list that stu-
dents read, and are still reading, and one they continually refer back to.  Is 
there an inherent danger that through the form and function of a printed 
book over time you lose the currency of its content? As such learners both 
inside and outside of the education system perhaps still focus on that 
debate. So really the question is what do you see as the key debates now? 
What would you hope that learners today would be looking at now? And 
how would you like them to read your writings from eight to nine years 
ago? Photography in that time has become a very different beast, so what 
do you see those key debates as being?
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Communities and conversations
CC: You’re right; photography has changed during that time, but the 
book was still the best way for me to represent that moment, in as much 
as it was quite a definitive moment, and that’s what books do – they are 
definitive rather than iterative.  But in my own practices I have also been 
interested in creating structures for iterative processes, because we are 
at a time that is not definitive in a conventional sense – it is in flux.   I 
started thinking seriously about how you might develop ideas within a 
self-elected community in 2006 when I was living in New York, and I 
wasn’t working for a museum, so it was the first time in a long while that 
conversation didn’t just come to me in my place of work.
NFS: You mean you had to seek it out?
CC: I think it was a more normal experience of how ideas and opinions 
develop.   Working as a curator in a national museum is a very specific 
thing – it’s a vocation that I really believe in. For me it was the best way 
in which to engage with photography, within an environment where the 
stakes are very, very high. However, the reality of the way we discover and 
change our mind about culture, and especially in the 2000s when I think 
many of us were changing our minds about lots of things, well, I didn’t 
feel that those definitive processes of printed books and institutional exhi-
bitions at best reflected what was actually happening in terms of ideas 
around photography.   The jury was (and maybe still is) out about who 
is going to make visual culture, how the creative industries will reform, 
what we will consider to be the pivotal issues for visual practice.  Where 
does the energy of photography at large move at a time like this? I mean, 
we are all to a certain degree blinded by the empirical mass of citizen and 
orphan photography, and only to a certain degree have we began to anal-
yse that. ‘Words without Pictures’ was the first iterative discussion project 
that I staged, and it was borne out of the fact that some of the most mean-
ingful conversations I was having around photography were outside insti-
tutional frameworks. These were important conversations for me because 
of the quality of opinions and an openness, a discursiveness, that was just 
in the air, in the absence of anyone or any institution having the answer. 
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NFS: Very much so, and this is totally at the heart of the NewFotoScapes 
project. A time to stop worrying that the landscapes are not formed. To 
stop trying to work out what is true, what is fact, what is finished, what is 
complete, and perhaps think more about how can we develop and evolve 
the tools. So, if we adopt the analogy of using a map and a compass, our 
focus is perhaps more on the decisions and the paths that we navigate our-
selves around. It would be true to say that our senses become heightened 
and we are far more aware when we travel somewhere alien, somewhere 
unknown. I think and wonder what might happen if we consider our-
selves at this point of the journey to discovery? And this seems to really 
chime with your earlier description of being young, and reminds me of 
one of your recent interviews, where you referred to the practitioners or 
processes or thinkers that you seek out to act as your antennae. Who are 
they and why have you chosen those people?
CC:   I think you are referring to my introduction to the spring 2013 
Aperture Photo Book Review, which I guest edited. The well of the pub-
lication is a series of conversations I asked people that I talk to about pho-
tography and creative culture to ‘perform’ for the publication.  I had an 
email this morning from someone I met very briefly a couple of years ago, 
and they had been reading the review and they told me why they liked 
it. They said it was because I really had asked my friends to talk as they 
would talk to me. They appreciated that I hadn’t edited it in such a way 
that looked down on an audience, and I had just assumed that everyone 
is conversing in the same way. Actually I think it’s human nature to have 
people whose opinions you seek out and to make the time to meet up and 
really talk it through. I think it’s a more useful way to form an understand-
ing of this creative moment.
NFS: What is really important and ultimately compelling about this 
approach and way of working is that honesty and desire to offer clarity 
to an audience. It starts with that openness and transparency, rather than 
the hierarchy and ‘by invitation only’ philosophy. It acknowledges the 
strength of a community and then seeks to build engagement and invite a 
wider audience to participate. We will talk a little bit more about ‘Words 
Without Pictures’ shortly, but that would be a perfect example of how 
you consider the audience: not in a way to look down on them, as you say, 
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but to seek to either engage them or look at methods of building networks 
or communities.  And I think what is great is that you also speak about the 
importance for photographers to look at building their own networks.
CC: Yes, definitely.
NFS: Which makes for really exciting times for photographers today, 
and moves us further away from seeking approval from the institution 
or the gatekeeper. This could equally be quite challenging. Is it possi-
ble to just open up a little bit more about how you consider the process 
of engagement?
CC: I have been a curator for coming up to twenty years. I feel very 
happy with the role of curator, as somebody who does creative things for 
other people – there is always an audience with curating. I’m not an art-
ist. Although I’m a very self-aware person, I’m not directly exploring the 
internal questions that I have for myself as an artist does. I don’t think a 
photographer needs to be a curator at heart, but I think a photographer 
does need to understand the curatorial mode of their practice for sure.
NFS: You have talked about this idea that you are mostly curating experi-
ences, whether it’s digital, whether it’s online, or whether it’s a physical 
live event, which I think is a really important way to consider our roles as 
the field progresses. 
It is a good reminder that we need to consider our purpose, not the appa-
ratus. But we could perhaps suggest there have been experiential prec-
edents. The camera obscura and the cinema: an immersive experience 
within a darkened environment, illuminated by a single project revealing 
and interpreting an ‘outside or alternative’ world. I also enjoy the similari-
ties between today’s digital tablet and the early drawings of a painter’s can-
vas using a camera obscura. Similarly, we seem to have forgotten that the 
book is a piece of technology, so it really just reinforces the message that 
technology has and will always continually evolve and change. I think, 
interestingly, your approach seems to seek to maximise the experience of a 
particular platform or mechanism, and in that way truly consider engage-
ment and participation with an audience. Would you say that is true? 
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CC: There is a multitude of modes to most creative people’s practices. 
The way that #phonar is structured consciously seems to address that, 
given the emphasis placed on not only the ‘photographer-as-artisan’ train-
ing, but also, importantly, the ‘photographer-as-editor’ and   ‘photogra-
pher-as-curator’, ‘photographer-as-researcher’. That’s the wonder of now 
– suddenly the true plurality of photographic practice isn’t something 
that you are supposed to keep hidden.
NFS: During the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art ‘Is Photography 
Over?’ debate that you were part of, there is one particular thing George 
Baker, who I think you have worked with before, said that I thought 
was great, where he talks about the forgotten potentials of the medium. 
It seems that photography has almost become dominated by particular 
forms, by particular methods of commissioning, etc. And that actually it 
was all there in the beginning, and that maybe we simply need to go back 
to remembering or look at those potentials and begin to re-explore them.
CC: Geoffrey Batchen’s writing about the earliest era of photography has 
been really instrumental in us thinking of photography as not an inven-
tion but a conception; suggesting that there was something in the cultural 
psyche that meant that photography happened when it did, and it was 
not just reliant on technological innovation. I think that the academic 
field of comparative media studies is an amazingly well developed area 
that is usefully applied to thinking about contemporary photography. I 
was speaking at a conference recently and really enjoyed the thoughts of 
art historian David Joselit, who talked about photography as ‘the many’ 
and related our contemporary sense of ‘image overload’ to the early 20th 
century, and the wholesale adoption of photomechanical reproduction 
methods. He talked very convincingly about how avant-garde and con-
temporary artists are negotiating parallel issues of what it means to create 
singular, artistic images in eras when photography embodies ‘the many’. 
Genuinely open
NFS: Absolutely. This would seem to be a good time to talk about a couple 
of your recent projects, ‘Words Without Pictures’ and ‘eitherand’. You’ve 
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mentioned ‘Words Without Pictures’ earlier; I wondered if you might 
summarise how and why that project came about.   You have previously 
mentioned a sense of frustration?
CC: I think my sense of frustration is very quickly followed by, ‘You might 
as well do it yourself – what’s the worst thing that could happen?’. The 
worst thing that can happen is that somebody else does it and not as well 
as you could if you’d put your mind to it! ‘Words Without Pictures’ was 
essentially driven by both my conversations with people I met in New 
York, as I mentioned earlier, and then finding the right context to develop 
the idea. I had just started as curator at Los Angeles County Museum of 
Art and I needed to rebuild a community around the photography depart-
ment. I didn’t want to build a community based on explorations of the 
collection, which might have been the obvious place for a photography 
department in a museum! But I wanted to make an invitation to photo-
graphic practitioners living in Los Angeles to think of LACMA as a place 
where the crucial conversations about photography could happen.  One 
of the areas I still feel very strongly that museums need to provide for, is 
those years after college when you want to know where you can go for a 
really serious debate about the creative sphere you are passionate about.
NFS:   It’s about that sense of the institution being regarded as safe and 
trusted, so you know the information you are going to receive has been 
filtered through your peers, which I think is vital.
CC: Yes, just think how radically we have shifted our view about peer-
reviewing and editing of photography. Even five years ago it was still 
something that institutions were very suspicious of endorsing.  ‘Words 
Without Pictures’ was one of a small number of projects that arts insti-
tutions initiated, which were genuinely open and which released edito-
rial control. The smart institutions really did that. They saw that there 
was nothing advantageous in censoring or institutionalising the language 
of this particular moment and, instead, that we just needed to be gener-
ous hosts to the thoughtfulness of creative people thinking aloud and 
together. […]
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NFS: I am intrigued by how you planned and mapped out the legacy of 
‘Words Without Pictures’ in the context of the web as an open and free 
domain. You knew you wanted to have clear parameters for its time-
frame: so that project had twelve months, with new stimuli on a monthly 
basis, mixed with live events, and then as the culminating physical 
resource.  The book went from being print-on-demand, to its new associa-
tion with Aperture, and in fact to being published by Aperture. Why isn’t 
it online anymore? Why take it away, close the door down in that sense?
CC: Obviously I’m not working at LACMA anymore so I am not in con-
trol of the evolution of the project.  I decided from the outset that the web-
site would only exist for a year, as I felt a year was the maximum amount 
of time before the behaviour of the site would become institutionalised. 
The next phase of the life of the project happened in other places, off-
line, mainly in classrooms where the essays began to be used as prompts 
to live discussions. The pdf versions of the essays rippled out in the world 
and appear on curriculum reading lists. We didn’t work with a sort of 
modernist idea of the original ‘Words Without Pictures’, so all of these 
permutations, all of these iterations of the project, are part of it.  Our suc-
cess criteria for the project was that we wanted to create a framework for a 
discussion to be had, and I was happy that we only had 300 readers a day 
and a new response to the monthly essay came in very slowly, because we 
found the quality of the engagement was astounding.
NFS: I think that’s an interesting point, though, only 300 readers a day. 
If we equate that to a physical lecture theatre in the largest universities, 
that is often the size of one room. So the scale you cite, I think still makes 
a serious impact. But almost more importantly it demonstrates an active 
engagement with the subject that you wouldn’t be guaranteed in that 
same lecture theatre. Having a desire for the project to achieve more, do 
you think that framework was enabled through technology? Was it able to 
become more viral or more permeable?
CC: It was beautifully planned and beautifully designed; it was very true 
all the way through. There was real thoughtfulness within the concept 
and throughout the design. David Reinfurt is an incredible designer. 
The amazing Alex Klein, who is an artist and a curator, was the editor 
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overseeing all aspects, every day.  The most important thing is to use these 
platforms in a way, which is really true to what it is you want to do, and all 
we wanted to do was to create a framework for the discussion to happen.
Mixed economies
NFS:  I’d like to end with two questions.  We have talked about the obsta-
cles and challenges facing photography, and how perhaps these have at 
times shaped your future. What is your next project that begins to address 
or look at those and question them?
CC: I think I am going to continue to live in a mixed economy which 
sees me sometimes as the author with researched and definitive opinions, 
as a participant in things that I think are really interesting but I am not 
an expert in, and as a collaborator developing ideas with creative peo-
ple who come from other areas of expertise. My next text book is under 
development. It’s going to take me a while but the title is ‘Photographic’. 
Contemporary photography is beautifully faceted – photography remains 
a prompt for social change. It is a vital vehicle for ideas. It is an astound-
ing empirical mass. Photographic technology is an author of the ways 
we perceive the world.  And photographic industries are challenged but 
reforming, and photography is of course a material form. I want to offer 
useful reading to people embarking on their creative, photographic lives 
that really embodies the current debates.
NFS: That sounds fantastic.   My other question was really going to be 
about what would potential projects for you, thinking in five years’ time, 
look like, in light of this change and these exciting yet challenging devel-
opments? And I think what you are suggesting is that they would have 
multiple elements, but importantly that they should be a prompt for some-
thing more, something different.  That’s maybe the space we are entering 
into, where being able to be fluid and responsive is going to be key.
CC:  Yes, but within that, is having your own internal critical framework 
for what it is you do. […]
200 Jonathan Shaw
Antennae
As a way of extending the initial conversation Charlotte Cotton has 
offered the following list of writers whose ideas are inspiring her in the 
continuation of her practice:
Fred Ritchin, Professor of Photography and Imaging at New York 
University’s Tisch School of the Arts. He has written three critically 
acclaimed books on photography, In Our Own Image; After Photography 
and, most recently, Bending the Frame. 
Katherine Hayles, Professor of Literature at Duke University. Her 
recent book How We Think seeks to embrace the idea that we think 
through, with, and alongside media. 
Julian Stallabrass is a writer, curator and photographer. He is Professor 
in Art History at the Courtauld Institute of Art, London. He is noted for 
his controversial views on the art world and for his observations on the 
major transformations and opportunities afforded to artists by technologi-
cal developments in production and distribution. 
Grant Kester is Professor of Art History in the Visual Arts depart-
ment at the University of California. Kester’s 2011 book The One and 
the Many provides an overview of the broader continuum of collaborative 
art practices. 
David Joselit is the Carnegie Professor of Art History at Yale 
University. His latest book After Art defines a shift in the status of art 
under the dual pressures of digital technology. 
Original source and licence
Shaw, J. (ed.) (2014) NewFotoScapes. Birmingham: The Library of 
Birmingham: 69-88. Also available online at http://newfotoscapes.org/. 
Licence: CC BY NC-SA 4.0. This version has been slightly edited 
from the original.
CHAPTER 15
The Creative Power of 
Nonhuman Photography 
Joanna Zylinska
Photography as philosophy
This article offers a philosophical exposition of the concept of ‘nonhu-
man photography’. What is meant by nonhuman photography here is not 
just photos taken by agents that are not human, such as CCTV cameras, 
body scanners, space satellites or Google Street View, although some of 
these examples will be referenced throughout the piece. Yet the princi-
pal aim of this article is to suggest that there is more to photography than 
meets the (human) eye and that all photography is to some extent non-
human. With this, no doubt still somewhat cryptic, proposition in mind, 
let us take a small detour from philosophising to look at a photographic 
project which introduces the key ideas behind this article.
Called Topia daedala (figures 15.1-15.4), this series of twelve black 
and white photographs1 arises out of an ongoing exploration on my part 
of various forms of manufactured landscape. Taken from two vantage 
points on both sides of a window, the composite images that make up 
the series interweave human and nonhuman creativity by overlaying 
the outer world of cloud formation with the inner space of sculptural 
arrangement. Remediating the tradition of the sublime as embraced by 
J.M.W. Turner’s landscape paintings and Ansel Adams’ national park 
photographs, the series foregrounds the inherent manufacturedness of 
what counts as ‘landscape’ and of the conventions of its visual represen-
tation. Through this, Topia daedala performs a micro-sublime for the 
Anthropocene era, a period in which the human has become identified 
as a geological agent whose impact on the geo- and biosphere has been 
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irreversible. It also raises questions for the role of plastic – as both con-
struction material and debris – in the age of petrochemical urgency.
Figures 15.1-15.4. Joanna Zylinska, from Topia daedala, 2014.
Topia daedala is not meant to serve as a direct illustration of the concept of 
nonhuman photography this article engages with. However, it does intro-
duce us to a wider problematic of human-nonhuman relations, raising at 
the same time the politico-ethical question about our human responsibil-
ity in the world in which the agency of the majority of actants – such as 
wind, rain or earthquake – goes beyond that of human decision or will, 
even if it may be influenced by human action. The question of human 
responsibility in the universe which is quintessentially entangled, on both 
a cellular and cosmic level (with us all being ‘made of starstuff’),2 is an 
important one. Even if we cannot be entirely sure what this fragile human 
‘we’ actually stands for, the responsibility to face, and give an account of, 
the unfoldings of this world – which is made up of human and nonhuman 
entities and relations – belongs to us humans in a singular way. Philosophy, 
in particular ethics, has typically been a way of addressing the problem of 
responsibility.3 But written linear argument is only one mode of enquiry 
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through which this problem can be approached. Alongside philosophical 
writing, over the recent years I have been attempting to experiment with 
other, less verbal, modes of addressing ethical and political issues: those 
enabled by art, and, more specifically, photography. These experiments 
have been driven by one overarching question: is it possible to practice 
philosophy as a form of art, while also engaging in art-making and pho-
tography as ways of philosophising? The reason photography may lend 
itself to this kind of cross-modal experimentation is because of its onto-
logical, or world-making (rather than just representational), capabilities. 
We can turn here for support to literary critic Walter Benn Michaels, 
who, while upholding ‘the impossibility (and the undesirability) of simply 
denying the indexicality of the photograph’ (Michaels, 2007: 447), also 
argues that ‘It is precisely because there are ways in which photographs 
are not just representations that photography and the theory of photogra-
phy have been so important’ (445). My proposition about photography’s 
ontological capabilities entails a stronger claim than the one made by 
Michael Fried in the Conclusion to his book, Why Photography Matters 
as Art as Never Before, in which photography as practiced by representa-
tives of what Fried calls ‘the anti-theatrical tradition’ such as Jeff Wall, 
Thomas Struth or Berndt and Hilda Becher is positioned as ‘an onto-
logical medium’, because it ‘makes a positive contribution’ to ontological 
thought via its engagement with issues such as absorption and worldhood 
(Fried, 2008: 347). While for Fried photography just makes philosophy 
better, my claim in this article is that photography makes philosophy, full 
stop – and also, more importantly, that photography makes worldhood, 
rather than just commenting on it.
It may seem at this point that what was meant to be an account of non-
human photography is revealing itself to be quite strongly attached to the 
concept of the human – as philosopher, photographer or art critic. This is 
true, because there is nothing more humanist than any unexamined sin-
gular gesture of trying to ‘move beyond the human’. My ambition here, 
as in my other work, is therefore to explore the possibility of continuing 
to work with the concept of the human in the light of the posthumanist 
critique,4 taking the latter seriously as both an injunction and a set of pos-
sibilities. The reasons for this proposed retention of the human have noth-
ing to do with any kind of residual humanism or species nostalgia. Instead, 
they spring from the recognition of a strategic role of the concept of the 
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human in any kind of artistic, creative, political or ethical project worth its 
salt, while also remaining aware of the fact that in many works of recent 
posthumanist theory the human has been successfully exposed as nothing 
more than a fantasy of unity and selfhood. This fantasy has been premised 
on the exclusion of the human’s dependency, both material and concep-
tual, on other beings and non-living entities. Seen as too Eurocentric and 
masculinist by postcolonial and feminist theory, the human has also been 
revealed by various sciences to be just an arbitrary cut off point in the line 
of species continuity on the basis of characteristics shared across the spe-
cies barrier: communication, emotions or tool use. This (non- or posthu-
manist) human this article retains as the anchor point of its enquiry is thus 
premised on the realisation that we are in (philosophical) trouble as soon 
as we start speaking about the human, but it also shows a certain intransi-
gence that makes (some of) us hang on to the vestiges of the concept that 
has structured our thinking, philosophy and art for many centuries. So, 
onto a posthumanist theory of nonhuman photography, as articulated by 
a human, all too human, philosopher-photographer…
Towards nonhuman photography (and all the way back)
By way of contextualising our discussion of nonhuman photography, I 
want to look at two important texts in photography theory in which the 
relationship between human and nonhuman agents, technologies and 
practices has been addressed explicitly: a 2008 essay by John Tagg called 
‘Mindless Photography’ and a 2009 book by Fred Ritchin titled After 
Photography. Tagg’s essay is a commentary on the supposed withering of 
the critical paradigm in both photographic practice and its interpretation, 
a paradigm articulated by Victor Burgin in his 1984 seminal text Thinking 
Photography and subsequently adopted by many scholars and students of 
photography. In his article Tagg references two then recent phenomena 
which, in his view, had radically altered the relationship between pho-
tography and the human: the CCTV system introduced in 2003 to moni-
tor the implementation of congestion charge in central London and the 
visual rendering of data captured by a radio telescope, in June 2005, of 
solar dust cloud radiation in the Taurus Molecular Cloud, with the data 
representing an event that ‘took place in 1585, or thereabouts’ (Tagg, 
2008: 21). While in the 1970s and early 1980s ‘photography was framed 
The Creative Power of Nonhuman Photography  205
as a site of human meanings that called the human into place’, the more 
recent developments cited by Tagg are said to have undermined ‘this 
confident assumption’ (24). Tagg seems disturbed by the fact that, in the 
London traffic surveillance system, the relationship between the embod-
ied human subject and the technical apparatus has been irrevocably bro-
ken, with the technological circuit which consists of ‘cameras, records, 
files and computers’ (19) doing away with visual presentation, ‘communi-
cation, psychic investment, a subject, or even a bodily organ’ (21) – until 
the visual data concerning the car with a given number plate that has 
missed the congestion charge payment reaches the court. Tagg is similarly 
troubled by the severance of the relationship between photography and 
human sensation, between stimulus and response, in space photography. 
He goes so far as to suggest that in those new technological developments
photography loses its function as a representation of the ego 
and the eye and even as a pleasure machine built to excite 
the body. In place of those figures, photography is encoun-
tered as an utterly dead thing; mindless in a much blunter 
sense than imagined [by Burgin] twenty-five years ago… [It 
is] driving towards a systemic disembodiment that, acceler-
ating in the technologies of cybernetics and informatics, has 
sought to prepare what has been hailed as the ‘postbiological’ 
or ‘posthuman’ body for its insertions into a new machinic 
enslavement. (25)
Photography which is unable to provide stimulation and pleasure for the 
human is then immediately linked by Tagg with mindlessness, empti-
ness and, ultimately, death. It may seem that, with this articulation, Tagg 
is engaging in a belated attempt to rescue photography from its long-
standing association with mortality established by canonical texts such 
as Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida, and to retrospectively postulate the 
possibility of photography acting as a life-giving force. However, this no 
doubt radical possibility, briefly hinted at in the above cited passage, is 
immediately withdrawn. Photography does not deliver life to the human 
any more and, for Tagg, it is only the human that can be both life’s sub-
ject and its arbiter. This is of course a familiar philosophical gesture, first 
enacted by Aristotle, whereby technology is reduced to a mere tool for 
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human existence, survival or improvement and is then assessed on the 
basis of how well it performs this function (rather than being understood 
as a dynamic network of forces the way Michel Foucault and Bernard 
Stiegler respectively suggest, or as an ‘intrinsic correlation of functions’5 
between the human and the apparatus the way Vilém Flusser apprehends 
it). Conceived in these instrumental terms, as the human’s opponent and 
enemy – and not part of the originary techno-logic that brings forth the 
human in the world, and the world itself as a space occupied by human 
and nonhuman entities – photography must inevitably fail.
It would be unfair not to mention the political motivation that under-
pins Tagg’s argument. His concern with ‘machinic enslavement’ is driven 
by what he sees as the deprivation of the human subject of both corpo-
real integrity and political subjectivity as a result of the encroachment 
of those new photoimaging technologies, in which ‘there is nothing to be 
seen’, on our lives (Tagg, 2008: 24). This concern no doubt becomes even 
more pressing in the era of global networked surveillance enacted by the 
likes of the NSA, GCHQ, Facebook and Google. Yet to blame photogra-
phy for the immoral and inhumane actions of its users is to misidentify 
the enemy, while also weakening the power of a political critique devel-
oped in its ambit. In his essay Tagg takes some significant steps towards 
analysing the changes occurring to photographic practice at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century but then recoils in horror from the brink 
of his own analysis. What could have served as a stepping stone towards 
developing both a radical posthumanist photography theory and a radical 
posthumanist political analysis ends up retreating into a place of melan-
cholia for the human of yesteryear, one who was supposedly in control of 
both his personal body and the body politic but who can now only tilt at 
windmills – which are turning into drones in front of his very eyes. 
If only Tagg had allowed himself to hear the exhortation from 
another photography theory radical, Fred Ritchin! Admittedly, Ritchin’s 
work is not free from a sense of melancholia espoused by Tagg: in After 
Photography Ritchin clearly reveals how he misses the time when people 
believed in images and when images could be used to solve conflict and 
serve justice. Yet, even though his book opens up with a rather dispirit-
ing account of the changes occurring to the photographic medium and its 
representationalist ambitions, it ends with an affirmation of life in photog-
raphy. Dazzled by the horizon of scale opened by telescopy and physics 
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in a similar way Tagg was, Ritchin nevertheless admits that ‘in the digital-
quantum world, it might be just possible … to use an emerging post-pho-
tography to delineate, document, and explore the posthuman. To dance 
with ambiguity. To introduce humility to the observer, as well as a sense 
of belonging. To say yes, and simultaneously, no’ (2009: 183).
(Always) nonhuman photography 
It is precisely in this critical-philosophical spirit, of saying yes and, simul-
taneously, no, that my opening proposition that all photography is to some 
extent nonhuman should be read. While I am aware of, and concerned 
with, ways in which the nonhuman aspect of photography can produce 
inhumane practices, I also want to suggest that it is precisely in its non-
human aspect that photography’s creative, or world-making, side can be 
identified. Therefore, rather than contribute to recent jeremiads about 
photography, what with it being seen as supposedly dying in the digital 
era because it is no longer authentic or material enough, or imploding due 
to its excessiveness and banality as evidenced on Instagram and in the 
much maligned selfie phenomenon, I want to argue in what follows that 
it is precisely through focusing on its nonhuman aspect that we can find 
life in photography. This line of argument is partly indebted to the work 
of Flusser, who, in Towards a Philosophy of Photography, writes: ‘The 
photographic apparatus lies in wait for photography; it sharpens its teeth 
in readiness. This readiness to spring into action on the part of appara-
tuses, their similarity to wild animals, is something to grasp hold of in the 
attempt to define the term etymologically’ (2000: 21-22). Flusser builds 
here on the Latin origins of the term ‘apparatus’, which derives from 
apparare, ‘make ready for’ (as a combination of the prefix ad-, ‘toward’, 
and parare, ‘make ready’). This leads him to read photography as facili-
tated by, or even proto-inscribed in, the nexus of image-capture devices, 
various chemical and electronic components and processes, as well as 
sight- and technology-equipped humans. 
Flusser’s proposition challenges the humanist narrative of invention 
as an outcome of singular human genius: it recognises the significance 
of the technological set-up in the emergence of various human prac-
tices. This is not to say that these practices function outside the human 
but rather that the concepts of self-contained human intentionality and 
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sovereign human agency may be too limited to describe the emergence of 
specific technological processes at a particular moment in time. Flusser’s 
idea seems to be (unwittingly) reflected in Geoffrey Batchen’s proposition 
outlined in Burning with Desire that photography was invented – seem-
ingly repeatedly, by Nicéphore Niépce, Louis Daguerre, Hyppolyte 
Bayard and William Fox Talbot, among others – due to the fact that in the 
early nineteenth century there already existed a desire for it. This desire 
manifested itself in the proliferation of the discourses and ideas about the 
possibility of capturing images and fixing them, and of the technologies – 
‘the camera obscura and the chemistry necessary to reproduce’ (Batchen, 
1999: 25) the images taken with it – that would facilitate such a develop-
ment. We could therefore perhaps go so far as to say that the photographic 
apparatus, which for Batchen contains but also exceeds a discrete human 
component, was awaiting the very invention of photography.
The above discussed ideas on the photographic apparatus will even-
tually point me not just towards rethinking the photographic medium 
but also towards a possibility (one that has been withheld by Tagg) of a 
posthumanist political analysis. For now, taking inspiration from Flusser, 
I want to suggest that human-driven photography – where an act of con-
scious looking through a viewfinder or, more frequently nowadays, at an 
LCD screen held at arm’s level – is only one small part of what goes on 
in the field of photography, even though it is often made to stand in for 
photography as such. The execution of human agency in photographic 
practice, be it professional or amateur, ostensibly manifests itself in deci-
sions about the subject matter (the ‘what’) and about ways of capturing 
this subject matter with a digital or analogue apparatus (the ‘how’). Yet in 
amateur, snapshot-type photography these supposed human-centric deci-
sions are often affective reactions to events quickly unfolding in front of 
the photographer’s eyes. Such reactions happen too quickly, or we could 
even say automatically, for any conscious processes of decision-making to 
be involved – bar that original decision to actually have, bring and use a 
camera, rather than not. This automatism in photography also manifests 
itself in the fact that these kinds of ‘snap’ reactions are usually rechan-
neled through a whole database of standardised, pre-programmed, pre-
existing image-frames, whose significance we are already familiar with 
and which we are trying to recreate in a unique way, under the umbrella 
of so-called individual experience: ‘toddler running towards mother’; ‘girl 
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blowing a candle on a birthday cake’; ‘couple posing in front of the Taj 
Mahal’. It is in this sense that, as Flusser has it, ‘weddings conform to a 
photographic program’ (Flusser, 2001: 56). 
Similar representationalist ambitions accompany many professional 
photographic activities, including those undertaken by photojournalists 
who aim to show us, objectively and without judging, what war, pov-
erty and ‘the pain of others’, to borrow Susan Sontag’s phrase (2003), are 
‘really’ like, or those performed by photographic artists. Even prior to any 
moment of making a picture actually occur, fine art photographers tend to 
remain invested in the modernist idea of an artist as a human agent with 
a particular vocation, one whose aesthetic and conceptual gestures are 
aimed at capturing something unique, or at least capturing it uniquely, 
with an image-making device. And thus we get works of formal portrai-
ture; images of different types of vegetation or geological formations that 
are made to constitute ‘landscapes’; still-life projects of aestheticised 
domesticity, including close-ups of kitchen utensils, fraying carpets or 
light traces on a wall; and, last but not least, all those works that can be 
gathered into that rag-bag called ‘conceptual photography’.6 In this way, 
images inscribe themselves in a cybernetic loop of familiarity, with minor 
variations to style, colour and the (re)presented object made to stand for 
creativity, originality or even ‘genius’.
The automated image
Through the decisions of artists and amateurs about their practice, pho-
tography becomes an act of making something significant, even if not 
necessarily making it signify something in any straightforward way. It is 
a practice of focusing on what is in its very nature multifocal, of literally 
casting light on what would have otherwise remained obscure, of carving 
a fragment from the flow of life and turning it into a splinter of what, post-
factum, becomes known as ‘reality’. Traditionally, this moment of selec-
tion – referred to as ‘decisive’ by followers of the documentary tradition in 
photography – was associated with the pressing of the button to open the 
camera’s shutter. However, with the introduction of the Lytro camera on 
to the market in 2012, the temporality of this seemingly unique and tran-
sient photographic moment has been stretched into both the past and the 
future. Lytro captures the entire light field rather than a single plane of 
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light, thus allowing the photographer to change and readjust the focus on 
a computer in postproduction. Interestingly, Lytro is advertised as ‘The 
only camera that captures life in living pictures’ – a poetic formulation 
which is underpinned by the ongoing industry claim to ‘absolute novelty’, 
but which merely exacerbates and visualises the inherent instability of all 
photographic practice and all photographic objects. Lytro is thus just one 
more element in the long-term humanist narrative about ‘man’s domin-
ion over the earth’, a narrative that drives the progressive automatisation 
of many of our everyday devices, including cameras, cars and refrigera-
tors. Giving us an illusion of control over technology by making cameras 
smaller and domestic equipment more user-friendly, the technoscientific 
industry actually exacerbates the gap between technology and the human 
by relieving us from the responsibility of getting to know and engage with 
the increasingly software-driven ‘black boxes’.
Figure 15.5. Véronique Ducharme, Encounters, 2012-2013.
In the light of the dominance of the humanist paradigm in photography, 
a paradigm that is premised on the supposed human control of both the 
practice of image-making and the equipment, it is important to ask what 
gets elided in such conceptualisations. Of course, I am not the only one 
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who is asking this question: the problem of nonhuman agency in pho-
tography has been explored by other theorists, artists and curators. One 
recent photography event that brought many of these ideas to the fore was 
Drone: The Automated Image, a series of shows taking place under the 
umbrella of the photography biennale Le Mois de la Photo in Montreal, 
curated by Paul Wombell, in 2013.7 The uniqueness of this 13th edition 
of the Montreal biennale lay not so much in highlighting the machinic 
aspect of photographic and video practice, as this aspect had already been 
mobilised in the early days of photography – for example, in the works of 
Alexander Rodchenko or László Moholy-Nagy. Drone: The Automated 
Image (which was concerned with much more than just drones) took one 
step further on this road towards not just nonhuman but also posthuman-
ist photography by actually departing from the human-centric visuali-
sation process. In many of the works shown, the very act and process of 
capture were relegated to a computer, a camera mounted atop a moving 
vehicle, a robot or a dog. To mention just one example, Canadian artist 
Véronique Ducharme presented a photography-based installation called 
Encounters, consisting of images taken by automatic hunting cameras (fig-
ure 15.5). As the artist herself explains:
Over the course of one year, automatic cameras, installed 
in various parts of the Quebec landscape, recorded images 
from the forest. The images included animals, sunrise, wind 
and other actants susceptible of triggering the shutter of the 
cameras. These digital images, including the ‘mistakes’ of the 
cameras (i.e., blacked-out or overexposed images) were then 
transferred onto slide film in order to be projected in the gal-
lery space using slide projectors. Accompanied by its rhyth-
mic mechanical click, each machine has been programmed to 
sporadically and unpredictably project the images around the 
space, leaving the viewer entangled within the dialogue cre-
ated by the machines and the images. (2014: non-pag.)
Ducharme’s project offers a thought-provoking intervention into the 
debate about (human) intentionality in photography theory, whereby the 
former is seen as a condition and a guarantee of the medium being con-
sidered a form of art.8 Photographic agency is distributed here amongst a 
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network of participants, which includes not just nonhuman but also inan-
imate actors – even if ‘the beholder’ of the installation is still envisaged to 
be a human gallery-goer.
Figure 15.6. Juliet Ferguson, Stolen Images, 2011.
Ducharme’s work has similarities with another project which foregrounds 
and remediates nonhuman photographic agency without reneging on its 
human dimension: Stolen Images by British photographer Juliet Ferguson 
(figure 15.6), published in the London independent photography maga-
zine Flip in 2012 and online in Photomediations Machine in 2013. 
Accessing CCTV cameras using appropriate search terms via Google as 
part of her journalism job, Ferguson was able ‘to see through the all-seeing 
eyes of the CCTV camera places’ (Ferguson, 2013: non-pag.) what she 
would not have access to in the real world – without leaving her sofa. The 
process led her to reflect ‘on what it means to take a photograph’ and to 
pose the following questions: ‘The majority of the cameras I used I could 
pan, zoom and focus. Is this any less photography than someone using a 
fully automatic camera and taking a picture from a designated panorama 
point at a beauty spot? Does photography demand a presence or are pho-
tographs taken using appropriated cameras controlled from another coun-
try in another time zone just as valid as “created” images?’ (Ferguson, 
2013: non-pag.). Ferguson has revealed that, in the process, she began 
‘to see a certain beauty in the images as they became removed from their 
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original intention of surveillance. Instead, they offered a unique perspec-
tive on the ebb and flow of a day, from a vantage point and rigidity that 
ordinary photography doesn’t offer’ (non-pag.).
The photographic condition
These two projects discussed above demonstrate that art practice is 
merely part of a wider photographic condition, with things photographing 
themselves, without always being brought back to the human spectrum 
of vision as the ultimate channel of perception and of things perceived. 
Naturally, humans form part of this photographic continuum – as artists, 
photojournalists, festival organisers, computer programmers, engineers, 
printers, Instagram users, and, last but not least, spectators. However, 
what the examples just presented make explicit is that we are all part of 
that photographic flow of things being incessantly photographed, and 
of trying to make interventions from within the midst of it. In this way, 
Ducharme’s and Ferguson’s projects fall into a category that we might 
term ‘insignificant photography’ – not in the sense that they are mindless 
(as Tagg would perhaps have it), irrelevant and of no consequence, but 
rather in the sense of allowing us to see things that have been captured 
almost incidentally and in passing, with the thematic ‘what’ not being the 
key impulse behind the execution of the images. It is worth emphasising 
that this idea of insignificant photography has not just come to the fore 
with the development of networked digital technologies but was actually 
present in the early discourse of photography, even if the latter tended to 
confine photography’s nonhuman aspect to the fairly conservative idea of 
‘objective observation’. Steve Edwards explains that 
Throughout its history, the camera has repeatedly been seen 
as an objective machine that captures information without 
any interference from the artist. … in the early years of photog-
raphy this was an often repeated theme: it was assumed that 
the sun made the picture, or the camera did, or even that the 
object in question depicted itself (Talbot spoke of his coun-
try pile, Lacock Abbey, as the first building ‘that was ever yet 
known to have drawn its own picture’). (Edwards, 2006: 19) 
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The separation between the mechanism of photography as ‘objective 
observation’ and the human-centric notion of the ‘intentionality’ of the 
photographer has been used as a disciplinary device in art history: as sig-
nalled before, the elevation of photography to the status of art has been 
premised upon it.9 It is this separation that the work of many contempo-
rary photographers such as Ducharme and Ferguson troubles to a signif-
icant extent.
So what is meant by this notion of photographic condition, and does 
the postulation of its existence stand up to philosophical and experien-
tial scrutiny? To explore these questions, let us start from a very simple 
proposition: there is life in photography. If living in the so-called media 
age has become tantamount to being photographed on a permanent basis, 
with our identity constituted and verified by the ongoing development of 
our photo galleries and photo streams on mobile phones, tablets and social 
media platforms such as Facebook, Tumblr and Pinterest, not to mention 
the thousands of security cameras quietly and often invisibly registering 
our image when we pass through city centres, shopping malls and airports, 
then, contrary to its more typical Barthesian association with the passage 
of time and death, photography can be understood more productively as 
a life-making process. As Sarah Kember and I argue in Life after New 
Media, it is ‘precisely in its efforts to arrest duration, to capture or still 
the flow of life – beyond singular photographs’ success or failure at repre-
senting this or that referent – that photography’s vital forces are activated’ 
(Kember & Zylinska, 2012: 72). Photography lends itself to being under-
stood in a critical vitalist framework due to its positioning in a network of 
dynamic relations between present and past, movement and stasis, flow 
and cut. In making cuts into duration, in stabilising the temporal flow into 
entities, photography is inherently involved with time. Significantly, for 
vitalist philosophers such as Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, time, 
duration and movement stand precisely for life itself. As Bergson pro-
vocatively asks, ‘But is it not obvious that the photograph, if photograph 
there be, is already taken, already developed in the very heart of things 
and at all the points of space?’ (1911: 31). Photography’s proximity to life 
is therefore revealed in its temporal aspect, which is enacted in photogra-
phy’s dual ontology, whereby it can be seen as both object and practice, as 
both snapshot and all the other virtual snapshots that could have poten-
tially been there, and, last but not least, as both being something here and 
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now and as something always unfolding into something else. It is also in 
this dual ontology that the nonhuman side of photography comes to the 
fore, enacted as it is through agents as diverse as CCTV, aerial camera 
systems, satellites, endoscopy equipment and webcams as well as cam-
era- and mobile-phone-sporting humans. It is perhaps worth making 
a quick reservation here that, to acknowledge the life-making aspect of 
photography is not necessarily to condone the politically suspicious yet 
increasingly widespread technologies of ubiquitous surveillance, control 
and loss of privacy enabled by various kinds of cameras. However, much 
has already been written about the latter, with little acknowledgement 
so far of the vital potentiality of photography – which, in an ontological 
sense, does not have to be an agent of control, even if it often is. There 
is therefore a danger of moralising photography in academic and public 
discourses before its potential has been truly explored. The foreground-
ing of the inherently creative power of photography as a practice is part of 
the philosophical argument of this article, although issues of politics never 
disappear from its agenda.
Photography and life
The on-off activity of the photographic process, which carves life into 
fragments while simultaneously reconnecting them to the imagistic flow, 
may allow us to conclude not only that there is life in photography, but also 
that life itself is photographic. Interestingly, Claire Colebrook explains 
this process of creative becoming in and of life by drawing on the very 
concept of image production, or ‘imaging’. She writes: ‘All life, accord-
ing to Bergson and to Deleuze after him, can be considered as a form of 
perception or “imaging” where there is not one being that apprehends or 
represents another being, but two vectors of creativity where one poten-
tial for differentiation encounters another and from that potential forms a 
relatively stable tendency or manner’ (2010: 11). This idea has its root in 
Bergson’s Matter and Memory, where our experience of the world, which 
is always a way of sensing the world, comes in the form of images. We 
should mention here that, on the whole, Bergson is somewhat hesitant 
about the role played by images in cognition: in Creative Evolution he 
dismisses them as mere ‘snapshots’ of perception, post-factum reductions 
of duration and time to a sequence of the latter’s frozen slices.10 It may 
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therefore seem strange to be revisiting the work of a philosopher who only 
used the concept of photography negatively, to outline a ‘better’, i.e. more 
intuitive and more fluid, mode of perception and cognition, in an attempt 
to say something new about photography. However, my argument here, 
as in my previous work,11 is that Bergson’s error is first and foremost 
media-specific and not philosophical per se: namely, he misunderstands 
photography’s inherently creative and dynamic power by reducing it to 
a sequence of already fossilised artefacts, with the mind fragmenting the 
world into a sequence of ‘snapshots’. This is why I want to suggest that, 
its mystical underpinnings aside, we can mobilise Bergson’s philosophical 
writings on duration understood as a manifestation of élan vital to rethink 
photography as a quintessential practice of life. Indeed, photography is 
one possible (and historically specific) enactment of the creative practice 
of imaging, with the cuts into duration it makes always remaining con-
nected to the flow of time. If we accept the fact that cutting – be it with 
our visual or conceptual apparatus – is inevitable to the processes of mak-
ing sense of the world, then we can see any outcomes of the photographic 
cut, i.e. photographs and other products of the image-making process, as 
temporary stabilisations of the flow of duration that still bear a trace of life 
– rather than as frozen and ultimately deadly mementoes of the past. It is 
important to point out that, in order to recognise any kind of process as a 
process, we need to see it against the concept of a temporary stabilisation, 
interruption or cut into this process. A photograph is one possible form 
such stabilisations take, and a rather ubiquitous one at that. It is precisely 
because of its ubiquity and its increasingly intuitive technological appara-
tus that it serves as a perfect illustration of Bergson’s ideas – or rather, of 
my own ‘differentiated reading’ of Bergson. Bergson himself foregrounds 
this mutually constitutive relationship between process and stoppage 
when he says that ‘Things are constituted by the instantaneous cut which 
the understanding practices, at a given moment, on a flux of this kind, and 
what is mysterious when we compare the cuts together becomes clear 
when we relate them to the flux’ (1944: 272). This supposition allows us 
to posit photography as an ultimately salutary and creative force in man-
aging the duration of the world by the human as a species with limited 
cognitive and sensory capacity. 
The notion of the creative role of the imaging process in life has also 
recently made its manifestation in the work of radical biologists, such as 
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Lynn Margulis. As she puts it in a book co-authored with her son Dorian 
Sagan, ‘All living beings, not just animals, but plants and microorganisms, 
perceive. To survive, an organic being must perceive – it must seek, or at 
least recognize, food and avoid environmental danger’ (Margulis & Sagan, 
2000: 27). This act of perception, which involves the seeking out and rec-
ognition of something else, involves the making of an image of that some-
thing else (food, predator, sexual partner), one that needs to be at least 
temporarily fixed in order for the required proximity – for consumption 
or sex – to be accomplished. We could perhaps therefore suggest that 
imaging is a form of proto-photography, planting the seed of the com-
bined human-machinic ‘desire’ explored by Batchen that came to its own 
in the early nineteenth century. After Bergson, images (which are not yet 
photographs) stand for ‘a certain existence which is more than that which 
the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls 
a thing – an existence placed half-way between the “thing” and the “rep-
resentation”’ (Bergson, 1911: vii). It is precisely through images that nov-
elty comes into the world, which is why images should not be reduced to 
mere representations but should rather be understood as creations, ‘some 
of which are philosophical, some artistic, some scientific’ (Colebrook, 
2010: 23). To put this another way, the creative impulse of life takes it 
beyond representation as a form of picturing what already exists: instead, 
life is a creation of images in the most radical sense, a way of temporarily 
stabilising matter into forms. Photographic practice as we conventionally 
know it, with all the automatism it entails, is just one instantiation of this 
creative process of life. 
If all life is indeed photographic, the notion of the photographic 
apparatus that embraces yet also goes beyond the human becomes fun-
damental to our understanding of what we have called the photographic 
condition. To speak of the photographic apparatus is of course not just 
to argue for a straightforward replacement of the human vision with a 
machinic one, but rather to recognise the mutual intertwining and co-
constitution of the organic and the machinic, the technical and the dis-
cursive, in the production of vision, and hence of the world. In her work 
on the use of apparatuses in physics experiments, the philosopher and 
quantum physicist Karen Barad argues that such devices are not just ‘pas-
sive observing instruments; on the contrary, they are productive of (and 
part of) phenomena’ (2007: 142). We could easily apply this argument 
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to photography, where the camera as a viewing device, the photographic 
frame both in the viewfinder and as the circumference of a photographic 
print, the enlarger, the computer, the printer, the photographer (who, in 
many instances, such as surveillance or speed cameras, is replaced by the 
camera-eye), and, last but not least, the discourses about photography and 
vision that produce them as objects for us humans are all active agents in 
the constitution of a photograph. In other words, they are all part of what 
we understand by photography. 
Becoming a camera
As signalled earlier, it is not just philosophy that helps us envisage this 
nonhuman, machinic dimension of photography: photographic, and, 
more broadly, artistic practice is even better predisposed to enact it (rather 
than just provide an argument about it). A series of works by British artist 
Lindsay Seers is a case in point. Exhibited, among other places, at Matt’s 
Gallery in London as It Has To Be This Way in 2009, and accompanied 
by an aptly titled book, Human Camera, Seers’ ongoing project consists 
of a number of seemingly autobiographic films. These are full of bizarre 
yet just-about-believable adventures occurring to their heroine, all veri-
fied by a body of ‘experts’ – from doctors and critics through to family 
members – that appear in the films but also leave behind ‘evidence’ in 
the form of numerous written accounts, photographs and documentary 
records. In one of the films, a young girl, positioned as ‘Lindsay Seers’, 
is living her life unable to make a distinction between herself and the 
world, or between the world and its representations. The girl is gifted 
with exceptional memory so, like a camera that is permanently switched 
on, she records and remembers practically everything. ‘It is as if I was in 
a kaleidoscope, a bead in the mesmerising and constantly shifting pat-
tern. Everything was in flux, every single moment and every single object 
rewritten at every turn’, as ‘Lindsay Seers’ recalls in a short piece called 
‘Becoming Something’ included in Human Camera (Seers, 2007: 36). 
This terrifyingly magnificent gift is lost once the girl sees a photograph 
of herself. She then spends her adult life clothed in a black sack, photo-
graphing things obsessively. In this way, she is literally trying to ‘become 
a camera’ by making photographs on light-sensitive paper inserted into 
her mouth, with the images produced ‘bathed in the red light’ of her body 
The Creative Power of Nonhuman Photography  219
(figure 15.7). This ambition is later replaced by an attempt to ‘become 
a projector’ by creating things ex nihilo through the emanation of light. 
Some of Seers’ films presented in the show are screened in a black hut 
modelled on Thomas Edison’s Black Maria, his New Jersey film studio 
that was used for projection as well as photography. With this, Seers 
invites us not just to witness her process of becoming a camera but also to 
enter a giant camera ourselves, to literally step into the world of imaging, 
to re-connect us to the technicity of our own being. 
Figure 15.7. Lindsay Seers, Optogram (mouth camera), 2010.
Although Bergson’s argument about life as a form of imaging is pos-
ited as transhistorical, we can add a unique inflection to it by returning to 
Flusser, and, in particular, his study of the relation between the human 
and the technical apparatus. For Flusser, that relation changed signifi-
cantly after the Industrial Revolution, a state of events in which ‘photog-
raphers are inside their apparatus and bound up with it... It is a new kind 
of function in which human beings and apparatus merge into a unity’ 
(2000: 27). Consequently, human beings now ‘function as a function 
of apparatuses’ (26), limited as they are to the execution of the camera’s 
programme from the range of seemingly infinite possibilities which are 
nevertheless determined by the machine’s algorithm. Arguably, humans 
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themselves are enactors of such a programme, a sequence of possibilities 
enabled by various couplings of adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine, 
arranged into a double helix of life. To state this is not to postulate some 
kind of uncritical technological or biological determinism that would 
remove from ‘us’ any possibility of action – as artists, photographers, crit-
ics, or spectators – and any responsibility for the actions we are to take. It 
is merely to acknowledge our kinship with other living beings across the 
evolutionary spectrum, with our lives remaining subject to biochemical 
reactions that we cannot always understand, control or overcome (from 
blushing through to ageing and dying). Just as ‘the imagination of the 
camera is greater than that of every single photographer and that of all 
photographers put together’ (Flusser, 2000: 30), the imagination of ‘the 
programme called life’ in which we all participate (and which is an out-
come of multiple processes running across various scale of the universe) 
far exceeds our human imagination. Such a recognition of our entangle-
ment as sentient and discursive beings in complex biological and tech-
nical networks is necessary if we are to become involved, seriously and 
responsibly, in any kind of photography, philosophy or other critical or 
everyday activity in which we aim to exercise ‘free will’. 
Re-forming the world
By reconnecting us to the technical apparatus, by letting us explore our 
machinic kinship, artists such as the appropriately named Seers and the 
other image-makers discussed in this article are all engaged (even if they 
are not always up-front about it or perhaps even entirely aware of it) in 
exploring the fundamental problem that many philosophers of technol-
ogy who take science seriously have been grappling with: given that ‘there 
is no place for human freedom within the area of automated, programmed 
and programming  apparatuses’, how can we ‘show a way in which it is 
nevertheless possible to open up a space for freedom’? (Flusser, 2000: 
81-82). Such an undertaking is very much needed, according to Flusser, 
‘because it is the only form of revolution open to us’ (82). Flusser points 
to ‘envisioners’, that is ‘people who try to turn an automatic apparatus 
against its own condition of being automatic’ (Flusser, 2001: 19), as those 
who will be able to undertake the task of standing ‘against the world’, 
by pointing ‘at it with their fingertips to inform it’. In this perspective, 
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codification and visualisation are seen as radical interventions into the 
world, and ways of re-forming it, rather than as ways of dehumanising it 
the way Tagg seemed to suggest.
Any prudent and effective way of envisaging and picturing a trans-
formation of our relation to the universe must thus be conducted not in 
terms of a human struggle against the machine but rather in terms of our 
mutual co-constitution, as a recognition of our shared kinship. This rec-
ognition of the photographic condition that encompasses yet goes beyond 
the human, and of the photographic apparatus that extends well beyond 
our eyes and beyond the devices supposedly under our control, should 
prompt us human philosophers, photographers and spectators to mobil-
ise the ongoing creative impulse of life, where the whole world is a cam-
era, and put it to creative rather than conservative uses. The conceptual 
expansion of processes of image-making beyond the human can also allow 
us to work towards escaping what Colebrook calls the ‘privatization of the 
eye in late capitalism’ (2010: 17), where what starts out as a defence of 
our right to look often ends up as a defence of our right to look at the small 
screen. In challenging the self-possessive individualism of the human eye, 
photography that seriously and consciously engages with its own expan-
sive ontological condition and its nonhuman genealogy may therefore be 
seen as a truly revolutionary practice. Indeed, the concept and practice 
of nonhuman photography reconnects us to other beings and processes 
across the universe: including those of the Taurus Molecular Cloud. It 
serves as a reminder that the short moment in natural history when the 
human species has folded ‘the world around its own, increasingly myopic, 
point of view’ (Colebrook, 2014: 22), and that has allowed it to become 
‘seduced, spellbound, distracted and captivated by inanity’ (15), should 
not obscure the wider horizon of our openness to the world, our relation-
ality with it through originary perception. Nonhuman photography can 
therefore serve as both a response to ‘man’s tendency to reify himself’ 
(Colebrook, 2014: 15) and an opening towards a radical posthumanist 
political analysis. It can do this by highlighting that there is more than just 
one point of view and that, by tearing the eye from the body and embrac-
ing the distributed machinic vision, it may be possible to see the drone 
as a more than just a killing machine – although of course there are no 
guarantees.12
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Original source and licence
Mika Elo and Marko Karo, with Marc Goodwin (eds) (2015) Photographic 
Powers. Helsinki: Aalto ARTS. Licence: CC BY 4.0.
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Notes
1  This series was developed as a visual track for my book, Minimal Ethics for 
the Anthropocene (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2014).
2  This is a famous line by physicist Carl Sagan from his documentary TV 
series, Cosmos.
3  In my books Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene (Ann Arbor: Open 
Humanities Press, 2014), Bioethics in the Age of New Media (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2009) and The Ethics of Cultural Studies (London and 
New York: Continuum, 2005) I explored this question of responsibility 
by taking some steps towards outlining a non-prescriptive, non-moralistic, 
content-free ethics.
4  Although the tradition of posthumanist critique in the humanities extends 
as far back as at least the work of Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud, 
and includes writings by authors such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida 
and Donna Haraway, some of the recent key texts that critically expound 
the concept of posthumanism include: N. Katherine Hayles (1999) How 
We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Cary Wolfe (2009) 
What Is Posthumanism?. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Rosi 
Braidotti (2013) The Posthuman. Cambridge: Polity; and Stefan Herbrechter 
(2013) Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis. London: Bloomsbury.
5  Cited from a letter written by Flusser in Zielinski (2013: 114). Zielinski 
explains that, for Flusser, ‘the apparatus does what the human wants it to do, 
and the human can only want what the apparatus is able to do’ (114).
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6  There are of course many ways of systematising art photography, with 
additional categories and subcategories – such as ‘abstraction’, ‘architecture’ 
or ‘nude’ – being frequently listed. The quick typology proposed here does 
not aim to be comprehensive or scholarly: rather, my aim is to highlight the 
traditional categories frequently used by professional fine art photography 
exhibition and competitions, as well as amateur artist photo hosting sites. The 
last category, ‘conceptual photography’, is perhaps the most open and the most 
contentious. I am using the term here in the expanded sense it has gained on 
many art photography websites. To cite from one of them, Fotoblur (www.
fotoblur.com), conceptual photography is a ‘genre of photography in which the 
artist makes a photograph of a concept or idea’. 
7  This article arises out of a catalogue essay I wrote for this exhibition: 
J. Zylinska (2013) ‘All the World’s a Camera: Notes on Nonhuman 
Photography’, in Paul Wombell (ed.), Drone: The Automated Image. 
Bielefeld: Kerber.
8  For the exposition of this argument, developed in response to the writings of 
Michael Fried on the work of Thomas Demand, see Michaels (2007: 443-44).
9  Fried’s Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before espouses this 
point of view.
10  Bemoaning our suppression of intuition – which can offer us a more 
accurate and less fragmented picture of the world – Bergson highlights our 
overreliance on the intellect in the cognitive process: 
Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place our-
selves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take 
snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic 
of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform 
and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in order to 
imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself. Perception, 
intellection, language so proceed in general. Whether we would think becom-
ing, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set going 
a kind of cinematograph inside us. (1944: 362)
11  This section develops some of the ideas discussed in chapter 3 of Kember and 
Zylinska, Life After New Media. 
12  For a playful, tactical media-style exploration of what a drone would 
do in times of peace see IOCOSE’s project, Drone Selfies, 2014, http://
photomediationsmachine.net/2014/08/06/drone-selfies/.
IV The Networked Image

CHAPTER 16
Benjamin, BitTorrent, Bootlegs: 
Auratic Piracy Cultures? 
Raúl Rodríguez-Ferrándiz
Seventy-five years ago, Walter Benjamin showed us that the 
line between ‘production’ and ‘reproduction’ had begun to 
blur. Reproduction was no longer optional, consequential, 
and degrading (the shredding of the original’s aura), but was 
instead being transformed into a principle of production 
itself: something was produced bearing in mind how it was 
to be reproduced. No longer did the original exist (in photog-
raphy, film, music recordings), but instead, there was diffu-
sion, exhibition. The work existed precisely at the time and 
place of its enjoyment. Today, the cultural pirates of the new 
digital era take this principle to the extreme, with a certain 
characteristic also foreseen by Benjamin: a yearning to par-
ticipate, to post-produce something captured in order to later 
return it to the Internet, modified in some way and made 
available to others. This postproduction is what is now often 
mixed up with reception, just as production and reproduc-
tion were in Benjamin’s day. Postproduction on the receiv-
er’s side, which somehow augments and extends the received 
work, in other words creates an etymologically rigorous 
author-ization (auctor as the root of both author and augmen-
tation). The cultural pirate only deserves redemption thanks 
to this creative augmentation. 
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From product to re-product 
The most cited and renowned of Walter Benjamin’s works1 can still be 
read today, without much effort, as the first treatise on multimedia cul-
tural piracy. Let us briefly recall the text. First, Benjamin reminded us 
that the reproduction of images dates back to the age-old tradition of 
minting coins and the serial manufacturing of bronze and terra-cotta 
pieces. This copying of images by the hundreds was perfected thanks 
to such technological developments as xylography, contemporary with 
printing, and much later, toward the end of the 18th century, lithogra-
phy. However, none of these techniques were even remotely capable of 
reaching the quotas achieved by photography in the mid-19th century. In 
fact, throughout this journey, starting with photography and moving on 
through film, the very concept of ‘original’ itself obviously loses consis-
tency: the original is already a copy, and the distance between future cop-
ies and the first is irrelevant. The work is no longer at its place of origin, 
nor does it show evidence or traces of such an origin (which is what is 
meant by ‘original’), but instead, it exists precisely at the time and place 
of its distribution, where neither its accuracy (guaranteed by technology), 
nor its origin (converted into a fetishism which increases its exchange-
value, but not the aesthetic pleasure which the copies can also provide) 
play any essential role. 
Benjamin seems to laud, in any case in a prudent and subtle manner, 
artwork which is able to break away from its sacred origins, with its own 
specific time and place, and special and specialized officiants. In other 
words, he praises artwork which, while still being a work of art, does not 
claim to be an original, but is diffused around the world as reproduction, 
reaching the masses to whom art and culture had previously been inacces-
sible. Furthermore, Benjamin foresaw the concept of ‘mass narcissism’ as 
an effect of technical reproducibility. In cinema halls, the masses are not 
only witness to an imaginary and inaccessible world, but also to a world 
they themselves occupy, filling the streets on marches and demonstra-
tions, on strike or in celebration; attending mass events, political rallies, 
sporting events; even fighting in wars. Obviously, the full magnitude of 
this is not something that the demonstrators themselves could appreciate, 
nor could they replay it at will. Neither could they form part of a causal 
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history in which they were collectively included as protagonists – masses 
as actors in a narrative.
Faced with the anguish felt by his friend Adorno, Benjamin intuitively 
knew that a new dawn awaited the arts. In addition, by no means had arts 
such as painting, theater, or music suffered due to inventions like photog-
raphy, film, and industrial phonography. It was possible for the painter, 
playwright, and composer to incorporate these new technologies into 
their work, and in so doing, to adapt their creations to the requirements 
imposed by reproducibility. All of these factors could serve not only as 
sources of motivation, but also for the projection of works unto previously 
unreachable audiences. 
The aura of the original, ‘the unique phenomenon of a distance, how-
ever close it may be’, is lost in reproduction, according to Benjamin (1969: 
221-230). As he states in The Arcades Project, reproduction sees the aura 
give way to the trace, which is a sign of intimate possession, and at the 
same time, of irretrievable loss (1999b: 447). The aura is the authentic 
and singular existence of a work of art; it is what gives an account of its 
material origin, as a thing in the world, and of a tradition from which said 
work is nourished and upon which said work has an effect, becoming a 
part of that tradition. Be it manual or technical, reproduction omits these 
qualities of the original work and the aura, in which they reside, disap-
pears. The aura is what cannot be reproduced, what cannot be pirated: 
‘there can’, as Benjamin puts it, ‘be no replica of it’. So, what happens if 
the mere concept of ‘original’ loses meaning in a photochemical cultural 
production (as a static or moving image) which is essentially (not option-
ally) reproducible and therefore not anchored to a time and a place, to an 
epiphany, or to the uniqueness of its expression, but is, rather, a nomadic 
production? (1969: 224, 244). 
Benjamin noted the turning point which photography and film 
brought to aesthetics, phenomenology, and even ethics of reproduction. 
Photography and film are technical reproductions which undermine the 
notion of ‘original’, and which switch the focus of interest from the work 
as a singularity that physically retains the creator’s touch to a vision of 
the work as a multipliable and liberated piece which removes distinctions 
between original and copy, between early and late, between here and 
there and therefore, Benjamin suggests, removes distinctions between cre-
ator and audience. The nature of the new arts in technical reproducibility 
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is, precisely, to remove itself from the ritual, the uniqueness and concen-
tration, the time and place, the privileged audience, and instead, project 
itself to an undefined space and moment, and to a completely unknown 
audience – a mass audience ‘whose sense of the universal equality of 
things has increased to such a degree that it extracts it even from a unique 
object by means of reproduction’ (1969: 223). 
When using such methods, the author is aware that he or she is work-
ing to promote traffic, public access, and convenient availability, as well as 
a process, a flow, and an audience of potential consumers of copies. Does 
the aura itself become reproducible, leaving the original, if there is one, 
without any claim to a stake? Does technical reproduction, the shredding 
of the aura, become its hiding place? 
It is true that Benjamin’s position with regard to the destruction of the 
aura is ambivalent. He tackles the subject in ‘The Work of Art…’ and on 
three other occasions,2 to the point where it can be said without exaggera-
tion that his reflections on the aura permeated the intellectual output of 
the last ten years of his life. Benjamin oscillated between a ‘liquidationist’ 
and an ‘elegiac’ attitude to the aura, just as he oscillates in his writings 
between a specific conception (the aura upon the arrival of photography 
and film) and another, more general (one could say ‘experiential’) concep-
tion, between an aesthetic and an ethical vision. In any case, and seeking 
to reconcile these perspectives, we could say that, for Benjamin, it is not 
so much that the aura can be derived from some objects (paintings and 
theatrical productions) and not from others (photographs and films), but 
rather, that there is a fundamental category of experience, memory, and 
perception which imbues people’s ways of looking at the world, at oth-
ers, and at works of art, and that said category is now disappearing under 
the weight of new technologies in technical reproducibility, which is both 
an opportunity and a danger. We could say that 1) an aura becomes less 
a property of the object and more a quality of the subject of the percep-
tion, a special sensitivity that allows this subject to perceive the world and 
works of art auratically, and 2) what is important, in this instance, is atti-
tude, the use the subjects make of their ability to look and see in each case 
(Costello, 2005). 
Let us consider for a moment a fully ‘auratic’ example: The Scream 
by Edward Munch. Curators of the Munch Museum in Oslo doubt that 
they will ever be able to repair the damage the painting suffered during 
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its theft and subsequent recovery. The board was wet in some areas, and 
the painting had deteriorated so much that it seems it will be difficult 
to ever restore its original tonalities. This example, though unfortunate, 
gives pause for thought. On the one hand, Munch is considered a careless 
and almost even negligent painter in the completion of his works, often 
considering them finished, even when they showed signs of accidental 
marks or scratches. Who knows if the painting we were familiar with was 
not the result of luck and chance, even more than artwork usually is? The 
incidence of its theft was the most passionate adventure of its entire life as 
an artistic object, beyond the boring comfort of the Norwegian museum, 
where it was held under controlled temperature, humidity, and lighting 
conditions. No one dares to question whether the event of its theft and 
recovery has been lucrative for the museum and added to the painter’s 
renown: this event is an added value to Munch’s biography and the count-
less interpretations of his work. It is comparable in some ways to the lost 
head of the Winged Victory of Samothrace and the mutilated arms of the 
Venus de Milo. 
The difference is that we have known Munch’s painting in its (rela-
tive) completeness and integrity, while these statues have reached us and 
become part of the history of art with their beautiful defects. The paint-
ing, contrary to these statues, has been copied and photographed thou-
sands of times, and had been reproduced a million times over on post-
cards, picture cards, posters, t-shirts, etc. prior to its deterioration. Thus, 
the curators must turn to these copies, born of technical reproducibility, 
in order to restore the initial appearance of the board as far as possible, 
in such a way that it will be the reproduction that will serve as proof of 
expertise in restoring the original, and not the original – now not so origi-
nal and not so suggestive of its origin, but rather, corrupted by the circum-
stances of its theft. The reproduction is therefore the guarantee of accu-
racy. In a way, the copies are now more authentic than the original itself, 
more loyal to the author’s will when he decided his work was completed. 
Munch created up to four different versions of the painting, two of which 
– not one – were stolen, in 1994 and 2004, and recovered soon after-
wards. The differences between these versions are clearly distinguish-
able, though Munch did not identify any one as superior to the others. 
Was Munch himself trying out a type of ‘serial’ process in the creation 
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of his own original work? Was he reproducing himself in a chirographic 
sense? Was Munch the first copier of The Scream? His own first pirate? 
This anecdote, to which so many equivalents can be found in the his-
tory of painting, outlines the paradox which Benjamin had to confront, 
and which must still give us pause for thought today. The paradox of a 
photograph which can unquestionably crush the aura with the disqui-
eting (but incomplete, frustrated) likeness it presents to us and with the 
(viscous, not friendly) closeness it imposes, but which is often that which 
is responsible for preserving that aura, that which testifies to something 
that the damaged original can no longer guarantee. And not only this, it is 
also responsible for feeding the aura, for exalting it: is it not true that the 
photograph of a work of art, which allows it to be reproduced in catalogs 
for museums and exhibitions, in encyclopedias, textbooks and history of 
art essays, and which has recently multiplied its dissemination and global 
circulation through the Internet, is far from an insignificant factor in the 
ever-renewed prestige, the topicality of said work? (Malraux, 1947/1978). 
Let us consider for a moment the differences between, on the 
one hand, this act of actual theft and attempted piracy (as the thieves 
undoubtedly intended to trade in the stolen work) and, on the other, an 
act of online pillaging. Obviously, we must condemn the theft or destruc-
tion of an original, which is not only a criminal act, but also an irreparable 
loss for art as an institution and heritage. But what are we to say about the 
multiplication of an original? Does it call for the same judgment? Internet 
pillaging obviously involves digital copies, rather than a unique and irre-
placeable original. And digital copies are, as we shall see, qualitatively 
different from chirographic copies: the practice of ‘secondary’ copying 
(copying in an attempt to supplant the original, to usurp its prestige) no 
longer exists. This secondarization of copying has no meaning in the digi-
tal world, as we are dealing with identical duplicates, rather than copies. 
Digital copying is a form of transportation which does not, however, move 
what has been copied from its original place, which does not seek to sup-
plant but which in any case seeks a circulation that is difficult to restrict 
(Bunz, 2007). A circulation, yes, but also a rewrite, an alteration which, 
again, does not suppose the corruption of the original. Let us suppose that 
the thieves of the Munch paintings had been a mixture of admirers and 
frustrated painters. And they had wanted to add their own brush strokes 
to the original, to in a way renew Munch, update him. It seems absurd, yes, 
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but this is what hundreds of Internet pirates are and what they do, as can 
be seen by anybody who types ‘The Scream’ into Google Images. From 
Macaulay Culkin to Homer Simpson, from Tarzan to Eric Northman 
(the latter being one of the stars of the series True Blood), from the mask 
used by the killer in the Scream saga (named, by no coincidence, after the 
Munch painting) to Senator Harry Reid – they have all been lifted by out-
side hands into the place of that anguished face, to varying degrees of suc-
cess and creativity. New faces which perhaps (coincidences of this type 
have been seen before) occupy just the spot in which the corruption of 
the canvas due to its theft and handling could be most pronounced. And 
this is in a playful way, one that does no harm to the original held in Oslo, 
which will be restored (or not) thanks to photographs. Furthermore, it is 
in a way which poses no threat either to the history of the painting (nor, 
admittedly, does it substantially improve it), or to the copyright held by 
Munch’s heirs, should there be such a thing.3 
Reproducible arts and the reproducibility of the arts 
With great insight, Benjamin defined a point of inflection not so much 
between the chirographical and technographical arts (painting and pho-
tography, respectively), but rather between arts for the purpose of produc-
ing an original and arts in which the notion of original loses value in favor 
of a multitude of ‘copies’ available to the public. The issue is not, strictly 
speaking, a matter of technology: our notion of ‘technological’ is history-
based, but, upon further reflection, chirography also requires technology, 
whether paintbrush, stage, pen, chisel, flute, or violin. An artistic genius 
has never been hindered by these more or less refined technical instru-
ments, which have allowed his or her self-expression through the model-
ing of a material, but rather, the test of his or her art has been precisely his 
or her ability to dominate the techniques required to bring imagination to 
life in the form of artwork. 
The crux of the matter lies in the development and perfection of 
technology and the skills for reproduction – all reprographic techniques, 
in the broadest sense, from the press to the laser printer, photographic, 
sound/music, cinematographic, and also broadcasting-related technolo-
gies (radio, television, video, Internet) which appear to offer a point of 
convergence or overlap with production-related technologies and skills. 
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We refer to the critical moment in which, for example, a camera points its 
lens at paintings exhibited in museums, at sculptures, at monuments and 
buildings, and thereby allows their reproduction through illustrated cards 
(Malraux, 1978), or the moment in which a musician’s live performance 
is reproduced at a distance or recorded (Szendy, 2008). 
But then, what Benjamin documents and theorizes about is precisely 
that period in the history of technology at the service of creation during 
which the line between production and reproduction blurs. Paradoxically, 
this occurs to the point where reproduction both ‘precedes’ production 
and becomes its ultimate purpose: something is produced bearing in mind 
how it will look or sound once it is reproduced and the devices, supports, 
and reproductive formats with which it will be reproduced. The creator 
is perfectly aware that of the whole he or she produces, the only part that 
counts is the part that goes on to be reproduced – let’s call it the ‘reprod-
uct’: the negatives from which positive images will be created, enlarged, 
and eventually exhibited or published; the takes that will become the final 
shots in the film; the recorded chords and vocalizations which will com-
pose the corresponding soundtrack. Meanwhile, these same reproduc-
tion techniques do not simply involve a carefully thought-out selection 
or reduction of the whole that was recorded before the camera or micro-
phone, but they also provide a mine of expressive resources which alter 
(by stylizing, hyper-realizing, dramatizing, ridiculing, cleaning, equal-
izing, synthesizing, and sampling) what has been saved on photographic 
film, motion picture reels, sound recordings, or digital archives. 
The record industry provides a clear example. Doesn’t a pop or rock 
artist compose a song or collection of songs to be recorded on an album 
in a studio where technical manipulations and virtuosities are carried 
out that are impossible during a live performance? Also, don’t we often 
yearn to adapt a live concert performance, the ‘copy’, to the recording we 
have listened to previously, our original? Even when we seek a different 
experience at the live concert, a more direct musicality, isn’t this live con-
cert itself often recorded for marketing purposes, whether as an audio 
(a music CD of the live concert) or audiovisual product (a reproducible 
DVD for viewing on the TV or computer screen)? The performance’s 
dynamics concerning time and space are subjected to the needs of the 
sound or video recordings. Just to make things even more complicated, 
isn’t this video recording projected live on giant screens for the public in 
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situ? A crowd so large that, for the majority, the only option is to watch 
the live broadcast of the performance, in this case not on television, but 
on proxivision, in a rigorously etymological sense. Isn’t it true that the live 
retransmission, in using multiple cameras and audio takes, offers a differ-
ent experience, but one which is probably richer in sound and visually 
than that enjoyed by the front-row spectator at the foot of the stage? The 
other spectator (the ambivalent one) is able to experience the real pres-
ence of the artist and his or her work (the aura?), as well as the contagious 
mood of a multitudinous congregation, all while receiving the detail and 
quality provided by audiovisual reproduction technologies. 
Nevertheless, this paradoxical precedence and preference of the 
recording or retransmission of the performance does not only occur 
in pop music. A classical music composer or performer may prefer a 
recording, i.e., performing for a recording device under favorable condi-
tions, over a live public performance. Let’s take Stravinski and Glenn 
Gould as two opposing paradigmatic cases. In the early 20th century, 
due to his concerns about the distortions that his written, perhaps inter-
preted albeit unrecorded, work could suffer at the hands of Hollywood 
(e.g., the arrangements of The Rite of Spring for Fantasia), Stravinski 
struggled between preventing such manipulation and his general disap-
proval of mechanical recordings and personally controlling said record-
ings, or in other words, of establishing an approved version of his work 
which would prevent or discredit as mere rearrangements all of those 
which, whether he liked it or not, would eventually be produced by the 
music or film industry. Conversely, Glenn Gould detested exhibiting his 
performance-based virtuosities and preferred to lock himself away in a 
recording studio and transform the production of records into his ‘art’. In 
other words, Gould decided to take advantage of the fact that technical 
reproducibility could finally separate the musical performance from the 
listening experience, after centuries of necessarily coinciding, and thus 
edit the recording that mediated between the two to create a montage of 
different performances, perhaps even recorded at different times.4 The 
same is true for music lovers: for them, it can no longer be a live perfor-
mance by the conductors Menuhin, Bernstein, or Von Karajan that they 
adore, but rather, the recordings of these performances which, without a 
doubt, create a musical experience that is different from attending a live 
performance and, in their judgment, unquestionably superior to any later 
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performance, whether recorded or live. Most likely this is due to cultural 
fetishism, fanaticism, and perhaps an excessive admiration, that repre-
sent, even amongst connoisseurs, a guarantee for technical reproduction: 
the recorded performance, experienced and enjoyed strictly as such, 
becomes the standard for excellence of any other performance, whether 
recorded or live. 
Benjamin was precociously aware of this major aspect of 20th-cen-
tury culture, society, and technology, which opens up a joyful, or at least 
hopeful, perspective, precisely in the mid-1930s, a time when culture, 
society, and technology offered little in the way of hope. Furthermore, 
Benjamin also seems to propose, often between the lines, that technical 
reproducibility, which in a certain sense corrupts originality and the aura, 
is capable of relocating and reconstructing this elsewhere, perhaps at the 
receptor’s end – but let us not get ahead of ourselves. The main point 
is that Benjamin advocates the intimacy and mutual support that exists 
between productive and reproductive technologies, as well as the initial 
impact this undoubtedly has on the diffusion, circulation, and (surely) 
ownership of the work of art. 
From re-product to post-product 
Let us take a step forward: what happens in the case of digital works of 
art? As noted by Michael Betancourt: 
Every digital reproduction is identical to every other; digital 
objects are stored as a form of information, rather than limited 
as physical objects inherently are; thus the digital state can be 
understood as a form of instrumental language – instructions 
for executing the ‘retrieval’ that is a specific digital (art) work. 
(2006: para. 9) 
Digital objects are radically different from physical objects. Betancourt 
distinguishes between a ‘digital object’ materially present to our senses 
and a ‘digital work,’ i.e., ‘a series of binary signals recorded by a machine 
and requiring a machine to render this unseen “code” readable to humans’. 
This separation between the digital file in binary code form, which is lim-
itlessly copyable, and its effective retrieval using a device which displays 
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it in the form of a still or moving image, or as text, music, or whatever, is 
a way of resurrecting the aura – the ‘aura of the information’, in this case. 
While the material aspects of the digital work appear to be characterized 
as ephemeral, lasting no longer than the phenomenological encounter 
with its presentation, the aura of information suggests that the digital 
itself transcends physical form: the digital work as immortal. An immor-
tality that is no longer associated with the uniqueness of an original which 
acts as a warranty for all its copies, but with precisely the proliferation 
of identical instances. A digital master which lives on in the successive 
textual bodies in which it materializes, across different spaces (surfaces of 
expression) and times (the evolution of digital technologies in both hard-
ware and software). 
It is a paradoxical aura, which resides in a reproducible binary code 
that is limitlessly copyable (although illegible to humans) and that, 
depending upon the device in which it is embodied, makes its effective 
presentation contingent, ephemeral. Moreover, it is, as Betancourt notes, 
an aura that separates physical materiality from the context of the tradi-
tion in which it was produced and, instead, highlights both the contexts 
of its effective reception and, further still, those of its use, as envisaged by 
Benjamin. It is an aura which makes sacred the digital but not the digi-
talized, as this use often anticipates – and even encourages – the transfor-
mation of what is received: manipulation of the basic binary code. This 
creates an obvious problem with accumulation and intellectual property: 
access must be regulated, more so than ownership. And once access has 
been regulated, the conditions of the derived work must be established. 
Now, we are not only dealing with the confusion between production 
and reproduction, but also between reception and postproduction. Let us 
look at some examples: 
1) Music fans not only play the tracks of an acquired product as often as 
they like, they can also select their favorite songs, rename and recompile 
them at will, producing a new, if unedited, set of tracks, or even edit or 
sample them, post-producing the product to create personalized listen-
ing on a CD or an MP3 player’s playlist. This practice, which became 
known in the industry as ‘sampling’ in the 1950s (with sampler albums 
being compilations of various artists from the same label), is now a pre-
rogative of the listener. But the concept went from being an anthology of 
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tracks to being the creation of a new tune through mixing existing tracks, 
something which is also within reach of the user. Two or three tunes 
would be mixed to produce a musical mashup, a hitherto-unheard mix 
of previously released and recognizable tunes.5 Video clips are another 
format much favored by the fans of singers and groups, as well as (on the 
crossover) by lovers of audiovisual creation. There are, of course, ‘official’ 
clips, but there are also anime music videos (AMV), an entire category 
of alternative clips, and amateur clips, as well as a universe of home-
produced clips which employ images from highly diverse sources set to 
music, ranging from tributes to the most outrageous parodies. There are 
also lip-dubs (or mass motion sequence shots with playbacks of hit songs) 
in which members of a collective generally choreograph a routine around 
a song.6 And new categories of music videos are being created all the time, 
driven by emulation and even competition. Listeners are transformed into 
arrangers, their instruments come between the instruments (the ‘musical’ 
instruments) used for production, the competent performers thereof, and 
their own listening. Is this, then, an interposition or a continuity of said 
instruments? 
2) Painting enthusiasts can download an image from the Internet or scan 
a printed copy, modify, rename or label it at will, thereby appropriating it 
(without necessarily avoiding any reference to the ‘original’). The afore-
mentioned painting by Munch is available on the Internet in hundreds of 
different ways, as we have pointed above, with hundreds of variations on 
the subject, whether they be for the better or for the worse. Photo enthu-
siasts act similarly, using photographs taken by others or from an image 
bank and applying computer graphics to these materials. The humoris-
tic dimension of these collage techniques is self-conscious, as if the cre-
ators want to insure that the process of ‘cut and paste’ underlying the joke 
remains evident. Interactive humor, funny photos, maniphotos, phanima-
tion, celebrity soundboards, and PowerPoint humor are recently coined 
words describing these techniques (Shifman, 2007). 
3) Movie-buffs and home moviemakers not only play movies and make 
home videos or DVDs, they also edit, add sound, dub, insert subtitles 
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or signs, visual or sound effects, and design their own trailers. It is also 
popular to compile anthologies of favorite scenes, organized by direc-
tor, actor, genre, or subject.7 A host of ad hoc terms is already in circula-
tion to describe all this audiovisual productivity on the part of the user: 
synchros, i.e., split screens with windows showing simultaneous actions 
viewed at different points in time;8 recaps, i.e., summaries of a TV sea-
son, for example, using a selection of dramatic highlights, often with a 
voiceover or explanatory subtitles to link the scenes together;9 unofficial 
trailers; alternative endings; interstitial stories which ‘fill in’ the gaps of 
another product (what did so-and-so from such-and-such series do during 
the missing two years?); spoilers, or unauthorized previews of an essen-
tial element of the plot or its denouement, some rather tongue-in-cheek;10 
false trailers for non-existent films, or trailers in which the sound, logos, or 
montage paradoxically change the genre of a well-known film; and home-
made clips at the boundary between the music and the video industry, 
made by amateurs. 
4) Readers of e-books, or of digitalized literary texts in general, show a 
tendency toward underlining, annotating, and criticizing these texts. This 
is obviously nothing new: we readers have been doing so since the dawn 
of writing. What characterizes the current time is the obsession with shar-
ing these selected quotes, impressions, comments, and comparisons with 
other earlier or later texts by adding to the original, thus extending and 
diffusing them. The task of Google Books to digitalize all the books in the 
world is complemented by the joint, collective, but no less titanic task of 
giving these books their commentary, their replica, their gloss. In the most 
elaborate cases, even with parodies, sequels, and prequels, this can mean 
picking up threads which are intimated but not developed, or following 
up with secondary characters who are relegated but show promise. 
5) First, bloggers (more selective) and then social networkers (more fre-
quent and usual), the apex of this electronic Babel, combine the aforemen-
tioned multimedia skills and multiply circulation. We are dealing with 
telematic activity and interactions between individuals and groups that 
do not simply feed off a product, but moreover, off a productivity that is in 
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a process of continuous construction and acquires a precarious stability at 
the moment in which it is accessed, only to be modified the next time, by 
our hand or by that of another. Furthermore, the increasingly advanced 
skills involved in browsing, production, postproduction, and circulating 
all these different kinds of files give rise to a tidal wave of user-generated 
content which encroaches upon all the aforementioned media (music, 
illustration, photography, animation, audiovisual productions, written 
texts, etc.) and sets them working synergistically through transmedia fic-
tional universes which are as complex as they are, quite consistently, joint 
and collaborative.11 
All of this does not strictly enter the dominion of the habitual Internet 
user; it also falls within the still institutionalized artistic practices them-
selves – in other words, the fields of literary, plastic, cinematographic, or 
musical arts – which have replicated this vast (post)productivity of the 
‘sampler’ (Bourriaud, 2005) or ‘remixer’ (Manovich, 2005) in their works. 
Thus: product, re-product and, finally, co-product? post-product? trans-
product? e-product? A product which is not only in transit, but is being 
remade while it transits and because it transits. Said digital transit, then, 
represents the happy encounter of the aura of an origin with the imprint 
of the reproduction, as discerned by Benjamin. All this is accompanied 
by the successive imprints of multiple reproductions which will keep on 
coming, one after the other. Of course, some will only be reproduced as 
streamings, downloads, or copy-and-pastes of an identical digital master, 
but others will be veritable edits, as authentic author-izations: the auctor, 
in the etymological sense, was the person who augmented (augmentation 
and author come from augere, to increase, also giving rise, in a way, to 
author-ize).12 
Strictly speaking, more than being confusing, what production/repro-
duction and reception/postproduction do is share, to a great extent, the 
same instruments and same actions. Acclaimed musicians, moviemakers, 
videographers, press editors, publicists, and plastic artists increasingly 
and decisively practice the technique of presenting the Internet-based 
public, sometimes organized into very active communities, their partial 
or completed works for the purpose of receiving feedback, reactions, pro-
posals, collaboration – all user-generated content (Jenkins, 2006b). Lev 
Manovich questions whether, in this digital era, culture will not end up 
being divided into discrete units designed to be copied and integrated 
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within larger modules, like LEGO bricks. Blocks which contain all of the 
information required in order to be easily attached to others, to be adapted 
to facilitate this attachment, and also to record, at any given moment, 
the historical sequence of loans which, as a whole, result in the product 
as it stands. Bricks which, moreover, are displayed in a quasi-unlimited 
showcase in such a way that users can endorse them and express their 
support for the changing contents. In other words, he foretells a ‘cultural 
modularity’ in which, paradoxically a priori, there is no minimum delim-
ited vocabulary (given that the modular seems to require a finite series of 
minimal units, the combination of which results in an exponential vari-
ety). This modularity does not reduce the total number of units to be com-
bined, but rather, it allows the modification of each unit during each use, 
thereby guaranteeing an innovative final result (Manovich, 2005). 
From the DJs of the 1980s to the current geeks who remix and fine-
tune cultural products that are in circulation, such as photographs, songs, 
films, television series, videogames, and their corresponding promotional 
subproducts (trailers, clips, promos, etc.) and return them to the Internet, 
edited but remixable (lip-dubs, mashups, public movies), all the fan cul-
ture in general assumes a modular logic (Jenkins, 2006a, 2006b). These 
interventions are, to a great extent, ironic and parodic (Shifman, 2007). 
On the one hand, they recognize (and do not try to hide) this assembly of 
preformed parts, citations, allusions, and intertextual gestures, and on the 
other, they give value to a democratized creativity of diffuse and jointly-
owned authorship.13
From experience to experiment 
Recently, cultural objects in their most noble form seem to aim to be 
‘appropriated’ by the reader, listener, or spectator, not only as the object 
of their contemplation, but also as an operation; not only as an experi-
ence, but also as an experiment. They are definitely more open to being 
manipulated and handled; they offer a moment of reading, listening, or 
contemplating, surely, while at the same time, there is an invitation to 
write, compose, and design, to implicate oneself through participation 
and co-production. In addition, we could say that modern technologies 
which act as the means of support for cultural goods – literature, painting, 
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film, music – have substantially modified our way of understanding how 
to deal with them. 
Cultural experience was, before, a circumscribed activity, exclusively 
applied to an object, and therefore intense and almost always intimate. 
Meanwhile, today, a valued cultural experience is one that does not seem 
to fix its attention on one particular point, unraveling it in detail, but 
rather, it follows a trajectory which jumps from one point to another, stop-
ping at any specific point only long enough to gather momentum to move 
on to the next interconnected point. It’s not a matter of diving down into 
the depths to recover a hidden, though identified, treasure, but rather, it is 
one of quickly surfing along the surface’s intermittently emergent crests, 
which may crash over us and swallow us up if we stop too long.14 
If we look closely, this is precisely how Internet works, with a hyper-
textuality that mines (or contaminates or sows) each text with links that 
lead to all kinds of other texts, inviting us to jump from one to another 
without having even, perhaps, finished reading the text displayed before 
us, and which is already disappearing from view (although always recov-
erable) in our search for another which grabs our attention, and so on. 
This same experience of connection is what hierarchizes Google searches: 
the list of results is not ordered so much according to how many times 
the word we are searching for appears in the text, but rather, according 
to how many documents are linked to the text we are presumably search-
ing for, and which will therefore prove to be the most useful to us, pre-
cisely because these are the most connected documents on the Internet. 
Therefore, these documents have the most interconnections between 
pieces of knowledge that form a series which is practically infinite, but 
which is especially broad and attractive at certain points (Battelle, 2006). 
In today’s panorama, a heterogeneous public is presented with an 
elaborated, but as yet unfinished and open-ended, product, presented 
both as a ‘figure’, and as the possibility for ‘configuration’; as finished 
pieces, and as an instruction manual for building something previously 
unknown, foreseen but not present. Enjoyment of the product is achieved 
not so much through mere contemplation, but rather, by creating a fin-
ished product, albeit it a provisional one, as there always exists the pos-
sibility of recovering the original condition and opting for a different 
reconstruction – a finished product. The placement of an ‘order’, to the 
contrary of what occurred during times of patronage, does not happen at 
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the beginning of the work, but upon its completion; it is not an order from 
a client to a cultural producer, but rather, from the cultural producer to 
the client, who appropriates the work not merely by purchasing it as part 
of a lot identical to one acquired by many other buyers, but by finishing 
it through an appropriation which is not strictly commercial in nature 
and which presupposes (and this is the essence of the business) the cli-
ent’s access to similar instruments used in its production by the issuing 
entity. This is the case with many current artistic approaches which take 
the idea of ‘open work’ to its ultimate consequences, not only as regards 
interpretative closure (mental), but also regarding physical participa-
tion and intervention (interactive installations, video art), and involving 
entertainment-related technologies (karaoke, videogames, virtual reality, 
video game consoles) and, in general, cultural experiences in which digi-
tization, interactive computerization, and advanced interfaces intervene. 
If we include connection to the Internet, this opening-up of the process 
is multiplied exponentially, and it is even more evident that 1) reception 
and consumption are potentially creative (and digital platforms actively 
promote this creative participation), 2) this user-generated content circu-
lates freely, open to new creative reappropriations, and 3) the increase in 
culture owned by others neither undermines nor threatens our own, but 
rather reinforces it through cooperative exchanges (Creative Commons 
and copyleft licenses, P2P protocols for file sharing, circulation of free 
software, etc.). 
If, as Morin yearned for in the 1960s, the cultural industry were to 
consist of a collection of mechanisms and operations through which cul-
tural creation was transformed into production, then the new paradigm 
of production, which transfers completion and even endorsement of the 
productive process to the reception of the product itself by a multitude of 
possible destinations (perhaps partially predetermined, but with a great 
degree of uncertainty nevertheless), should be christened with a name 
that accounts for this mutation (Rodríguez-Ferrándiz, 2011). Terms such 
as postproduction (Bourriaud, 2005), remixability or software culture 
(Manovich, 2005), mass self-communication (Castells, 2009), amongst 
others, have been proposed and already circulate. The old pairs of cre-
ation/enjoyment or production/consumption are insufficient and fail to 
consider the complexity of the situation. 
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Conclusions 
Since Benjamin, we have become used to speaking of an author’s work as 
a production, and of the cultural industry as offering reproductions which 
lack the aura of an original that was directly manipulated by its author. 
This was a prerogative of cultural production over other types of indus-
trial manufacturing: no one would even think of considering a soft drink 
can or an automobile off a Ford-type assembly line as either a reproduc-
tion or a copy, but rather as a product (Lash & Urry, 1994). However, we 
do so with books, records, DVDs, or the publishing of pictorial works. We 
have already observed that Benjamin was precisely aware of how pho-
tographic or cinematographic copies jeopardized the notion of original. 
And we have observed how digital reproducibility extends and radical-
izes this tendency by definitively shattering the hierarchy of original then 
copy, by consecrating digital files as auratic treasures which are no less 
valuable for having been reproduced and copied, and which are, at the 
same time, open to recreative manipulation, open to use (and abuse). 
In brief, what we have explored here is the extension of the phenom-
ena: not only do production and reproduction converge, but they both 
also converge with reception and postproduction. Not only is production 
carried out bearing in mind reproduction, but it also depends on recep-
tion and postproduction. Nevertheless, it is not merely a matter of the 
lector in fabula or the spectator in spectaculo, in other words, prefiguring 
the model receptor in the text. The intended receptor is not only contem-
plative, but also participative: he or she must be capable of intervening 
in, manipulating, and (provisionally) finishing the product. Therefore, 
it is not a matter of merely acquiring the product (a possessive piracy, as 
in the accumulative logic of libraries, record or video collections, which 
are often inactive and inert – ROM, HD, or downloading logic, by the 
person accumulating the material just in case there’s time later to watch, 
read, or listen to it, who foresees enjoyment but might not be able to ful-
fill this desire). Rather, it is a matter of doing something with it, a piracy 
which does not just involve collecting treasures, but reminting the coins, 
adding the pirate’s own stamp, and making them available to others by 
recirculating them, for free, a type of piracy which conciliates appropria-
tion and conviviality – RAM, access and streaming logic by someone who 
does actually watch, listen, or read what he or she acquires, and does not 
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merely accumulate for accumulation’s sake, but enjoys the material. It is 
this enjoyment that produces a comment, a recommendation, a critique 
or an intervention – the (authorized) consumer as postproducer, to para-
phrase, once again, Walter Benjamin. 
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Notes
1  ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ was written in 
1936, but not translated into English until 1969, in a book edited by Hannah 
Arendt, Illuminations (Benjamin, 1969: 217–251). That was the year of the 
Berlin Olympics, Picasso’s ‘Guernica’, Riefenstahl’s ‘Triumph of the Will’ 
and Chaplin’s ‘Modern Times’ – in other words, when old technologies were 
new. Benjamin’s work has yielded a vast bibliography over the past 20 years, 
particularly after the publication of The Arcades Project (Benjamin, 1999b). 
Many relevant works can be found in the article by Isenberg (2001), while 
New German Critique magazine has devoted several issues to the author: 17 
(1979), 39 (1986), and 83 (2001). With regard to technical reproducibility in 
Benjamin, see Buck-Morss (1989), Carroll (1998), Kaufman (2002), Koepnick 
(2002) and several essays in Gumbrecht and Marrinan (2003) and Patt (2001). 
2  One such occasion, which predates that quoted, is his ‘Little History of 
Photography’ (1931/1999: 507–530), with the other two – subsequent 
– occasions being ‘On some motifs in Baudelaire’ (1939/1968: 155-200), 
particularly Epigraph XI, and some of the texts by the convulte J (Baudelaire) 
of The Arcades Project (1999b: 228-386), which date from a similar period to 
the aforementioned text (between 1937 and 1940). 
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3  Umberto Eco devotes several chapters of The Limits of Interpretation to 
both serials of a work (#5 ‘Interpreting Serials’) and forgeries (#12 ‘Fakes 
and Forgeries’; Eco, 1994). While Munch’s serials are similar to what Eco 
describes in the case of De Chirico (non-identical copies by the author which 
are but slight variations on the same theme), the ‘textual poachers’ we are 
dealing with, whether analog (Jenkins, 1992) or digital (Jenkins, 2006b), 
practice an intertextuality which does not seek to plagiarize, falsify, or 
supplant, but rather, to play. 
4  Gould argued that one should be free to ‘edit’ a sonata by Beethoven 
or a fugue by Bach, cut into it unrestrictedly and apply post-production 
techniques: ‘[I]n this way the composer, the performer and, particularly, the 
listener, would be better served’ (Gould, 1990: 359). In fact, as Gould himself 
would admit, the Fugue in A minor from volume I of The Well-Tempered 
Clavier included in the record edited by CBS does not correspond to a unique 
recording of his, but is a rearrangement of two different recordings.
5  Riders on the Storm by The Doors and Billy Jean by Michael Jackson are 
mashed up here, in Billy Jean on the Storm: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=BMLFrwK7EYA. 
6  One such example is the University of Quebec, with I Gotta Feeling by the 
Black Eyed Peas: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-zcOFN_VBVo.
7  Selected fragments of the entire film catalog of Quentin Tarantino:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bdovgjn7BY&feature=related.  
See also The murder scenes, one after the other, in The Sopranos: http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhFeZZflUj4.
8  Using the film Elephant by Gus Van Sant, for example, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=HZ7aAuGukps.
9  Such as the 6th season of Lost: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=AOHVuJC1o1Y. See also this recap of The Sopranos: http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=AsgRwxx7au0.
10  Like this from the Fine Brothers: ‘100 Movie Spoilers in 5 Minutes’. Pared-
down economic resources employed with a fine irony: http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=hN5avIvylDw.
11  In other words, so-called transmedia storytelling, which is described as 
the professional strategy for producing (and promoting) industrial culture 
(Jenkins, 2006a; Scolari, 2009) consisting of expanding a fictional universe 
through different media (film, TV, comics, books) and platforms (blogs, 
forums, wikis, social networks), has its replica in the tactics of users, who 
create an entire parallel and complementary narrative, colonizing the 
unoccupied narrative spaces, the virgin lands of this universe. Television 
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series such as Lost (ABC, 2001-2006) and True Blood (HBO, 2008-), among 
many others, and also franchises of publishing or movie origin (Harry Potter, 
Lord of the Rings, Pirates of the Caribbean) have not only been expanded 
through different media and platforms, but have also stimulated creativity 
in the form of user-generated content. Production teams have often reused, 
in terms of narrative, what was originally amateur content submitted free 
of charge online. Three consequences can be highlighted of this strategy-
tactics mix in transmedia storytelling: 1) the potential for enjoyment which 
can be generated by this way of audiences viewing, understanding, and 
participating; 2) audiences’ increased skills and abilities for transmedia 
surfing; and 3) the adoption and adaptation of the logic of games into mass-
media fiction, so that fictions are a place not only of contemplative and 
essentially passive enjoyment, but also of active enjoyment which demands 
working with the products, circulating them, enriching them, connecting 
them with other fictional universes – a tendency toward resolving them 
like a game. 
12  Let us note that almost all of the definitions of digital piracy in circulation 
(OED, Webster’s, Wikipedia) stress that it is the unauthorized reproduction 
or use of something, such as a book, recording, computer program, film, etc. 
It is paradoxical that condemnation of unauthorized copies now has little to 
do with the actual author who is being copied and more to do with the entity 
that holds the rights (the publishing house, record label, film distributor). And, 
by contrast, that the person who challenges this authority often becomes 
the author (let’s say aug-men-tor) of the author, in that etymological sense of 
augmenting or extending an existing work without thereby corrupting it or 
seeking to arrogate ownership or rights. The condemnation of digital piracy 
indiscriminately lumps together the action of pirates who trade commercially 
with works subject to copyright and the action of users who appropriate the 
work to recreate it, augment it, give it new meaning and a new direction, and 
then share their product. To identify such piracy, which is often non-venal 
transit and recreation, with theft – as is done in an unskippable anti-piracy 
film included in some movie DVDs – is unfair. 
13  An urgent question must be raised at this point. It would be naive to ignore 
the fact that the percentage of users who effectively participate creatively in 
this postproductivity is, while growing, relatively small. Manovich provides 
a pertinent figure: in 2007, only between 0.5 and 1.5% of users of the 
most popular sites classified as social media (Flickr, YouTube, Wikipedia) 
contributed with their own content. But for the same year, research 
conducted by Michael Wesch shows that commercially produced videos 
comprised only 14% of YouTube content, with the remaining 86% made 
up of user-generated content. Small but highly active communities drive 
much of this. An added complication, noted by Manovich (2008): how to 
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draw the dividing line between professional and amateur products? Is it that 
professionals cannot imitate the ‘carelessness’, the homemade touch of regular 
users? Is it that industry professionals (software or hardware manufacturers, 
Internet or mobile phone service providers, the companies behind the social 
media) cannot hide what they are, but use contributions to promote profitable 
traffic to these pages? 
14  By the mid-1930s, Benjamin was already speaking of that disconcerting mix 
between the voracity of cultural and aesthetic stimuli from the public, and (at 
the same time) the inconstancy, impatience, and dispersed average attention 
span: ‘The film makes the cult value recede in to the background not only 
by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at 
the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but 
an absent-minded one’ (1969: 240-241). Not only do we find the urgency of 
pronouncing an opinion here (a non-expert but nevertheless firm opinion), but 
also the will to participate, for now, in the print culture: 
For centuries a small number of writers were confronted by many thou-
sands of readers. This changed toward the end of the last century. With the 
increasing extension of the press, which kept placing new political, religious, 
scientific, professional, and local organs before the readers, an increasing 
number of readers became writers – at first, occasional ones. It began with the 
daily press opening to its readers space for ‘letters to the editor’. And today 
there is hardly a gainfully employed European who could not, in principle, 
find an opportunity to publish somewhere or other comments on his work, 
grievances, documentary reports, or that sort of thing. Thus, the distinction 
between author and public is about to lose its basic character. The difference 
becomes merely functional; it may vary from case to case. At any moment the 
reader is ready to turn into a writer. (Benjamin: 1969: 231-232) 
 See Eiland (2003) on these aspects of Benjamin’s work. 
CHAPTER 17
The Gestural Image: The Selfie, Photography 
Theory and Kinaesthetic Sociability
Paul Frosh
A selfie, whatever else it might be, is usually a photograph: a pictorial 
image produced by a camera.1 This banal observation informs wide-
spread understandings of the selfie as a cultural category: ‘A photograph 
that one has taken of oneself’ (Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year, 
2013: 1). Yet despite the selfie’s obvious photographic provenance, little 
scholarly research has drawn systematically on the intellectual resource 
most closely associated with the aesthetics of its host medium: photog-
raphy theory.
In a way this is unsurprising. The selfie is the progeny of digital net-
works. Its distinctiveness from older forms of self-depiction seems to 
derive from non-representational changes: innovations in distribution, 
storage and metadata that are not directly concerned with the produc-
tion or aesthetic design of images. As the 2013 Oxford Dictionaries 
definition continues, the selfie is typically ‘taken with a smartphone or 
webcam and uploaded to a social media website’. It is these innovations 
that are thought to distinguish the selfie: ‘Instantaneous distribution of 
an image via Instagram and similar social networks is what makes the 
phenomenon of the selfie significantly different from its earlier photo-
graphic precursors’ (Tifentale, 2014: 11).
Recent research on transformations in personal photography in gen-
eral has been largely provoked by these non-representational develop-
ments (Lasén and Gómez Cruz, 2009; Lister, 2013; Nightingale, 2007). 
Their influence has even prompted Gómez Cruz and Meyer (2012) to 
proclaim the arrival of a new, ‘fifth moment’ in photography history. And 
where aesthetic developments are foregrounded, they too appear to be 
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driven by device functions not principally concerned with image produc-
tion or design. Hence the immediacy, ephemerality and incessant perfor-
mativity of contemporary everyday photographs are primarily explained 
with reference to the combined ubiquity, mobility and connectivity of 
smartphone devices (Murray, 2008; Van Dijck, 2008; Van House, 2011). 
Once non-representational technological changes are made ana-
lytically pre-eminent, what role remains for an aesthetically-oriented 
and medium-specific intellectual tradition like photography theory? In 
fact, the recent prominence of non-representational practices echoes a 
recurrent tension in photography theory that has long divided scholars: 
between an ‘ontological’ commitment to the (largely semiotic) ‘essence’ of 
the medium, which tends to privilege the discrete photographic image as 
an object of aesthetic analysis, and historical conceptualizations of pho-
tography as a fluctuating constellation of different devices, material cul-
tural practices, and representational forms (Batchen, 1997). This tension 
between aesthetic object and socio-technical practice is even evident in 
two of the adjective-noun compounds recently coined in contemporary 
photography theory itself: the networked image (Rubinstein and Sluis, 
2008) and algorithmic photography (Uricchio, 2011).
The selfie affords a productive vantage point on this tension. On the 
one hand it appears to constitute an aesthetic and representational inno-
vation in everyday photography, potentially offering a degree of resis-
tance to non-representational emphases (similar claims could be made 
for popular applications like Instagram and Hipstamatic). Moreover, 
as a photographic genre, it invites attention to the pictorial conventions 
underpinning generic identity: after all, one cannot recognize an image 
as a selfie without looking at what it represents.2 Yet as with genre more 
broadly, representational criteria alone are insufficient (Mittell, 2001). 
Understanding that a particular image is a selfie (rather than just a photo-
graph of, say, a face) requires viewers to make inferences about the non-
depictive technocultural conditions in which the image was made (Frosh, 
2001). It requires, among other things, that these viewers have been ade-
quately socialized through having seen, taken or heard tell of selfies.
The selfie thus foregrounds representational change while putting 
the very term ‘representation’ in quotation marks as a contingent variable. 
This makes it a timely ‘theoretical object’ (Verhoeff, 2009), a concrete 
phenomenon that is good to think with about contemporary photography 
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and representation in general. The selfie prompts us to ask how it can be 
explained using concepts fashioned to illuminate the traditional aesthet-
ics of photography, and how it might reconfigure those concepts to forge 
new directions for theorizing both photography and digital culture.
In what follows, then, I propose to animate the conceptual fecundity 
of the selfie by engineering some brief encounters with a number of terms 
in photography theory: indexicality, composition and reflection. Together 
these encounters will weave an argument – perhaps surprising, given its 
emergence from a visually-oriented body of thought – that the selfie is a 
‘gestural image’, and that we should not understand its aesthetics purely 
in visual terms. Rather, selfies conspicuously integrate still images into a 
techno-cultural circuit of corporeal social energy, which I will call ‘kin-
aesthetic sociability’. This circuit connects the bodies of individuals, their 
mobility through physical and informational spaces, and the micro-bodily 
hand and eye movements they use to operate digital interfaces.  
Indexicality
Indexicality is the conceptual bedrock of traditional photography theory. 
Based on Peirce’s notion of the index as a sign that stands for its object 
through physical or causal connection, it designates the sense that photog-
raphy is distinctive because what it depicts had, necessarily, to be located 
in front of the camera at the moment the photograph was taken. The pho-
tograph is described as an ‘emanation’ (Barthes, 2000) of the referent, or a 
‘quotation’ (Sontag, 1977) from reality, since it is produced by light-sensi-
tive material reacting to the light reflected from the spatio-temporal field 
exposed before the lens. 
The supposed loss of photographic indexicality in a putative ‘post-
photographic’ era of digital image simulation was loudly debated in the 
1990s (Mitchell, 1992; Robins, 1996). Recent revisions question the 
simple analogue-digital binary, with claims that the substitution of photo-
electronic and computational processes for photochemical and darkroom 
ones need not have eroded – though it may subtly have altered – photog-
raphy’s indexical quality (Soderman, 2007). 
Given this intellectual commotion, what can we learn from the selfie 
about photographic indexicality that has not already been said? Two 
things: first, that the selfie as an index is less the trace of a reality imprinted 
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on the photograph than of an action enacted by a photographer; second, 
that the selfie exploits indexicality in favour of connective performance 
rather than semantic reference. These two things are intertwined, and 
they reconfigure photography in relation to distinct dimensions of indexi-
cality that are often fused, which Doane (2007) calls ‘index as trace’ and 
‘index as deixis’ (see also Niessen, 2011). The former dominates tra-
ditional photography theory, casting the photograph as equivalent to a 
footprint in the sand: a material trace or imprint created by ‘contact’ with 
its object, the photograph foregrounds the temporal relation of pastness 
with its original event. Yet Doane claims that ‘index as deixis’ is equally 
important. Deixis is the pointing finger, directing attention onto a present 
object: as Barthes says, ‘the Photograph is never anything but an antiphon 
of “Look”, “See”, “Here it is”’. (Barthes, 2000: 5). The connection to deic-
tic language – ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and personal pronouns ‘I’, ‘you’ 
etc. – is especially revealing. These terms acquire sense in reference to 
a present context of discourse which constantly changes: where ‘here’ is 
altered from one execution to another. The index as deixis operates in the 
temporality of the mutable present, rather than of the salvaged past. 
Like much everyday digital photography the selfie tips the balance 
between these forms of indexicality. The advent of photography as a 
‘live’ medium, utilizing digital networks to connect interlocutors in space 
rather than in time, brings it closer to a conversational practice that draws 
images and their referents into the immediate moment of discursive inter-
action (which applications like WhatsApp and especially Snapchat both 
promote and exploit). It also turns the temporal oscillation of the photo-
graph as trace (Durand, 1993) – between the ‘now’ of viewing and the 
‘then’ of the depicted scene – into a spatial oscillation between a proxi-
mal ‘here’ and a distal ‘there’. The selfie is a form of relational positioning 
between the bodies of viewed and viewers in a culture of individualized 
mobility, where one’s ‘here’ and another’s ‘there’ are mutually connected 
but perpetually shifting (Garcia-Montes et al., 2006). It continually 
remolds an elastic, mediated spatial envelope for corporeal sociability.
But the selfie does more than this: it deploys both the index as trace 
and as deixis to foreground the relationship between the image and its 
producer, since its producer and referent are identical. It says not only 
‘see this, here, now’, but ‘see me showing you me’. It points to the per-
formance of a communicative action rather than to an object, and is a 
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trace of that performance. This performance is embodied. As Jerry Saltz 
observes: ‘…selfies are nearly always taken from within an arm’s length of 
the subject. For this reason the cropping and composition of selfies are 
very different from those of all preceding self-portraiture. There is the 
near-constant visual presence of one of the photographer’s arms, typically 
the one holding the camera’ (Saltz, 2014: 4). 
The selfie, then, is the culmination and also the incarnation of a ges-
ture of mediation. It is an observable ‘sensory-inscription’ (Farman, 2012) 
of the body in and through technological means. The body is inscribed in 
part into an already existing order of interpersonal signification – gestures 
have meanings in face-to-face interactions – but it is also inscribed as a fig-
ure for mediation itself:  it is simultaneously mediating (the outstretched 
arm executes the taking of the selfie) and mediated (the outstretched arm 
becomes a legible and iterable sign within selfies – of, among other things, 
the ‘selfieness’ of the image). In order to understand more about how the 
selfie communicates this sensory inscription, another term needs to be 
brought into play.
Composition
Visual composition usually refers to the arrangement of elements within 
the space of a picture and their orientation to the position of the viewer 
(Kress and van Leeuwen, 2004: 181). One key feature of conventional 
photographic composition that remained relatively unchanged across 
the analog-digital divide is the spatial separation between photographed 
objects and the photographer’s body. The depicted scene is produced 
from a position behind the camera, a position almost always occupied 
by the photographer and subsequently adopted by the viewer. Although 
there is a venerable history of photographic self-portraiture (Lingwood, 
1986), literally ‘putting oneself in the picture’ (Spence, 1986) relies on 
technological ‘work-arounds’ like timers or remote control devices, the 
use of reflective surfaces, or a human proxy. Taking a conventional photo-
graph means, as a rule, not being in it.
This ‘backstage’ of image-production generates a linear gaze through 
the apparatus of the camera towards those being photographed. It also 
encourages a directorial performance of spatial evacuation: photogra-
phers shooing unwanted objects off-frame as potential interferences. 
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Traditional camera design and use – of both analogue and digital devices 
– means that the camera is not just a machine for making pictures: it is 
a barrier between visible photographed spaces and undepicted locations 
of photographing and viewing. Composition, the integration of elements 
together ‘into a meaningful whole’ (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2004: 181), 
is thus based on a foundational cleavage between seeing and being seen, 
directing others and being (com)posed. Such compositional separation 
tends to underpin asymmetrical power-relations between viewer and 
viewed (Beloff, 1983; Frosh, 2001; but see Rose, 2010 on the complexity 
of these relations), drawing its scripts from broader disciplinary ‘scopic’ 
regimes shaping social relations (Jay, 1988; Sekula, 1989; Tagg, 1988).3 
Three features of smartphone design enable the selfie to challenge 
this spatio-representational segregation: they can be held and operated 
relatively easily by one hand, they display an image of the pre-photo-
graphic scene large enough to be viewed at arm’s length, and the inclusion 
of front- and back-facing cameras. The first consequence of this challenge 
is that the photographing self is easily integrated into the depiction. The 
space of photographic production/enunciation is effortlessly unified with 
the space of the picture itself, and not photographing oneself as part of 
an event or scene becomes an aesthetic, social, political and moral choice 
(Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014; Becker, 2013) rather than a sine qua non of 
the photographic act. Group-selfies are particularly striking examples of 
this transformation, where the photographer is usually at the forefront of 
a mass of faces and bodies, visibly participating in the process of compos-
ing the image as it is taken.4
Additionally, the unified space of production and depiction becomes a 
field of embodied inhabitation. The camera becomes quite literally incor-
porated, part of a hand-camera assemblage, whose possibilities and limi-
tations are mutually determined by technical photographic parameters 
(available light, field of view, angle, etc.) and the physical potential and 
constraints of the human body. The most important embodied constella-
tion consists of 1) moving one’s outstretched arm holding the smartphone 
or tablet at a calculated angle before the face or body, 2) the sensorimo-
tor co-adjustment of those body parts which are to be photographed 
(frequently the face and neck, and 3) the visual and spatial coordination 
of these two in composing the image to be taken via the device’s screen. 
The very term ‘composition’ is reconfigured through this constellation. To 
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‘com-pose’ acquires a hyphen: no longer does it refer to the arrangement of 
elements in a representation whose origin it hides, but to the act of posing 
together, mutually emplacing the photographing body and the depicted 
figure (the famous Oscars Ellen DeGeneres shot). The dominant figura-
tion of the body shifts from the still, invisibly-directed pose of others in 
traditional everyday photography, to the dynamic, visible, self-animated 
gestural action of limbs and faces in selfies. That the body is both the plat-
form and the limitation of this new kind of self-depiction is evident from 
the deliberately extreme examples of photographic pyrotechnics assem-
bled by projects like the ‘Selfie Olympics’, as well as in reflexive images of 
oneself taking a selfie.5
These ‘athletic’ examples remind us that taking selfies is not natural 
to the body: it is an acquired skill and requires practice, the attainment 
of limbic and manual dexterity (activating the right button/icon to take 
the picture while often holding the device at extreme angles to maximize 
headspace), and the calibration of the body to technical affordances and 
desirable representational outcomes. The selfie is both expressive and 
disciplinary: this is the duality of most kinds of sensory inscription. Just 
as the moving body is the platform for the smartphone, so the device is 
the picturing agency that motivates, justifies and disciplines the body’s 
performance. These two faces of embodied technicity are inherent, and 
frequently explicit, in ordinary (i.e., non-athletic) selfies, combined – as 
I have mentioned – in the visible arm gesture or in its implied presence. 
Yet that gesture not only ‘composes’ technicity and embodiment in the 
moment of image-production: it also constitutes a deictic movement of 
the body that draws attention to the immediate context of image-viewing, 
and to the activity of a viewer. The suggestive power and versatility of 
this deictic movement of the photographing gesture towards the viewer 
is vividly demonstrated in ‘Around the World in 360 degrees: 3 Year 
Epic Selfie’ by Alex Chacon, a three-minute video stitching together the 
photographer’s video selfies taken as he traversed ‘36 countries in 600 
days using 5 motorcycles’. A key feature of the film is the use of the out-
stretched arm, and especially the prosthetic limb of a stick camera-mount, 
to create a visual-corporeal lexicon of direct kinetic relations between 
Alex’s body and the viewer: walking alongside, hand-on-shoulder, moving 
counter-balance, circular dance, to name only a few.6 These (and other) 
gestures invite the viewer to infer and adopt a physical position in relation 
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to the photographer. Manifested in the suggestion of bodily contact, they 
propose a particular kind of sociable interaction: the act of accompanying, 
and the subject-position of companionship. 
Murad Osmann’s Instagram series ‘Follow Me’ provides a converse 
yet parallel example of how a deictic gesture can generate kinetic rela-
tions between viewer and viewed.7 In this project each image is based on 
an identical formal template, the intrusion of the photographer’s arm as 
he (and by implication, the viewer) is led by the hand by a young woman, 
always seen from the back in a different location. Unlike the broad lexi-
con of deictic and kinetic visual figures in Chacon’s film, Osmann’s series 
demonstrates the power of a single gesture of implied physical move-
ment and sociable companionship sustained across multiple iterations. 
As with Chacon’s project, however, the outstretched arm (or prosthetic 
stick mount) doesn’t just show the photographer depicting himself. It 
also draws the viewer in as a gesture of inclusion, inviting you to look, be-
with, and act.8
Reflection
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed that photography is a ‘mirror 
with a memory’ (Holmes, 1859/1980: 74). This may have been meta-
phorically apposite to photography in general, but as we have seen it was 
not literally applicable to most cameras. The popular iconography of the 
selfie literalizes Holmes’ trope: rather than forming a barrier between 
photographer and viewed, the smartphone camera produces a reflective 
image for beholding oneself, apparently resembling nothing so much as a 
pocket makeup mirror. 
It is all too easy, then, to conceptualize the selfie’s gestural invitation 
to look through a voyeurism-narcissism model of mediated performance 
(Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998): as others have noted, the accusation 
of narcissism is one of the most common themes in public discourse about 
selfies.9 While there is an enticing self-evidence to the accusation, it is 
often unnecessarily reductive: with important exceptions like Mendelson 
and Papacharissi’s (2010) analysis of Facebook ‘self-portraits’, it tends to 
block further thought – regarding both selfies and narcissism – and fre-
quently ignores its own gendered assumptions linking young women with 
fickle self-obsession.
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Other interpretative extensions of the visual trope ‘reflection’ pro-
vide food for thought. The first, and most obvious, is that the selfie is a 
reflexive image. Reflexive texts are usually understood to direct attention 
to the conditions and context of their own presence, activity, or efficacy: 
they are expressly self-referential (Stam, 1992). With regard to the selfie, 
this observation itself has two applications. One is that the selfie is self-
referential as an image. It makes visible its own construction as an act 
and a product of mediation. Losh (2014) calls this ‘transparent media-
tion’: parallel terms would include ‘hypermediacy’ (Bolter and Grusin, 
1999). Not every selfie is reflexive in this sense, though the popular sub-
genre employing mirrors and screens suggests the achievement of playful, 
generic self-consciousness.
 More prosaically, and perhaps more significantly, selfies are a genre 
of personal reflexivity. This is true of all selfies by definition: they show a 
self, enacting itself. Selfies extend the photographic grammar of everyday 
communication: they are an instantly recognizable visual correlate to the 
linguistic self-enactment routinely performed by reflexive verbs. Indeed, 
their ability to combine transparent mediation and personal reflexivity 
reveals the very instability of the term ‘self’ as a deictic shifter, fluctuat-
ing between the self as an image and as a body, as a constructed effect of 
representation and as an object and agent of representation.
Tied to techno-cultural conditions of synchronous connectivity with 
others, the self-enactment elicited and shown by selfies is simultaneously 
mediated, gestural and sociable. These three features combine in the invi-
tation to the viewer implicitly made by the outstretched arm. They also 
converge through a further twist in the trope of ‘reflection’: the centrality 
of imitation and mirroring to human cognition, emotion and communica-
tion. Psychological work on imaginative projection and mental simulation 
(Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002), neurological research on mirror neurons 
(Gallese, 2005), and aesthetic scholarship on make-believe as the basis for 
mimesis (Walton, 1990), despite important differences between them, 
connect human responses to representations with sensory and mental 
processes that imitate depicted states – especially, though not exclusively, 
the motor activity of the body. Put very crudely, responses to representa-
tions are built upon embodied simulation of what is shown: neurological 
and/or unconscious mental processes that perform bodily and sensory 
imitations ‘offline’. 
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These ideas, though contested within their various fields, are extremely 
fertile for thinking about the selfie as a gestural invitation to distant oth-
ers. They enable us to conceptualize the selfie as a sensorimotor (rather 
than merely sensory) inscription of a bodily gesture into a still image that 
summons us to do more than look. The selfie invites viewers, in turn, to 
make conspicuously communicative, gestural responses. Sometimes, 
viewers respond to selfies in kind, taking reactive selfies that themselves 
summon further response: here sensorimotor mirroring is almost literally 
achieved. In most cases, however, the action is displaced into other physi-
cal movements that execute operations via the social media platforms on 
which the selfies are seen: ‘like’, ‘retweet’, ‘comment’. Like the selfie, such 
operations are also performed through sensorimotor actions – actions 
that are semi-conscious yet habitual to the degree that we might even 
call them ‘reflex’: fingers swiping and tapping apps on touchscreens, or 
scrolling, moving and clicking a mouse attached to a desktop computer. 
In Osmann’s ‘Follow Me’ series, for example, viewers cannot literally fol-
low the woman’s outstretched arm into the image, but the kinetic power 
of the gesture redirects this sensorimotor potential to a different opera-
tion of the hand, and a substitute performance of following: clicking on 
the ‘Follow’ icon next to the photograph in the Instagram interface. As a 
gestural image, then, the selfie inscribes one’s own body into new forms of 
mediated, expressive sociability with distant others: these are incarnated 
in a gestural economy of affection as the ‘reflex’ bodily responses by which 
we interact with our devices and their interfaces, through the routinely 
dexterous movements of our hands and eyes. 
Conclusion: the selfie, the phatic body and kinaesthetic sociability
We have moved far from the primarily visual terms of traditional photog-
raphy theory and the conventional uses of indexicality, composition and 
reflection. These terms have been steered towards recent conceptualiza-
tions of photography as an embodied performance and a material practice 
(Edwards, 2012; Larsen, 2005), intersecting with accounts of the corpo-
reality of digital culture and its organization of affection (Hansen, 2004). 
The motivation behind this rethinking of core terms is not mere theoreti-
cal whimsy. Rubbing these concepts against the grain of the selfie reveals 
their enduring productiveness for thinking about photography. It also 
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reanimates photography theory as a truly aesthetic project, in that it is 
concerned not just with visual semiotic modes, but with broader somatic 
and sensory dimensions of cultural experience and practice.
That practice is sociable. ‘The impulse to sociability distils, as it were, 
out of the realities of social life the pure essence of association, of the asso-
ciative process as a value and a satisfaction’ (Simmel, 1910/1997: 125). 
The selfie – deictically indexical, inclusively com-posed, reflexive and 
reflex – alters and deepens the relationship between photographic media-
tion and the impulse to sociability. 
Two final observations will clarify this claim. The first is that the 
selfie is linked to phatic communion, ‘a type of speech in which ties of 
union are created by a mere exchange of words’ (Malinowski, 1923: 315), 
whose primary purpose is the production, expression and maintenance 
of sociability. Miller (2008) argues that contemporary networked culture 
accentuates a phatic culture of non-substantive communication mediated 
across distances: his examples are primarily drawn from the banal verbal 
messages on Twitter and other social network services. The selfie repre-
sents a parallel process to this mainly verbal phenomenon: the production 
of the mediated phatic body as a visible vehicle for sociable communica-
tion with distant others, who are expected to respond.
Response is crucial: phatic exchanges stage sociability as a binding 
affective energy transferred between individuals in interpersonal set-
tings, and response is an embodied social reflex – it is hard not to per-
form it. Highly ritualized and yet profoundly routinized, phatic utter-
ances demand to be requited (Coupland, Coupland and Robinson, 
1992). Failure to acknowledge the nod of a passing acquaintance or her 
casual ‘how are you?’ is easily perceived as an expression of non-recogni-
tion and social exclusion. Yet how are mediated exchanges of responsive 
phatic energy made possible through the representational form of a still 
photograph? 
This is where the second observation becomes important.  The selfie 
is a pre-eminent conductor of embodied social energy because it is a kin-
aesthetic image: 1) it is a product of kinetic bodily movement; 2) it gives 
aesthetic, visible form to that movement in images; 3) it is inscribed in 
the circulation of kinetic and responsive social energy among users of 
movement-based digital technologies. As a kinaesthetic image, then, the 
selfie makes visible a broader kinaesthetic domain of digital culture that is 
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relatively overlooked as an object of analysis. This is the limbic, gestural 
register, overtly apparent in games systems like Wii and Kinnect, that 
creates a circuit for mediating social and corporeal affective energy by 
intersecting with two other registers of embodied technicity: ‘the mobile’ 
– the mediated mobility of whole bodies in physical and augmented 
space provided by locative technologies (the body as a single moving data 
point), and ‘the operative’ – the habitually nimble coordination of hands 
and eyes used for navigating the virtual space of interfaces (body parts as 
media operators). The selfie is thus a new phatic agent in the energy flow 
between bodily movements, sociable interactions and media technologies 
that have become fundamental to our everyday, routine experience of 
digital activities: part of what Hjorth and Pink (2014), following Ingold’s 
work, call digital ‘wayfaring’. It is a sign not only of digital photography’s 
agency as a form of popular depiction, but of the further transformations 
of everyday figural representation as an instrument of mediated, embod-
ied sociability.
Original source and licence
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Notes
1  The author would like to thank Zohar Kampf, Ifat Maoz, Amit Pinchevski, 
Limor Shifman and Julia Sonnevend for their readings of an earlier version of 
this article.
2  The need for at least basic representational criteria is evident from the 
sampling design of projects like Selfiecity (http://selfiecity.net/#dataset): ‘To 
locate selfies photos, we randomly selected 120,000 photos (20,000-30,000 
photos per city) from a total of 656,000 images we collected on Instagram. 
2-4 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers tagged each photo. For these, we 
asked Mechanical Turk workers the simple question “Does this photo show a 
single selfie?”’.
3  Significant controversies about the historical stability of visual modes in 
modernity are elided here for lack of space. Crary (1992) is well known 
for disputing any simple claim of continuity between the photographic 
camera, 19th and 20th century visual regimes, and the ‘camera obscura’ 
model of vision that preceded them. Jay (1988) associates photography with 
two different ‘scopic regimes’ connected with painting, and also argues 
that photography simultaneously strengthens and undermines modern 
‘ocularcentrism’ (Jay, 1995).
4  Ellen DeGeneres’ group Oscar selfie from 2014 is a perfect 
illustration of this point: http://www.smosh.com/smosh-pit/
photos/30-hilarious-pics-selfie-olympics.
5  See ‘The 31 Best Selfies From The First Annual Selfie Olympics’ on 
Distractify, http://old.distractify.com/news/the-best-selfies-from-the-first-
annual-selfie-olympics-i-cannot-believe-how-far-people-took-it. 
6  Alex Chacon ‘Around the world in 360° - 3 year epic selfie’: https://www.
youtube.com/user/chaiku232.
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7  Murad Osmann #followmeto Times Square, http://instagram.com/
muradosmann.
8  Purists may question whether Osmann’s images are really selfies. The 
photographer’s arm is a perpetual visual synecdoche for his presence in his 
own images: hence if they are not ‘true’ selfies they are sufficiently close to be 
of relevance. Thanks to Gefen Frosh for help on this point.
9  For a critique of the popular (and scholarly) charge that the selfie is 
narcissistic, see The Carceral Net: http://thecarceralnet.wordpress.com.
CHAPTER 18
The New Technological Environment 
of Photography and Shifting 
Conditions of Embodiment
Mika Elo
In 1889 George Eastman, the founder of Eastman Kodak Company, 
introduced the No. 1 Kodak camera with the catchy slogan ‘you press the 
button, we do the rest’. While photography still involves pressing the but-
ton the ‘we’ and the ‘rest’ have transformed significantly during the last 
few decades. In the age of information, ‘photography has come to exist 
within a new technological environment’, as Martin Lister aptly puts it 
(2007: 251). This shift has wide-reaching cultural consequences that also 
involve our bodily existence, even if no significant changes can easily be 
recognized at the level of the trigger finger.
It is a widely recognized fact that images are involved in thinking pro-
cesses. Their status, however, has been heavily disputed. The figurative 
elements of thinking have been seen now as a sign of weakness of think-
ing, now as its innermost strength. Logical empiricism and early romanti-
cism could be used to mark the two extremes in this regard.
Thinking, however, does not only rely on imaginative elements that 
refer to our bodily experience; it also takes place in the body. Body is 
the place where the intellect and the senses come together and consti-
tute meaningful thinking. Referring to Immanuel Kant’s ‘transcendental 
aesthetics’ we could say that the body schematizes. It makes an ‘image’ 
of reality, and, at the same time, takes part of it as an image-like unit. 
Further, the question as to whether and how thinking finds its place in 
images is a theme taken up by several philosophers and media theorists. 
It is all but self-evident how to demarcate the place of thinking with 
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regard to living and non-living bodies and the images they, in one way or 
another, embody.1
In the discussions concerning the relations between image, body and 
thinking, interestingly enough, attention has often been turned to pho-
tography. In Jacques Rancière’s discussion of the pensiveness of images, 
photography constitutes a paradigmatic example (2009). In How Images 
Think Ron Burnett takes up photography as a good example of intelli-
gence programmed into images (2004). Jean-Luc Nancy, in turn, has paid 
attention to an analogy between the Cartesian cogito and photography 
(2005). He writes: ‘Every photograph is an irrefutable and luminous I 
am … Like the other ego sum, this one is made explicit as an ego cogito. 
Photography thinks …’ (Nancy, 2005: 105, emphasis in the original). 
Nancy also insists on the inseparability of body and thinking in Descartes: 
‘for Descartes, the res cogitans is a body’ (Descartes, 2008: 131).
Against this background it seems that image, body and thinking 
relate to each other in a circular way: both body and thinking make use 
of images, both images and bodies think, and both thinking and images 
involve a body. Should one break this circle or should one dive into it? I 
choose the latter: I dive in, since I think that this seemingly vicious circle 
can be turned into a productive one, even if it soon becomes obvious that 
one touches here upon the limits of conceptualization.
I want to ask how photography contributes to this frame of ‘bodily 
schematism’. I will focus on the question of haptic realism and the way it 
builds on the interplay of three aspects of embodiment that I would like to 
call (1) physical body, (2) phenomenological body and (3) libidinal body. 
The notion of ‘haptic realism’ refers here to the peculiar role that touch-
ing (both in tactile and in affective terms) plays in representations that are 
considered realistic. Using these terms, I will develop a hypothesis that 
aims at indicating how a certain shift in the cultural status of touching 
might contribute to reshaping the ‘photographic’ conditions of embodi-
ment in the age of information. 
Photographic distance and proximity
It has become one of the commonplaces of recent media theoretical 
debates to state that digital media transform the frame of human expe-
rience. It is not difficult to find a consensus on this general level of the 
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diagnosis of a shift. It is easy, for example, to agree on the fact that digital 
media are changing our sense of time and space – the conditions of our 
bodily existence – in many ways. Distance and proximity, both in physi-
cal and mental sense, take new forms. The task of theoretically articulat-
ing the details and the transformation mechanisms of experience that is 
at stake here is, however, a much more complicated matter and leads to 
numerous questions and debates.
In these debates photography is often claimed to be an outmoded 
medium as we live in digital or even post-digital culture. Photography is, 
however, booming like never before, both in terms of quantity of images 
produced and multiplicity of new photographic technologies and prac-
tices. In its current state of rapid transformation and diversification 
photography shows rich cultural potential, a situation comparable to 
the first decades after the invention of photography in 1839. As a con-
sequence, photography research is facing new challenges and gaining 
new importance.
Today, photographic technologies are linked to new production and 
publishing structures that alter the ways photographs circulate. This has 
multifaceted social, economical, political and theoretical consequences 
that are difficult to decipher. What to think, for example, of the fact that 
with the help of metadata that accompanies the digital image, moments 
of capturing, processing, presentation and distribution can be automati-
cally interlinked in ways that go beyond visual mastery of spatiotempo-
ral relations? To use Lev Manovich’s terms, it would seem that digitally 
mediated photographs are part of another kind of ‘cultural interface’ or 
‘cultural software’ than film-based photography (2001). The cultural sta-
tus of photographic images is undergoing a transformation. My question 
will be: how to articulate this in terms of ‘bodily schematism?’ How are 
the intimate connections between body, thinking and photography cur-
rently changing? 
The sense of touch offers a productive starting point for an enquiry 
into these questions. The highly ambivalent role that touching has in 
western thinking is symptomatic of the tensional relation between physio-
logical, mental and technical aspects of sentience. Touch twines together 
physical and psychical movements and intensifies them in pleasure and 
pain. To touch is always, in one way or another, to touch a limit, to push it 
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and to test it, and, in the same instance, to attest to it. Touch is sentience 
at the limits, and thus an exemplary figure of reconfiguration. 
In contrast to other senses, at least seemingly, the sense of touch makes 
the sensing and the sensed coincide. When I see a stone, it is ‘out there’ 
and does not see me, but when I touch that stone, it is ‘right here’ and 
touches me. This sense of concreteness and immediacy lends the sense 
of touch a certain credibility. A seen stone can be made of plastic even 
if it looks just like a stone, but when I touch it I can feel the material. It 
is due to this fullness of touching that the tactile metaphor of ‘grasping’ 
can stand for ‘fully understanding something’. From this point of view 
the sense of touch appears as uncomplicated and immediate. On closer 
inspection, however, its status as a sense is rather difficult to grasp. In fact, 
it is more appropriate to speak of senses of touch, since touching exceeds 
the tactile world and encompasses also immaterial aspects of experience. 
Due to its multifaceted characteristics touch also challenges representa-
tional thinking in many ways (Elo, 2012). 
Photographs make this evident in a poignant way when they touch us 
at the same time as they withdraw themselves from the realm of tangibil-
ity and meanings. As Margaret Olin points out, there is a tension between 
the ways in which photographs involve looking and touching: ‘the two 
activities seem to alternate like a blinking eye, as though we cannot do 
both at the same time’ (Olin, 2012: 2). This implies that our grasp of pho-
tographs does not take place in the light of knowledge only. One might 
recall here also the thought-provoking claim that Roland Barthes makes 
in Camera Lucida, according to which ‘a photograph is always invisible’ 
(Barthes, 1981: 6). Visibility falls short of explaining the ways in which 
we relate ourselves to photographic images. A photograph is touching 
when it provokes speech by being mute, and when it opens up a space for 
thinking by a gesture of closing itself off, by being individually separate 
and distinct. In other words, photograph’s entry to the realm of represen-
tations is mediated besides vision also by a distant touch – not unlike an 
eye contact that seizes the gaze only as absent (Olin, 2012: 3).
Touching is a moot point in western conceptions of embodied experi-
ence due to its peculiar role as a mediator between the material and imma-
terial aspects of reality. Different conceptual articulations and arguments, 
however, almost invariably share the ‘haptocentric’ idea that touching is a 
way of locating and guaranteeing the contact between different elements 
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of experience (Derrida, 2005). On this basis, reality is understood as 
being-in-touch-with-something-real. The matter is further complicated 
by the fact that the different parties to this contact have many names in 
our tradition: soul, mind, psyche, reason versus body, flesh, sensuality, etc. 
Correspondingly, the contact itself has been studied from the point of 
view of religion, intuition, reflection and synapses.
Touch, as a mediator between processes of signification, affectivity 
and materiality, figures prominently also in discourses on photography. 
Various forms of contact play an important role, especially whenever pho-
tography is inscribed into the tradition of ‘true images’ (vera icon) or ‘self-
generated images’ (acheiropoietoi). Variations of this scheme can be found 
in Henry Fox Talbot’s ideas of ‘natural magic’, C. S. Peirce’s ‘indexical’ 
sign function, André Bazin’s ‘objectivity’, and Roland Barthes’s discourse 
on ‘punctum’ (Geimer, 2011: 28-30). With regard to the digitalization 
of photography the role of touching in its relation to seeing is, however, 
highly ambivalent. This is not quite unexpected, since, in the experiential 
horizon of digital technology, the status of touch as a guarantor of tangible 
reality would appear unstable, as a great deal of what we consider real 
is anything but tangible – even when we find it touching. At the same 
time, touch as tactility plays an important role in various forms of inter-
face design. There the implicit aim is to functionalize touch and to inte-
grate it into a system of digital mediations in order to increase the sense of 
instantaneity and realism. In these settings, touch tends to become repre-
sented as a sense that works in synchrony with vision offering a support 
for optical intuitionism. The question arises of how to relate tangibility to 
the conceptual, affective and mental dimensions of touch or feel.
In the 1990s much of the discussion concerning the digitalization of 
photography focused on questions of difference between the digital and 
the analogue. Digitalization was often seen as a fundamental shift com-
parable to the invention of phonetic writing (Stiegler, 2002) or that of 
central perspective (Mitchell, 1992). These debates led to various recon-
siderations of the peculiar convergence between notions of photographic 
realism and discourses of indexicality (Frohne, 2002; Green and Lowry, 
2003; Wortmann, 2003). Today, as photography has come to exist within 
a new technological environment, questions of connectivity, mobility and 
metadata are also starting to play an important part in considerations of 
the photographic ‘reality effect’. In Frieder Nake’s terms, we could say 
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that at the same time as there are ever more invisible indices on the ‘sub-
face’ that are made operative in the construction of photographic ‘real-
ity effects’, the digital ‘surface’ is modelled on photographic looks familiar 
from film-based photography (Nake, 2008). Photoshop filters such as ‘film 
grain’ and ‘lens flare’ are in this respect telling examples.
What strikes me in these debates is the way in which most concep-
tions of photographic evidence tend to rely on ideas of continuity and 
causality. Photographic ‘reality effect’ – regardless of whether it is held to 
be a result of context-related signification or material mediation – seems 
to be modelled on the ‘haptocentric’ idea according to which the ‘real’ is 
something we can grasp mentally or touch physically, and, ideally, both in 
a synchronous way. In short, the rhetoric of photographic realism builds, 
in one way or another, on the continuity of chains of reference.
At first glance there would seem to be a clear contrast between mental 
continuity and sensuous contiguity, between the sign and the trace. On 
closer inspection, however, we can discern that the trace-like character of 
the photographic image relies, in the last instance, on some kind of autho-
rization, an ‘authorizing legend’ that establishes the continuity of chains 
of reference (Wortmann, 2003). It is telling that even if photographs (and 
the various layers of metadata attached to them) can be used as pieces of 
evidence in court, they cannot replace a testimony. The photographic 
trace needs to be authorized, i.e. ‘culturally generated’ (Wortmann, 2003: 
222). The other side of the coin is that signification processes need to be 
embodied, i.e. bundled and incorporated, in order to be effective.
Haptic realism
I would go as far as to claim – this is my hypothesis – that the very notion 
of photographic realism is ‘haptocentric’ in the sense that it tends to func-
tion as a vehicle for reproducing the idea of touch as an objective sense, 
i.e. as haptic sense operating in the realm of physical bodies. In short, 
visual capture combined with perceptual and cognitive recognition tends 
to objectify bodies.
This operation tends to conceal something that we, following 
Bernhard Waldenfels, could call the ‘pathic moment’ of touching 
(Waldenfels, 2002: 14-16). The term ‘pathic’, derived from the Greek 
word pathos, refers to sensibility, affectedness and suffering. Inherent 
274 Mika Elo
to the term, although normally ignored, is the concrete sense of being 
exposed to something excessive and unexpected that can even leave pain-
ful marks, such as wounds. In a word, ‘pathic moment’ refers to exposede-
ness that is implicated in all forms of touching.
Following Waldenfels it can be argued that as regards the phenom-
enological body, touching constitutes a prototype of ‘pathic experience’ 
(Waldenfels, 2002: 71). It is the felt sense of being in the world, of being 
exposed: to touch is always also to be touched. Although touching is con-
tact with the touched, there remains something inaccessible and with-
drawing, something even untouchable inherent to the touched. This 
withdrawal lends to the contact an affective tension: the touched becomes 
touching. In other words, touching is over-determined by otherness as 
strangeness, and it turns out to manifest traits of a ‘foreign-sense’, with 
respective ethical significance (Waldenfels, 2002: 64). This elemental 
asymmetry tends to be ruled out when touching is studied in terms of 
immediacy and symmetry of a contact. 
As a prototype of ‘pathic experience’ touch turns out to be a com-
plex field of sensing and feeling. In short, it is the making sense of vari-
ous encounterings. This elementary function implies that when we 
consider the sensory distance, we cannot take the separateness of sensor 
and sensed as our point of departure, because to be exact, they are only 
articulated as such in touching. Furthermore, the question what should 
be invested in the positions of sensor and sensed is historical. To be able to 
study the suspension of sensory distance we must take into account ‘phe-
nomenotechnics’, i.e. the technical and technological conditions of each 
particular time, since the experiences of distance and proximity are also 
always articulated in relation to them (Waldenfels, 2002: 361-2). This 
shows how the pathic structure of touch brings out the elemental role of 
technics in the constitution of experience.
My hypothesis is that in the ‘haptic realism’ the photographic contact 
is conceived of in terms of immediacy and continuity, despite its obvi-
ous asymmetry. This takes place predominantly in the name of visibility. 
This implies that, as ‘hapto-visual’ appropriation, photography tends to 
reduce different dimensions of touch to tactility, that is, to an order where 
all distinctions are made between the same and the other and where there 
is the structural possibility for a third party to assess these distinctions. 
In contrast to this realm of objective contact between visible surfaces of 
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physical bodies, touch as exposedness has to do with existential integrity, 
a depth, from which any objectifying third party is excluded. This pathic 
moment of touching is about separation between own and alien, between 
self and stranger, and remains a matter of singular experience. Touch as a 
pathic sense is a sense of exclusion of a third party.
‘Haptic realism’ would thus be about conflating or confusing these 
two orders. It would be about equalizing the ways in which distinctions 
between the same and the other can be made and the ways in which a self 
separates itself from a stranger. In other words, in haptic realism phenom-
enological bodies would, tendentiously, be modelled on physical bodies. 
Here photography builds on a long tradition, since this kind of haptocen-
tric conception of the sense of touch has been operative in western think-
ing from Plato to Husserlian phenomenology as, for example, Jacques 
Derrida has painstakingly shown (2005). 
The tendency to confuse these registers derives form the visual accu-
racy of photography as light-writing. This has consequences as regards 
both material mediation and signification processes. With regard to 
material mediation, the optical laws of light-writing suggest a natural 
link between the iconic and the indexical aspects of the depiction. As 
regards signification processes, in turn, the visual accuracy of the photo-
graphic image makes it more tempting to look through the image and see 
it as a visual representation of an absent thing than to see the image as 
a strange presentation that brings forth something which finds its origin 
in the image itself. In both cases there is a tendency to conflate iconic-
ity and indexicality, and to measure photographic evidence in terms of 
visual likeness.
Formatting embodied experience
Digital forms of photography both reaffirm and destabilize this link 
between iconicity and indexicality. On the one hand, the relation between 
the ‘subface’ and the ‘surface’ tends to be conceived of (and programmed) 
in terms of hapto-visual appropriation. On the other, the affective tension 
potentially involved here turns out to be non-programmable. I try to expli-
cate this ambivalence with regard to the third aspect of embodied experi-
ence that I introduced at the outset: the libidinal body. 
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Here I would like to take up the interesting argument made by 
Cathryn Vasseleu that digital technologies contribute to the ‘formalization 
of touch’ by instituting touch as an objective sense – with the objective of 
making contact and staying in touch (Vasseleu, 1999: 159).2 According to 
her, digital technologies tend to prioritize haptic appropriation and grasp-
ing by detaching the objective side of touching from its affective quali-
ties. The result is an enhanced polarity between two interacting modes of 
touching: hypersensitive ‘ticklishness’ that is detached from all functional 
object relations and ‘haptic touch’ exemplified by the omnipotence of the 
finger as regards the horizon of real-time telecommunication. This has 
implications for the libidinal body. This is also the decisive point where 
I see that digitality changes something in the intricate interplay between 
image, body and thinking that I call ‘bodily schematism’. 
In so far as ‘ticklishness’ is a domain of tactile experience that is out of 
self-coordinatable control, it cannot have any pre-programmed function 
in digital telecommunication networks, since these are built on the idea 
that being in contact equals perception that one is in touch with someone 
or something. It nevertheless plays an important role in digital tactility.
The enhanced polarity between the two modes of touching that 
Vasseleu discerns can be seen as a symptom of a transformation of tactile 
experience that finds its articulation also in the new technological envi-
ronment of photography. This enhanced polarity becomes tangible in 
situations where the feedback structure of an interface is engaging at the 
same time as it lets the lability of the mediated contact come to the fore. 
Various forms of visual live streaming and instant photo sharing could be 
used as examples of this.
The psychodynamics of these operations can be studied in terms of 
Freudian vocabulary. In his article on denial, Sigmund Freud foregrounds 
parallels between thinking and perceiving by suggesting that they are 
both based on a ‘palpating impetus’ (tastender Vorstoß), that is, a feeling 
and testing of the limits between inside and outside. This tactile process 
of demarcation offers a basis for psychic structures and various defence 
mechanisms, such as denial. Freud states that repressed representations 
can enter into the consciousness under the precondition that they are 
denied. Denial is a process of rationalization that disconnects affectivity 
from representation. The integration of repressed representations into 
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consciousness takes place only on an intellectual level, and the affective 
implications of the repressed are cut off (Freud, 1999: 12–15).
Denial depends on an intellectual judging function (intellektuelle 
Urteilsfunktion), which concerns questions of inclusion and exclusion 
(13). The ego decides if something is to be taken in or excluded. The 
reverse side of this intellectual decision is something Freud calls ‘reality 
testing’ (Realitätsprüfung) (14). The ego tests if an intellectually accepted 
and thus internalized representation also reappears in perceived reality. 
What is at stake in both functions is a decision between the inside and 
outside. The subjective exists only inside, whereas everything that counts 
as objective must exist outside as well. This double operation of internal-
ization and reality testing makes sure that the relation between the inner 
representations and their counterparts in outer reality can be mastered.
Against this background, ‘haptic realism’ in digitally mediated pho-
tography can be understood as denial of the ambivalence of touch. It is 
an operation that secures the division between the inside and the outside 
by representing the affective and physical aspects of contact as relatively 
autonomous dimensions. Hereby, tactility is prioritized and made into the 
paradigm of touching. Further, as a media technological form of denial 
‘formalization of touch’ appears as a ‘reality test’ that contributes to con-
solidating those patterns of communication and affective behaviour that 
fit to its formats. 
Following Bernard Stiegler one could also take up Freud’s nephew 
Edward Bernays’ theory of industrial manipulation of libido, according to 
which ‘the fight against economic crises required harnessing consumers’ 
desire to lead them to consume things they did not need’ (Stiegler, 2011: 
224). As the facilitation of the passage from need to desire this ‘harness-
ing’ allowed for the manipulation of the desire itself, because the passage 
is constituted by phantasm, i.e. the realm of objects that has reality only 
in the framework of desire. In other words, the harnessing of consumers’ 
desire is like set design as regards the staging of the desire in a phantasm. 
For Stiegler, the central question is, who is in control of this set design? In 
his analysis, the globalized culture industry has led to intensified exploita-
tion of libidinal energy that accelerates the decomposition of desire into 
drives. In his scenario, finance capitalism itself, epitomized by the short-
term investments of the stock market, becomes drive based. ‘[T]he rule of 
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the short term is the rule of the drive. The drive wants everything right 
away: it wants immediate satisfaction’ (Stiegler, 2011: 226).
With regard to the new technological environment of photography, 
the phantasmatic structure of the libidinal economy becomes tangible, if 
we think of the ways in which various forms of interactivity that involve 
photographic images endow the user with a sense of power at the same 
time as the status of the objects gained access to remain suspended. 
Typically, the developers of multimodal interfaces set as their goal not 
only the richness and realism of sense feedback but also the pleasure that 
the user can experience. The idea is to have everything related to the sys-
tem smoothly to hand. When this happens, the pathic moment of touch 
and the ethical dimensions of feedback remain in a dead angle. The focus 
is on feedback that affirms recognition and forms in its functionality a cir-
cle that feeds the sense of selfpower.
Conclusion
The difference between ‘haptic realism’ in film-based and in digitally 
mediated photography, according to the initial analysis presented here, 
would thus lie in their different ways of enhancing hapto-visual appro-
priation. Whereas the haptic realism of film-based photography tends to 
reduce touch to tactility by modelling phenomenological body on physi-
cal body, digital environments add to this an affective shortcut by custom-
izing information with regard to the physical body (and its metonymic 
figure, the omnipotent finger). In their new technological environment 
photographs engage the viewers, or perhaps more precisely the users, 
more and more often by being hotspots. With regard to the tensional 
relation between vision and touch this implies that it is the affective link 
between the user’s body and digital information that tends to motivate 
the visual appearance of media contents in digital culture, whereas in pre-
digital visual culture the most powerful substrate of affectivity was made 
up by visual appearances. In both cases the pathic moment of touching 
tends to be concealed. In Stiegler’s vocabulary, this kind of tendency is 
regressive: it marks the destruction of desire and the passage to the level 
of unbounded drives. This process takes the form of a ‘disordering of the 
aesthetic’ that, despite of its regressive tendency, opens up also the pos-
sibility for a ‘re-constitution of a new libidinal economy’ (2011: 227-35).
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The rather schematic and hypothetical argument I have presented 
here has the implication that when analysing photographic truth claims 
and reality effects we should take into account not only technological 
formats but also conceptual, affective and sensuous processes of format-
ting. As I have indicated, a careful consideration of the multiple senses 
of touch operative in haptic realism offers a productive starting point 
for this. Against this background, the new technological environment of 
photography appears as a site where the ambivalent tendencies of touch 
are negotiated. Photographic interfaces, i.e. the ways in which photog-
raphy faces the body, provide something like an ‘aesthetic horizon’ for 
the experience in the age of information by engaging the contradictions 
of our time at the level of the senses.3 The way in which these processes 
are intertwined in and through photographic images makes up the highly 
ambivalent and historically variable setting of photographic conditions of 
embodied experience.
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Notes
1  ‘Bodily schematism’ and ‘embodiment’ have been conceived from numerous 
points of view. On the one hand, thinking has been seen as an embodied 
phenomenon, and on the other, a certain ‘schematicism’ has been linked 
to body. About 100 years ago, Henry Head and Gordon Morgan Holmes 
introduced the notion of body scheme in neurology (1911), and this notion has 
figured in many ways in the biological sciences ever since (Callagher, 2005). 
On the side of the humanities Jacques Lacan’s theory of the ‘mirror stage’, 
Didier Anzieu’s (1989) theory of ‘skin-ego’ and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1962) phenomenology of perception have been widely influential in studies 
of different aspects of embodied experience. Interesting attempts to articulate 
the dynamic exchange between bodies, images and thinking can be found 
also in contemporary ‘image science’, or, Bildwissenschaft (Belting, 2011; 
Boehm, 2007; Bredenkamp, 2010; Krois, 2011).
2  Vasseleu refers to Immanuel Kant’s Anthropology and the ambivalent 
position Berührung (referring both to tactility and affectivity) takes there 
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with regard to the distinction between objective and subjective senses 
(Vasseleu, 1999: 155).
3  I borrow the very useful term of ‘aesthetic horizon’ from Miriam Bratu 
Hansen. According to her analysis of early twentieth century mainstream 
film culture, so-called ‘classic cinema’, ‘not only traded in the mass production 
of the senses but also provided an aesthetic horizon for the experience of 
industrial mass society’ (Hansen, 1999: 70). It ‘engaged the contradictions of 
modernity at the level of the senses’ and contributed to the ‘mainstreaming’ of 
the emergence of mass culture (70).
CHAPTER 19
Authorship, Collaboration, Computation? 
Into the Realm of Similar Images
Katrina Sluis  
Photographers may think they are bringing their own aes-
thetic, epistemological or political criteria to bear. They may 
set out to take artistic, scientific or political images for which 
the camera is only a means to an end. But what appear to 
be their criteria for going beyond the camera nevertheless 
remain subordinate to the camera’s program. 
(Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography).
I feel like everyone sort of has the same photos.
(Hannah, respondent in a 2008 Facebook study).
In 2011, Google added a ‘search by image’ feature to its suite of search 
products. Capitalising on advances in computer recognition, the tool 
enabled users to find images with similar ‘visual fingerprints’ spread 
across the web. On Google’s search blog, Johanna Wright, Director of 
Search Product Management, described its value as follows: ‘You might 
have an old vacation photo, but forgot the name of that beautiful beach. 
Typing [guy on a rocky path on a cliff with an island behind him] isn’t 
exactly specific enough to help find your answer. So when words aren’t 
as descriptive as the image, you can now search using the image itself’ 
(Google: Inside Search). Being able to search ‘visually’ was the latest 
method through which one might overcome the fallibility of human 
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memory in an age of accelerating data. Its launch presented Google as an 
indispensable aide, collaborator and confidante for your digital lifestyle. 
Or, as Google VP Marisa Meyer phrased it: ‘Your best friend with instant 
access to all the world’s facts and a photographic memory of everything 
you’ve seen and know’ (Google: Official Blog). 
Figure 19.1 Erica Scourti, ‘search by image’ from So Like You, 2014
Through the magic of pattern-recognition algorithms, Google would 
be there to help you recall names and locations, and create novel vec-
tors between your snapshots and billions of others in only milliseconds. 
By temporarily unifying groups of dispersed images hosted on remote 
web servers, the tool offered itself up as a kind of networked, protologi-
cal vision machine. Just as image tagging had transformed Web 2.0 plat-
forms, here was a technology that offered a new navigational paradigm for 
the image ‘cloud’. But, whereas tagging was an important part of the social 
Authorship, Collaboration, Computation? Into the Realm of Similar Images 285
life of platforms such as Flickr, with ‘reverse image search’ it became pos-
sible to plot a course through a web of images using the ordering logic of 
the machine’s gaze. Think your #srsly #cute #scottishfold #cat is unique? 
Think your enhanced high-dynamic-range photo of the Franz Josef gla-
cier viewed from the altar window of Waiho church in the South Island 
of New Zealand is unique? Think again. The grouping, aggregating and 
tracking online of images ‘visually’ made it possible to discover images 
that were just like yours, and escape the image-language problem of previ-
ous archival taxonomies. 
Authorship and collective labour in an image cloud
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was not in the potential imag(in)ing of collec-
tive memory but in the arena of rights management that Google’s reverse 
image search was quickly co-opted by photographers. Professionals and 
amateurs alike praised the tool for its ability to track an image’s reuse 
online in order to ‘catch copyright crooks’ and ‘recover what is rightfully 
yours’. Rather than sending photographers into a spiral of angst around 
the cultural politics of reproduction, ‘search by image’ became the Holy 
Grail for a community intent on defending its authentic creativity against 
an information economy that valorises the real-time exchange of multiple, 
simultaneous, orphaned images. 
But the question of how to be acknowledged as an author – with all 
the economic and social capital that entails – is not just limited to pro-
fessional photographers in network culture. The pursuit of self-realisa-
tion through creative digital labour has been a defining feature of social 
media in an era characterised by hyper-individualism (observe the rise of 
the ‘selfie’) and hyper-consumption (observe the rise of the ‘selfie, hold-
ing my new boutique pet’). Within neoliberal culture we are all invited 
to endlessly re-invent ourselves, turn our life into a work of art and, in the 
process, make ourselves transparent to software and to each other. How, 
then, might it be possible to be recognised as a unique individual with a 
creative voice when Instagram has made everyone’s photos look the same? 
In considering this paradox, it is worth returning to a question that has 
haunted photography since its inception: is photography a technology of 
reproduction or a tool for artistic expression? The problem with the latter, 
as critics point out, is that the collective labour that makes photographic 
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reproduction possible (from design and marketing to manufacturing and 
display) is rendered invisible when the photograph is limited to a creative 
act originating in the mind of an individual photographer. And despite 
the increasing automation of photography, this model of modernist 
authorship persists in the rhetoric of consumer electronics manufactur-
ers, museums, and university photography courses alike. But when the act 
of viewing, searching or tagging an image online potentially changes its 
visibility, velocity and legibility, the separation of author from audience, 
individual from crowd becomes extraneous. Not least because today’s 
web architectures have become ‘social machines’ in which the boundaries 
between computations performed by machine logic and those that result 
from human sentiment are increasingly interwoven. 
Collaborating with machines
It is precisely this meshwork of humans and non-humans, images and 
code that the artist Erica Scourti attends to in her practice. Setting out 
to test the limits of self-expression in a fully mediated culture, her work 
explores the tension between the desire to be (or believe oneself to be) 
authentic and singular within it. Subjecting her life to the gaze of the 
machine (and keenly aware of the implicit narcissism), Scourti has col-
laborated with security experts, software platforms, Googlebots and other 
network users in her search for self-knowledge. Informing her approach 
is an understanding that sharing the digital detritus of our lives may con-
nect us to a host of interested and interesting unknown people, in ways 
that ultimately require us to be readable to others (and their non-human 
agents) too.
In Life in AdWords (2012–13), Scourti wrote and emailed her diary 
to her Gmail account over a year, collecting the keywords that Google had 
scanned and harvested for targeted advertisements. She read the results 
to her webcam wherever she happened to be that day, creating video por-
traits of her life as mined and understood by Google’s algorithms. Rather 
than a document of authentic or quotidian experience, Scourti explains 
that her diary became a compilation of ‘clusters of relevant ads, making 
visible the way we and our personal information are the product in the 
“free” Internet economy’. Hijacking and making visible the commercial 
exploitation of personal data, the project uses the intimate mode of the 
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webcam confession in order to raise the question of whether there is any 
area of life that can’t be assimilated and commodified through the power 
of computer analytics. 
In approaching her commission for Brighton Photo Biennial 2014, 
Scourti set out to discover what happens when statistical correlations are 
used to delineate existing links between things and direct relationships 
between people. Beginning with the specificity of her own personal mem-
ory – in the form of documents, love letters, snapshots and other ephem-
era – she used Google’s ‘search by image’ function to create a version 
of her own life through the discovery of thousands of other images that 
visually resemble it. Brought into this process was an array of network 
users who gained a temporary closeness with Erica not through shared 
interests but through the statistical similarities determined by Google’s 
Figure 19.2 Erica Scourti, from So Like You, 2014
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VisualRank algorithm. Her investigation into the mediation of the self 
through software also has links to the increasingly popular paradigm of 
the statistically derived or quantified self – in which one’s own identity 
makes sense as part of a wider demographic. With this in mind, Scourti 
asks us to consider how this tension between the individual and the col-
lective be staged in relation to the images we capture and continuously 
share? What does it mean to open oneself up to metadata? What possibil-
ities become available when you acknowledge software as a collaborator 
in the reflexive project of the self?
Scourti’s work helps to highlight the way that a photograph’s value 
might not lie in the specificity of its content but in its legibility to machines 
and the data generated around it. Whilst photographers continue to 
demand control of their intellectual ‘property’, ownership and monetisa-
tion of the data that accumulates as a by-product of our collective creativ-
ity remain less contested. This is, of course, what Getty understood when 
it decided to give away its image assets for ‘free’ – with the condition that 
we permit it to harvest information about the photograph’s use. This 
reflects a paradigm shift in which there is less value to be extracted from 
individual images than from the relations between them. These relations 
tell us much about audience sentiment, patterns of consumption and 
Figure 19.3 Erica Scourti, from So Like You Tumblr, 2014
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potential future demand for images. The situation has wider implications 
for culture, as data-driven decision-making becomes the latest business 
meme to cross over into UK arts policy. One wonders if, in the future, 
it will be Getty and not the gallery that will serve as an example of what 
an audience-responsive, market-driven, image-serving organisation might 
look like in tune with the public’s cultural desires.
Original source and licence
An earlier version of this text was published as (2014) ‘Authorship, 
Collaboration, Computation? Into the Realm of Similar Images’, with 
Erica Scourti, Photoworks, Brighton Photo Biennial: 150-159. © Katrina 
Sluis. Permission to republish granted.
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CHAPTER 20
The Horrors of Visuality 
Rob Coley
PART I
[T]he supernatural has returned – not in the guise of 
answered prayers or divinely sanctioned holy wars, but via 
the panoply of media objects that satellite us and that are 
embedded into the very material fabric of our bodies, cities, 
and lives. (Thacker, 2014: 95). 
Monstrous Media
In his terrifying essay-cum-horror-story on the then nascent logic of ‘con-
trol’, Gilles Deleuze warned of a power that writhes and flexes like the 
‘coils of a serpent’ (Deleuze, 1992: 7). Speculating on the transformative 
implications of the digital, he told of an ontological power, an adaptable 
power performed in complex systems of mediated communication, a 
power no longer restricted by the space-time of modern institutions. In 
this story, a monstrous control operates in the form of computational stim-
uli, functioning socially and biologically, infiltrating bodily relations so as 
to cultivate an addiction to its influence. The aim of such a power is not to 
fix or restrict radical energies but to manage or generate such processes by 
massaging relational potential, by mediating the becoming of the world.
Here, in three short essays, I briefly consider how the 21st century 
actuality of such a monster might demand an adjustment in the study 
of visuality. To begin, it is important to stress that this does not mean 
supplementing ‘visual culture’ with ‘new media’. Indeed, the apparent 
newness of new media, so highly venerated by the culture industries, is a 
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problematic designation, to say the least. There is often nothing particu-
larly new about new media – media continually rework their older forms, 
continually revisit and transmute their own past. Instead of asserting 
claims to newness, the role of the digital should rather be seen as lying 
in its tendency to refocus attention on what media do, on the transforma-
tive powers of media, on the ability of media to invisibly affect the overall 
‘conditions of possibility’ (Galloway et al., 2014: 1). In a society of control, 
any study of visuality must therefore also be a study of media, and this 
means taking on ‘media and mediation as conceptual objects in their own 
right’ (Galloway et al., 2014: 2).
In doing this, the canonical issues and concerns of photography stud-
ies, and visual culture studies more generally, do not suddenly become 
irrelevant, but the way in which these issues are approached must change. 
This is precisely because the fundamental paradoxes of mediation make 
the task of theorizing visuality today so challenging, to say nothing of 
the disappearing possibilities for ‘countervisuality’. Specifically, though 
visuality is understood here, with Nicholas Mirzoeff (2011), as a matrix 
of power that is undoubtedly visual in its expressions and symptoms, it 
is also now clear that the activities of visuality are enacted prior to, or 
beyond, representation. Moreover, in the 21st century, contact with, and 
experience of, visuality can be increasingly understood to function on the 
basis of what, in Deleuzian terms, we might call a ‘disjunctive synthesis’ 
of the pure immediacy and total opacity of mediation. In cultivating this 
relation between materiality and abstraction, it is a power that domesti-
cates and exploits paradox.
In this context, mediation is something that cannot be examined 
discretely, in the way that media objects tend to be studied. This is to 
insist on a departure from studies of media long preoccupied with an 
opposition between technological determinism and social constructiv-
ism. In this opposition, agency is understood to lie either with techni-
cal machines which causally determine the future form and function of 
society, or with the humans who produce and use technologies to wield 
such power through various representations. It is on the basis of such dis-
ciplinary investments that, even in recent attempts to radically reassess 
the concept of visuality, media is still understood as a series of technical 
objects that maintain and uphold dominant ideologies. However, with the 
increasingly seamless integration of such objects into the social habits of 
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everyday activity, it seems that any act of countervisuality must begin by 
addressing ‘modes of mediation that refuse bi-directionality, that obviate 
determinacy, and that dissolve devices entirely’ (Galloway et al., 2014: 
10). Beyond representation, this is a question of belief – belief in what 
psychical researcher William James called ‘the reality of the unseen’, 
belief in the communication of something incommunicable, in a truth 
which exceeds the conventions of rationalism. The digital prompts us to 
reconsider our belief in a realm we had long since given up on. And so, 
to confront the monster, countervisuality must tactically aspire to make 
flesh creep (James, 1982: 63).
From beyond
McKenzie Wark (2012: 68) gives shape to such a tactic by calling for 
the identification of weird moments, anomalous irruptive events, when 
the paradoxes of control reveal an ‘after image’, a peripheral glimpse of 
the monster. One suitably weird moment occurred in December 2013, 
when a now infamous image was made public via the official Twitter 
account of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 
an agency headed up by retired lieutenant general James Clapper, princi-
pal advisor to Barack Obama on issues of national security. Set against an 
emblematic starfield, the illustration depicts a giant cephalopod seizing 
hold of the planet Earth (figure 20.1). One of its arms, or tentacles, grips 
hold of the planet, while others stretch and unfurl. The creature glowers, 
which is to say, in anthropomorphic terms, that it wears an evil expres-
sion. Emblazoned below it is the motto, ‘Nothing is beyond our reach’. 
As revealed by follow-up photographs tweeted from the ODNI account, 
this menacing creature is the official insignia of the latest in a series of spy 
satellites launched under the auspices of the National Reconnaissance 
Office, the US government agency responsible for satellite intelligence 
(figure 20.2). Further tweets gave updates on the favorability of rocket 
launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, along with a link to a gallery of 
images produced by the organization which provides space launch ser-
vices for the US government. A video of the launch itself was later posted 
on the Facebook page of the 30th Space Wing. ‘Anyone stay up late to 
watch?’ asked the ODNI in a tweet.
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The oblique announcement is at once transparent and opaque, open 
and secret. In this odd exercise in public relations, in which something 
that remains invisible is branded, the announcement publicizes and 
draws attention to an event – a blast off – while revealing only that the 
event is classified. The same paradox is central to artist Trevor Paglen’s 
Symbology series. Traversing restricted landscapes and tracking classified 
objects, Paglen’s work attempts to map what his sources and informants 
call the ‘black world’. Symbology is an ongoing project to collect the heral-
dic patches and insignias designed for secret military units. Among these 
cryptic logos (or ‘gang colors’, as one of Paglen’s sources puts it), there are 
tongue-in-cheek references to popular conspiracies concerning Area 51 
(as seen in the bug-eyed faces of alien ‘grays’), together with examples 
of frat boy humor (as seen in the recurring presence of a character from 
MAD magazine). But there is also a dominance of occultural iconogra-
phy – the wizard, the serpent, and the all-seeing eye familiar to mystical 
practice. Moreover, the evil world-dominating cephalopod also appears in 
Paglen’s series of patches (figure 20.3).
Figure 20.1. The ODNI unveil the NROL-39 logo. Image from ODNI Twitter account, original 
available at: https://twitter.com/ODNIgov/status/408712553179533312, accessed February 4, 2014.
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The real paradox of this image lies not only in its communication 
of something that must not be communicated, but also in its communi-
cation of something that cannot be communicated. It is weird because 
Figure 20.2. The NROL-39 payload, ready for mating with an Atlas V booster 
rocket. Image from ODNI Twitter account, original available at: https://twitter.
com/ODNIgov/status/408715995008598016, accessed February 4, 2014.
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it provides a creeping glimpse of a power ‘from beyond’; as an image, it 
‘works too well’, it communicates ‘more than we bargained for’ (Thacker, 
2014: 102). This is, however, the paradox that conditions all mediation, 
and to consider it more closely we must grasp the monster’s tentacle.
Problematized ontology
For novelist China Miéville, the tentacle is ‘the default monstrous append-
age of today’, and it ‘signals the epochal shift to a Weird culture’ (2008: 
105). Today, weird fiction, once relegated to the status of supernatural 
pulp horror, is accorded classic status and revered by a new generation 
of writers, fiction and non-fiction alike. Indeed, in contemporary cultural 
theory, references to the work of H. P. Lovecraft – the key proponent of 
what Miéville calls haute-weird – are so widespread as to practically con-
stitute a field in itself. The genre’s earlier form came in something of a 
radical break from the conventions of Gothic storytelling, with monstrous 
Figure 20.3. Image by Trevor Paglen. Original available at: https://twitter.com/
trevorpaglen/status/390580113840283648/photo/1, accessed February 4, 2014.
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cephalopods, and their multiplicity of suckers, first taking hold of the pre-
Weird writings of Jules Verne and Victor Hugo. While myths and leg-
ends of monsters have always been a part of the collective imaginary of 
the sea, in the 19th century major technological developments altered the 
way in which the sea was represented, and in which it reflected new anxi-
eties about a changing world (Grant, 2013: 24-30). It was, though, only in 
the 20th century, with Lovecraft’s Kraken-inspired Cthulhoid creatures, 
that an emergent media culture began to be conceived as a Weird culture, 
a culture in which the human’s centrality and dominance over the nonhu-
man was increasingly thrust into a state of crisis.
Of course, the Lovecraftian Weird is itself paradoxical. On one hand, 
the writer’s unsettling narratives express an explicit desire to escape the 
mechanistic prison house of human space-time, while, on the other, this 
desire remains inseparable from ‘a loathing of the alien materialisms he 
conjures up in his fiction’ (Lockwood, 2012: 75). The sudden encoun-
ter with a cephalopodic monster offers an escape from meaning; it is, in 
Miéville’s terms, ‘unprecedented, unexpected, unexplained, unexplain-
able – it simply is’. Yet at the same time, this encounter threatens and 
overwhelms the stable aesthetic of the human. Such is the power of the 
humble octopus. Once identified by the pattern recognition procedures 
of human perception (having previously employed camouflage and 
mimicry to remain hidden in plain sight), the creature is recognized as a 
possible form. And yet this form is horrifying precisely because it trans-
gresses the solidity and specificity we normally associate with being: ‘The 
octopus is problematized ontology’ (Miéville, 2008: 109). It expresses the 
potentiality of a weird world, a ‘cosmic outsideness’, as Lovecraft put it, 
in which the outside is immanent to – within and beyond – the human 
(Lovecraft, 1933).
In the 20th century, problematized ontology is central to the early 
development of a weird culture. As Dean Lockwood suggests, it is marked 
by the departure of the octopus from the sea and its institution within the 
network. In his account, the evolution of a ‘networked, tentacular’ horror 
is inseparable from the evolution of media. Specifically, ‘the affective core’ 
of Lovecraft’s writing took shape in the immediate context of ‘the new 
wireless traffic in media messages’, namely early commercial broadcast-
ing (Lockwood, 2012: 80). The radio set, ensconced in the living room, 
is ‘invasive, tentacular and alien’, a whisper in the darkness (Lockwood, 
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2012: 81). The development of broadcast radio marks a shift from an oce-
anic model of media, one in which early wireless communication is con-
ceived as a vast sea of noise, a roiling flux in which it is possible to become 
lost, to a network model of media in which radio captures and controls 
a mass audience. Yet, in harnessing the transformative ‘waves of forces’ 
that create and destroy, in subjecting the forces of a Dionysian world, 
Nietzsche’s ‘monster of energy’, to control, there is something about our 
contemporary network culture that retains the vastness of the ocean. 
Today, our relations with media can unmoor old dualistic certainties and 
produce an encounter with the systems of feedback embedded within 
everyday life. In such encounters, human life – previously understood 
as a separate determining force – is revealed as part of an assemblage of 
forces, a supernatural composition of processes both human and nonhu-
man. It is this ‘weird media’, as Thacker (2014: 133) puts it, that ‘indicates 
a gulf or abyss between two ontological orders’, between the natural and 
the supernatural.
In part 2, I will begin to outline how a horrifying encounter with such 
an abyss might be formulated in the critical practice of countervisuality.
PART II
Once again, the secret world won… And once again, the bor-
der between the black and the white dissolved. Everything 
became gray. It was hard to tell where one world ended and 
the other began. (Paglen, 2010: 273)
Weird media
Trevor Paglen describes his practice of countervisuality in terms of 
adjusting attentional habits and perceptual tendencies. To identify 
weird glitches in the system of control, he emphasizes the need to remain 
attuned to its occlusions. ‘It’s difficult to figure out what goes on behind 
the restricted airspaces, the closed doors, the cover stories, and the offi-
cial denials of the Pentagon’s black world’ (Paglen, 2008: 4). This black 
world is one of closely guarded secrets, a covert world that, for the most 
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part, remains entirely hidden. From time to time, though, Paglen sug-
gests, ‘the black world peeks out into the “white” world, and those paying 
attention can get a fleeting glimpse’ (11). This is not, however, a process 
of enlightenment, or simply a consequence of having seized the right to 
look. Indeed, Paglen’s black and white worlds seem all too dualistic for 
the soupy miasma of mediation and its weird paradoxes.
Let us instead imagine a countervisuality more directly inspired by 
supernatural horror. For Thacker, horror is the mode of thought most 
suited to an increasingly unthinkable world. It seizes upon the paradoxi-
cal moments ‘in which thinking enigmatically confronts the horizon of its 
own possibility’ (Thacker, 2011: i). As he describes it, dominant modes 
of thought and perception presume the world to be a human world: for 
us, governed by us. Alongside this subjective, human-centric world, we 
also acknowledge an objective nonhuman world-in-itself that exists in 
an ‘already-given state’, that is, until the very moment that we perceive 
it and transform it into a world for us (Thacker, 2011: ii-iii). Arguably, 
these are the dominant terms by which visuality has been conceived up to 
now, that is, by focusing on the formation of a world picture, on a compre-
hensive representational object. For Thacker, though, horror confronts a 
third category beyond the subjective and objective world – a world with-
out the human (Thacker, 2014: 113). This is a hidden, occulted world 
that cannot co-exist with the human-centered world, a world that can 
only become perceptible ‘after’ the human. The horror in question, then, 
is one of negation – it does not express the emotional fear of a human in 
a human-centered world, but a horror produced in the confrontation of 
the very limits of the human. It is a communication with or mediation of 
something from beyond that, simultaneously, remains a communication 
breakdown, a failure to mediate anything more than a void. Its irruptive 
power is generated by the mediation of lacunae, blind spots. Its weird-
ness is an event, a perceptual encounter with something for which our 
habitual patterns of recognition cannot prepare us.
In Thacker’s terms, this weird space-time is a ‘magic site’, a place 
in which ‘the hiddenness of the world presents itself in its paradoxical 
way’ (Thacker, 2011: 82), which is to say that what is revealed is the 
site’s own hiddenness. In horror fiction the magic site is, on occasion, spe-
cifically constructed by humans as a device through which an occulted 
world might be accessed. It is, though, usually produced spontaneously or 
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accidently, without design. Moreover, it is not ‘black’. Rather, as Thacker 
describes, such sites manifest the occulted world as mists, fogs and slime. 
Magic sites are marked by their betweenness: by formless clouds both 
material and immaterial, by oozing states that inhabit both liquid and 
solid form, by grayness. If black and white worlds are separate worlds set 
in opposition, a gray world is one in which such categories are in open 
communication with one another. And yet, this does not mean that gray-
ness is simply a ratio of black and white. On the contrary, it is produced 
by the careful composition of a multiplicity of colors, a spectral prism, it is 
the color of the whole.
Ancient revelations
We now know about PRISM. We know about the collection of data from 
the servers of Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook and Apple. We know 
about Boundless Informant, the NSA’s tool for metadata analysis, for the 
real-time examination of data flows. In the UK, we also know about the 
government’s Tempora project, we know about ‘Mastering the Internet’ 
and ‘Global Telecoms Exploitation’, the project’s component parts. For 
Geert Lovink, such enlightenment is a rude awakening – the Snowden 
revelations bring to an end three decades of naïve media rhetoric and 
celebration. The revolutionary dreams of cyberculture, in which ‘media’ 
becomes synonymous with ‘future’, are exposed as a waking nightmare: 
‘The values of the internet generation have been dashed to pieces: decen-
tralization, peer-to-peer, rhizomes, networks. Everything you have ever 
clicked on can and will be used against you’ (Lovink, 2014). Affirmative 
Deleuzian-inspired discourses of acceleration – collective flights toward 
future trajectories – are exposed as the very energies, which feed the 
monster of control. Futures have been foreclosed. 
By contrast, for Wark, although the Snowden documents illustrate a 
current form and strategy of power, there is nothing radically new about 
these revelations. The dialectic of escape and capture has been integral 
to every era of communication – surveillance has always been part of 
telephonic networks, just as it was part of the networks of express mail 
that preceded them (Wark, 2014). Indeed, this would all seem to con-
firm current theories of visuality. Take, for example, the science-fictional 
images of the NSA’s Information Dominance Center (figure 20.4).Last 
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year, the journalist Glenn Greenwald published excerpts from the archi-
tect’s brochure of the Center based at Fort Belvoir in Virginia. The doc-
ument notes that designers were asked to model the space on the com-
mand bridge from Star Trek’s Enterprise. The space was fitted out with 
‘chrome panels, computer stations, a huge TV monitor on the forward 
wall, and doors that made a “whoosh” sound when they slid open and 
closed. Lawmakers and other important officials took turns sitting in a 
leather “captain’s chair” in the center of the room and watched as [NSA 
chief General Keith] Alexander, a lover of science-fiction movies, showed 
off his data tools on the big screen’ (Greenwald, 2013). The architect’s 
brochure goes on to state that ‘the prominently positioned chair provides 
the commanding officer an uninterrupted field of vision to a 22’-0” wide 
projection screen,’ while the primary function of the center ‘is to enable 
24-hour worldwide visualization, planning, and execution of coordinated 
information operations’.
Such power would seem directly aligned to the historical legacy of 
visuality, a term Mirzoeff (2011) traces to 19th century historian Thomas 
Carlyle. For Carlyle, visuality is an authoritarian perceptual activity, one 
that endows the heroic commander with a power both techno-scientific 
and mystical.1 In this account, visuality’s truth-giving authority worked 
precisely against the kind of grayness produced by excitable states of 
Figure 20.4. The NSA’s Information Dominance Center. Image by DBI 
Architects, original linked at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
sep/15/nsa-mind-keith-alexander-star-trek [no longer accessible].
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social flux and disequilibrium. Visuality was a force that shone ‘like a pole-
star through smoke-clouds, dust-clouds, and all manner of down-rushing 
and conflagration’ (Carlyle, 1841). It would, then, be easy to take images 
of the NSA’s Information Dominance Center as confirmation of the con-
tinuing operation of a visuality that functions to maintain transcendent 
order, that ensures future order remains bound to a certain truth and real-
ism, while the irrationalities of other, virtual potentials remain closed off. 
And yet, the danger of reducing all of visuality’s current manifestations to 
mere iterations of its historical form – wielded by a commander – is that it 
remains all-too-human in its conception.
Indeed, following the Snowden leaks, we now also know that the 
vast majority of data intercepted from fiber-optic cables is unexamined 
by humans.2 It is software that sieves metadata, that conducts complex 
pattern analysis, that searches for ‘triggers’ (MacAskill et al., 2014). 
Here, as Deleuze warned us (Deleuze, 1992: 5), the individual becomes 
the ‘dividual’, the network subject, depersonalized as packets of poten-
tial. Moreover, the gray infrastructure of distributed computing through 
which such power is exercised – wi-fi networks, apps, system protocols, 
passwords, verification procedures, traffic routers and switches, fire-
walls – is an assemblage of biological and technological actors, ‘a restless 
expanse of multihued contaminations, impurities, hybridity, monstrosity, 
contagion, interruption, hesitation, enmeshment, refraction, unexpected 
relations, and wonder’ (Cohen, 2013a: xxiv). There is, though, something 
neutral, something bland about this technological unconscious: this ‘gray 
media’. Its unspectacular operation, its ‘dull opacity of devices and tech-
niques’, mostly eludes our attention (Fuller and Goffey, 2012: 1). And 
yet, grayness is not flat or uniform – it is dynamic, it remains in continu-
ous transition. These states of disequilibrium are, as Mirzoeff insists, the 
strategic environment for visuality’s new cultural counterinsurgency, but 
the newness of this mode of power is not what concerns us here.
What makes revelations about PRISM so terrifying is, instead, the 
disclosure of something older, something more ancient. PRISM is an 
attempt to command and coordinate prismatic multiplicity, this spectrum 
of possible relations and agencies, human and nonhuman. It aims to man-
age escape and capture systematically, which is to say non-dialectically, 
extracting and generating difference from a single set of relations – rela-
tions from which no godlike perspective is possible. It therefore reveals to 
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us what we were already. It reveals the alien immanent to the human. It 
reveals our instability, our in-betweenness. It reveals that ‘we are media’ 
(Kember and Zylinska, 2012: 13).
In the third and final part of this essay series, I will reflect further on 
the vitality of this gray middleness and propose that practices of counter-
visuality must remain immanent to its weird processes.
PART III
Conflict with time seems to me the most potent and fruitful 
theme in all human expression. (H. P. Lovecraft: 1933)
Shades of gray
In the Deleuzian horror story, control operates on the basis of modula-
tion. It is a power both supple and subtle, adjusting from one moment 
to the next. Media theorists Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey take 
the idea of modulation seriously. For them, processes of mediation cre-
ate ‘a troubling opacity and thickness in the relations of which they are a 
part’. These are processes ‘with an active capacity of their own to shape 
or manipulate the things or people with which they come into contact’ 
(Fuller and Goffey, 2012: 5). The consequence is that mediation gener-
ates ‘opaque zones’, the compositional form of which Fuller and Goffey 
describe in terms of grayness.
Typically, grayness is conceived in anthropocentric terms, that is, as a 
depletion of life, as a running down of energy and vibrancy, as an absence 
of human vitality. A gray world is a post-disaster world, a world in which 
the human is all but snuffed out (Cohen, 2013b: 270). In the collective 
imaginary of the 21st century, gray is the color endured by surviving 
humans scratching out an existence in the aftermath of a secular apoca-
lypse. What remains missing from such imagery, though, is a certain gray 
vitalism. As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen argues, gray is a process rather than a 
color, and in this sense the liminality of the gray should not center on the 
human: ‘The gloaming is a place of life, but not necessarily of those sub-
lime forms we expect life to assume’ (Cohen, 2013b: 271-2).
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The grayness of mediation is vital; it is comprised of generative forces, 
of world-making processes, but human life is just one amongst many of 
these interrelated energies. A certain grayness characterizes the human’s 
ontological entanglement with its technical environment, whereby the 
apparently natural division between human and machine is dissolved. 
In the gray, technology can neither be defined as a tool for our use nor 
as something that uses us. More importantly, for the human, the world 
has always been gray – grayness has always been ‘an intrinsic condition 
of being-in, and becoming-with, the technological world’ (Kember and 
Zylinska, 2012: 1). The human has never been an autonomous agent, 
there is what Bernard Stiegler has called an ‘originary technicity’ to the 
human, always outside and beyond itself, open to the nonhuman.
The materiality of grayness, of gray relations, is continually variable, 
continually shifting: grayness thins and congeals, darkens and lifts. It is 
a rushing, an undulation, a noise. Noise is something that is impossible 
to get a distance on, something that infects you, that you cannot be rid 
of. Noise is that which cannot or will not be confined to the usual her-
meneutic categories. So it is that noise is ‘indelibly associated with hor-
ror’ (Hainge, 2013: 85). In the standard cybernetic model of mediation, 
noise is the unwanted corruption of a transparent connection between 
sender and receiver. In such a model, mediation is understood in terms of 
a device connecting two self-contained and previously separate points. It 
is only by occluding noise that ‘meaning’ can occur. But in the ancient fug 
of gray, noise is always present – it cannot be distinguished or separated 
out from ‘information’. Noise is medial, it expresses the relation between 
actual and virtual; noise is ‘the trace of the virtual out of which all expres-
sive forms come to be, the mark of an ontology which is necessarily rela-
tional’ (Hainge, 2013: 13-14). It is, then, the breakdown in conventional 
models that gives rise to the horror. With no clear senders or receivers, 
our existence in the world appears less hospitable, less validated by mean-
ing. We are left with nothing but an oceanic middle, a cosmic middle in 
which we suddenly find ourselves (Thacker, 2014: 87-90). For Lockwood 
(2012: 80), this constitutes a ‘media sublime’ – not as rapturous transcen-
dent sublime, but an immanent-transcendence, a sublime as the infective 
propagation of alien affect into the everyday.
In a society of control, the media sublime again serves to describe 
weird encounters, those fleeting moments when it is briefly possible to 
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perceive the powers of modulation in effect. As an ‘affective and percep-
tual condition’, as a low level buzz, an atmosphere, grayness constitutes 
‘a changeable but often unnoticed background – unnoticed until an 
environmental shift occurs’ (Fuller and Goffey, 2012: 12). Usually, gray 
media have little aesthetic charge, they calibrate human activity on a pre-
individual level, on a low boil, a simmer of not entirely burnt out produc-
ers and not entirely addicted users. Their unconscious background of 
routines and algorithms assuage perceptual and affective intensity just 
as they preserve a consistent liveliness (Fuller and Goffey, 2012: 14). 
But there are necessarily glitches in the continuity of this system – more 
forceful movements of power into the ontogenetic processes of life itself, 
movements that leave vague impressions on conscious perception. More 
importantly, it is possible to instigate such horror in ways that glitch con-
ventional belief in the world and confront the sensation that ‘the scratch-
ing from “outside” is already inside, infecting, running rampant, warping 
and deforming human life’ (Lockwood, 2012: 76).
Cosmic countervisuality
In his own response to the opaque powers of control, Deleuze famously 
called for ‘circuit-breakers’, for ‘vacuoles of noncommunication’ (Deleuze, 
1995: 133). Today, in the midst of an increasingly loquacious and per-
formative century, how are we to understand such a tactic? Are we to 
fall silent? On the contrary – as Wark (2014) cautions, ‘secret’ commu-
nication only serves to attract greater attention. Vigilant, surreptitious, 
or false behaviours, which impair algorithmic control, might allow some 
room to manoeuvre, but an escape to transcendent privacy remains a 
bourgeois fantasy. Silence is too moral, too human. Any countervisual-
ity must be immanent to the weird and noisy middle of mediation.3 This 
is to believe in our existence within what Deleuze (Deleuze, 1995: 133) 
called a ‘cramped space’, a bottleneck, though cramped need not indi-
cate something small – we might imagine the horror of being cosmically 
cramped. Indeed, this is, at least in part, the approach Trevor Paglen takes 
in another recent project.
In November 2012, the communications satellite EchoStar XVI 
launched from a base in Kazakhstan and joined the hundreds of other 
spacecraft now in geosynchronous orbit around the earth. In this narrowly 
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defined region of space, in which there is no atmospheric drag, the craft 
will continue to circle the earth for millions, even billions of years. It will 
remain stable, never falling back to earth. It is now part of ‘humankind’s 
longest-lasting material legacy’, ensuring that, long after all human life 
on the planet has winked out, it ‘will remain encircled by a thin ring of 
long-dead-spacecraft’ (Paglen, 2012: 6). In the years leading up to its 
launch, Paglen conceived the idea of attaching to the satellite an archival 
disc micro-etched with one hundred photographs. The work, titled The 
Last Pictures, is a collection of images that will outlast the species that 
produced them.
On one level, the work is a product of the Anthropocene, namely the 
present era in which human activity is understood to affect all life on 
the planet. This is made clear in the selection of images which, although 
occasionally weird (figures 20.5 and 20.6), generally attest to a political 
and environmental crisis. The first photograph shows the back of Paul 
Klee’s Angelus Novus, an image famously described by Walter Benjamin 
(1968: 257-58) as depicting the angel of history, who looks at the mount-
ing wreckage of the past as he is blown backwards into the future by the 
storm of progress. Paglen’s set of images compels us to adopt the angel’s 
view of recent history, comprised as it is by pictures of the Occupy move-
ment, a nuclear explosion, battery farming, a disappearing glacier, cloned 
livestock, drone warfare, and high frequency trading. But for Paglen, who 
is conscious of the project’s conceptual affinity with haute-Weird, the 
work is also ‘a future alien artifact’, made for a future in which humans 
are the ‘ancient aliens’ (Paglen, 2012: 7). Accordingly, the artifact con-
fronts that which Lovecraft (1933) described as ‘the most profoundly 
dramatic and grimly terrible thing in the universe’, namely, time. It desta-
bilizes anthropocentric time in favor of an ‘utterly foreign’ and ‘deeply 
unearthly’ time (Paglen, 2012: 6, 3).
It was, after all, only in the 20th century that human knowledge 
grasped with any certainty the ‘deep time’ of the Earth, encountering a 
new concept of planetary history that spans billions of years. The sheer 
scale of this temporality entirely shatters humanist narratives of progress, 
narratives in which man continuously develops and commands ever more 
sophisticated machines. Deep time is entirely alien to us, it exceeds our 
powers of imagination. It is in this sense that The Last Pictures invokes a 
cosmic perception, a terrifying view of the world after the human.
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Paglen’s work is not about control society but it does force us to think 
reflexively about our relations with nonhuman agents. Importantly 
though, the images – apparently selected to represent the challenges, 
complexities and crises of human existence on and with the planet – play 
a different role in this process. In spite of the lengthy deliberations, inter-
views, research and debate, which led to their inclusion, the individual 
images actually function most effectively as a series of negations, as fail-
ures. In other words, where the work necessarily fails in its curatorial 
attempt to ‘render the inaccessible accessible’, to capture an artifactual 
portrait of human life, it does reveal something else; in its cosmic sensibil-
ity it does begin to ‘make accessible the inaccessible – in its inaccessibil-
ity’ (Thacker, 2014: 96). The work not only evokes the limits of repre-
sentation but the limits of perceptual experience, the limits of expression. 
The work is a scream.
For Deleuze, the scream is a disharmony of the senses through which 
perception can be transformed (Deleuze, 2014: 15). It is a ‘spasm’, the 
body’s attempt to escape itself, to break from the frameworks of recogni-
tion that inhibit other perceptions, other visualities. The scream resolves 
Figure 20.5. ‘Lernaean Hydra, Albertus Seba’s Thesaurus’ (as featured in Trevor 
Paglen’s The Last Pictures). Image from Wikipedia Commons: http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Albertus_Seba_-_Hydra.jpg [accessed April 15, 2014].
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nothing, creates nothing, but it does express a perception of opacity in 
and of itself. In this we can begin to imagine how seizing upon the right 
to scream might produce an ethico-aesthetic sensibility to that which is 
beyond the human. We can begin to formulate new tactical possibilities 
for confronting a visuality that is not simply visual. For in the end, while 
the sublimity of the scream is born of fear over the demolition of the uni-
fied human subject, of a perception of connectedness as terrifying over-
connectedness, it also testifies to an excitable awe at radical relationality, 
to a sudden wonder at perceiving a multiple and collective subject. It wel-
comes, as much as it fears, becoming monstrous.
Original source and licence
Photomediations Machine, 30.06.2014, http://photomediationsmachine.
net/. © Rob Coley. Permission to republish granted.
Figure 20.6. ‘Dust Storm, Stratford, Texas’ (as featured in Trevor Paglen’s The Last Pictures). 
Image from US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 
http://www.photolib.noaa.gov/bigs/theb1365.jpg [accessed April 15, 2014].
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Notes
1  Similar assertions could be made of DARPA’s much discussed Total 
Information Awareness project, which came with its own Illuminati-inspired 
mystical insignia.
2  The story’s source states that, ‘The vast majority of data is discarded without 
being looked at… we simply don’t have the resources’.
3  It is in similar terms that Fuller and Goffey commend ‘gray immanence for 
gray media’ (2012: 13).
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Photomediations: A Reader offers a radically different way  
of understanding photography. The concept that unites the  
twenty scholarly and curatorial essays collected here cuts  
across the traditional classification of photography as suspended 
between art and social practice to capture the dynamism of the 
photographic medium today. It also explores photography’s 
kinship with other media - and with us, humans, as media.
The term ‘photomediations’ brings together the hybrid
ontology of ‘photomedia’ and the fluid dynamism of ‘mediation’.  
The framework of photomediations adopts a processual, 
and time-based, approach to images by tracing the technological, 
biological, cultural, social and political flows of data that produce 
photographic objects. 
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